Across political party lines, American foreign policy leaders are drawing greater attention to women as a specific group, from First Lady Hillary Clinton's claim that “Women's Rights are Human Rights” in 1995 to President Donald Trump establishing the Women's Global Development and Prosperity Initiative in 2019. Despite this increased attention, we have little understanding of how and why women matter to American foreign policy. Are these women-focused foreign policies “feminist” (and if so, what kind of feminist? Liberal? Imperial? Global? American?), a form of “cheap talk,” a new way to achieve strategic American foreign policy objectives, and/or an extension of domestic gender politics? Is the United States committed to global women's rights as an American foreign policy goal? How are the interests of women worldwide represented? The aim of this article is to shed needed light on these questions by analyzing the political dynamics surrounding three pieces of American foreign policy legislation that focus on foreign women as the policy target.
Foreign women and girls potentially affected by these American foreign policies have neither electoral power over how their interests are constructed nor offer any electoral incentive to democratically elected U.S. leaders. Traditional theories of democratic representation offer no clear explanation (Mayhew Reference Mayhew1974) of how and why members of Congress dedicate their limited time and resources to these issues. To help us better understand the representation of women in American foreign policy, I explore the political dynamics surrounding American foreign policy legislation that directly refers to foreign women and/or girls as policy targets, which I refer to as women's foreign policy. Footnote 1 To accomplish this, I conduct a qualitative comparative case study analysis of the three women's foreign policy bills introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives during the 111th Congress (2009–10) that had the greatest number of congressional cosponsors, suggesting broader congressional support (Koger Reference Koger2003). The high number of cosponsors reflects considerable efforts by the lead sponsors of these bills, who can be described foreign policy entrepreneurs (Carter and Scott Reference Carter and Scott2009) or critical actors for women (Childs and Krook Reference Childs and Krook2009). They have dedicated much of their limited time and resources to building a coalition, lobbying other members, and even changing policy language in the bill to ensure broad congressional support. Given that each of these three bills was sponsored by a Democratic member of Congress and that there was a Democratic president (Barack Obama), a Democratic majority in the U.S. House, and a Democratic majority in the U.S. Senate during the 111th Congress (unified Democratic government), one may expect that these women's foreign policy bills had a fairly decent chance of passing into American foreign policy statute at this time. Despite the persistent efforts of the bill sponsors and issue advocates, however, all three bills ultimately failed to pass the House.Footnote 2
The first case is a bill advocating for the Senate to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), with 136 cosponsors. The second case, with 134 cosponsors, is the International Violence Against Women Act (IVAWA), a proposed policy that prioritizes reducing gender-based violence worldwide. Finally, the International Protecting Girls Against Child Marriage (IPGCM) Act, legislation that would enhance mechanisms to eliminate child marriage and hold foreign countries more accountable, is the third case for analysis, with 112 cosponsors. In each of these cases, I investigate the political context surrounding the bill and analyze the obstacles to passage.
Based on my interviews with issue advocates, legislative staff, and members of Congress, as well as my analysis of secondary materials, I find a shared pattern of women's foreign policy bill failure: domestic gender politics. More specifically, my study reveals that antiabortion politics constrained the legislative process in Congress in each of the cases, regardless of relevance. This suggests that foreign women's bodies can serve as a terrain for U.S. legislators to advance antiabortion policy objectives with minimal electoral constraint. The boundaries of women's representation in American foreign policy appear to be drawn by domestic gender politics. Though more research is needed, these findings offer new insight into the political dynamics surrounding women's foreign policy legislation, the representation of women, congressional decision-making, and the impact of domestic politics on American foreign policy.
REPRESENTATION, GLOBAL WOMEN'S RIGHTS, AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
Gender and politics scholarship has only begun to explore the impact of gender on foreign policy, and much of this research has been within the fields of comparative politics (Barnes and O'Brien Reference Barnes and O'Brien2018; Bashevkin Reference Bashevkin2014; Koch and Fulton Reference Koch and Fulton2011; Towns and Niklasson Reference Towns and Niklasson2016) and international relations (Aggestam and Bergman-Rosamond Reference Aggestam and Bergman-Rosamond2016; Tickner and True Reference Tickner and True2018). When it comes to the case of gender and American foreign policy, studies have focused primarily on gender differences in American public opinion (Eichenberg Reference Eichenberg2003; Fite, Genest, and Wilcox Reference Fite, Genest and Wilcox1990; Lawless Reference Lawless2004). Studies of congressional behavior rarely explore American foreign policy decision-making (Lindsay Reference Lindsay1994), let alone the impact or import of gender. Perhaps since the American public is fairly inattentive to foreign policy (Holsti Reference Holsti2004), research shows that members of Congress typically make American foreign policy decisions based on what they individually believe is best for the country, with minimal electoral constraint or incentive (Carter and Scott Reference Carter and Scott2009; Lindsay Reference Lindsay1994). Early studies on gender and American foreign policy centered on a few elite women as American foreign policy actors, such as Eleanor Roosevelt, Bella Abzug, Margaret Chase Smith, and Jeane Kirkpatrick (Crapol Reference Crapol1992; Jeffreys-Jones Reference Jeffreys-Jones1997) or the gender dynamics inside the U.S. Departments of State and Defense (McGlen and Sarkees Reference McGlen and Sarkees1993).
