The contemporary world can be characterized as traditional and conservative, if we are viewing it superficially from the angle of religions and churches. Whether religions and churches are identified as major, mainstream, traditional or established, both religions and churches have been present for centuries. Religions and churches are deeply rooted in the sociological, political and national identities of nations and states. At the same time, religions and churches form an important aspect of international relations, whether international actors cooperate or (even more importantly) whether they are hostile. Human beings, curious and innovative as ever, tend to form new beliefs and try to organize new churches. The contemporary world acknowledges in general the possibility, the need and the right to establish a new religion and a new church that will allow such a new belief to be practised and expressed. The law is an important element for defining the position of religions and churches in communities and in states. This article will evaluate the legal issues involved in creating new churches, in terms of the most general principles and aspects of law that deal with these issues.
The moment in central European history when the issue of religions, churches and states reached a turning point, which remains important from the standpoint of modern states and the contemporary world, is the Peace of Westphalia (1648). Marking the end of the European wars of religion, it established inter alia the principle of territorial sovereignty and religious tolerance. Since then, legal thinking about religions and churches has been developed in terms of law concerning the legal status of religions and churches within a state and the right of individuals to choose their religion and church. This article is organized according to those two aspects of law, the choice of religion as a human right and the status of a church as subject matter for national law. The aspect of human rights falls under international public law, that is, international human rights. The article will therefore explore human rights as they are prescribed in major international legal acts. The legal status of a church within a state will be elaborated on by means of a case study of Serbian Constitutional Court jurisprudence combined with the criteria developed in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).
A case that emerged before the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Serbia, concerning the compliance of the Act on Churches and Religious Communities (2006) with the constitution of the Republic of Serbia, showed how deeply divergent understandings of issues concerning the law and the church could be. The issues elaborated were shown to be far more complex and theoretically challenging than expected, including the conjunction of the law on churches with fundamental principles, freedoms and human rights, as well as important aspects of state organization, such as the separation of state and church.
International law on religions and churches has developed several basic intertwined rights for individuals, states and churches: first, the right of an individual to profess and believe in religion by free choice; second, the right of an individual or group to establish a new religion, a new church or religious organization; third, the right of a state to prescribe conditions for founding a new religion, church or religious organization; fourth, the right of churches and religious organizations already existing to preserve their legal status at a time when laws and even states are changing; and fifth, the right of churches and religious organizations to organize their internal structure and laws (canon law).Footnote 1
The main legal principles governing these rights are those of equality and identity. The principle of equality, arising from human rights philosophy, has the primary role of allowing individuals equal freedom in choosing their belief and joining the church of their choice. This principle, when elaborated in terms of human rights, is often characterized negatively as the principle of non-discrimination. One of the most important, and oldest, grounds for discrimination was religion. It would be questionable, though, whether the human rights approach could be widened to other fields of law, and specifically to administrative law governing the conditions for registration of religions and churches. It would be even more questionable when it comes to canon law, which has been developed by some churches over hundreds of years. Another aspect of the equality principle is whether churches are equal among themselves, thus presenting individuals with a choice of religions of equal status.
The principle of identity governs whether each and every newly registered church should be considered as a completely new religion, with consequences for its status, even if it is an outgrowth of a traditional church and based on familiar forms of religious thinking. It is doubtful whether the factor of identity influences equality; that is, whether churches can be truly equal if they are considered in terms of ‘new as opposed to traditional’ and whether if treated differently they can establish their position within a state organization on the same principles and be equal before the law.
The normative frameworks for considering the relevant rights and principles, the activities and contribution of international organizations and the body of court jurisprudence are impressive. For the purpose of this article, their presentation must be simplified and reduced, and the presentation here will focus on the particular case of Serbia. The conclusion will assess the consistency of the law, whether individuals are equally protected to believe according to their choice, whether they can organize churches that are equal and whether a state influences the human right to religion by differentiating between churches in their status and identity. In the final analysis, if there is an issue of identity, can there be equality? Who has the final word in judging whether a religion is new: the existing churches or the state?
