SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY AND LDS MOBILIZATION

Mancur Olson (Reference Olson1965) argues that success in influencing public policy required that groups combat the tendency for members to shirk tasks promoting group interests (i.e., overcome the free-rider problem). The most successful groups minimize individual shirking by mixing sanctions and individualized benefits for members. Olson also notes that small cohesive organizations maintaining strong boundaries on membership have the best chance for success when seeking narrow policies economically benefiting group members. When group membership increases and boundaries separating members and non-members weaken, economic benefits for each member become diluted, and the risk of individual shirking increases due to increasing difficulties in monitoring and sanctioning noncompliance.

While Olson mentions that non-economic organizations do not fit his theory as well, he explains, in a footnote, that, “A religion that promised some ultimate benefit, such as a favorable reincarnation, to individuals who were faithful followers, and some punishment to persons who did not uphold the religious institution, would be consistent with the theory offered here” (Olson Reference Olson1965, 160). Where expected benefits are infinite, a group may overcome the free-rider problem since even a small slice of an infinite benefit is likely to exceed the member's cost of organizational service. Olson also notes that psychic benefits to individuals (e.g., increased feelings of self worth, social solidarity, etc.) may reduce shirking by members of non-economic groups. The same might be said of psychic and solidary sanctions related to failing to fulfill one's spiritual duty as defined by a shared faith culture. As Wald, Silverman and Fridy (Reference Wald, Silverman and Fridy2005, 132) observe:

In fighting ERA ratification, the Church mobilized members by convincing them that the amendment posed a threat to the faith's foundation of male leadership and traditional family structure. The importance of these factors to the LDS laity cannot be overstated. Mormons are distinct from other American religious groups in their family-related attitudes and behaviors. Around the time of ERA's defeat, over 97 percent of Mormons over the age of 30 had married, a significantly higher percentage than Protestants, Jews, Catholics, and those with no religious affiliations. Mormons' divorce rate was relatively low, and they remarried at a higher rate than did adherents of other religions. A majority of LDS families had three or more children; 20 percent had more than five. Most LDS respondents reported their ideal number of children as four or more (Heaton and Goodman Reference Heaton and Goodman1985). These patterns persist. Today, compared to other religious groups and religiously unaffiliated persons in the United States, Mormons are still characterized by high rates of marriage and large families (Pew Forum 2007b). The Mormon faith is also distinctive in the theological importance placed upon gender differentiation in the context of eternity; for Mormons, “[g]ender is an essential characteristic of individual premortal, mortal, and eternal identity and purpose” (The Family 1995). Only men may fulfill church leadership roles, serve in the priesthood, and perform religious rituals such as baptism and blessings (Cornwall Reference Cornwall, Cornwall, Heaton and Young1994, 240). Female Mormons are charged with promoting stability in the family and raising children in the faith (Beaman Reference Beaman2001). The ERA, especially in light of Roe v. Wade, was seen as undermining key tenets of the faith by challenging traditional gender and family roles.

When facing challenges to boundary maintenance between the faithful and the outside world, groups can choose either to withdraw into private action or venture politically into the public sphere (Hunter Reference Hunter1984; Reference Hunter1987). Smith (Reference Smith1998) notes that evangelicals have thrived by managing the tensions between the outside world and their faith, thus turning the challenges of modernity into engines of solidarity among adherents. Fundamentalists, according to Smith, generally choose to withdraw from the social fray while mainline and liberal sects choose to adapt to the surrounding culture. Mormon history exemplifies circumstances that would create strong boundaries between LDS followers and others. Events in their shared past — the martyrdom of church founder Joseph Smith, violence against early Mormons, the trek into the Utah wilderness to build their version of Zion — continue to make Mormons very aware of their separate cultural identity. Still, at times, the Church has adapted even its tenets of faith — most notably plural marriage — under duress from external forces. In reacting to the changing role of women in American society, the Mormons have generally struck a productive balance between accommodation and resistance (Iannaccone and Miles Reference Iannaccone, Miles and Cornwall1994). But on the issue of the ERA (and later, on the issue of same-sex marriage), the Mormons clearly chose political resistance over accommodation. Why? Theories on decision-making under conditions of uncertainty provide a clue. When analyzing a substantial change such as amending the nation's fundamental law, people will tend to weight potential losses more strongly than potential gains (Kahneman and Tversky Reference Kahneman and Tversky1984), and those who concede give a far greater value to the concession (viewed as their group's loss) than do those who receive the concession (Kahneman and Tversky Reference Kahneman and Tversky2000). Theologically, the LDS Church had reason to perceive a large looming loss in the political and legal developments of the 1970s because, as Davies (Reference Davies2000) noted, the Mormon concept of salvation differs in some key respects from salvation as envisioned by other Christian denominations. As noted before, Mormons believe in the eternal nature of gender and the family, so earthly changes loosening the bond of marriage and weakening the patriarchal structure of family and church represent very substantial losses. Blocking the ratification was nothing less than spiritual warfare for the LDS (Mathews Reference Mathews1993). Such motivation is an important political resource because, as Key (Reference Key1961, 207) reminds us, “the qualities of an opinion, as well as the number who hold it, enter into the equation of political forces.”

