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Abdullah Ahmad Badawi: A Malaysian Neo-Conservative?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 August 2012

AHMAD FAUZI ABDUL HAMID and
MUHAMAD TAKIYUDDIN ISMAIL
AHMAD FAUZI ABDUL HAMID
Affiliation:
School of Distance Education, Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM), Penang, Malaysiaafauzi@usm.my
MUHAMAD TAKIYUDDIN ISMAIL
Affiliation:
School of History, Politics and Strategy, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM), Bangi, Selangor, Malaysiataki_prk@yahoo.com
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Abstract

This article proposes an analysis of changes implemented during Malaysia's Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi's administration (2003–09), using the theoretical framework commonplace in studies on conservatism. Based on the premise that transformations in conservative polities are prone to producing conflict, the dynamics of conflict situations during Abdullah's checkered Premiership is foregrounded. As we apply the main criteria defining conservatism to regime behaviour in Malaysia, it becomes clear that such criteria are stoutly held by the regime's elites in their quest for social harmony and political stability. Regime maintenance then finds justifications in such seemingly sublime ends, thereby self-perpetuating Malaysian conservatism. Such despondency prevailed during Mahathir Mohamad's administration (1981–2003), which displayed bias against changes and introduced schemes to justify the systems it upheld. Transmutations wrought during Abdullah's tenure may have been neither substantial nor totalizing, but within the conservative paradigm which had long gripped national politics, Abdullah's deviations were significant nevertheless.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Japanese Journal of Political Science , Volume 13 , Issue 3 , September 2012, pp. 379 - 399
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

Introduction

As a Malaysian conservative I have admired you from a distance. Your tenacity and singleness of purpose are qualities that we need for ourselves here. We are a developing country and to develop we must face many challenges within and outside our country. Learning from you we will persevere. We will not be deterred by adverse criticisms of our industrialisation programme, or of our political system or of our economic policies. In the final analysis it is the hard headed executives who make the decisions, not the self-appointed experts.Footnote 1

Malaysian politics in the era of Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (2003–09) was one characterized by change, at least attempted, even if not as comprehensive as he had intended it to be. Abdullah's tenure as Prime Minister was cruelly cut short in the aftermath of Malaysia's historic twelfth general elections of March 2008. After only four years at the helm of the ruling National Front (BN: Barisan Nasional) coalition, including its biggest victory in 2004, Abdullah was to carry the burden as the leader responsible for BN's worst electoral performance ever. Not only did BN lose its two-thirds majority in the federal Parliament, but it also lost the state governments of Penang, Selangor, Perak, Kedah, and Kelantan to an opposition electoral pact, later formalized as the People's Alliance (PR: Pakatan Rakyat).Footnote 2 At the national level, BN's popular votes barely edged PR's by a 2% majority. Astoundingly, if one had excluded the East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak from the figures, votes for PR would have tipped BN's by a similar margin.Footnote 3

Change was the mantra which accompanied the political storm enveloping Malaysia in March 2008. Scholars of Malaysian politics are generally pessimistic about the capacity for such change to maintain long-term momentum, as witnessed from the variegated characteristics of Malaysia as an adulterated form of democracy, resistant to pressures to transform into more developed polities.Footnote 4 With what had transpired in the twelfth general elections, prospects for significant change were strongly felt, re-enacting the political climate after the tenth general elections of 1999 but which encountered a hiatus following BN's overwhelming triumph in 2004.Footnote 5 However, this article is not limited in scope to developments ensuing from the 2008 elections. This study adopts a longer-range view that the catalyst for change can be situated in Abdullah Ahmad Badawi's very own leadership style and policies, which marked a sharp departure from the political order of Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia from 1981 to 2003. While some measure of change was probably inevitable in the light of Mahathir's lengthy tenure and iron fist rule, bearing the task of having to execute the accompanying modifications to the post-Mahathir administrative landscape and statecraft was daunting and unenviable. Such an enterprise ran the huge risk of being accused of undoing Mahathir's legacy, which had acquired almost cult status among ordinary Malaysians. Furthermore, to be seen to be going against the Mahathir-set development trajectory was anathema to his supporters within the ruling UMNO party, as beset by a culture of neo-feudalism and neo-patrimonialism.

This article aims to propose some theoretical explanations of Abdullah's political positions and actions. For this purpose, we utilize the basic ideological framework of conservatism, as found especially in the practices of a dominant party, which in Malaysia is represented by UMNO and BN.Footnote 6 We argue that policy reforms and departures undertaken by Abdullah during his era effectively amount to the development of a model of neo-conservatism. In other words, Abdullah's legacies and political thought may be properly termed as manifestations of neo-conservative ideology. In projecting such a hypothesis, this article is divided into two parts. The first part looks at the position of conservatism as an ideology, particularly in the context of the Malaysian state and regime. The varied understandings associated with conservatism, loosely comprehended, are outlined. The second part explores the issues of conservatism and change from the standpoint of reforms initiated by Abdullah. Facts on the reforms and ensuing conflicts that surrounded his administration are situated within the context of the model of neo-conservatism developed.