Human Rights
The human rights approach, as it relates to the main topic of this article, concerns the freedom of religion, the freedom of association and the principle of non-discrimination, that is, the principle of equality.Footnote 2 On the level of general international laws, as a beginning, it might be useful to remember that the Covenant of the League of Nations did not include a provision concerning religious liberties; rather, freedom of religion was directly stipulated in bilateral treaties on the rights of minorities.Footnote 3 Later on, religious rights emerged as individual human rights, as part of the freedom of conscience.Footnote 4
On the other hand, the principle of non-discrimination, that is, the principle of equality, was based from the very beginning on religious grounds. Through the equality / non-discrimination principle, the protection of religious groups was included in the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948) and important universal conventions such as the International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948),Footnote 5 the International Convention on Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965)Footnote 6 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966). Freedom of religion and freedom of association were prescribed in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights,Footnote 7 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,Footnote 8 and the European Convention on Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950).Footnote 9
Even after all these major measures, legislative activity did not stop. At the level of the United Nations, for example, in 1981 the UN Declaration on Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination based on Religion or Belief was adopted. In 2000 the position of UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion was established.Footnote 10 The Council of Europe also engaged in legal activity regarding freedom of religion. For example, the Venice Commission adopted the Guidelines for Legislative Reviews of Laws affecting Religion or Belief in 2004, revised in 2014, offering its preferred understanding of substantive issues such as religion, belief and the inter-relation of different human rights, and defining the values underlying freedom of religion, and religion and education.Footnote 11 In addition, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) adopted several documents and commitments concerning freedom of religion, from the Helsinki Final Act (1975), Principle VII, through the Madrid Principles (1983) and the Vienna Principles (1989),Footnote 12 to the Córdoba Declaration (2005), which promoted inter-faith and inter-cultural dialogue.Footnote 13 In 2014, the Council of Europe and the OSCE also adopted Joint Guidelines on the Legal Personality of Religious or Belief Communities, intended primarily to ‘assist all religious and belief communities in obtaining the status they seek to ensure that everyone can enjoy their freedom of religion or belief fully and with the dignity they deserve as members of the human family’.Footnote 14
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the cornerstone of international human rights, provides the main elements of the freedom of religion. Article 18 affirms that every individual has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change religion or belief and also freedom to manifest, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, a religion or belief through teaching, practice, worship and observance.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) defines freedom of religion or belief along the lines already recognized in the Universal Declaration, but also imposes limitations on that freedom. It is important to underline that as much as we consider the freedom of religion to be a fundamental right, nevertheless, it is not an absolute right, and as such it is subjected to some limitations. The covenant recognizes limitations in several categories: limitations should be prescribed by law and be necessary to protect public safety, order, health, morals or other fundamental rights and freedoms. Each state can define what is necessary for it, and what measures are to be taken to protect order, morals and safety.
The right to freedom of religion clearly upholds the manifestation of beliefs in a community with others, thus upholding the ratio of freedom of association. Nevertheless, religious organizations can also be protected by freedom of association, as prescribed in Article 22 of the covenant. In general, freedom of association is defined in the same fashion as freedom of religion: the general right to the freedom of everyone to associate with others is established, followed by a list of possible limitations and restrictions that must be prescribed by law, necessary in a democratic society, in the interest of national security, public safety, public order, public health, morals or protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Freedom of association prescribes the general rule, while expression of belief in community with others represents a specific aspect of the very notion of religion or belief.
