Examining why wars start has always been a central concern for students of international relations. By comparison, studying how peace is established and why it persists has received less interest, perhaps because it is harder to explain. Addressing that very issue, political scientist Lily Gardner Feldman has written a major new study that focuses on the role of reconciliation in West German and, after 1990, unified Germany's relations with France, Israel, Poland, and Czechoslovakia (later the Czech Republic). These four case studies are appropriate because they represent states with which Germany had had the most difficult political, economic, territorial, humanitarian, and even emotional relationship at the end of World War II. Moreover, attempts at reconciliation on both the governmental and nongovernmental level have proved highly successful in each case. Even Israeli officials spoke in 2009 of “intimate” (175) relations with Germany and called it a partner that should not be taken for granted.

Feldman defines reconciliation in foreign policy as “both process and outcome”; it refers, to “changing conditions of international enmity into a status of bilateral amity, converting old enemies into friends” (1–2). Her first chapter surveys what various academic disciplines can contribute to understanding this process, arguing that reconciliation in international relations does not require “acceptance of the victims of having being victimized” (18)—in contrast, for example, to religious thinking on reconciliation, which emphasizes that victims must extend forgiveness. Instead, they merely have to accept what has happened and recognize the need to move in a more positive direction in the future. She also outlines four analytical categories—history, leadership, institutions, and international context—which she applies to the case studies. By “history,” she means the weight of the past, which provides the initial stimulus for reconciliation and then for the mutual acknowledgment of grievances. The past must also become the “present” through ongoing attempts to use education and commemoration to preserve historical memory. The more intense history's importance is for the process of reconciliation, the more important moral—as opposed to practical—concerns are for both parties. Astute and committed political leadership, as well as a dense framework of governmental and nongovernmental institutions, are as crucial as “history” in this process. Finally, the broader international context can either promote or discourage reconciliation. In particular, strong multilateral ties (e.g., within the European Union) will prevent both sides from avoiding one another and encourage them to further their joint interests.

The four case studies reveal some common patterns: “In all four cases, whether it was societal actors or officials advocating a new approach (French, Polish and Czech examples), or demanding a change in German behavior (the Israeli case), it was the victim who took the initiative” (324-325). The German government responded by acknowledging grievances, both symbolically and concretely. The efforts of nongovernmental actors, and especially religious organizations, always predated official attempts to promote reconciliation, and today a dense network of institutional ties bind Germany to the other four states. Political leaders in all of the countries had to overcome domestic resistance, and their personal relationships—both the good and the bad—helped determine the pace of the reconciliation process. There were also some significant differences, however. For example, the Czech-German relationship could only fully develop after 1990 and is, therefore, the least developed of the four cases (significant nongovernmental ties had developed with Poland long before then). In the Israeli case, there could be no question of a mutual acknowledgment of grievances related to the expulsion of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe. Readers will especially appreciate the author's overview of the complex bilateral institutional frameworks, as well as her coverage of the more recent period between 1990 and 2009, the year her study closes.

Feldman also suggests a new paradigm for understanding pre-1990 German foreign policy. She is correct in emphasizing the importance of reconciliation. It was fundamental to every aspect of the Federal Republic's international activities, and not just with respect to the four cases studied here. More so than the reunification question, it provided a unifying factor for its foreign policy. In this sense, Feldman joins a growing number of students of twentieth-century international relations who downplay the importance of the Cold War when compared to issues such as the North-South split or the legacies of the world wars. But is she correct in asserting that “the cornerstone, perhaps the very definition, of German foreign policy after World War II became, progressively, reconciliation” (18)? West German elites had already signaled a desire for reconciliation before the creation of the Federal Republic, but they pursued it in the context of other political and material interests that limited and perhaps even defined or superseded that goal. Indeed, as the author notes, the Cold War itself severely limited the Germans' ability to improve relations with both Poland and Czechoslovakia. A lesser criticism is that the author does not deal with the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). To what extent did its socialist internationalism and its pledge to end German militarism help it and its population reconcile with neighboring states, in particular in Eastern Europe?

This is an important book on a topic with implications for other parts of the globe. Its underlying message is that reconciliation is a project that requires constant commitment and attention from the participants. In this vein, Feldman closes her book with reflections about how the German experience could be used to promote a better understanding between Japan and its neighbors in the Far East.