Conservatism as an ideology

In 2003, findings of research by Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway elicited controversy by apparently confirming some prevalent perceptions about the conservative school of thought in the USA.Footnote 7 In truth, such controversy is not unexpected, taking into account the myriad forms, positions, and shapes conservatism has taken in past debates.Footnote 8 The present authors are well aware that any discussion of ‘conservatism’ has to be accommodative of the term's immense pliability. Hence the subjection of ‘conservatism’ to varying interpretations, two of which are found to be dominant. Firstly, one which perceives conservatism as ‘a state of mind, a type of character, a way of looking at the civil social order’, as outlined by Russell Kirk, USA's putative father of modern conservatism.Footnote 9 In his famous work, Rationalism in Politics, first published in 1962, leading British political theorist Michael Oakeshott espouses a similar approach. He sees conservatism as a form of thought and behaviour – the inclination to choose what has become familiar and proven in contrast with unfamiliar and unproven items.Footnote 10 In other words, these scholars reject the notion of conservatism as an ideology or object of abstract theory, as had also been propounded by the acknowledged founder of conservatism, Edmund Burke (1729–97).Footnote 11 In the general context, this first interpretation treats conservatism as part of human nature, which is inevitable.Footnote 12

The second interpretation dissects conservatism in a more systematic manner, as a philosophy, ideology, theory, and system of beliefs.Footnote 13 Such divergent designations, although etymologically different, have been used interchangeably in studies on conservatism, especially in the context of Asia.Footnote 14 Precedents from these studies suggest that conservatism may be conceptualized as a foundational ideology of Malaysian politics. Moreover, societies can adopt an ideology even unconsciously, without necessarily resorting to formal institutionalization.Footnote 15 In his study of the political ideologies of UMNO and PAS, Funston admits the lack of a clear ideology on the part of Malaysia's ruling regime. Nonetheless, strongly defined views and implicit ideological underpinnings on some issues may well be taken to constitute a proper ideology.Footnote 16 Hence, we need not limit our understanding of ideology to only what can be explicitly seen and comprehended. In furtherance of such a view, we may propose a discourse on Malaysian conservatism, which is developed within two situational contexts.

First, conservatism may be assessed from the standpoint of nationalist movements in the pre-independence and early post-independence years. The rightist stream is formed by nationalists who accommodated colonial interests in negotiating for independence from the British. The leadership of these ‘conservative nationalists’ overwhelmingly came from the upper-class Malay aristocrats and non-Malay communal elites who were bent on preserving the traditional social functions of their respective ethnic groups.Footnote 17 The opposite of this stream, the leftists, were considered radical in their demands and thus failed to gain recognition of the colonial master who subjected them to witch-hunts and enforced detentions. The masses were indoctrinated into believing the colonial propaganda vilifying the leftists as threats to a viable socio-political order, whose stability was made into a pre-requisite for independence. In the pre-independence political spectrum, the leftist stream was represented by such parties as the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), the Centre for People's Power (PUTERA: Pusat Tenaga Rakyat), and the Malay Nationalist Party (MNP) together with its wings the Aware Youth Corps (API: Angkatan Pemuda Insaf) and the Aware Women Corps (AWAS: Angkatan Wanita Sedar).Footnote 18 The rightist–leftist classification above, however, has been subjected to critical scrutiny by local scholars dissatisfied at its implicit acknowledgement of colonial-imposed categories and marginalization of the roles of radical Malay nationalists and Islamic reformists.Footnote 19

It is not within the scope of this article to broach the debate above. Suffice to say, conservatism can exist within any political continuum – left or right, democratic or authoritarian – and need not be conceptualized solely within the context of incumbent governments and ruling regimes.Footnote 20 As Huntington argues, conservatism is better apprehended in terms of its situational or positional significance. Hence, conservatism as a system of ideas is used to justify the persistence of any contemporary order in the face of challenges which threaten its shape and form. Conservatives resent any action which seeks to unwind the established institutional order.Footnote 21 In the Malaysian case, the second context in which conservatism as an ideology has been heavily discussed is found in the discourse on Islamic movements. Conservatism has been regarded as one of the streams of Islamic thought in Malaysia.Footnote 22 Debate has also emerged about the changes engulfing the main Malay parties, UMNO and PAS, as to the fluidity of their ‘conservativeness’ as opposed to their ‘progressiveness’ and ‘moderateness’ with respect to religious principles.Footnote 23 Observers of contemporary Islam in Malaysia have also applied the term ‘religious conservatism’ in explaining regressive Islamic policies that the Malaysian state had made which exacerbated ethno-religious relations during the Premiership of Abdullah Ahmad Badawi.Footnote 24

From the afore-mentioned facts, it is clear that employment of the concept of ‘conservatism’ varies according to context. For our present practical purpose, the yardstick for measuring the degree of conservatism is intimately related to UMNO's position as Malaysia's dominant party. The best comparison is perhaps with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of Japan. Japan never had a truly conservative party in the mould of the British Conservative Party or the Republican Party in the USA. LDP is better known as a centrist party. Yet, due to its protracted control over the reins of government, LDP rule is frequently referred to as that of a conservative regime.Footnote 25 In many important aspects, UMNO resembles LDP. Apart from sharing the dominant party status, successive Malaysian leaders from Mahathir to Abdullah to Najib have frequently alluded to UMNO's hegemonic persistence by using LDP as their basis for comparison.Footnote 26

Is it at all possible, therefore, to postulate broad principles which form the basis of conservatism and its general traits? Such principles may not be embraced in whole by a conservative, but as a matter of principle it is fair to say that one who professes conservatism will more than likely espouse them.Footnote 27 In proposing a Malaysian model of political conservatism in juxtaposition with UMNO's experience, we try to merge precepts thought of as universally reflecting conservatism with conservative qualities gleaned from past studies which purportedly looked at conservatism from a Malaysian perspective.Footnote 28 Firstly, a conservative adheres to the prescriptive approach and the principle of attachment,Footnote 29 as exemplified in his or her emphasis on traditions, antecedents, precedents, conventions, institutions, harmony, and continuity. Such an inclination results from the conservatives’ negative perception of human nature as by and large limited in potential and in need of control. To conservatives, tradition becomes a priority as it has prima facie value in fulfilling human needsFootnote 30 and ascertaining political ‘truths’.Footnote 31 Secondly, a conservative gives importance to societal and communitarian priorities more than to individual needs. Aspects such as hierarchy, authority, leadership, rule of law, discipline, and loyalty occupy a special place in his or her choices. Following Burke, he or she believes that a good order is fundamental to all that is good.Footnote 32 This aspect not only refers to the sustainability of security and stability, but also acts to guarantee regime perseverance, as practised by the strong state concept of Britain's Conservative Party leader, Margaret Thatcher (1979–90).Footnote 33 Thirdly, belief in conservatism is also marked by one's resistance to efforts in achieving social equality. Since a traditional set-up conventionally takes the form of a less than egalitarian hierarchical order, authority-related concepts such as power and preferences are inequitably distributed. To resist change is tantamount to opposing attempts to alter the status-quo, which is invariably characterized by such inequity.Footnote 34 In the Malaysian context, hierarchy is externalized via ethnic Malay political domination and constitutionally guaranteed special privileges, such as the exalted positions of the Malay monarchy and the religion of Islam. Simply speaking, it is at once UMNO's cardinal organizing principle as well as ideological bullwark. However, in contrast to popular belief, this does not necessarily mean that a conservative is perennially opposed to change. This dovetails with the final criterion defining a conservative: that while he or she holds to the necessity and desirability of change, he or she seeks a wise implementation of it.Footnote 35 In practical terms, this means change that is gradual, controlled, does not sacrifice past interests, and fits with a society's primordial form. Radical and thorough change will invite unwarranted repercussions and is thus resisted.Footnote 36