MORMONS AS A DISTINCT POLITICALLY MOBILIZED RELIGIOUS GROUP

Several characteristics of the LDS Church distinguish its political mobilization efforts from those of other religious groups. Probably most distinctive is the Latter-Day Saints' tradition of authoritative leadership. Jelen (Reference Jelen1992) argues that religious messages, especially those running contrary to the larger culture, must claim some special authority beyond the individual clergy member proclaiming them if these messages are to persuade members. Something in the religion itself must lend “plausibility structure,” a source of credibility built in to distinguish religious cues from other cues in society. For Mormons, that authority is the special status of the church leader as a prophet. The LDS Church's “seemingly effortless and lightning-quick ability to mobilize its members” is impressive, especially when compared to larger religious groups with similar conservative agendas. “Catholics make a practice of ignoring their bishops, and evangelicals are a disparate flock, but Mormons believe that the head of their church is a prophet of God — and tend to act accordingly” (Daughtrey Reference Daughtrey2009). LDS leaders have not always claimed divine inspiration, but the notion of LDS president as God's mouthpiece was cultivated in the late 1970s, with significant political consequences (Young Reference Young2007a). In a 1979 issue of the LDS publication Ensign, a high Mormon official explained that “When the Prophet speaks, the debate is over” (Tanner Reference Tanner1979). Similarly, Barbara Smith, president of the primary LDS women's organization, told the New York Times that women who supported the ERA could not see ahead to the unanticipated consequences ratification would bring. “But the Prophet can so see. And if you know that, you know there is no further need for discussion” (Ivins Reference Ivins1979).

But Campbell and Monson (2007) observe that the LDS hierarchical structure alone does not explain Mormons' successful mobilization. The Catholic Church is also hierarchical, but Catholics lack the Mormons' “intensive voluntarism among the laity to foster social networks, civic skills, and intragroup trust” (Campbell and Monson Reference Campbell, Monson and Wilson2007, 29). Verba, Schlozman and Brady (Reference Verba, Schlozman and Brady1995) assert that American religious organizations spark political activity among members not only by requesting their help with particular causes, but also by developing civic engagement skills in the religious context that can be transferred to the political arena. This the Mormons accomplish very effectively. In their church activities, Mormons far exceed Catholics and Protestants in time spent giving speeches and taking part in decision-making at meetings (Campbell and Monson Reference Campbell, Monson and Wilson2007). Young Mormon men are expected to do two years of full-time missionary work, while single women and senior couples may do missionary stints of 12 to 18 months. These missions involve intensive development of civic skills such as door-to-door canvassing and persuasive speaking with strangers. Even outside the mission context, devout Mormons engage in church-related activities about 20 hours a week (van Biema Reference Van Biema2009) and often tithe. Thus, LDS subculture primes individuals to expect the Church to ask for donations of time and money, but usually not for political causes. Campbell and Monson (Reference Campbell, Monson and Wilson2007) argue that Mormons possess “an explosive capacity to muster their troops” because calls for political action come infrequently, the “dry kindling” effect. “Should LDS leaders speak on politics more frequently, Latter-day Saints might respond in smaller numbers or with less vigor. The result is a delicate balance between frequency and potency” (Campbell and Monson Reference Campbell, Monson and Wilson2007, 30).