Research is expanding, however, and scholars have begun to take a deeper look at the relationship between gender and American foreign policy. In her study of the U.S. women's movement from 1916 to 2000, Goss (Reference Goss2009) argues that U.S. women's interest groups lost their influence over the broader U.S. foreign policy agenda and were restricted to testifying in Congress on global women's issues alone rather than foreign policy more generally. Goss highlights how this emphasis on separate “women's issues” in American foreign policy beginning in the late 1960s ultimately prevented U.S. women's groups from voicing how gender mattered for all aspects of American foreign policy. Though my study looks only at bills that emphasize women as a separate group, future research needs to explore how issues affecting foreign women are represented in all forms of American foreign policy and explore how U.S. interest groups have shaped the representation of global women's rights in American foreign policy.
In terms of the representation of women's rights as an American foreign policy objective, we know little. Scholars have analyzed the representation of women's rights as an American domestic policy objective (Carroll Reference Carroll and Rosenthal2002; Costrain and Majstorovic Reference Costain and Majstorovic1994; Dodson Reference Dodson2006; Swers Reference Swers2002; Washington Reference Washington2008; Wolbrecht Reference Wolbrecht and Rosenthal2002), showing how social movements, political parties, the gender of members of Congress, and even familial relations can affect the representation of American women's rights. In terms of American foreign policy, similar to domestic policy (Swers Reference Swers2002), we do know that women in Congress are more likely than men to introduce women's foreign policy legislation, acting as global surrogate representatives of women (Angevine Reference Angevine2017). However, the content of these women's foreign policy bills and/or the political dynamics these bills face after introduced to Congress is unknown. Are these bills an extension of U.S. domestic gender policy objectives, with similar support and opposition, or are they an extension of U.S. foreign policy objectives, with similar support and opposition? Since foreign women have no direct electoral power, how are claims of women's representation formed, authorized, and challenged? Research needs to clarify and make transparent this murky context in which the representation of women worldwide takes place by U.S. political actors.
Global Women's Rights as American Foreign Policy
Drawing from studies on gender and development, there are several plausible reasons why one may expect to see support for global women's rights in American foreign policy by members of Congress. This may be a way for members of Congress to extend their American foreign policy agenda. Advancing the status of women advances the American foreign policy objectives of promoting democratic stability and capitalist economic development and the moral objective of protecting universal human rights (Hudson et al. Reference Hudson, Caprioli, Ballif-Spanvill, McDermott and Emmett2009; Inglehart and Norris Reference Inglehart and Norris2003). In addition, scholars show how drawing attention to “saving” foreign women can be an effective ploy to support U.S. military intervention or imperialism via masculinist protectionism (Mohanty Reference Mohanty2014; Young Reference Young2003). Thus, one could expect support for advancing the status of foreign women and girls, even if it is only “cheap talk.”
However, advocating for women in foreign countries could be highly contentious, given domestic and international divisions on what should constitute “global women's rights” (Hawkesworth Reference Hawkesworth2012; Htun and Weldon Reference Htun and Weldon2018). By this rationale, members of Congress may prefer to avoid the potential blowback from their constituents and steer clear of a potentially divisive issue that would affect their reelection chances (Mayhew Reference Mayhew1974). Legislators may also perceive this as a cultural issue that the United States should not interfere with in foreign countries. Lastly, U.S. foreign policy is dominated by masculine values, reflecting a culture of hegemonic masculinity (Leatherman Reference Leatherman, Tolleson-Rinehart and Josephson2005), and thus issues affecting women may simply be considered a lesser priority as feminine and not important.
Representation and Global Women's Rights
It is difficult to assess representation without an electoral connection. Political theorist Michael Saward (Reference Saward2006) argues that the claim of representation is the critical act of representation, when elected leaders construct the referent (the represented) and their interests. To better understand representation, one must interrogate representative claims. “[E]xploring the representative claim can provide us with a rich range of insights and hypotheses about the dynamics of political representation that conventional, and even more recent innovative, views miss, by and large” (Saward Reference Saward2006, 305). Following Saward and work by Celis et al. (Reference Celis, Childs, Kantola and Krook2008) on measuring the representation of women as a group, this study looks at specific legislation that claims to represent the interests of women in foreign countries.