In comparative terms, we may point to the example of Japan. According to Pempel, Japanese-style conservatism encompasses dominant elements which unite and maintain the regime. This system creates political stability through its relationship with Japan's governing institutions, reaching equilibrium based on a consensus which gives advantage to the incumbent regime in preserving power. In arriving at such a consensus, a host of ancillary factors comes into play: the capitalist economy, industrial relations, social welfare efforts, higher education, environmental protection, the bureaucracy, the rule of law, the media, and local culture.Footnote 37 Such factors have become, using Karl Mannheim's terminology, the ‘vegetative patterns’.Footnote 38 A similar model is arguably found in Germany. In explaining the operationalization of Germany's conservative welfare regime, Poole refers to conservative attributes that had arisen from distinctive features embedded in Germany's Basic Law constitution introduced in 1949. Such attributes have, furthermore, been bolstered by the presence of synergistic and complementary ‘organizing principles’.Footnote 39 In the Malaysian context, such an understanding is congruent with what historian Mohamad Abu Bakar calls ‘dominant values’ which appear in the form of ‘fundamental thought, historical memory, heritage institutions, sometimes getting carried away in past glory and attendant symbolisms’. Such elements act as ‘the organizing concept and modus operandi in political conduct’ to be perennially defended at all costs.Footnote 40

Succinctly put, conservatism is embodied by a polity which emphasizes rationality in decision making, order, and caution in executing change. While the positive aspects of conservatism are undeniable, in practice it has more than often been used as a justification and consensus-builder against attempted changes perceived as too radical. Hence, conservatism has unsurprisingly been identified by scholars as possessing anti-democratic tendencies, accentuated by an apparent slant towards the authoritarian state and regime continuity.Footnote 41 Related to this is the role of tradition as the pulse of conservatism.Footnote 42 Yet tradition is liable to invention, construction, and reconstruction. Through a carefully orchestrated repetitive process, a society absorbs values and norms which in time gain a sacrosanct reputation. Invented traditions may differ from original traditions in the vagueness of their values, arising responsibilities, and demands on members of a polity.Footnote 43

Neo-conservatism in Malaysia

As a generic concept, ‘neo-conservatism’ connotes the re-emergence of conservatism, after having undergone adjustment, in new form and within a new environment, whilst retaining its fundamental constitution.Footnote 44 But, like conservatism, ‘neo-conservatism’ too has various dimensions and thus needs to be applied contextually. The present authors discern at least five different ways in which the contestable concept of ‘neo-conservatism’ has been used.

Firstly, in the USA and United Kingdom, ‘neo-conservatism’ denotes a re-assertion of past values, as championed by President Ronald Reagan (1981–8) and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (1979–90), respectively. Part of the neo-conservative package here includes the neo-liberal economics, both of them dramatically introduced.Footnote 45 In the early to mid-1980s, countries adopting neo-liberalism in their economic policies were often categorized as neo-conservative.Footnote 46 The second application of ‘neo-conservatism’, which has been in vogue for the past decade or so, refers to it as a stream in American foreign policy which supports the USA's capitalizing on its economic and military prowess to export the ideals of democracy, liberalism, and human rights to foreign countries. It reached unprecedented heights under the presidency of George W. Bush (2001–08), when the protruding influence of neo-conservatives brought it into conflict with traditional conservatives.Footnote 47 Thirdly, with Germany as a pertinent case, ‘neo-conservatism’ has been analysed as a restructuring of the political spectrum.Footnote 48 Fourthly, ‘neo-conservatism’ has also been employed to refer to right-wing intellectuals in Germany's Weimar Republic (1919–33), who were not affiliated to any political party, as was the case with American neo-conservatives during their early phases.Footnote 49 Finally, within the context of Islamic legal and democratic theory, ‘neo-conservatism’ has been referred to as one of the three main contemporary schools of thought, which integrates Islamic teachings with Western social sciences.Footnote 50 Clearly, whenever and wherever the term ‘neo-conservatism’ is applied in academic discourse, one needs to be cognizant of its differential meanings and implications, without necessarily conflating it with heinous doctrines. Such over-simplification has unfortunately overwhelmed the discourse on ‘neo-conservatism’.

In the Malaysian context, despite their slowly gaining currency, the terms ‘neo-conservatism’ and ‘neo-conservative’ have still to become familiar political jargon. Usage of the terms revolves around two forms of discourse. Firstly, political economists have discussed them in their typologies of development models.Footnote 51 Secondly, since the mid-1980s, ‘neo-conservatism’ has also been employed to denote the stream of Islamists who pose a challenge to more progressive and liberal strands of the movement.Footnote 52 In arriving at a distinctively Malaysian understanding of ‘neo-conservatism’, the wide variations in usage above have to be borne in mind. An arbitrary employment of any usage will lead to a jaundiced interpretation of both ‘neo-conservatism’ and its precursor, conservatism. An operational framework beckons us to compare the Malaysian experience with those of past dominant conservative regimes, focusing on the emergence of a neo-conservative discourse in each of the cases. For this purpose, we have chosen the cases of the Soviet Union, China, Japan, and Taiwan.Footnote 53 As in Malaysia, discourses on ‘neo-conservatism’ in these countries are intimately related with the conservative ideology, on which their political order and dominant political actors’ thinking had been based for an extensive period.