Another factor distinguishing the LDS Church is its striking capacity for political mobilization despite its status as a small minority religion, and one that many Americans regard with suspicion. The Church is growing rapidly domestically and internationally, but Mormons still represent a tiny proportion (1.7 percent) of the United States population compared to other religious groups, such as Catholics (23.9 percent), evangelical Protestants (26.3 percent), and mainline Protestants (18.1 percent) (Pew Forum 2007b). As became evident during Mormon Mitt Romney's bid for the 2008 Republican presidential nomination, some Americans still distrust Mormons and suspect they take orders from a central church leadership. While 53 percent of Americans viewed Mormons favorably, two 2007 public opinion surveys found that respondents' most common association with Mormons was “polygamy,” the practice of plural marriage, which the LDS Church (though not all of its splinter groups) renounced more than a century ago (Pew Forum 2007a; Ruby 2007). Another frequent association with Mormons was the term “cult” (Ruby Reference Ruby2007). This image of Mormonism as a cult has been nurtured by the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC), which has actively preached against Mormonism for four decades (Young Reference Young2007b). The SBC also happens to be a dominant denomination in many of the states that failed to ratify the ERA.

Furthermore, many political conservatives share the general public's ambivalence about Mormons. Michael Steele, Chairman of the Republican National Committee (RNC), claimed that the party base rejected Romney as a presidential candidate in 2008 because of issues with his Mormonism. The RNC later issued a statement noting that Steele regretted “the way his comments have been interpreted” (Banks Reference Banks2009). Steele's initial comment was probably accurate if not politically savvy; data from 2007 indicate that 36 percent of Republicans identifying as evangelicals hesitated to vote for a Mormon candidate, compared to 25 percent of the overall electorate (Banks Reference Banks2009). Nor did conservative political figures shy away from making public anti-Mormon comments during the 2008 campaign. Mike Huckabee, one of Romney's rivals for the Republican Party nomination, was quoted by a New York Times reporter as saying “Don't Mormons believe that Jesus and the devil are brothers?” Bill Keller, an evangelical radio preacher from Florida, told his listeners that a vote for Romney was a vote for the devil, and Focus on the Family founder James Dobson told talk-show host Laura Ingraham that he didn't believe conservative Christians would vote for a Mormon (Dougherty Reference Dougherty2009).

Regardless of their politics, many American Christian groups recognize deep theological divisions between themselves and LDS. Websites of mainline denominations (e.g., Southern Baptists, United Methodists, Presbyterian Church USA, Roman Catholics) indicate widespread denial that the LDS share in the Christian tradition (Is Mormonism 1999). Theological differences can spill over into political alliances. As Dougherty (Reference Dougherty2009) said of the Mormons:

Because of continuing image issues, LDS mobilization has sometimes relied on elements of stealth, as we shall see in the ERA and same-sex marriage campaigns. One approach is to enter into “marriages of convenience” with less controversial conservative groups. Church elders acknowledged this motivation in partnering with Catholics on several occasions, notably in Hawaii and California on the same-sex marriage issue (Crapo Reference Crapo2008). Mormons have also developed alliances with conservative Protestants that might be described as uneasy at best. Additionally, Mormons have consciously structured their own mobilizations to appear more spontaneous than they actually are.

All of these distinctive characteristics are important in understanding the Mormons' mobilizations against ERA and same-sex marriage. The LDS authority structure, quickly activated networks of willing donors and skilled volunteers, and image issues leading to partnerships and stealth tactics all came into play to impact the ultimately successful campaign to block ratification and have contributed to a string of successes in the continuing same-sex marriage conflict.

HOW THE MORMONS FOUGHT THE ERA … AND WON

Early in the campaign to ratify the ERA, the LDS Church did not take a formal position on the amendment. LDS President Harold Lee, who served only from 1972 until his death in December 1973, appeared to be unwilling to take on the issue. Furthermore, he wished to play down the reverential treatment of the Church President and resisted being called the Prophet (Quinn Reference Quinn1997). Mormon members of Congress were split on the ERA, with six voting for the amendment, two against, and two abstaining. Likewise, many Utah state legislators, including Mormons, favored ratification early in the ERA campaign. About 45 percent of Utah legislators supported the ERA as late as the opening of the 1975 session in January (Young Reference Young2007a). Yet a month later, the Utah legislature strongly rejected a ratification proposal. This dramatic switch cannot be explained by the electorate's views; a state survey published in November 1974 indicated 63 percent support for the ERA among Utahns (Quinn Reference Quinn1997). However, after the legislative session opened, the Church issued its first pronouncement against the ERA. On January 11, 1975, an editorial in the Deseret News' “Church News” section spoke strongly against ratification. Lee's successor as president, Spencer Kimball, was ready to lead a charge against the amendment as a moral issue.