Without direct electoral ties, one wonders what motivates a member of Congress to represent women in foreign countries. The claim of “advancing women's rights” has often been used by leaders for alternative political purposes (Farris Reference Farris2017; Teele Reference Teele2018). For example, in her study of Islamophobia in Europe, Sara Farris (Reference Farris2017) shows how nationalist political parties strategically framed “advancing women's rights” as a tactic to justify targeting Muslim men as threats and to Westernize migrant women (primarily women of color). Similarly, members of Congress may be applying this strategic frame of “advancing women's rights” in foreign countries to justify their own political interests. Postcolonial feminist theorist Gayatri Spivak (Reference Spivak, Nelson and Grossberg1988) argues that the power dynamics between imperialism and patriarchy have paired to create a discourse where the protection of the subaltern woman serves as a symbolic measure of a good society. She argues that “white men saving brown women from brown men” (Reference Spivak, Nelson and Grossberg1988, 92) has animated rationales for colonialism and calls for scholars to trace mechanisms of imperialism, investigate the silences, and critically analyze representations.
The American Policy Formation Process
When investigating the action of representation, one must explore how members of Congress, legislative staff, and issue advocates work to advance their policy proposals in government. Representation is not only making the claim, but also the repeated acts of advancing the claim and dedicating time and resources to the claim. Hall (Reference Hall1998) argues that to understand representation, one needs to focus on the participation of members of Congress. For example, in the House of Representatives, there are 435 members of Congress who all have their own political agenda. The “work” of legislating in Congress is primarily conducted by policy entrepreneurs building broader support for one's own legislation, such as by gaining cosponsors and through the committee structure. Members of Congress will likely lobby the chairs of the respective committee for their bill to hold a hearing (Fenno Reference Fenno1973). Then, inside the committee there may be a markup of the bills to reflect the interests of other committee members, with the hope that the agreed-upon policy language will pass out of the committee so that it can be voted on by the broader chamber and ultimately have a chance of being passed into law. Most bills are not ever marked up by the committee, and very few become law. For example, in the 111th Congress, of the 9,583 bills introduced to Congress, just 1,006 were considered by committee, and only 265 passed into law.Footnote 3 Though there has been an increase in “unorthodox lawmaking” (Sinclair Reference Sinclair2016) that skips some of these critical legislative steps, overall, the policy-making process is slow and deliberative in U.S. democracy by design. Thus, all bills face obstacles advancing on a crowded political agenda.
METHOD
The aim of this research is to analyze the political context surrounding the representation of foreign women in American foreign policy, which I call women's foreign policy. I define a bill as a women's foreign policy bill if it directly references foreign women and/or girls in the Congressional Research Service summary of the bill and is referred to the House Foreign Affairs Committee. These bills make a representative claim on behalf of foreign women (Saward Reference Saward2006). To best understand the political context surrounding women's foreign policy, I apply a qualitative comparative case study approach. A qualitative case study analysis offers the best method for respondents to articulate rationales in their own words and offers richer detail regarding the nuances of the legislative process. This type of analysis can better illustrate the competing relationships, contested meanings, and the political dynamics that surround this legislation. Case studies “capture various nuances, patterns, and more latent elements that other research methods might overlook” (Berg Reference Berg2009, 318).
The first case study focuses on a House bill supporting Senate ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. The bill was introduced by House Representative Lynn Woolsey (D-CA) and garnered 136 House cosponsors in the 111th Congress. My second case study is the International Violence Against Women Act of 2010, with 134 House cosponsors. In the House, Representative Bill Delahunt (D-MA) was the lead sponsor, and Representatives Jan Schakowsky (D-IL) and Ted Poe (R-TX) made up the driving legislative coalition. Senator John Kerry (D-MA) was the lead sponsor in the Senate and chair of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations at the time. The final case is the International Protecting Girls by Preventing Child Marriage Act of 2009, with 112 House cosponsors. Representative Betty McCollum (D-MN) in the House and Senator Richard Durbin (D-IL) acted as the lead sponsors. All the lead sponsors were white, but the political party and gender vary.
During this Congress, of the 435 members of the House of Representatives (excluding the delegates of Guam, Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia), there were 257 Democratic members, of whom roughly 22% (56) were women, and 178 Republican members, of whom roughly 10% (17) were women (CAWP 2019). When examining each case, I compare the party and gender demographic proportions of the bill cosponsors to the party and gender proportions in the House. Though my study focuses on the legislative activity in the House of Representatives, I also take into account the impact of any related legislative activity in the Senate.
