This interesting and complex book examines the role of law in defining the identity of the three major contenders for political power in Mandate Palestine: the British, Jews, and Arabs. The author, an associate professor on the law faculty at Tel Aviv University, argues that an understanding of how law shaped identity (and vice versa, how individual and collective identities shaped debates about and formulation of law) undermines a “dichotomous colonizer/native framework” that is detrimental to a more nuanced understanding of both legal history and the history of the conflict (p. 17).
The book is divided into three sections (“the British,” “Jews,” and “Arabs”) and nine chapters. Likhovski examines four levels of interaction between law and identity: the structure of the legal system, legal norms, the legal educational system, and demands for legal reform. He also explores six types of interaction between law and identity. In the introduction he positions his argument squarely within discussions of colonialism and, more specifically, colonial legal history. He criticizes studies of colonial law that focus on how it serves [colonial] power and is used as an instrument of conflict. “Law is not merely about power,” he states. “It is also about self-definition” (p. 8). In Mandate Palestine it was a “place where group identities were created, reflected, and disseminated with special intensity” and thus a way to answer the question of who or what one was (p. 2).
Over half of the book focuses on the British. Likhovski starts out by analyzing the legal structure and different jurisdictions the British inherited from the Ottoman Empire and how they dealt with adapting, codifying, and revising the legal system of Palestine. The court structure was complex: not only did the British have to administer the more formal state, municipal, and religious courts, such as Islamic courts, they also had to cope with “unofficial” courts: village, bedouin tribal courts, and Hebrew Courts of Arbitration (established by Zionist Jews who wanted to avoid Ottoman, rabbinical, or European courts). Issues of jurisdiction became sources of conflict “not only between but also within communities” because those making legal decisions gained power within the overall community (p. 39). The British became caught up in these disputes.
Paralleling the standard interpretation of British Mandate policy in Palestine overall, Likhovski characterizes British legal policy in Palestine as ambivalent and contradictory. The colonial power attempted to both preserve the legal status quo and make “civilizing” changes. The British had to decide and negotiate how and when to allow traditional, communal structures (with their attendant legal notions) to prevail and how and when to “import” English law into Palestine (called Anglicization), thereby replacing local law. The latter engendered debates about notions of justice and the universality of legal norms. Racism and discriminatory views of the “other” (both Arab and Jew) also informed and reinforced inconsistencies. On the one hand, some officials conceived their role to be bringing “more advanced” Western law to the “natives”; on the other hand, they viewed natives as unfit to be governed by Western laws.
Identity infused legal debates. Likhovski illustrates this in a complex discussion of Article 46 of the Palestine Order-in-Council, which states that “in the absence of Ottoman laws or local Palestinian legislation,” the civil courts would use common law or “doctrines of equity in force in England” but only “so far as the circumstances of Palestine and its inhabitants permit and. . .as local circumstances render necessary” (p. 61). The interpretations of this article differed widely according to the individual (colonial) judges' identities, as well as their attitudes toward the “natives” and natives' identities. This article, and cases in which it was used to issue judgments, forced judges “to compare the English and the inhabitants of Palestine, and to discuss their similarities and differences.” Thus arguments of the judges, the author says, were based on the question of “whether ‘the character of the English people’ was or was not ‘very different from [that] of the inhabitants of Palestine’” (p. 63).
The complexities of this are illustrated in Likhovski's discussion of different chief justices. One, William Fitzgerald, was “willing both to use English law and to recognize its defects” (p. 82). In doing so, he introduced new “dichotomies”: “the English ‘us’ was broken into two groups (tyrannical, tradition-preserving lawyers and democratic, progressive laypersons)” (p. 77). Likhovski notes that Fitzgerald was Irish; his discussion of Article 46 is informed by awareness of judges' (national, among others) self-definitions and even ethnic backgrounds, although he does not attribute their positions solely to these factors.
Using cases of child slavery, child marriage, and industrial child labor, Likhovski argues that legislation was an “active tool, used for representing identity” (p. 86). He highlights that in trying to legislate these sensitive issues, the British were less interested in the actual lives of the children affected than in how their legislation represented the British government (as progressive, enlightened, etc.) to various audiences, mainly the international community and British public.