In providing full and overall protection for everyone to enjoy their beliefs, the principle of non-discrimination forms an important part of the picture. A state is obliged not only to allow freedom of religion and association, but also ‘to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status’ (Article 2 §1; emphasis mine). This article, along with others developing the principle of non-discrimination, has been further developed by general comments adopted by the Human Rights Committee,Footnote 15 as well as by later UN declarations such as that on the Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination based on Religion or Belief.Footnote 16
Apart from these provisions of international law, the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) is of interest.Footnote 17 Article 9 reiterates the same rights to freedom of religion as those already elaborated: first, the right for everyone to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; second, freedom to change religion or belief; third, freedom to manifest religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance, either alone or in community with others and in public or private; and fourth, freedom to manifest religion or beliefs can be limited as prescribed by law and when necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. The difference lies in the specific terms used. One which is immediately apparent is the formulation ‘necessary in democratic society’, rather than merely ‘necessary’ in general. The convention is founded on democratic values; thus human rights can be limited only by restrictions that are germane to democratic values. As with Article 18 of the ICCPR, Article 9 recognizes that the limitations apply only to the manifestation of religion. The ‘right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion’ guaranteed by paragraph 1 is absolute, to the extent that it does not enter the realm of manifestation. This distinction has numerous practical implications. The ECHR also contains an article on the freedom of association similar to those already discussed. It stipulates firstly freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of personal interests, and secondly that restrictions can be imposed when prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Together with the freedom of religion and the principle of non-discrimination, this provision for freedom of association forms an important aspect of the reasoning of the ECtHR that will be elaborated further in what follows.
Serbian Constitutional Court Jurisprudence on the Legal Status of Churches
We turn now to the Act on Churches and Religious Communities adopted in Serbia in 2006. As mentioned in the introduction, this provoked some controversy regarding the understanding both of the act in general and of specific parts, which led finally to a process of determining its compliance with the Serbian Constitution.Footnote 18 I shall focus here on the main points of that case from the aspect of human rights and the associated principles.
The Serbian Constitution maintains ‘freedom of thought, conscience, beliefs and religion’ and also ‘the right to stand by one's belief or religion or change them by choice’. Everyone has the right to manifest religion or belief, and no person should be forced to declare his or her religion or belief. The rights to manifestation of religion or belief are based on standards laid down by international law: the manifestation of religion in worship, observance, practice and teaching, individually or in community with others. Restrictions can be set by national law and ‘if necessary in a democratic society to protect the lives and health of people, the morals of democratic society, freedoms and rights guaranteed by the Constitution, public safety and order, or to prevent inciting of religious, national, and racial hatred’.Footnote 19
The act defines freedom of religion in the same manner, including the freedom to have or not to have a religion, to retain or to change one's religion; that is, it establishes the freedom of belief, freedom to profess faith in God; freedom to manifest belief or religious conviction either individually or in community with others, in public or in private, by participating in religious services and performing religious ceremonies, through religious teaching and instruction, and cherishing and developing religious tradition; and freedom to develop and nurture religious education and culture (Article 1).Footnote 20 Limitations on freedom of religion may exist only to the extent that such limitations are prescribed by the constitution, the law and ratified international treaties, and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interest of the protection of public safety, public order, morals and the protection of the freedoms and rights of others (Article 3).
The Serbian Constitution defines that churches and religious communities are separate from the state, equal, and free to organize their internal structure and religious matters, to perform religious rites in public and to establish and manage religious schools and social and charitable institutions, in accordance with the law. The Constitutional Court may ban a religious community only if its ‘activities infringe on the right to life, the right to mental and physical health, the rights of a child, or the right to personal and family integrity, public safety and order, or if it incites religious, national or racial intolerance’ (Article 44).
The Act on Churches and Religious Communities declared freedom of association and assembly (Article 5) as citizens’ freedom of association and assembly with the aim of manifesting religious convictions. Restrictions can be defined by the constitution and by law. Churches and religious communities are declared to be autonomous and independent from the state; they are free to determine their religious identities and to arrange and follow their order and structure (Article 6).
These articles are defined according to the highest standards of international law and they do not provoke any debate about compliance with international human rights instruments.Footnote 21 The provision that was the starting point for opposing understandings and interpretations of the whole set of norms is the one that defines holders of religious freedom as defined in the Act on Churches and Religious Communities (Article 4): ‘Holders of religious freedom according to this Act are traditional churches and religious communities, confessional communities and other religious organisations (hereinafter: Churches and religious communities).’
Two constitutionally challenging elements were identified in this definition, relating to the aspects of freedom of religion, freedom of association, the principle of non-discrimination and the position of a church in a state. The first was apparent in the definition of churches, religious communities, confessional communities and religious organizations. The second relates to the norms governing legal personality and the registration process that should be fulfilled in order to obtain legal personality.
