The scholarly research on reputations has experienced a renaissance of sorts over the past decade, so much so that one may be tempted to assume it has reached a saturation point, with presumably hardly anything new to be added to the debate. In Reputations for Resolve, Danielle Lupton manages to overturn that assumption: making an original statement about how leaders acquire reputations and significantly contributing to this burgeoning area of research.
The major contribution of Reputation for Resolve is in shifting the analytical focus to address the underexplored issues of who holds reputations for resolve and how these reputations are formed in the first place. Lupton makes a convincing case that we should turn our attention to leaders themselves. They are ultimately responsible for the conduct of foreign policy, often going to great lengths to cultivate others' perceptions of their own resolve while forming beliefs about the resolve of other leaders as well (pp. 18–19). It follows that leaders can and do hold reputations and that these are distinct from those of their predecessors in office.
After establishing the need for a leader-specific theory of resolve, Lupton turns her attention to the issue of how these reputations are formed, generating several novel hypotheses. First, when new leaders take office, their behavior is critical, because there are no prior cues to inform us about their reputations for resolve. Moreover, these early signals become reference points for expectations about their future behavior; as such, the reputation that is forged early on persists over time and is difficult to change. Second, statements of resolve should not be viewed as mere cheap talk; instead, they do have a certain informational value. Irresolute behavior, for example, may or may not be damaging to a leader’s reputation, depending on whether it was preceded by statements generating beliefs that he or she is strongly resolved. For this reason, Lupton wisely advises leaders against excessive bluster (e.g., threats of “fire and fury” against North Korea), because it can create unreasonably high expectations that a leader might not be able to meet. Third, although earlier studies examined how contextual factors—balance of interests or power and regime type—interact with behavior in influencing reputations, Lupton takes a fresh theoretical angle to explain the interactive mechanism. Much like statements, these contextual factors can have a critical impact on forming expectations about future actions. Reputations are therefore generated or reinforced by the consistency between anticipated actions based on, say, the involved interests and the revealed level of resolve from the leader’s current behavior.
Another strength of the book is in Lupton's choice of a multimethod approach, which is deftly used in four empirical chapters. Chapters 2 and 3 present two separate experiments. A “single leader” experiment (chapter 2) is based on a creative process-tracing experimental design to ascertain how reputations are formed and whether they change over time at three different stages of interaction: summit, negotiation, and crisis stages. A “leader transition” experiment (chapter 3) further provides evidence that new leaders generate reputations that are distinct from their predecessors. As with all experiments in international relations, there is certainly the question of external validity, although Lupton argues convincingly in defense of her experimental design. She then turns again to the process-tracing technique for two case studies, analyzing Khrushchev’s assessments of Eisenhower’s (chapter 4) and Kennedy’s (chapter 5) resolve. These cases are thoughtfully chosen to hold constant the adversary leader (Khrushchev), relative power, and the interests at stake by exploring the same issue (Berlin). It is commendable that, rather than relying only on secondary sources, Lupton consults both US and translated Russian archival data as her primary sources. Indeed, the empirical chapters alone would be valuable additions to graduate methodology courses or more specialized seminars on experimental or qualitative research.
As expected from any good research, Lupton’s book also opens avenues for future research and discusses policy implications, thoughtfully summarized in the conclusion. For example, her case study of the 1955 Geneva Summit and 1958 Berlin crisis showed that Secretary of State Dulles generated a reputation that was distinct from that of Eisenhower, suggesting that research may need to be extended to actors other than leaders themselves. Or, in the case of the 1961 Vienna summit and subsequent Berlin Wall crisis, the absence of prior information about Kennedy’s resolve early in his tenure prompted Khrushchev to look for cues from his voting record in Congress and campaign statements. Reputations, therefore, may begin to form well before a leader takes office. These issues, and others, can provide fruitful lines of future inquiry.
Inevitably, even the best research is subject to critique, and one can disagree with certain aspects of this book. For one, the past studies are presented through a simple dichotomy between the “supporters” and “skeptics” of reputation research. Although this may be a useful framing device, it ignores much of the theoretical and empirical nuances in the arguments made by the scholars on reputation. Moreover, these scholars rarely provide an unqualified and simplistic evaluation of the significance of reputations, a fact that can easily elude a simplified dichotomous discussion of the “pro” and “con” literature. Perhaps for this reason, there is only scant discussion of the extant research on some of the same contextual factors that Lupton explores, specifically the balance of interest and balance of power. There is significant prior research that addressed the issue of whether and how contextual factors can affect and modify the reputational inferences that others draw from a state’s behavior. A more detailed discussion of this research would certainly help situate the contributions of Reputation for Resolve in such a broader debate.
While employing experimental and qualitative research methods, Lupton reaches a conclusion similar to some formal-theoretic and quantitative studies that find value in investing in a reputation for firmness. However, she also correctly cautions that the reputation-forming process should be conducted with care, because it may easily lead to dangerous situations that are difficult to control when behavior is driven strictly by reputational concerns. For example, by clarifying the special interests in Cuba in 1962, Kennedy effectively decoupled the Cuban Missile crisis from his weak reputation established in Geneva and during the Berlin crisis. Although I wholeheartedly agree with this cautionary conclusion, it should also be recognized that this point is unlikely to be lost on reputation skeptics. In other words, if the stakes were the ones that ultimately mattered, then there needs to be further refinements in explaining how reputational behavior was relevant as well.
On the whole, this is an important book that is a welcome addition to the ongoing research on reputation and foreign policy, while also having important policy implications. In addition to its novel theoretical contribution, Lupton's study is also valuable in demonstrating the validity of a multimethod approach through her well-crafted qualitative and experimental research design. As such, Reputation for Resolve should have a strong appeal to diverse audiences, ranging from scholars and students of international politics to the broader policy community.