While the speed and energy of Mormon resistance to ERA ratification in Utah is notable, one might expect the Church to exercise influence in this traditional Mormon stronghold. Nor is it too surprising that the Church targeted nearby Arizona and Nevada and concentrated anti-ERA efforts there by the late 1970s (Bradley Reference Bradley2005). For example, a coalition of Mormon and Catholic activists is credited with helping to defeat a Nevada referendum on ERA in 1978 (Richardson Reference Richardson, Bromley and Shupe1984). What is more remarkable is the fact that Mormon mobilization outside of the West appears to have been a significant factor in stopping the national ratification campaign in its tracks. White (Reference White1983, 14) asserts that, through largely covert lobbying and fundraising efforts, “small Mormon minorities exerted disproportionate influence over the fate of the ERA in Virginia, Missouri, Florida, Illinois and North Carolina.” In fact, during the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Church ran anti-ERA campaigns in 21 states outside of Utah — all those that had not ratified by 1977 plus those considering rescission (Quinn Reference Quinn1994).

Particularly striking is how effectively the Church channeled funds to battleground states. For example, Mormon contributors channeled more than $60,000 through a group called Families are Concerned Today (FACT) to support anti-ERA state senate candidates in Florida, where the legislature was closely divided on the issue (Florida 1980). FACT financial records suggest the rapid fundraising capabilities of the Church. President Kimball's letter authorizing Mormons to collect funds for anti-ERA efforts was sent to 9,000 church officers on October 12, 1978 (Divoky Reference Divoky1980). In short order, funds flooded into FACT's coffers from out of state. Although a few donations were large, most were quite modest, between $5 and $25 each. Between October 14 and November 6, 1978, 26 donations came from Alabama, 50 from Georgia, and 390 from California, impressive numbers considering the Political Action Committee was funding state legislative races (Sonia Johnson Papers Reference Sonia Johnson Papers1958–1982). Of the roughly $30,000 FACT raised that year, 53 percent came from California donors, all of whom were Mormons (Divoky Reference Divoky1980).

Equally important is the Church's capacity to mobilize volunteers. At least some of this mobilization might be described as “astroturfing,” meaning it is far more centrally directed than it appears to be. In short, the activity in question only looks like a grassroots effort. In the anti-ERA movement, the Church employed stealth to good effect. To be sure, the Church did not keep its opposition to the ERA secret, but rather took a public stance against the proposed amendment in at least nine major documents issued by Church leaders (Bradley Reference Bradley2005). Calls for action came from pulpits in worship services, and Mormon missionaries, at least in Florida and Virginia, were enlisted to speak against the ERA as they spread the Word (Quinn Reference Quinn1997). However, the Church also worked to increase its mobilization beyond the level that was apparent to the public. Barbara Smith, president of the Relief Society, became the LDS point person on anti-ERA efforts (Quinn Reference Quinn1997). At the time, the Relief Society, an organization that included all LDS women, had just lost a good deal of its former autonomy; the Church revoked the Society's financially independent status and placed the organization under the direction of the male church leadership in 1970. Smith characterized the new institutional arrangement as better reflecting the ideal Mormon marriage, where “the priesthood presides,” according to the “Lord's plan” (Young Reference Young2007a, 630–631). Through Relief Society events and other Church-related functions, LDS women were energized to lobby policymakers and urged to give the appearance of operating as individual concerned citizens without indicating their religious affiliation. Furthermore, LDS apostle Gordon Hinkley issued a statement urging Mormon-organized anti-ERA groups not to include “LDS” in their organizations' names (Quinn Reference Quinn and Sells2005, 186). In response, many such groups adopted generic names.Footnote ¹ This quasi-underground strategy allowed Mormon anti-ERA activists to operate very effectively even in states where Mormons constituted a tiny minority group. White (Reference White1986) argues that LDS covert politics allowed “cooperation and limited coalition formation” with non-Mormon conservatives to occur where it served the Church's purposes. “By forming coalitions when they constitute a small minority, Mormons enhance their power and influence; and by avoiding coalitions when they are the dominant religion, they do not have to share or yield power” (White 1986, 185). Anti-ERA groups relied heavily on LDS networks to move members to action. For example, the South Carolina group Pro-Family Unity was organized by a Mormon, was supported by private donations solicited by Mormon bishops, and was addressed by guest speakers Boyd K. Packer (an LDS apostle) and Paul Dunn (a Mormon General Authority). In addition, South Carolina Mormons were asked during church to write against extension of the time limit on the ERA, and the Relief Society used its phone tree to activate letter-writing campaigns to legislators (Sonia Johnson Papers Reference Sonia Johnson Papers1958–1982).