The definition of ‘traditional churches and religious communities’ is based on their historic continuity within Serbia for centuries (Article 10). The status of ‘traditional church’ is held by the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church, the Slovak Evangelical Church, the Christian Reformed Church and the Evangelical Christian Church. The traditional religious communities are the Islamic Religious Community and the Jewish Religious Community. All have their status as legal personalities guaranteed. The legal personality of these churches and religious communities is grounded in the law of the earlier Principality of Serbia, dating back to the nineteenth century, and the law of the Kingdom of Serbia and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia from the end of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century.Footnote 22 All these churches and religious communities hold their legal status on the basis of legal continuity.
In contrast, confessional communities are defined as ‘all those churches and religious communities whose legal position was regulated on the grounds of notification’ as it was regulated in the laws adopted during the period of socialist Yugoslavia.Footnote 23 The different legal starting position for these groups provided grounds for severe criticism during the debate of the Act on Churches and Religious Communities prior to its adoption by the parliament. The case was eventually heard before the Constitutional Court. These provisions were held to be unconstitutional on the basis of the principles of freedom of religion and freedom of association, and particularly because they were seen as breaching the non-discrimination principle. In addition, the act was seen as challenging the constitutional provision for the equality of churches and religious communities: the entities were not treated equally, they were accorded a different legal status, and they were subjected to a different registration process. Thus followers and believers in confessional communities had a different legal status, resulting in non-equality between different religions.
These criticisms encountered several challenges. First of all, churches, religious organizations and confessional communities are not identical, but they are equal. This stance was based on the understanding that in reality it is a historical fact that different churches and religious organizations have existed for quite different lengths of time, that they differ greatly in size, and that their structure and organization varies significantly when we look at their clergy, clerical education and promotion, budgeting and finance, and (probably the most visible) influence in society.
The Constitutional Court therefore did not find the provision on churches, religious organizations and confessional communities to be opposed to the non-discrimination principle, freedom of religion or equality of churches and religious communities as defined in the constitution. The court's reasoning can be summarized as being that not every difference is discrimination, and that difference in definition and style does not necessarily mean a different legal status before the law.Footnote 24 In addition, it found that legal status does not depend on designation as traditional or non-traditional, and that the autonomy, possession of assets, financing, and educational and cultural work of all these churches and religious communities, as well as their worship and the rights and responsibilities of their clergy, were all governed by the same corpus of norms and in the same way for all bodies. Moreover, in respect to freedom of religion, the Constitutional Court found that the wording ‘traditional church’ does not advance freedom of religion in respect to those churches and religious communities defined in this way, and that the lack of the designation ‘traditional’ does not diminish the freedom to believe as one chooses. The prevailing understanding of the phrase ‘traditional church’ was that it is accurate in that it expresses the simple historical fact that some churches are older, and in that sense ‘traditional’, and recognizes that some of them have existed for centuries, that they have been a unifying factor for the nation, that they form part of national identity and that they are older than the state.
Another issue in the procedure before the Constitutional Court concerned the question of differentiation between churches, religious organizations and religious communities through the registration procedure. Traditional churches and religious communities (seven of them, as listed in the act) are subject only to the notification process. Other religious organizations are obliged to submit an application and to undergo an approval procedure. Thus traditional churches and religious communities are required to provide the name of the church or religious community; the address of the headquarters of the church or religious community; and the full name and capacity of the person authorized to represent and act on behalf of the church or religious community. Applications for registering a new church are required to include the resolution by which the religious organization has been established, with full names, identification document numbers and signatures of founders representing at least 0.001 per cent of adult citizens of the Republic of Serbia; a statute or another document of the religious organization containing a description of its organizational structure, its form of governance, the rights and obligations of members and the procedure for establishing and terminating an organizational unit; a list of organizational units with the capacity of a legal person; any other relevant data concerning the religious organization; a presentation of the key elements of the organization's religious teaching, ceremonies, goals and main activities; and data on its permanent sources of income.