The Comparative Cases of Soviet Union,Footnote 54 China,Footnote 55 Japan,Footnote 56 and TaiwanFootnote 57

With respect to the former Soviet Union, conservatism has been employed as a tool to analyse conflicts that arose following the demise of Joseph Stalin, ending his protracted dictatorial regime (1922–53). Stalin's longevity had rendered all aspects of Soviet life to be heavily influenced by his policies and preferred values. His successor, Nikita Khrushchev (1953–64), tried to embark on changes ranging from administrative reforms and downsizing of the security apparatus to a host of welfare reforms. Despite scoring some early successes at de-Stalinization, opposition from traditional conservatives eventually stalled the reforms, which were deemed to have destabilized the Soviet state system. Khrushchev's incapacity was dictated by the engulfing presence of conservative forces variously referred to as ‘inertia’, ‘vested interests’, and ‘the legacy problem’. Khrushchev was eventually ousted and replaced by Leonid Brezhnev (1964–82). Brezhnev has been called a ‘neo-conservative’ for having reconfigured Stalinist elements previously thought of as embedded. It was only during the era of Mikhail Gorbachev (1985–91) that all-encompassing reformation came about through Glasnost and Perestroika, both of which derived inspiration from the early reforms that had been abortively experimented by Khrushchev.

In China, an era of neo-conservatism was said to have been unleashed by the passing of Deng Xiaoping's era (1980–9), manifested by acrimonious conflict between neo-conservative reformers and conservatives. Following the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown on the student uprising, the so-called neo-conservatives, as represented mostly by the upcoming intelligentsia, demanded serious attention be paid to democratization, restoration of political stability, devolution of centralized power, and the inauguration of populist measures. The neo-conservatives were convinced that survival of the People's Republic was conditional upon its readiness to adjust and modify its practice of communism by incorporating elements of the free market economy, accepting structural change, and absorbing democratic values, albeit still within the paradigm of the East Asian authoritarian model. Neo-conservatives also stressed a rejuvenation of nationalist and patriotic values in the face of new global challenges such as American criticism of China's human rights record. Neo-conservative ideas found a platform during the era of Jiang Zemin (1993–2003), a third generation leader. He managed to strike a balance between the reformers’ demands and the conservatives’ concerns, so as not to be misconstrued as trying to undo past communist legacies.

In Japan, the neo-conservative era is associated with more than one leader. Yasuhiro Nakasone's administration (1982–7) has been touted as having implemented the first phase of neo-conservatism. Apart from emulating the economic initiatives of Reagan and Thatcher, Nakasone proposed administrative reforms which would loosen the government's rigid control over political structures. However, reformation was a long drawn-out process, having to face the ‘party–bureaucracy–interest group’ complex, whose convoluted internal negotiations complicated matters and slowed down the pace of reforms. The era of the maverick LDP Prime Minister, Junichiro Koizumi (2001–06), witnessed the emergence of the second-generation neo-conservatives. Mostly young and enjoying the advantage of overseas education and professional qualifications, they clamoured for institutional reforms, such as the privatization of Japan Post, democratization in the selection of party presidential candidates, slash in public expenditure, reduction in the influence of party and interest groups in decision-making, and abandonment of isolationism in military and foreign policy.

As regards Taiwan, the lengthy era of Kuomintang (KMT) party leadership (1949–2000) has been commonly identified as one helmed by a conservative regime. In 1986, KMT leader Chiang Ching Kuo (President 1978–88) introduced democratization in Taiwan, as embodied in decisions to abandon martial law and allow the formation of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). After Chiang's death, his successor Lee Teng Hui continued his reforms by returning to the people hitherto non-existent freedoms, such as that of speech, media, and peaceful assembly. In contrast with other Asian leaders, whose advocacy of democracy was conditional on its moulding with a distinctively Asian paradigm, Lee firmly believed that democracy had universal values which could thrive in Asian societies. Hence the designation of Lee as a neo-conservative by Ping-hui Liao among others. From 1988 to 1993, post-Chiang KMT was embroiled in factional conflict, with the main faction backing Lee being the pro-reform neo-conservatives rather than the mainstream conservatives who went on to establish the New Party (NP). In a matter of a decade from the political re-alignments and democratic developments, KMT lost the leadership of Taiwan to DPP in 2000, before regaining it in 2008 via landslide wins in its presidential and legislative elections.

From the preceding discussion, it is clear that an understanding of ‘neo-conservatism’ need not be restricted to categories found in Western neo-liberal states. Nevertheless, in spite of some general criteria holding together cross-country definitions of ‘neo-conservatism’, local factors weigh significantly in ultimately determining whether a certain political leader or group can be appropriately labeled as ‘neo-conservative’. In the context of political change, which transpired at the behest of Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, three themes can be foregrounded in our conceptualization of ‘neo-conservatism’ in Malaysia, viz.:

  1. (i) The existence of a stream, tendency, thought, figure, or era which portray individually or collectively the occurrence of a sharp departure from the traditions and practices of past conservative regimes, albeit still adhering to the conservative paradigm, at least in fundamental terms.

  2. (ii) The sharp departure can take the form of policy rejuvenation, adaptation, and most importantly, political reform. Hence, past categories, approaches and values, which have been utilized to legitimize a particular political order, have no longer a binding effect that guarantees loyalty of or consensus among members of the polity.

