S.'s introduction to this collection speaks of ‘the intractable nature of the problem’ (p. x); indeed, it proves tricky to formulate a singular problem about particulars. In this regard, it is helpful to begin with Harte's, ‘What's a Particular and What Makes it So? Some Thoughts, Mainly About Aristotle’, which delineates the parameters of our discourse about particulars by clarifying different distinctions, each of which informs aspects of the work in this volume. One casts the particular in contrast to the universal, while another makes particulars the point of focus as it grapples with individuation – the precise particularity of the particular.
Harte's is an exceedingly intricate treatment that puts (and retains) at the forefront a conceptual map of driving questions and key considerations, allowing for due focus on both the metaphysical (are substantial indivisibles particulars?) and the attributive (does Aristotle treat particularity in just one of two ways?). In exploring the Platonic and Aristotelian origins of the distinctions between types of particularity, she weaves into a historical analysis an appeal to the subtle philosophical grounds for reconsidering the assumptions framing standard approaches. Plato, it turns out, will not be a sure source for the particular–universal distinction, which does not align neatly with his account of the contrast between Forms and what Harte terms ‘the “other” to Forms’ (p. 101).
With the goal of establishing whether indivisibles in Aristotle's category of substance are particulars, she undertakes a systematic exploration of Aristotle's terms and projects across an array of passages, concluding a judicious treatment of differing interpretations with an answer in the affirmative, secured by Aristotle's appeal in the Categories to ‘indivisibility and numerical unity’ (p. 119). Returning to and reflecting on the scope of her guiding questions, Harte finds that Aristotle's conception of substantial indivisibles allows him to distinguish these particulars from universals, though not from one another. Ever alert to the multifaceted nature of the project, she notes the independence of the two concerns about particulars in Aristotle. This insight will certainly inform analyses of particularity more broadly.
Rashed refines the subject matter of his ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias on Particulars’ by articulating the challenging ‘double aspect’ under which a specific individual may be conceived: as that existing being it is, and as ‘its verbal formulation’ (p. 158). The second brings to mind Harte's characterisation of the individual as ‘a one-off’ (p. 98), which precludes its repeat occurrence. Rashed's formulation of his project is indicative of the elaborate investigation to come: in criticising Porphyry's attempt to capture the individual by a description of qualities, Dexippus alleges that the individual is so by virtue of its countability, not its unique nature, and thereby retains the logical possibility of ‘co-specific particulars’ (p. 160) that are nevertheless distinct individuals. This poses a problem for an Aristotelian model: why not a repeat of the same individual at another time? In Alexander's solution, Rashed argues, identity is dependent in part on (continuous) duration over time. Ultimately exploring reflections in Leibniz of Avicenna's conclusion that, ‘Every particular is intrinsically singular’ (p. 174), Rashed's expansive treatment establishes theses, discovers their origins and engages fruitfully in the work of linking objections to their targets while drawing out key implications of each dispute.
In Natali's ‘Particular Virtues in the Nicomachean Ethics’, we find an informative discussion of particularity, as it pertains to learning and practising virtue, guided by a concern for Aristotle's commentary on methodology in the NE. The particularity at issue as Natali presents Aristotle's reasoning towards the genus and species of virtue is that of the accounts of particular virtues, in light of a definition of excellence in general. Natali opts persuasively for the view that Aristotle's definition of moral excellence is an outline not because it is not precise, but because it is not particular, and moreover that this difference is key to Aristotle's conception of the role of practical reasoning.
On the ways in which the general account of virtue informs and is consistent with the specific accounts, Natali considers numerous interpretative disputes as he explores how Aristotle edges toward an increasingly practical formulation. Alexander of Aphrodisias formulated one key difficulty, Natali explains, by noting the tension between support for and against the idea that the particular virtues are parts of virtue: whereas ‘if one virtue is lacking, all disappear, and the genus itself is destroyed’ (p. 92), Aristotle's definition of virtue in general holds also of the particular virtues, which would not be the case for a whole and its parts. Natali's concluding remarks bring into focus the import of Aristotle's appeal to the critical (though limited) role of universal precepts in the determination and explanation of particular courses of action: ethical decision-making without universals is not more precise for being unanchored.
Wardy's ‘Moral Vision and Legislating for the Good in Aristotle’ is an unusually lengthy piece – indeed, a small volume in itself – that demonstrates a thorough engagement with the topic in its vastness. Animated in style and scope, Wardy's extensive conversation with the texts and their readers raises and tackles a remarkable number of critical questions, addressing the ontological status of particulars, the merits of ethical particularism, the possibility of successful rule-following, the consistency of Aristotle's ethics, and more.
A perusal of Wardy's signposts will convey the scale and some of the substance of the journey. On Plato's Statesman: ‘is it that the expert is one who does draw on [general] principles to get it right; but that exploiting one's helpful rules is a matter of seeing that this is a such-and-such; and seeing this as a such-and-such … uses rules, but cannot be reduced to following them?’ (p. 9). On universal rules in Aristotle: ‘what is it … that induces him to propound an ethics which, at the very least, downplays the role allotted to generalizations?’ (p. 25). On the phronimos: ‘is moral vision literally perceptual, or merely quasi-perceptual?’ (p. 45). On the Laws: ‘Why is Aristotle so studiously non-committal?’ (p. 63). On the Politics: ‘Who but the phronimos could handle either the vagaries of atypical contingencies or – crucially – the articulation of moral insight into general legislation?’ (p. 67).
In ‘Particulars, Selves and Individuals in Stoic Philosophy’, Gill considers the relevance of arguments invoking particularity to questions concerning the presence and role of the modern conception of the U–P distinction in Stoic ethics. This is an exceptionally clear, multi-layered approach that aligns interpretative tasks with theoretical ones, considering, for example, just what it might be about an individual existing in a specific situation that supports particularism in ethics.
In one interpretative task, Gill offers a finely-tuned response to the view that Chrysippus' therapy reflects particularism in its apparent willingness to tailor a treatment to the patient's existing, if faulty, beliefs. Philosophical points about the interplay between passion and belief bolster textual evidence in Gill's defence of the thesis that the U–P distinction has ‘little grip’ in Chrysippus' model (p. 136). Even in Cicero's text on Panaetius' theory, Gill finds, other distinctions dominate the view that an ethical life is informed by and reflects both common and particular human elements. One of these more prominent ideas concerns the integrated psyche; thus Gill prompts us to further, valuable reflection on the particular virtues by his finding that, in Stoic ethics, ‘possession of any one virtue means possessing the whole set, since they are unified or inter-entailing’ (p. 139).
Hobbs's illuminating response to Gill's paper isolates guiding concerns and offers a recent history of the tensions between universalist and particularist approaches in ethical theory. Hobbs brings into sharp focus the difficulty of capturing the distinction itself: taken too strongly, it would suggest a wholesale appeal either to universal principles or to particular solutions. Her point that both of these extremes are unreasonable is a helpful reflection on a difficult theme considered in other papers in the volume. On Gill's argument, Hobbs grants some points and offers another look at key details and passages that may suggest a larger role for particularism in Stoic thought than Gill recognises, noting moreover that the U–P distinction as it appears in ancient thought may not be precisely the one captured by our present terms.
The papers in this collection are rewarding for their complexity and comprehensive appeal to many and diverse texts, as they take varied approaches to multiple manifestations of the idea of the particular in ancient philosophical traditions and beyond.