This registration procedure has provoked numerous comments and strong criticism. The first issue that arises from this provision lies more on the level of principle, that is, the principle of the relationship between the church and the state. If the state is to approve or forbid registration, can we conclude that the state is superior to the church? Secondly, a dilemma was expressed concerning the requirement to provide the names, identification numbers and signatures of members: did this conflict with the rules on privacy or the rule that no one should be forced to express their belief? As for the number of signatures, required to exceed 0.001 per cent of adult citizens, what exact number did this represent and who was authorized to decide that number? Why did the act not define an exact number, especially given that the rule for the registration of association requires just three founders?Footnote 25
The Constitutional Court, however, ruled that this norm did not breach the prohibition of discrimination or contravene the principle of freedom of religion or the position of churches within the state. It stated that freedom of association is related to the Act on Associations, and that freedom of religion is given expression through the Act on Churches and Religious Communities. The understanding of the Constitutional Court was that there is no discrimination between traditional and non-traditional churches in the registration procedure, but that there is an acceptable difference governed by law. Support was also sought in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, which in general recognizes differences as acceptable. The test was governed by several ECtHR standards, namely, whether the differences in the registration procedure had a legal aim, and whether the request was proportional to the defined legal aim. The justification for a different registration procedure and legal aim was found in the right to freedom of religion, or more specifically in the limitation of that right, in the provision of restrictions such as were necessary in democratic society, for the purposes of order, health, morals and security.
Yet another constitutional compliance issue emerged from the article governing the decision as to the eligibility of a religious organization to be included in the register of the Act on Churches and Religious Communities. The Ministry of Justice is able to reject the application of a religious organization to be included in the register if it finds that the aims, teaching, ceremonies or activities of the organization are contrary to the constitution and public order or if they endanger the life, health, freedom or rights of others, the rights of children, the right to personal and family integrity or the right to property. An especially interesting part of this provision is the requirement set for the ministry to take into account ECtHR decisions, as well as administrative or judicial decisions regarding the registration or activities of pertinent religious organizations in one or more member states of the European Union, when deciding on the application. The ministry is given a task that could be described as quasi-judicial. Deciding on the application in terms of the usual conditions (threat to public order, life, health and so on) is challenging enough. The obligation to take into account ECtHR decisions is a task only for a competent judicial institution, while European Union law is not the part of the Serbian legal regime. An explanation for the legal construction could be found only in the attempt of the legislative body to create a modern law that would guarantee deliberation according to the highest standards, an attempt which did not take into account the inappropriateness of such norms.
European Court of Human Rights Jurisprudence on Criteria for the Legal Status of Churches
At this point, it is useful to turn to the main criteria developed in ECtHR jurisprudence considering the status of churches. In very general terms, the governing principle for the ECtHR is pluralism of religion as ‘inseparable from a democratic society, and an overall dependence of democracy on various kinds of differences and diversities’.Footnote 26 Over several decades, the ECtHR, while interpreting the scope of the article governing the freedom of religion, which protects both religious and non-religious opinions and convictions, studied churches and enumerated ‘major’ or ‘ancient’ churches,Footnote 27 new or relatively new religions,Footnote 28 and various philosophical convictions.Footnote 29
The ECtHR has acknowledged that European states recognize three models of relations between states and religious communities and each of them is found to be compatible with the ECHR.Footnote 30 A state church, with a special constitutional status, is accepted in the same manner as a constitution which completely separates state and religious organizations, or the third model which is based on concordat-type relations. The ECtHR has adopted the stance that, in a situation where several religions coexist within the same national population, it may be necessary to place restrictions on freedom of religion in order to reconcile the interests of various groups and ensure that everyone's beliefs are respected.Footnote 31 In that case a state must include specific safeguards for individual freedom of religion. In particular, no one may be forced to enter, or be prohibited from leaving, a state church.Footnote 32
Another important standard developed in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR is that mere tolerance by national authorities of the activities of a non-recognized religious organization is not a substitute for recognition, if recognition alone is capable of conferring rights on those concerned.Footnote 33 The ECtHR clarified this standard by adding that even where legislation expressly authorizes the operation of unregistered religious groups, that is insufficient if domestic law reserves exclusively for registered organizations with legal personality a whole series of rights essential for conducting religious activities.Footnote 34
Regarding the recognition and registration of religious communities, the ECtHR recognizes the right of a state to verify and register a new religious organization, and to ensure that that entity is not engaged in activities for ostensibly religious purposes which are harmful to the population or endanger public security. In particular, refusal to register a religious organization may be justified by the need to establish whether it presents any danger to a democratic society or to the fundamental interests recognized by Article 9 of the ECHR.Footnote 35
The Identity of a Church as an Element of Equality
Equality among ecclesiastical societies may be challenged by the question of identity. For example, Article 19 of the Serbian Act on Churches and Religious Communities prescribes that a name or part thereof denoting the identity of the church or religious community already listed in the register cannot be registered again.
