This book tries in five chapters to shed light on the genesis and role of the institution of royal slaves (ghulams) in the first half of the 17th century. In chapter 1, an attempt is made to place Safavid royal slaves in the historical context of other similar experiences in Iran and the Middle East and to give a portrayal of the creation of that institution by Shah

Abbas I and his relationship with some of the leading slaves. In chapter 2, more information is offered on the development of the institute under Shah

Abbas I, and emphasis is put on the powerful triangle of eunuchs, concubines, and military slaves that came into being after Shah

Abbas I initiated the custom of incarcerating all male Safavid princes. In chapter 3, the role of Armenian merchants is discussed in providing capital to the cash-strapped Shah

Abbas I and their important role in the silk trade. It is argued that they were part of the royal household just like the slaves. In chapter 4, the patronage of some high slave officials is discussed in the construction of Isfahan. In the fifth and last chapter, the focus is on one slave, Qarachaqay Khan, as a patron of the arts, and as such he stands as a model for many of his colleagues.
There is no doubt that slaves played an important role in the Safavid state, but this book does not offer any new insights or information. That is a pity because its subject matter is of great interest. The four authors have basically condensed the information on slaves in their dissertations and/or earlier publications without adding new analysis or expanding the time period or meaningfully addressing facts and arguments that contradict their arguments. The bulk of the information deals almost exclusively with the period between 1580 and 1670 and is almost nonexistent for the preceding and following periods. The only thing that is “new” is that the slaves are looked at from four different vantage points in one book.
My main problem with the book is the lack of analysis of the genesis of the slaves per se and as a factor in Safavid political life as well as the lack of a clear definition of who were slaves and who were not. The authors suggest that Shah

Abbas I created the slave corps, but they themselves indicate that it all began much earlier. For example, they mention that in 1554 Shah Tahmasp I owned 40,000 slaves! Clearly,

Abbas I only formalized and further developed an existing system. Further, they do not assess in a meaningful analytical manner covering the entire Safavid period how large the influence of slaves was in terms of holding high office and what changes therein occurred over time—and in what way their socioeconomic and political behavior as a new elite and/or as individuals differed significantly from that of those who were not slaves.
There is no clear-cut identification of who was a slave. For example, the authors many times state that “gholamhood inculcated loyalty and obedience in the service of the shah.” Did that mean that this did not hold for the Qizilbash and other officials, or for that matter the population at large? That is hard to believe. This lack of an objective definition led the authors to identify groups or people as slaves when they were not. For example, neither Armenian merchants (who are the focus of an entire chapter) nor high-ranking officials such as Saru Taqi and Ganj

Ali Khan Zik were slaves; nevertheless, the authors present them as such. Half of chapter 4 is devoted to these two people, despite the fact that they were not royal slaves (Saru Taqi was a free Tajik, and Ganj

Ali was a free Kurdish Qizilbash). The same holds for the identification of the ishik aghasi-bashi, qurchi-bashi, tufangchi-bashi, and qushchiyan as slaves (p. 172, n. 11), of which only among the latter were there slaves. The other three most definitely were not, for they were free Qizilbash and Tajik officials. The Armenian mercantile elite of Jolfa (Isfahan) were not part of the royal household, and they were not slaves (p. 52). The very fact that the Shah had to issue an edict to protect them against government officials (p. 58) is further proof of that. Neither these merchants nor slaves “safeguarded and controlled the sale of silk in Iran,” and they did not increase silk production (p. 53). Later the authors stress that the Armenians were in the service of the shah and had ties with the ghulams, but then who did not at that time? As to the two art history chapters, they both are very informative on architectural and artistic issues but not so much about slaves. In fact, they ironically show that patronage of art was not limited to slaves and that it remains to be proven that they had a larger artistic impact than other sociopolitical groups in Safavid Iran. In short, the lack of a proper analytical framework, particularly a definition of who was a ghulam, and the many questionable generalizations confused rather than clarified the role of royal slaves in Safavid Iran.