  3. (iii) The sharp departure can potentially trigger conflict within, and impact detrimentally on, the dominant conservative regime. Success of the proponents of the sharp departure is uncertain as it may invite resentment and opposition from the traditional conservatives.

Malaysian politics and change

Prior to the Mahathir–Abdullah Ahmad Badawi leadership transition, most scholars broadly agreed that whoever replaced Mahathir would have to somehow distance himself from his predecessor's policies in order to gain fresh legitimacy.Footnote 58 The collateral damage incurred from unpopular legacies of Mahathir's rule, such as corruption and authoritarianism had to be stamped out.Footnote 59 Retention of the status quo had become a raison d'être of Mahathir's regime. With help from the state's coercive apparatus and regime control of state institutions and the mass media, probability of change stagnated at the minimal level throughout Mahathir's years in power.Footnote 60 Even if there was change, it had to be initiated by the regime, as seen in the case of the revocation of absolute legal immunity of the various states’ Malay sultans after determined anti-royalty campaigns waged by UMNO in 1983 and 1992.Footnote 61 Despite the recurrent crises affecting Mahathir's administration,Footnote 62 his party stewardship proved tenacious enough to withstand both domestic and foreign pressures and orchestrate BN to a more than two-thirds majority in all five elections during his tenure. The term ‘Mahathirism’ has been utilized to encapsulate precepts of his 22-year long strongman rule.Footnote 63

Dovetailing such a theme with concerns of this study, Mahathir may be said to have entrenched a form of political conservatism in virtually all state and party institutions as the bedrock of his regime's perseverance strategy. Among the dominant values cherished by Mahathir was the Asian Values doctrine which was brought forth to justify a distinctively Malaysian way of democratizing its polity and developing its economy. Ideas propagating the unsuitability of democracy in the Western mould, the relative importance of communitarian as opposed to individual values, fidelity to order and authority, resurrection of traditional values, and the assumption that change was highly likely to interrupt the process of continuous development powerfully underpinned Malaysia's march towards a Newly Industrializing Country (NIC) status. The Mahathir era was thus identified as one in which a ‘high degree of control, almost of domination’ of political institutions was exercised.Footnote 64 Khoo Boo Teik regards Mahathir as a ‘conservative politician’ who steadfastly held to such principles as ‘order’, ‘rule of law’, and ‘stability’ – antitheses of ‘anarchy’ which would see development recede.Footnote 65 To Mahathir, challenging his regime was tantamount to obstructing progress. As far as Mahathir was concerned, change was good only if implemented gradually, even though with positive ramifications.Footnote 66

Such ideological postures suggest some degree of affinity with conservative principles. Indeed, in a loose sense, Mahathir could also be conceived as a neo-conservative. For instance, if ‘neo-conservatism’ is to be comprehended as an economic doctrine more than anything else, Mahathir would probably qualify as a neo-conservative by virtue of his comprehensive implementation of neo-liberal economic policies, as showcased in his deregulation, privatization, and liberalization endeavours. Besides his emphasis on neo-classical economics, Mahathir undertook some radical departures from what are widely perceived as Malay conservative principles. Of special reminder here is his acrid confrontation with the Malay rulers in 1983 and 1993. In 1988, his orchestrated assaults against the judiciary culminated in the dishonorable removal of Malaysia's Chief Justice – a maneuver which his three predecessors, all of whom were lawyers by profession, would never have even dreamt of. By dismissing his once chosen successors Musa Hitam and Anwar Ibrahim, introducing an invented tradition designed to minimize intra-party competition, and behaving unresponsively towards the setbacks experienced by UMNO and BN in the 1999 general elections,Footnote 67 Mahathir on his own volition would have substantiated claims of him being a conservative.

Before assuming the reins of government, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi insisted that he was not keen to carry out ‘radical changes’. To him, he was presiding over an individual change of the nation's driver rather than a regime change. But he did not rule out implementing ‘improvement’ and ‘adaptation’ in line with contemporary demands. Like Mahathir, Abdullah also believed in the centrality of ‘continuity’ in the national development agenda.Footnote 68 Practically, however, barely a month from the power transition, Abdullah had showcased a surprising determination not to become a carbon copy of Mahathir.Footnote 69 Abdullah began promisingly by initiating policies which could well be interpreted as constituting a subtle process of de-Mahathirization.Footnote 70 Not having as aggressive a personality as Mahathir had, Abdullah showed an early willingness to listen and work as a team. He brought into his fold young advisors, attempted economic liberalization, declared war on corruption, improved governance, and opened up democratic space. Within the context of rejuvenating old policies, he re-attached importance to agriculture, re-emphasized poverty eradication, highlighted human capital development, and shifted focus to regional development – four elements which had formed important planks of the second Prime Minister Abdul Razak Hussein's overall development strategy.Footnote 71 In the realm of ethnic and religious identification, he attempted to apply an inclusive approach as had been practised by first Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman.Footnote 72 Islam Hadhari or ‘civilizational Islam’, a progressive approach towards understanding and practising Islam as a modern rather than conservative religion, served as a mantra of his administration. Within a year of assuming power, many of these policies proved to be more than just declaratory hype.Footnote 73

Interestingly, reforms initiated by Abdullah hardly met with reservations, let alone protests. On the contrary, Malaysians warmly responded to Abdullah by giving his government, in the 2004 general elections, an overwhelming 63.8% of popular votes, which translated into an astonishing 90.9% of parliamentary seats.Footnote 74 This triumph, the largest ever registered by a sitting Prime Minister, prompted the leftist intellectual Rustam Sani to project Abdullah as one who would deviate rather than persist in the path hitherto charted by Mahathirism.Footnote 75 Nonetheless, Abdullah's reforms were not effected on a comprehensive scale, as many would have liked. Instead, he preserved significant organizing principles of Malaysia's political system. For example, he retained restrictive laws and consistently cited constitutional provisions safeguarding privileges accorded to the indigenous Bumiputera (sons of the soil) population. From the theoretical perspective of this study, he is said to have retained fundamental regime elements, thus challenging any designation of him as a reformist per se.