Over the three cases, I conducted 27 formal interviews between 2011 and 2013. I asked the respondents to reflect upon the political dynamics surrounding the legislation during the 111th Congress and offer their explanations of why the bill in question failed to pass. I interviewed 15 legislative staff members from both political parties, 11 issue advocates, and 1 member of Congress.Footnote 4 Four of the legislative staff respondents had served as House Foreign Affairs Committee staff working specifically on women's foreign policy issues. In addition, I spoke with two other members of Congress and several other legislative staff members informally. I also analyzed Dear Colleague letters, newspaper articles, press releases, hearing transcripts, C-SPAN videos, and the House floor debates related to each of these bills. Each of these cases offered a unique lens through which to view the representation of foreign women. For each case study, I first summarize the history of the policy, describe the political dynamics in the 111th Congress for the bill, and outline the obstacles to passage. Comparing across the cases, I then discuss the shared obstacle of antiabortion politics and offer an analysis of why they constrain the fate of any women's foreign policy legislation.
CASE 1: PUSHING THE SENATE TO RATIFY CEDAW, HOUSE RESOLUTION 22
[I]t is long overdue for the United States to stand with the women of the world in their effort to obtain the basic rights that women in this country [United States] enjoy.
—Ambassador for Global Women's Issues Melanie Verveer, CEDAW hearing, 2010With the greatest number of cosponsors in the 111th Congress (136), House Resolution 22 expressed the sentiment of the House that the Senate should ratify CEDAW. The convention is a United Nations (UN) human rights treaty that requires states to take proactive action to protect the rights of women (Baldez Reference Baldez2014). The central aim of CEDAW is to urge countries to place legislative provisions to protect the rights of women in their own country. The official CEDAW language was adopted in 1975 at the International Women's Year Conference in Mexico City, Mexico (Hawkesworth Reference Hawkesworth2012; Joachim Reference Joachim2007). After several years of negotiations, the UN General Assembly approved CEDAW in 1979.Footnote 5 CEDAW is considered the foundational global women's rights treaty and supported by women's rights activists worldwide (Joachim Reference Joachim2007). It is a unique case of women's foreign policy since, as a global women's rights treaty, CEDAW's principles apply to American women and foreign women. However, in the 111th Congress, issue advocates and proponents framed CEDAW as a vehicle to support the rights of foreign women so that they could enjoy the “basic rights” that American women enjoy, as illustrated by the quote at the beginning of this section.
At this time, the United States is the only highly industrialized country that has not ratified CEDAW. The Senate holds the constitutional authority to ratify treaties, and it has been pressured by the House and the president to ratify CEDAW throughout the last 30 years. In the 1980s, women's rights became more closely aligned with the Democratic Party (Wolbrecht Reference Wolbrecht and Rosenthal2002), and support for CEDAW from the Republican Party waned. During the 103rd Congress (1993–94), newly elected Representative Woolsey acted as the CEDAW proponent in the House. As CEDAW gained momentum in Congress, the opposition was amplified.Footnote 6
Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) emerged as the central voice opposing CEDAW. Helms and Representative Chris Smith (R-NJ) worked to prevent this “radical feminist” bill from moving forward in Congress. Thus, CEDAW has been pending in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations for more than 30 years. In each year since her 1992 election, Representative Woolsey has introduced legislation in the House urging the Senate to ratify CEDAW, and she has continued to gain legislative cosponsors.Footnote 7
Political Dynamics of the 111th Congress
The 111th Congress was a favorable political opportunity structure for CEDAW ratification. President Obama supported CEDAW ratification and selected CEDAW advocate Senator Joe Biden (D-DE) as his vice president and Senator Hillary Clinton (D-NY), a vocal global women's rights advocate, as his secretary of state. Woolsey again introduced her bill (H.R. 22) urging Senate CEDAW ratification and gained numerous cosponsors (136). Of her 136 cosponsors, 135 were Democrats (of whom 36% were women), and she had one Republican man as a cosponsor. During the 111th Congress, a Senate hearing was held on CEDAW, but not in the Foreign Relations Committee. On November 18, 2010, the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Human Rights and the Law held a public hearing, Women's Rights Are Human Rights: U.S. Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Footnote 8 This was the first time the Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing on CEDAW and the first congressional hearing on CEDAW since 2002. The 2010 CEDAW hearing in the 111th Congress brought U.S. public attention back toward CEDAW, but little legislative action occurred beyond that. Though the House bill was symbolic and had nearly a third of the chamber as sponsors, it still did not pass.