In the organizational structure of Orthodox churches, it is very important to determine exactly who is the holder of the name and thus of the legal personality. Unlike the Roman Catholic Church, which is a single entity, Orthodox churches are separate and organized in a manner which is rooted in their centuries-long history and internal relations.Footnote 36 In the list of churches and religious communities in the Serbian Register, the provision of Article 19 means that the Serbian Orthodox Church is listed but that other entities including the word ‘Orthodox’ in their names are not found.Footnote 37 The Serbian Orthodox Church is the only Orthodox church in Serbia, and is defined as a traditional church in Article 10 of the Act on Churches and Religious Communities, reflecting eight centuries of autocephaly.
Questions of identity are beyond the law of the state, but for some churches they are still very present. This can be illustrated by considering Eastern Europe and questions of the relationship between identity and equality amongst the Orthodox churches. The Serbian Orthodox Church marked eight centuries as an autocephalous body in 2019; throughout that time it was the church for all Orthodox Christian believers in the territory of (what is now) ex-Yugoslavia. Since the break-up of Yugoslavia, nations with a majority of Orthodox Christian believers have tended to establish national Orthodox churches, some of which are struggling for autocephaly, as in Macedonia and Montenegro. These efforts have resulted in several legal cases, including one in Serbia and another before the ECtHR.
In Serbia the process was led by the Montenegrin Orthodox Church (MOC), which has never had autocephalous status. In 2007 the Association of Montenegrins in Serbia ‘Krstas’, requested the Serbian Ministry to register the MOC as a religious entity, that is, as a church. This application was rejected.Footnote 38 The legal process afterwards went through the complete appeal procedure before the courts.Footnote 39 One of the key aspects was the name – and thus the identity – of the church. Since Article 19 of the Serbian Act on Churches and Religious Communities unequivocally forbids the inclusion of more than one church with the same name in the register of churches, the outcome of this legal battle was more than predictable. If we look at the legal issue in terms of the formal name, it appears straightforward. However, beyond the provisions of national legislation lies a more fundamental issue: can a non-autocephalous church, which is not recognized by other Orthodox churches, be recognized and registered by state authorities?
Another process involved the Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese, renamed the Greek Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese of Pecka Patrijarsija. This has been in a legal battle with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRoM) for almost two decades, and the case is at present before the ECtHR.Footnote 40 This process considers the legal status and identity of the archdiocese arising from canon law and national law.Footnote 41 The legal situation in this case is opposite to the previous one, since the Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese has evolved from the original Ohrid Archdiocese established in 1018. After several transformations in its status during a period of nearly a millennium, it was finally defined as an autonomous archdiocese within the religious jurisdiction of the Serbian Orthodox Church and recognized as such by other Orthodox churches in 2005. Its legal status was challenged by the refusal of the legal authorities of the FYRoM to register it as a church, a decision which was rooted in the nation's law.Footnote 42 The Macedonian authorities maintained that the Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese should be considered a part of the Macedonian Orthodox Church (MaOC), the main purpose of this being the benefit which the transfer of its autonomy would bring to the new MaOC.Footnote 43 The reaction by the Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese was to amend its name to the Greek Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese of the Pec Patriarchy [sic].Footnote 44 This was intended to make more obvious its nature and identity. At the same time, it left the MaOC with no ecclesiastical identity, since that church had never acquired autocephaly. However, an entity under that name does now exist in the eyes of the state, since it was recognized in the 1991 Macedonian Constitution (Article 19). In contrast, the archdiocese has instituted registration proceedings under both its names, and both applications have been rejected. The main arguments were that such an entity is ineligible since it is in canonical union with a foreign church, and that the name cannot be used if already registered. The ECtHR found breaches of freedom of religion (ECHR Article 9) and freedom of association (ECHR Article 11) in the refusal to register applicant associations as religious organizations.Footnote 45 According to the ECtHR judgment, Macedonia was therefore obliged to allow registration of the archdiocese. This Macedonian example is opposite to the Montenegrin, but with the same question: can a non-autocephalous church, that is, a church which is not recognized by other Orthodox churches, be recognized and registered by state authorities? Is it a church or an association?