Abdullah Ahmad Badawi and the Question of Conservatism

In the theory of conservatism, change is deemed to have the potential to produce conflict because it alters interests, institutions, policies, and values which have become entrenched in a particular political system. Such conflict can materialize in either constructive or destructive form.Footnote 76 As a leader with a weak grassroots base, Abdullah lacked the ability and facility to gauge the real strength of conservative elements that existed in both his party and the wider political system. Amidst early indications of Abdullah making his own mark in Malaysia's national leadership, Bridget Welsh detects an impending clash of values between Abdullah's initiatives and Mahathir's philosophy of a strong executive and unswerving loyalty.Footnote 77 Further limitations were imposed by the Mahathir-era hangover effects from rampant corruption, collusion, and nepotism.Footnote 78 Eighteen months into his tenure, Abdullah implicitly admitted to the presence of bottlenecks which confronted his reforms with ‘symptoms of malaise and inertia’.Footnote 79 Reflecting on the overall political developments throughout his administration, Abdullah confessed, ‘Reforms are not easy. I have tried so, so very hard and it is not easy. . .You can't just rush in and bulldoze through and have an “I don't care a damn” attitude.’Footnote 80

In the economic sphere, Abdullah's resolve not to further increase the number of mega projects incurred the displeasure of financially powerful UMNO elites. The Little Napolean malaise became a serious obstacle against Abdullah's efficiency drive in the public sector.Footnote 81 Conservative Islamists censured Abdullah in reaction to his calls for more dialogue to resolve multi-faith issues, aggravating already tense ethnic relations. What would have been his hallmark reform, an independent Police Complaints and Misconduct Commission (IPCMC), had to be watered down following resistance from within UMNO and the police force, giving credence to the emergence of a powerful ‘bureaucratic conservatism’. Two other bodies whose founding was significant for Abdullah's transparency agenda, the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) and the Judicial Appointments Commission (JAC), were also approved only in their watered down versions, unable to stay clear from UMNO-emanated criticisms. At times, Abdullah seemed to be all alone in his battle against corruption and money politics. UMNO delegates, popularly dubbed warlords, did not conceal their uneasiness of and sometimes outright opposition against Abdullah's crusade. Similar doubts were expressed by UMNO economic nationalists against Abdullah's plans to transform government-linked companies and liberalize the economy. Abdullah's own cabinet members forced him to stall the idea of disclosing their wealth to the public by threatening to resign. In short, Abdullah's moderate path raised the ire of UMNO ultra-conservatives, who staged aggressive protests during the controversial UMNO General Assembly of 2006.Footnote 82

Further inflaming the prevailing tension was the provocative displays of racial prejudice by the pro-UMNO Utusan Malaysia and Malay non-governmental organizations (NGOs), another source of grassroots support for UMNO. In a situation where these entities sought to swerve Malay public opinion to the right following the specter of a non-Malay takeover of the country following the 2008 elections, Abdullah's moderate prescriptions and openness were negatively viewed as unbalancing the accepted equilibrium in Malaysia's power-sharing formula, which guaranteed the hegemony of Malay-Muslims via a blurring of boundaries between UMNO and the state. Predictability, a cherished feature of Malaysia's consociational arrangement, became anachronistic. Blame was heaped on Abdullah for charting the trajectory of possible loss of Malay-Muslims’ hegemonic role in politics. His penchant for a conciliatory approach in negotiations with opposition and reformist forces was observed by UMNO conservatives with trepidation. Included in this series of Abdullah's ‘faults’ was the overturning of the conviction and subsequent of release of Anwar Ibrahim, well-known for his pluralist ethno-religious views, from jail in 2004. The disastrous results of the 2008 elections gave the cue for UMNO conservatives to act. In the words of Khairy Jamaluddin, Abdullah's son-in-law who emerged as the leading intellectual behind Abdullah's reform agenda:

There is certainly institutional inertia. The political culture of the ruling elite has been very much one of control. Institutions of governance need to be controlled, the media needs to be controlled, laws must enable control over potential enemies and also the public. Control is power and when push comes to shove you wield that power to stay in power. That's more or less how it worked and how some still feel it should work. When talk of reforms begins, it threatens this status quo, this rule by power and control. Many would naturally want to stall these reforms because they believe it will result in a loss of control.Footnote 83

The most important factor in legitimizing opposition against Abdullah, however, was its endorsement by none other than his predecessor, Mahathir. Reacting to the cancellation of some of his favoured projects and an alleged rise of authoritarianism thought to be uncharacteristic of Abdullah, Mahathir rallied opposition and civil society forces against him. The ‘Abdullah Badawi versus Mahathir’ conflict revealed Mahathir's true colours as a conservative who would rile against any attempt to unwind his legacy. Mahathir's offensive strategy, previously alien to UMNO, eventually convinced voices within Abdullah's cabinet, including present Deputy Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin, to demand that Abdullah's original leadership transition plan be fast-tracked.Footnote 84

Nonetheless, we cannot under-estimate two other factors which carry respective weighting in eroding Abdullah's public legitimacy. Firstly, the effectiveness of the Anwar Ibrahim-led opposition and civil society forces. Ironically, these two movements had to a certain extent backed Abdullah's reform efforts, which however did not go enough towards appeasing them. After a relatively good start, Abdullah's failure to maintain his reform momentum cost him the support of young and non-Malay voters, who in 2004 had backed him on condition that he would deliver on his promises for change. A week before Abdullah's resignation, veteran DAP maestro Lim Kit Siang reflected:

The fault cannot be borne by Abdullah alone, but must be on the shoulders of the rest of UMNO and Barisan Nasional leaderships, for failing to give Abdullah the necessary support, and, in many cases, for actively sabotaging him in the past five years to frustrate Abdullah from walking the talk of long overdue national reforms.Footnote 85