The second part of the book, on the Jews, contains one of the best chapters, “Crafting Law to Fit Identity.” Likhovski examines the movement for revival of Hebrew law in Palestine, a complicated and internally contentious movement. As he notes, the Zionist attempt to “revive” Hebrew law was ultimately “not so much the restoration of an old tradition as the invention of a new one” (p. 128). Nationalism intruded, creating contradictions and tensions between secular Zionists and ultraorthodox Jews. The revivers both romanticized and attempted to distance themselves from the past. The ancient (Talmudic) law, associated with a time when the Jews were “free,” was preferred over the legal traditions of the hated exile as part of the attempt to create a legal system that would reflect the “identity. . .of the new ‘Hebrews’ of Palestine. . .in a way that would fit Zionist Jews' new imagined identity” (p. 152).
The question (and contradiction) remained, however: how to “weed out those parts of Jewish law that did not conform to modern values,” as much of the older, more traditional Jewish law did not (p. 135). Zionist identity was furthermore constructed in relation to “others”: the diaspora Jew and the “Oriental” Arab. Revival was focused on “exorcis[ing] the exilic and Oriental traits of Jewish law” (p. 138). What further complicated this agenda was disagreement among the revivers as well as (in some cases) individual revivers changing their views over time. Thus the revival was fraught with contradictions in both theory and among its theorists. At the core of the debate was Zionism.
The third part is perhaps the weakest section of the book. One of Likhovski's main arguments regarding the relationship between Palestinian Arab identity and the law is that “French law. . .came to serve as a surrogate national identity for some of Palestine's lawyers” (p. 190). Analogous to Egyptian nationalists, Palestinian nationalist lawyers developed an “infatuation with French culture” as a method of opposing British rule and a “procontinental” (pro-French) position that advocated adopting French legal norms and opposing Anglicization (p. 185). This argument is not entirely convincing. His major evidence, an article written by a Nablus lawyer for the only Palestinian Arab legal journal, al-Huquq, rather than expressing a “procontinental” view instead articulates a very complex and nuanced critique of British law that analyzes it from a wide variety of different perspectives, including one that explicitly invokes British principles of judicial independence.
In his conclusion, Likhovski again refers to the false dichotomy of colonizer/native. “The British, Arabs, and the Jews cannot be placed exclusively on one side of the colonial equation. None of the three groups clearly supported change, modernization, or Westernization” (p. 217). The history of the Mandate was one of “two partially Westernized communities facing the question. . .how to espouse modernity while preserving their unique non-Western identities” (p. 219). These comments raise a critical point that underlies the author's analysis: throughout the book he seems to mostly accept certain definitions of “West” that equate it with modernity and notions of universal law. The dichotomies he sets up in the book—East/West, traditional/modern, particular/universal—require more deconstruction.
Also important to this argument are clearer definitions of the various “identities” he invokes: British, Arab, and Jew. Likhovski never fully discusses what he means by various delineations (including, for example, “ultraorthodox,” which is frequently used). To his credit, however, he does recognize the instability and fluid nature of the identities he discusses.
The book is mostly well written, engaging, and intelligently argued. It is also challenging and complex in places, especially where he uses English legal terms (“remedy of specific performance,” “bona fide purchaser in market overt,” “doctrine of consideration,” pp. 67, 71, 64), which most nonlawyers would not understand. The legal issues are intricate. The two chapters that deal with the Arabs are not as strong as those on the British and the Jews. This seems partially a problem of sources: Likhovski overly relies on a few, major sources in these chapters (the legal journal al-Huquq, which published for only five years in the 1920s and a book by district commissioner ʿArif al-ʿArif) and does not seem to have utilized material for the Mandate period such as the Arabic press and memoirs. The chapters on the British and the Jews, however, are strongly argued and richly sourced.
Toward the end, Likhovski asks, “How can one talk about the Jews as colonizer when their legal thought shows Zionism as a Third World rather than European phenomenon?” (p. 219). A discussion of this link is elusive in what comes before this question. Ultimately, although his main thesis regarding how identity shapes law and vice versa is compelling, his attempts to delink Zionism from colonialism are less convincing.