While anti-ERA front groups engaged in political activities, most did not register as lobbies or disclose their donors except under strong legal pressure. For example, the Virginia LDS Citizens Coalition (later called the Virginia Citizens Coalition), which swelled to 16,000 members, eventually registered as a lobby under pressure from the Commonwealth (Foreman Reference Foreman1981). The whistle-blower was Sonia Johnson, a highly outspoken Virginia Mormon and the leader of Mormons for ERA. In asking Secretary of the Commonwealth Frederick T. Gray, Jr., to investigate the Coalition's activities, Johnson explained that the Coalition printed and distributed anti-ERA literature, organized demonstrators to rally in Richmond, and trained Mormons in how most effectively to express their views to legislators without revealing their religious affiliation (Sonia Johnson Papers Reference Sonia Johnson Papers1958–1982). In response to this action and Johnson's other high-profile pro-ERA activities, such as testifying before a Senate subcommittee and addressing the American Psychological Association, the Church ex-communicated her in 1979. According to Sillitoe (Reference Sillitoe1990):

Astroturfing strategies were especially prominent in relation to state conferences of the International Women's Year (IWY) 1977. Mormon women in many states organized to attend and vote at these conferences as a bloc. For instance, LDS women in New York were told that attending the state IWY conference in Albany was “one of our duties and of PRIME IMPORTANCE” (caps in original). While participants were instructed to act as individuals, “as citizens and residents of New York State — and not of any church or organization,” they were nevertheless urged to “dress modestly and in a well-groomed manner that reflects the highest ideals of LDS womanhood.” Local churches provided lodging, transportation, subsidized meals, and babysitting services for attendees during the conference weekend. Furthermore, the Church offered to pay travel expenses for those who wished to attend the national IWY conference in Houston, Texas (Sonia Johnson Papers Reference Sonia Johnson Papers1958–1982).

As another example of the astroturfing strategy in action, consider the following event documented in a letter to Sonia Johnson. In January 1980, Robert F. Smith attended a city council committee meeting in Kansas City, Missouri, which was also attended by an anti-ERA women's group. The committee was discussing whether it should urge the state legislature to ratify the ERA. Smith writes: “Not once during the entire hearing was there any hint that this gathering of lovely ladies was 98 percent Mormon. None of the Mormon speakers identified himself/herself as such, and the ‘LDS’ was quietly deleted from the name of Mrs. (Norma) Tracy's organization.” This was the Missouri LDS Citizens Coalition, identified at the meeting simply as Missouri Citizens Council. “Why the sudden subterfuge?” Smith asked. “Mayhap the Mormons preferred to give the impression of being a typical cross-section of the community at large? Mrs. Tracy later explained to me that there was a desire not to embarrass the Church, but that bespeaks a sense of shame for the well-known Church position” (Sonia Johnson Papers Reference Sonia Johnson Papers1958–1982).

Letter writing, too, was organized without acknowledgement, thereby appearing to be a spontaneous groundswell of opposition to the ERA. Quinn (Reference Quinn2000) states that Mormons authored up to 85 percent of letters going to legislators in states where LDS members represented less than 1 percent of the population. Richard Johnson, a Mormon on the Virginia Tech faculty and Sonia Johnson's spouse, wrote to Virginia legislators to explain the source of anti-ERA correspondence they had received, especially letters that are “handwritten and on colored paper, as per instructions.” Johnson writes:

MORMONS FIGHTING AGAINST MARRIAGE REFORM: ECHOES OF AN OLD BATTLE?

In many ways, the Church's current campaign regarding same-sex marriage builds on successful anti-ERA tactics, and strong parallels exist between the two efforts. Again, the LDS Church is playing a key role — organizationally and financially — in stopping a state-by-state effort to pass progressive legislation. Again, the Church sees the proposed legislation as threatening the family. Theologically important gender distinctions are being questioned in the larger society. The ability to organize locally and raise funds nationally still exists, and the norm of obedience to Church leaders continues to be strong. And again, Church efforts apparently involve some covert tactics.