Secondly, what we may call the ‘paradox of reformists’. Abdullah was trapped by his ‘nice guy’ image throughout his Premiership, shackling his capacity to cultivate even semblances of aggressiveness, decisiveness, and ruthlessness – elements which correlate positively with acknowledged notions of effective leadership.Footnote 86 Available evidence suggests that Abdullah was neither a political strategist nor tactician. Pundits are known to have criticized his choice of March 2008 as the moment to call for elections.Footnote 87 Dilatory in implementing his reform programs, he failed to fill his cabinet with credible figures identified with reform.Footnote 88 By showering enviable trust to Khairy Jamaluddin and his team of young advisors, Abdullah drove a wedge with traditional UMNO patronage networks.Footnote 89 While probably giving Abdullah sound theoretical advice,Footnote 90 their portentousness eventually overshadowed Abdullah and counterpoised his good intentions.Footnote 91 With additional problems such as his family's business dealings, Abdullah never came close to surmounting the perception deficit surrounding his image.Footnote 92

Conclusion

Considering that conservatism involves theories of change, and that such changes may potentially cause conflict, the present article adopts the hypothesis that reforms which transpired during Abdullah's administration were manifestations of a larger degree of change which can be encapsulated under the rubric of ‘neo-conservatism’. Analyzing Abdullah's leadership from conservative lenses, one could understand his era better by investigating the dynamics of intra-elite politics, involving the different conservative factions within UMNO in its position as a dominant party. Firstly, the neo-conservative faction, as represented by figures such as UMNO Youth leader Khairy Jamaluddin and former Minister in the Prime Minister's Department, Zaid Ibrahim.Footnote 93 This liberal faction, although a minority, gave unceasing support to Abdullah's reform initiatives in the face of stiff opposition from within UMNO. Secondly, the progressive conservative group, which shares several features with the neo-conservatives but which this group is more circumspect in its advocacy of reform. Included in this group are former Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs Minister, Shahrir Samad, and present Minister in the Prime Minister's Department, Nazri Aziz. Thirdly, the traditional conservatives, among whom may be listed figures like Mahathir, Najib, and Muhyiddin. These pragmatists represent the majority of UMNO members. Finally, the ultra-conservatives, whose right-wing views were voiced out in earnest during the 2006 UMNO General Assembly and manifested recently in the outburst by Ahmad Ismail, the suspended UMNO Chief of Bukit Bendera division, Penang.Footnote 94 For them, the status quo must be defended at all costs.

By applying universal conservative categories to Malaysia's regime form and behaviour, a Malaysian model of conservatism takes shape. In the state-manufactured popular parlance of Malaysians, such conservatism is inextricably linked with the need to preserve communal and religious harmony. Conservatism is reinforced by policies which end up justifying the worries which had been foremost in the minds of conservatives resistant to change. If supported by a heavy dose of authoritarianism, a conservative regime will suffer from lack of dynamism and eventually stagnate. In Malaysia, such stagnation was attributed to, inter alia, a ‘culture of fear’.

Herein lies the contribution of Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, who had to suffer the ignominy of having the shortest tenure among Malaysian Prime Ministers. His weaknesses aside, Abdullah's sharp departure from Mahathirist conservatism was significant in the Malaysian context. This essay offers an alternative way of looking at the dynamics of change in contemporary Malaysian politics, by employing the paradigm of conservatism and the accompanying framework of neo-conservatism, which we believe have eluded observers and researchers of Malaysian politics. This is in line with the assertion picked up from the theme of a recent conference, that:

Conservatives had been among the most powerful political actors in many societies during the 20th century and there seems no reason for a substantial change in the coming years. But the scholar interest to Conservatism still remains weak and Conservatism is mostly neglected as an ideology or a theoretical tool to interpret socio-political phenomena.Footnote 95

About the authors

Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the School of Distance Education, Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM), Penang, Malaysia. He graduated in Philosophy, Politics and Economics from the University of Oxford, gained a M.A. in the Politics of International Resources and Development from the University of Leeds and completed his Ph.D. in Politics at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom. He expresses gratitude to USM for providing an incentive grant which facilitated research for this article.

Muhamad Takiyuddin Ismail is a lecturer at the School of History, Politics and Strategy, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM), Bangi, Selangor, Malaysia. He graduated in Political Science from UKM before successfully pursuing a M.A. at the University of Sheffield, United Kingdom. A doctoral candidate at the School of Distance Education, Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM), Penang, Malaysia, he is currently awaiting his viva voce examination. He wishes to thank USM for funding this research via its Research University – Postgraduate Research Grant Scheme and also UKM for sponsoring his postgraduate studies.

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64 Milne, R.S. and Mauzy, Diane K., Malaysian Politics under Mahathir (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 1Google Scholar.

65 Teik, Khoo Boo, Beyond Mahathir: Malaysian Politics and its Discontents (London: Zed Books, 2003), p. 188Google Scholar.

66 ‘Wawancara: Dr M menilai kepimpinan’, Mingguan Malaysia, 31 October 2004.

67 Cf. Funston, John, ‘Malaysia's Tenth Election: Status Quo, Reformasi or Islamization?’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 22 (1) (2000): 23–59CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Case, William, ‘Malaysia's General Elections in 1999: A Consolidated and High-Quality Semi-Democracy’, Asian Studies Review, 25 (1) (2001): 35–55Google Scholar.

68 ‘Pak Lah: No radical changes when I become PM’, Star, 8 July 2003.

69 ‘Abdullah steps out of Mahathir's shadow’, 30 November 2003, http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/17961 (accessed 22 October 2010).

70 Teik, Khoo Boo, ‘De-Mahathirising Malaysia’, Aliran Monthly, 23 (8) (2003): 2, 4–6Google Scholar.

71 ‘Pengaruh Tun Razak masih ada pada saya – PM’,Utusan Malaysia, 6 June 2007.