Failure of CEDAW: International Governance and Abortion Politics
There are many reasons why CEDAW continues to fail in Congress, but concerns over the authority of international governance and the perceived impact of CEDAW on domestic abortion policy are the most critical. With CEDAW, the very first U.S. Understanding (a method of clarifying a UN document to conform with domestic law) attached to CEDAW was the Helms Understanding, which stated that “nothing in this Convention shall be construed to reflect or create any right to abortion and in no case should abortion be promoted as a method of family planning” (as proposed in 1994, attached in 2002).Footnote 9 This language was a compromise to move CEDAW forward in the Senate at the time. As CEDAW was gaining momentum in the 111th Congress, opponents drew attention to CEDAW and domestic abortion politics. The argument that this UN treaty would surrender authority to an international governing body and that the CEDAW Committee would have direct influence over domestic abortion policy alarmed many in the United States opposed to abortion access. However, the CEDAW Committee only has the power to make recommendations for U.S. domestic law (Baldez Reference Baldez2014).
Proponents of CEDAW focused on how this legislation would improve U.S. standing as an advocate for global women's rights, advance the status of women in foreign countries, and expand support for women's rights in domestic policy. When CEDAW was first introduced in Congress, the House bill in support of ratification connected CEDAW passage to the importance of passage of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). This connection to the rights of U.S. women was not in the version introduced in the 111th Congress, perhaps because momentum behind passing the ERA in the United States was lacking. As one legislative staff member pointed out, “You're talking about equal rights for women around the world and that we are going to be a signatory? We don't have equal rights in our constitution, so you think people are really going to rally?”
Links between CEDAW and domestic gender politics appeared to be stronger for those opposed to abortion access. My respondents highlighted how opposing CEDAW was an excellent issue for Republican members of Congress and helped garner financial support for their reelection campaigns.
If you want one single fund-raising issue for the pro-life movement, bring up CEDAW. And the money will flow in. Bring up the threat of CEDAW. As long as I worked on the issue, it has always been like that. And even like, partial references to it, people [Republican members of Congress] are terrified. They don't want to be seen with it [supporting it]. . . . I mean, I cannot emphasize enough that it's like, the biggest kind of worst issue for any Republican. You mention it, and they will run screaming in the other direction. (Republican legislative staff member)
Republican members of Congress perceived a strong electoral threat if they chose to support this legislation and electoral incentives to oppose it.
On the other hand, Democratic members of Congress appeared to garner minimal electoral incentive to push the legislation forward. If anything, Democratic members were concerned that bringing up CEDAW ratification would stir up domestic gender politics on abortion.
Political actors still had a fear of opening up difficult political arguments around abortion and family planning that had happened in previous sessions in regards to CEDAW. I don't think that was the main reason but just knowing that it is an ever present risk when talking about any bills involving women's rights. That the anti-abortion activists will start to make it about abortion when in fact, CEDAW says nothing at all about abortion. But it will inevitably come up. (issue advocate)
My respondents lamented that few grassroots leaders in the United States emphasized the potential for CEDAW to expand domestic gender equality and American women's rights. One global women's rights issue advocate based in the United States lamented that there was “[n]ot a cohesive coalition, not a strategy. From what I saw, it was a lot of very, very high-level conversations that are happening, but none of the boots-on-the-ground, really-trying-to-get-things-moving-type things, no strong push for it.” Considering that CEDAW applies the principle of global women's rights to foreign women and American women, one may expect to see greater interest from the U.S. feminist community as a global intersectional feminist policy. Yet, as one staff member pointed out, the ERA has still not passed Congress.
In sum, the House bill supporting Senate ratification of CEDAW has been introduced in every Congress since the 111th and has never passed. Even though the House bill is only symbolic (since only the Senate can ratify treaties), there is still not enough legislative support for this gesture. In the 115th Congress (2017–18), Representative Carolyn Maloney (D-NY), who represents the UN buildings in New York City, began introducing the legislation and calling for the ratification of CEDAW with Woolsey's retirement. At the time of this writing, Representative Maloney also consistently sponsors legislation calling for the ratification of the ERA. CEDAW and the ERA still languish in committee.
CASE 2: THE INTERNATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT OF 2010, HOUSE RESOLUTION 4594
Anything that says “woman” or “health” is just like: abortion, abortion, abortion.
—Democratic legislative staff memberThe International Violence Against Women Act of 2010 is the second most widely supported U.S. foreign policy bill targeting women abroad, garnering 134 bill cosponsors (127 Democratic, 7 Republican) in the House during the 111th Congress. Of the 127 Democratic sponsors, 36 were women (roughly 28%). Of the seven Republican sponsors, there was only one woman (roughly 14%). In contrast to CEDAW, IVAWA maintains U.S. sovereignty while combating gender-based violence globally. Unlike the IPGCM Act, IVAWA targets numerous forms of gender-based violence, focuses on women (rather than girls), and substantially restructures the U.S. foreign policy administration to prioritize these issues.