As with the ERA, the Church has taken an explicit public stance against same-sex marriage. In October 2004, the First Presidency issued a formal statement of opposition, stating that same-sex sexual relations “undermine the divinely created institution of the family” (First Presidency 2004). In early ballot initiatives on same-sex marriage, Church officials repeatedly instructed Mormons in Utah, Hawaii, Washington, Alaska, New Mexico, California, Nevada, Nebraska, and Texas to “regard their vote as an act of obedience to leadership, rather than an act of individual conscience” (Quinn Reference Quinn2000, 10). Two more official statements against gay marriage were issued in 2004, and a pronouncement read from LDS pulpits nationwide in 2006 encouraged Mormons to support a proposed United States constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage (Campbell and Monson Reference Campbell, Monson and Wilson2007).

Nevertheless, the Church successfully orchestrated armies of activists and donors operating, at least in part, under the radar screen. Consider the campaign in Hawaii. In early 1996, the Church employed a local marketing firm to set up a front group, generically named Hawaii's Future Today (HFT), to lobby against same-sex marriage in that state. In public, the Church sought to separate itself from HFT. For example, HFT and the LDS Church filed separate but similar amicus briefs in the Hawaii court cases on same-sex marriage. LDS-affiliated newspapers reported on HFT activities without mentioning the connections between the group and the church, “perhaps to help perpetuate the image of Hawaii's Future Today as a grass-roots movement” (Crapo Reference Crapo2008). And yet, the Church and a Church-owned corporation provided HFT's facilities, and its largest donor was the LDS-organized political action committee Hana Pono (originally set up to fight the ERA). Mormons with expertise in politics or advertising were called from Hawaii and the mainland for short-term missions to help HFT (Crapo Reference Crapo2008). In a 1998 memorandum to Elder Marlin K. Jensen in Utah, Elders Loren Dunn and Richard Wirthlin in Hawaii urgently requested $50,000 “of the already budgeted allowance” for HFT (Crapo Reference Crapo2008). For another example, consider a Texas letter-writing campaign. Mormons in that state were urged in church to contact their state legislators and as many newspapers as possible, on the First Presidency's authority, but not to identify themselves as Mormons or members of the Mormon lobbying group Coalition for Traditional Marriage (CTM), an organization they were nevertheless encouraged to join (Quinn Reference Quinn2000). This “astroturfing” apparently happened elsewhere as well. “Rather than being a spontaneous expression of citizenship, the thousands of letters flooding each state's legislature have merely reflected instructions from LDS headquarters, and sometimes even specific quotas given to local congregations by regional LDS leaders” (Quinn Reference Quinn2000).

Mormons were highly mobilized to pass both California ballot measures against same-sex marriage, Proposition 22 in 2000 and Proposition 8 in 2008. In these campaigns, Mormons in California and surrounding states organized through their churches to send mailings, put up yard signs, go door-to-door, and staff phone banks. In October 2008, LDS churches showed a video featuring high Church officials (two LDS apostles and one member of the Quorum of the Seventy) asking for 30 volunteers in every California ward to give four hours of their time to support Proposition 8 (Stack Reference Stack2008). Members responded with enthusiasm. Jeff Flint, a strategist for the anti-marriage reform organization Protect Marriage, estimated that 80 to 90 percent of his group's early door-to-door volunteers in 2008 were Mormons (McKinley and Johnson 2008). In the fall of 2008, the Church asked members in Utah and elsewhere to staff phone banks, but “released” these volunteers after a couple of weeks when leaders concluded that calls coming from out of state were ineffective in persuading California voters (Stack Reference Stack2008).

Centrally coordinated donations are also a crucial element of the campaign against same-sex marriage. In 1998, the Church donated $500,000 to convince Alaska voters to approve a same-sex marriage ban (Ruskin Reference Ruskin1998), and LDS members contributed $1.1 million to campaigns against same-sex marriage in Alaska and Hawaii (Damore, Jelen and Bowers Reference Damore, Jelen, Bowers, Djupe and Olson2007, 69). In June of 2008, the LDS First Presidency issued a memo urging California Mormons to donate “your means and time” to the cause of passing Proposition 8. As many as 750,000 Californians may have heard this battle cry from the pulpit (Egelko Reference Egelko2008). Some Mormons who did not give money to support the proposition claimed they were subject to “highly charged appeals” from local LDS leaders, including admonitions “that their souls would be in jeopardy if they didn't give” (Schoofs Reference Schoofs2008). A high Church Official (a member of the Quorum of Seventy) conducted a conference call to several dozen Mormons in which he suggested that each donate at least $25,000 to support Proposition 8 (Schoofs Reference Schoofs2008). Many Church members responded.