72 Kling, Zainal, ‘UMNO and the BN in the 2004 Election: The Political Culture of Complex Identities’, in Swee-Hock, Saw and Kesavapany, K. (eds.), Malaysia: Recent Trends and Challenges (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), p. 191Google Scholar.

73 Welsh, Bridget, ‘Malaysia in 2004: Out of Mahathir's Shadow’, Asian Survey, 45 (1) (2005): 153–4CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Mely Caballero-Anthony, ‘Political Transitions in Southeast Asia’, Southeast Asian Affairs (2005), pp. 27–30.

74 For critical analyses of the eleventh general elections of 2004, see articles in Saw and Kesavapany (eds.), Malaysia: Recent Trends and Challenges.

75 Rustam Sani, ‘Siapa hina usahawan Melayu?’, Siasah, 28 April 2006.

76 Wilson, Francis G., ‘A Theory of Conservatism’, American Political Science Review, 35 (1) (1941): 29–30CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Tompson, ‘Khrushchev and Gorbachev as Reformers: A Comparison’, 79; Mohamad Abu Bakar, ‘Konservatisme dan Konflik’, 124.

77 Welsh, ‘Malaysia in 2004: Out of Mahathir's Shadow’, p. 155.

78 K.S. Nathan, ‘Malaysia: The Challenge of Money Politics and Religious Activism’, Southeast Asian Affairs (2006), p. 168.

79 Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, ‘The Harvard Club of Malaysia Dinner’, 5 May 2005, http://www.pmo.gov.my/ucapan/?m=p&p=paklah&id=2945 (accessed 25 October 2010).

80 ‘Man on a Mission’, The Sun, 4 December 2008.

81 Lim Kit Siang, ‘Abdullah cannot rid the government of “Little Napoleons” when “full-blown Napoleons” like IGP Bakri is allowed scot-free to set the bad example of open insubordination subverting the civilian authority of the Prime Minister, Cabinet and Parliament by publicly opposing the IPCMC’, media statement, 16 April 2006, http://www.dapmalaysia.org/english/2006/april06/lks/lks3871.htm (accessed 20 March 2011).

82 During proceedings of the Assembly, UMNO Youth Information Chief, Azimi Daim, stressed that in tense situations, the blood of Malay warriors risked being spilled. A delegate from Malacca, Hasnoor Sidang Hussein, warned the audience that UMNO members were prepared to be soaked with blood in defending their nation and religion. Hashim Suboh, representing Perlis, rhetorically asked the Youth Chief, Hishamuddin Hussein, when would he resort to use the keris (Malay dagger), having waved it twice during successive UMNO Assemblies.

83 Khairy Jamaluddin, ‘Interview: Time for a makeover’, Off the Edge, 9 January 2009, 44.

84 Hamid, Ahmad Fauzi Abdul, ‘Democracy and the Growth of Civil Society in Post-Mahathir Malaysia: Abdullah Ahmad Badawi's Years in Power’, in AMGT 2010 Proceedings: 2010 UI-KAAS International Conference Asia in the Midst of Global Transformation (Depok: Universitas Indonesia (UI) and the Korean Association of Asian Studies (KAAS), 2010), pp. 4–32Google Scholar.

85 Lim Kit Siang, ‘Abdullah's warning against return of Mahathirism – Will Najib scotch talk of imminent ISA arrest of Anwar?’, 26 March 2009, http://blog.limkitsiang.com/2009/03/26/abdullah%E2%80%99s-warning-against-return-of-mahathirism-%E2%80%93-will-najib-scotch-talk-of-imminent-isa-arrest-of-anwar (accessed 13 January 2010).

86 Joseph Nye, ‘Soft Power, Hard Power and Leadership’, 27 October 2006, www.hks.harvard.edu/. . ./11_06_06_seminar_Nye_HP_SP_Leadership.pdf (accessed 17 November 2009).

87 Shamsul Amri Baharuddin (Professor of Social Anthropology, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia), interview, Bangi, 12 March 2010.

88 Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, interview, Kuala Lumpur, 18 March 2010.

89 Shahrir Samad (former minister in Abdullah's cabinet, 2004–08), interview, Kuala Lumpur, 15 December 2009; Nazri Aziz (minister in both Abdullah's and Najib Razak's cabinet), interview, Kuala Lumpur, 15 April 2010.

90 Edmund Terence Gomez (Professor of Political Economy, University Malaya), interview, Kuala Lumpur, 26 May 2010; Saifuddin Abdullah (deputy minister in Najib Razak's cabinet), interview, Kuala Lumpur, 29 November 2010.

91 Edmund Terence Gomez, interview; Shahrir Samad, interview.

92 Ooi Kee Beng (Fellow, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies), interview, Singapore, 30 March 2010.

93 Brought into the cabinet by Abdullah following the March 2008 elections, Zaid Ibrahim was entrusted with the task of judicial reform, which was stridently attacked by conservative UMNO forces as embodying the voice of the opposition. Zaid eventually resigned from his ministerial position in September 2008 in protest against recent arrests under the Internal Security Act (ISA). He later joined Anwar Ibrahim's PKR, which he also quit in disillusionment in 2010, and now heads a new party, People's National Well-Being Party (KITA: Parti Kesejahteraan Insan Tanah Air). See an account of his experience in UMNO and Abdullah's cabinet in I, Too, Am Malay (Petaling Jaya: ZI Publications, 2009).

94 Ahmad Ismail earned notoriety in August 2008 for publicly calling the Chinese in Malaysia ‘migrants’. Ahmad Ismail's refusal to tender an apology for his statement caused a rift in Penang between UMNO and the Chinese-manjority GERAKAN party, which governed Penang from 1969 until 2008.

95 Tagline for the Conference of Conservatism Studies, ‘New Conservatisms and New Approaches’, Prague, 14–15 May 2010, see http://www.conservatismconference.org/call.html (accessed 29 October 2010).