In the 111th Congress, the initial IVAWA proposed policy language that created a five-year strategy to reduce violence in specific countries that have high levels of violence against women and girls, set up a central infrastructure within the Department of State to end violence against women, and appropriated the necessary funds to do so. IVAWA established the Office of Global Women's Issues in the Department of State in statute and appropriated $10,000,000 for it. It also created the Office for Women's Global Development within the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and appropriated $15,000,000 for the office. IVAWA required that one year after the bill's enactment, the ambassador-at-large for global women's issues and the director of women's global development present a five-year strategy to prevent and respond to violence against women and girls in the countries that are the most dangerous for women. In sum, IVAWA was considered by advocates to be a piece of groundbreaking legislation that would place stopping violence against women as a pillar of U.S. diplomacy and U.S. foreign aid.
Political Dynamics of the 111th Congress
During the 111th Congress, Senator John Kerry was the new chair of the Committee on Foreign Relations and the lead sponsor of IVAWA. On the House side, Representative Bill Delahunt was the lead IVAWA sponsor. In addition to Delahunt, Representative Jan Schakowsky, co-chair of the Women's Caucus at the time, signed on as a lead sponsor. Representative Ted Poe agreed to be the lead Republican cosponsor to strengthen bipartisan support. This House bipartisan coalition of Delahunt, Schakowsky, and Poe, in conjunction with the lead Senate sponsor being chair of the Committee on Foreign Relations, positioned IVAWA well for passage.
Kerry held an IVAWA hearing in the Senate Committee of Foreign Relations on October 1, 2009. According to Kerry at the hearing, this was “the first time that violence against women on a global scale has been the subject of a hearing of the full Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.”Footnote 10 A few weeks later, on October 21, 2009, the House held an IVAWA hearing titled International Violence Against Women: Stories and Solutions in the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight. Legislative momentum was building.
The Congressional Caucus for Women's Issues held several luncheons on IVAWA at which the lead sponsors emphasized how IVAWA would not cost any extra foreign aid dollars. The fiscal climate was particularly challenging at this time, and gaining support for new foreign aid programs was difficult. The exact amounts were then removed from the bill language, and the message shifted to stress how IVAWA would restructure existing U.S. foreign aid dollars. Several months later, on December 14, 2010, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations approved IVAWA. Although the bill was placed on the Senate legislative calendar on December 21 under General Orders (Calendar no. 725), a vote was not held before the 111th Congress adjourned. The Republican Party had decisive victories in the November 2010 elections, and it was difficult to move any legislation that could be considered controversial during the final days of the Democratic majority in the House.
Failure of IVAWA: Money and Abortion Politics
The two critical obstacles identified by my respondents to passing IVAWA were the initial costs of the bill and domestic abortion politics. My respondents described how members of Congress, legislative staff, and issue advocates were able to resolve the tensions over the costs, but the abortion issue remained. The legislation appeared to be well positioned for passage, yet terms such as “health” still triggered abortion politics. The legislation addresses women's safety, which includes dimensions of health. The original crafters of the bill wanted to draw attention to gender-based violence and steer clear of divisive abortion politics. That was an impossible task, according to my respondents (marking the boundaries of how foreign women's interests can be represented), at least for members of the Democratic Party.
The goal of the IVAWA community was stopping violence against women. And everybody said, “We don't want to move the ball on abortion. We don't want to move it forward. We don't want to move it back. We don't want to touch it. We don't want it to become a bill about abortion.” But you know, it just happened, and I think with a lot of international women's issues, it just happens. There's a strong pro-life movement that is wary of progressive members putting forth legislation about women and questions, “Is it a covert way to expand abortion rights?” (Democratic legislative staff member)
In each of my interviews, respondents pointed out how legislation that explicitly represents women, such as IVAWA, can be perceived as a potential vehicle for abortion politics. One issue advocate detailed the relationship as follows:
[I]n the case of IVAWA, one of the sticking points was the definition of violence against women. In the U.N. definition of violence against women, is the phrase, “psychological violence,” which makes sense a form of violence. But, some people thought that could open the door to abortion . . . And in the House, that's why it really never went anywhere—is because there could never ever be a resolution to that issue. (issue advocate)
During the markup phase of IVAWA in the Senate, there were efforts to place restrictive policy language in the bill to prevent funding from going to any foreign organization that discussed abortion. The legislative staff I spoke with continued to echo the issue advocate's position.