However, in the Proposition 8 campaign, the extent of financial involvement by the Church and by individual Mormons was obscured. Most Mormon money went through ProtectMarriage.com, which describes itself as “a broad-based coalition of California families, community leaders, religious leaders, pro-family organizations and individuals from all walks of life” (ProtectMarriage.com 2012). ProtectMarriage.com reported a total of $40,272,081 raised in support of Proposition 8 (Quist Reference Quist2010), and estimates that as much as half of its money came from Mormon donors (McKinley and Johnson Reference McKinley and Kirk2008). Another website, mormonsfor8.com, set out to track LDS donations for Proposition 8; data gathered there suggests that of money raised in increments of $1,000 or more by ProtectMarriage.com about half came from LDS members (Schoofs 2008). Also, several prominent Mormons appear among ProtectMarriage.com's largest donors, including Alan Ashton, grandson of the late LDS President David O. McKay, who donated $1 million, and Elder John C. Dalton of the North America West Area Seventy, who donated $250,000. The LDS Church itself donated $124,255 (Quist Reference Quist2010).

Other well-funded organizations opposing same-sex marriage legalization may or may not prove to be LDS-affiliated front groups. Chief among these is the National Organization for Marriage (NOM). While NOM's website does not indicate affiliation with any particular religious organization, evidence suggests the group has LDS ties. For example, NOM launched a website called abovethehate.com, which asks visitors to help counter the anti-LDS backlash in the wake of the Proposition 8 campaign. Prominent Mormon author Orson Scott Card is on the NOM board, and several Mormon activists appeared in NOM's national television advertisement against legalizing gay marriage (Vick Reference Vick2009). While refusing to disclose donor lists, NOM has grown and spread to tackle the same-sex marriage issue in multiple states, including Florida, Maine, New York, New Hampshire, Vermont, Iowa, and California. Critics have accused NOM of ignoring election laws. In March 2009, Fred Karger of Californians Against Hate amended an earlier complaint to California's Fair Political Practices Commission regarding LDS involvement with Proposition 8. The March amendment alleges that the Church set up NOM in 2007 for the purpose of getting Proposition 8 on the ballot. According to Karger, NOM “came out of nowhere,” and “all of a sudden it began raising big, big money” (Ferriss Reference Ferriss2009). Indeed, NOM raised $1.8 million to support Proposition 8, second only to ProtectMarriage.com in fundraising. At the same time, NOM funneled $10,000 to support a 2008 same-sex marriage ban in Florida (Quist Reference Quist2010). Questions about NOM's funding sources have also arisen elsewhere, notably in Iowa and Maine. In September 2009, the Interfaith Alliance of Iowa Action Fund and One Iowa filed a complaint against NOM with the Iowa Ethics and Campaign Disclosure Board. The groups claim that NOM violated state campaign finance laws, specifically in the group's $86,060 expenditure in August 2009 to benefit traditional marriage supporter Stephen Burgmeier, then running in a special state legislative election. According to the complaint, NOM acted illegally by not disclosing the identities of political contributors. Carolyn Jenison, Executive Director of One Iowa, alleges that NOM has a history of funneling money from the LDS Church to benefit same-sex marriage opposition while it refuses to disclose the sources of its money (Clayworth Reference Clayworth2009). Similar allegations arose in Maine regarding NOM's support of Question 1 banning same-sex marriage in 2009. Maine's Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices approved an investigation into NOM's donors, but the investigation remains stalled in the face of a NOM lawsuit to avoid disclosure (Cover Reference Cover2010).

United Families International (UFI) may also prove to be more closely connected to the LDS Church than it acknowledges. UFI's website denies affiliation with any religious organization, but Buss and Herman (Reference Buss and Herman2003) classify UFI as a Mormon group. Indeed, most of the group's leaders are active and prominent Mormons.Footnote ² While focusing mostly on international policy, the group is also involved in the same-sex marriage issue domestically. UFI twice donated to support Arizona ballot measures, giving about $83,000 in 2006 and $12,000 in 2008. Offshoot group United Families Idaho Action Fund raised $14,469 to support a 2006 ballot measure in that state (National Institute 2007). In fall 2009, UFI announced its partnership with Stand for Marriage Maine to support Question 1.