That John Rawls’s work has defined political theory in the twentieth century is impossible to deny. All aspects of political theory have been affected by his approach. This is true of feminist political theory as well. Although feminists have very different assessments of Rawls, the centrality of his work requires feminists to consider his approach.

Ruth Abbey’s introduction provides a well-rounded overview of the issues that feminists have emphasized in Rawls’s work. It also constitutes a rich bibliographic source for feminist work on Rawls. She focuses on a theme that is echoed in many of the articles in the volume: an analysis of the importance of Rawls’s contrast between political and comprehensive liberalism. This distinction is central to many of the feminist analyses of Rawls included here. In addition to this theme, feminists have stressed three other issues: justice in the family, care ethics, and children. The assessments are, on the whole, polarized between discussions of the potential of Rawls’s work and an emphasis on deep-seated deficiencies. The preponderance of articles focuses on the latter, rather than the former.

Anthony Laden’s essay is one of the few that sees potential in Rawls’s work for feminism. He argues that Rawls’s political liberalism is not blind to the oppression of women as so many feminists, and particularly Catherine MacKinnon, have claimed. Laden asserts that Rawls’s work provides the possibility of a profitable conversation about women’s status.

Lisa Schwartzman counters this argument by claiming that Rawls’s theory is too abstract to serve as a basis for feminist theory. Schwartzman, along with several other contributors, uses Okin’s analysis of Rawls as a touchstone for her approach. As perhaps the premier feminist analyst of Rawls’s work, Okin’s work overshadows much feminist work in the field. Schwartzman concludes that because Rawls fails to consider the power structures in society, his work is insufficient for feminist analysis.

Two of the essays, those by Elizabeth Burke and Janice Richardson, are concerned with the issues of self respect, self esteem, and self worth. Burke argues that Rawls does not thoroughly consider the issue, raised by these concepts, Richardson that he confuses the relationship among them. I do not think that in either case the argument is compelling. Although there are some minor differences among the concepts, most of us would place them in roughly the same category. Making much of Rawls’s failure to distinguish among them seems less than central to his work.

Clare Chambers, along with many of the authors, takes issue with Rawls’s work on the family. She argues against Okin who defends him by appealing to the whole structure of society rather than focusing on a single institution. Chambers argues that appealing to the justice of the whole structure does not save Rawls from his failure to consider justice in the family. Missing in Rawls is an adequate account of justice in the family, a central concern for feminists. Rawls's ambiguous remarks on the family are comprehensible only at the expense of his fundamental claim that there is something distinctive about the application of justice to the basic structure.

Perhaps the most intriguing essay in the volume is that by Nancy Hirschmann. She argues that we should consider disability from the perspective of freedom, not justice. By taking this position she reveals Rawls’s position on freedom as ablist and masculinist. She replaces this with a definition of disability as a social construction, an approach that profoundly alters our understanding of disability. Unless we can see disability as a product of social attitudes, as Rawls clearly cannot, we will not be able to discuss freedom for disabled persons.

Eileen Hunt Botting offers the second favorable commentary on Rawls in the volume. Focusing on international justice, she compares Rawls’s work with that of Martha Nussbaum. She argues that the result of the comparison can be a useful resource for feminism. Rawls’s The Law of Peoples (1999) is solidly grounded in social contract theory and takes his advocacy of political liberalism to another level. Rawls argues that we have an obligation to protect women in “burdened societies.” This echoes Nussbaum’s list of universal human rights. Botting insists that there are advantages and disadvantages to both perspectives but that Nussbaum’s approach is more comprehensive and useful. The fact that many feminists are very skeptical of Nussbaum’s universalism, however, weakens Botting’s argument. Many of us will come to the conclusion that neither approach is adequate.

Janice Richardson’s work falls prey to the same problem. Praising Jean Hampton’s criticism of Rawls raises the question of the worth of Hampton’s own work. Pateman, among others, has called her to task for taking a contractarian approach. We are thus left with two unacceptable alternatives.

In the final essay Amy Baehr goes against the grain of the other commentators and argues for adopting Rawls’s comprehensive doctrine rather than his political approach. She points out that feminism encompasses several comprehensive doctrines, but she nevertheless asserts that the accomplishment of feminist goals necessitates a comprehensive approach. Focusing on the concept of autonomy, she asserts that without a comprehensive approach this key feminist value would be lost. What is required, she concludes, is a comprehensive feminist doctrine with autonomy at its center.

It is undeniable that this volume is well-written, balanced, and intelligently argued. The essay by Hirschmann, in particular, constitutes a notable contribution to feminist critiques of Rawls. Considering disability as freedom throws new light on the problems with Rawls’s work from a feminist perspective. However, this cannot be said for the other essays in the volume. I do not think that this volume significantly advances our understanding of the relationship between Rawls and feminism.