At that point, we didn't want to add 30 pages of abortion language to a bill that had nothing to do with abortion . . . It was simply the word, “health.” In the bill, it said, “Address basic health needs of women and girls.” The word, “health” in itself triggers all sorts of things. (Democratic legislative staff member)
[T]he biggest issue is abortion. And the bill does not deal with abortion. It's not intended to either expand or restrict current abortion law. The question was, how to make that clear in the language in a way that everybody was comfortable with. (Democratic legislative staff member)
On the Republican side of the legislative aisle, my respondents indicated that Representative Chris Smith (R-NJ), as chair of the Pro-Life Caucus at the time, was largely responsible for determining what language was permissible. If he perceived the language as problematic, he could request that pro-life interest groups score the vote. “People trust him [Smith], and also, people fear him because he holds these groups, like all the groups that score on the pro-life issue—National Right to Life, Family Values Coalition, all these groups—he holds them in the palm of his hand,” according to one Republican legislative staff member. Thus, if a member of Congress voted in favor of the legislation, this may be perceived as supporting abortion and affect their abortion score, a cumulative average of how members of Congress vote on abortion. His office had raised concerns over the policy language in IVAWA. In sum, my interviews with legislative staff and issue advocates yielded the same perplexing dilemma. Abortion politics are forced into the policy negotiation despite efforts from proponents to keep them separate. IVAWA has been reintroduced each Congress since the 111th with little legislative movement.
CASE 3: THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTING GIRLS BY PREVENTING CHILD MARRIAGE ACT OF 2009, HOUSE RESOLUTION 2103
These young girls, enslaved in marriage, will be brutalized and many will die when their young bodies are torn apart while giving birth. Those who voted to continue this barbaric practice brought shame to Capitol Hill.
—Senator Dick Durbin, press release, December 16, Reference Durbin2010The International Protecting Girls by Preventing Child Marriage Act of 2009 is the third most widely supported U.S. foreign policy bill targeting women abroad, with 112 bill cosponsors (101 Democratic, 11 Republican) during the 111th Congress. Of the 101 Democratic cosponsors, 29 were women—close to 29%. Of the 11 Republican cosponsors, there was only one woman (roughly 9%). This bill had the greatest number of Republican cosponsors overall. The IPGCM Act was a piece of legislation that directed USAID funds to prevent child marriage in developing countries, created a multiyear strategy to prevent child marriage, promoted the empowerment of girls at risk, directed the Department of State to collect data on child marriage rates, and assessed the impact of child marriage on hindering U.S. development goals. The bill's aim was to “promote the educational, health, economic, social, and legal empowerment of girls and women” in foreign countries (H.R. 2103). By emphasizing the rights of girls, this framing focused on young females (girls) rather than older females (women). This perhaps created a distance from traditional global women's rights debates connected to sex and reproduction. Representative Betty McCollum sponsored the IPGCM Act, H.R. 2103, and the companion Senate bill, S. 987, was introduced by Senator Richard Durbin.
Political Dynamics of the 111th Congress
The IPGCM Act had a relatively short history in Congress. It was first introduced in the Senate on July 13, 2006 (S. 3651) during the 109th Congress (2005–06). Momentum grew behind the legislation in the 109th and 110th Congresses. Again, given the unified Democratic government and support for global women's rights in the 111th Congress, advocates felt this might lead to passage. On July 15, 2010, the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission in Congress, chaired by Representative Jim McGovern (D-MA), held a hearing on how child marriage is a harmful traditional practice that violates human rights. The bill was considered noncontroversial and the primary concern was the cost of the legislation.
Of my three cases, this bill advanced the furthest in the legislative process. In the Senate, Foreign Relations Committee chair Kerry held a markup on the bill, and it was slightly amended on September 21, 2010. It was clarified that the IPGCM would not authorize any new foreign aid funds. On October 26, 2010, the Foreign Relations Committee passed the bill, and it was reported favorably out of committee. After passing out of committee, the IPGCM Act was then voted on in the Senate and passed unanimously. The act, S. 987, was then sent to the House on December 2, 2010, where the process did not run as smoothly.
On December 14, 2010, Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) introduced an alternative version of the act, H.R. 6521. It mirrored portions of McCollum's bill but did not authorize appropriations or implementation procedures, which the issue advocates felt were the “legislative teeth” of the bill (Rogin Reference Rogin2010). The next day, House Committee on Foreign Relations chair Howard Berman (D-CA) moved to suspend the rules in order to hold the House vote on the IPGCM Act (the version that had passed the Senate reflecting McCollum's bill language). Time was critical as the 111th Congress (with a Democratic majority) drew to a close. The 112th Congress, with a Republican majority in the House, began in January 2011.