In the Montenegrin example a canonically non-recognized church was denied its canonical and legal status. In the Macedonian example, a canonically recognized church was denied registration by the state institutions, while a constitutionally established church, even though not recognized canonically, has become the leading church in the state.
The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion encompasses the obligation of the state to stay neutral when it comes to legal status of churches, especially those with a long history and complicated inner relations.Footnote 46 The ratio of such a registration is not in governing the emergence of churches, but rather in ensuring that new religious organizations are not harmful to society in terms of endangering public security, order, health, morals, rights and freedoms of others. Thus registration by state authorities cannot be a substitute for recognition according to canon law. An entity not recognized according to canon law may establish its legal personality on the legal ground of the right to freedom of association, but it is treated as an association, not a church.
From these examples, we may conclude that the identities of already existing religions and churches are complicated and multifaceted, grounded in both canon and state law and with the potential to endanger the absolute scope of the principle of equality. The identity of a church is substantially challenged if a state takes over the power of determining that identity, and so is the equality of believers. New religions and churches pose less complicated issues of identity and thus of equality, for they have no rivalry, no complicated history and are generally not politically motivated.
Both cases show that the question of ecclesial identity strongly affects the legal status of a religious organization, and thus the equality of churches and their believers. In legal terms, the question of identity is defined primarily in terms of canon law, whilst the question of equality is a matter of state law. These two cases show that even when states prescribe equality as the governing principle of the legal status of churches and develop this in legal acts, these external provisions must also be accompanied by provisions in canon law.
Conclusion
At the end of this short study, we may conclude that all the rights mentioned are consistent with one another in general, but that the law has its limitations. Freedoms of religion and association as human rights are prescribed and protected, not as absolute rights, but rather as limited ones. Believers should find their faith in religions and churches that are in compliance with both state law and canon law. Freedom of religion does not in essence support the emergence of new beliefs, and its intent is not the negation of traditional or major religions. States hold the right to prescribe the administrative procedure for the registration of churches, while protecting the freedom of individuals to express themselves through a new religion or church. States hold the right even to opt for a state church, as long as they safeguard the legal status of other churches and the freedom for individuals to choose their church and belief.
The law can address these relations relatively easily, so long as there are no major exceptions. However, the emergence of a new religion or a new church as a local manifestation of an old one can show the limitations of the law and the collision of rights and freedoms. For completely new religions and churches, the state is free to exercise its right to allow it or not, according to the law. A major problem is likely to arise in situations when there is a misunderstanding about whether a religion or a church is theologically new or not. The identity of a church is of utter importance for its legal status, leading to the potential inequality of churches. The inequality of churches leads to a breach of freedom of religion.
Identity as defined by religious thinking and churches, on the other hand, lies beyond the scope of state law. The major religions and churches are far older and more stable than states. Throughout the centuries, states and borders have changed, but religions and churches have been stable, gathering believers and often functioning as pillars of national identity. Law, rules and prescribed legal acts cannot delete centuries of religious tradition but instead must find a balance with it. Only when human rights, administrative law and canon law are in balance can the major governing principles, namely equality and identity, be applied.