Under a suspension of the rules whereby a two-thirds vote in favor is needed for legislation to pass, the IPGCM Act was put to a vote in the House at 8:04 p.m. on December 15, 2010. After the chorus of yeas in the chamber, the chair declared that the bill had passed via a favorable voice vote. Representative Dan Burton (R-IN), dissatisfied, then ordered that the vote be officially tallied and placed on the legislative record. The chair tabled the vote for the next evening, December 16. The next morning, both a “Dear Colleague” letter and a whip alert advising members to vote against the IPGCM Act circulated, stating that “House Minority Leader John Boehner (R-Ohio), Whip Eric Cantor (R-Va.) and Committee on Foreign Affairs Ranking Member Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-Fla.) all oppose it” (Terkel Reference Terkel2010). At 7:33 p.m. on December 16, the vote on McCollum and Durbin's IPGCM Act was officially taken, and it failed to reach the two-thirds majority necessary to pass (241 yeas to 166 nays).
Failure of IPGCM Act: Partisanship and Abortion Politics
Based on my interviews and analysis of secondary documents, the IPGCM Act failed as a result of heightened partisanship and abortion politics. When the Republicans gained a majority of House seats in the 2010 election, they were in a favorable position to deploy partisan tactics during the lame duck session. Instead of letting Democrats succeed in passing this legislation, Republican Party leadership used the issue of abortion effectively stop passage. On the morning of the House vote, a whip alert was sent out to members stating that “there are also concerns that funding will be directed to NGOs that promote and perform abortion and efforts to combat child marriage could be usurped as a way to overturn pro-life laws” (reported in Terkel Reference Terkel2010). This was the first time the issue of abortion was mentioned in connection with the IPGCM Act. The whip alert sent by the Republican leadership was able to incite fear in members of Congress by suggesting that voting in favor of the IPGCM Act would be considered a vote for abortion access- and thus counted as a part of their abortion policy scorecard. This threat was so effective that members of Congress who were cosponsors of bill, including Democratic congresswoman Marcy Kaptur (D-OH), voted against it.Footnote 11
The day after the vote, Representative Steven LaTourette (R-OH), disgusted by the partisan politics on this issue that he supported, chastised his own political party on the House floor. As a cosponsor of the IPGCM legislation and global advocate for women and children, he was disappointed that abortion politics effectively killed this legislation.
Yesterday, I was on the floor, and I was a co-sponsor with a piece of legislation with the Gentlelady from Minnesota, Ms. McCollum, that would have moved money—no new money—would have moved money so that societies that are coercing young girls into marriage, we could build them latrines so they could go to school. Or we could make sure that they stay in school so they're not forced into marriage at the age of 12 and 13. But all of a sudden, there was a fiscal argument. When that didn't work, then people had to add an abortion element to it . . . We should stop the nonsense, approve the bill and move on. (Representative LaTourette, Congressional Record, December 17, 2010)
It is unusual for a Republican House member to defy party leadership given the importance of party discipline in the House for achieving legislative outcomes (Baker Reference Baker2000). LaTourette articulated how abortion politics “nonsense” was a political tactic to ensure the defeat of legislation. My interview respondents echoed similar dissatisfaction with the application of abortion politics.
It passed unanimous consent in the Senate, right? But the House Republicans sent out a blast message to their caucus saying, “This will further abortion. Do not vote for this.” So, all of those 20 or 30 Republicans that were on the bill jumped off instantly, because they didn't want to be labeled as such. (Democratic legislative staff member)
This final case study on the IPGCM Act reveals the pervasiveness of antiabortion politics on any women's foreign policy bill progress in Congress. A piece of legislation that targets the rights of girls to be free from forced marriage did not pass the House due to an implication that the bill would support abortion access. Josh Rogin, a respected columnist for Foreign Policy, wrote an article the following day titled “How Ileana Ros-Lehtinen Killed the Bill to Prevent Forced Child Marriages.” Though many global women's rights advocates, based primarily in Washington, DC, were shocked and disappointed, this was the lone piece of media coverage for the political move. This strategic maneuver sent a strong message that any piece of women's foreign policy legislation, even for seemingly noncontroversial purposes, could be a vehicle for abortion politics with little consequence.
THE BOUNDARIES OF WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
Much research has examined the representation of women in American domestic policy (Dodson Reference Dodson2006; Swers Reference Swers2002; Wagner Reference Wagner2018; Wolbrecht Reference Wolbrecht and Rosenthal2002). By analyzing how and why women are represented in American foreign policy, this research provides new insight into what happens to the boundary of content (the representation of women) when crossing the boundary of country. My findings reveal that domestic gender politics extend abroad, which has implications not only for the representation of women but for advancing U.S. interests broadly speaking.
Abortion is one of the most divisive political issues in the United States. In their book Abortion Politics in Congress, political scientists Scott Ainsworth and Thad Hall argue that “abortion is the centerpiece of one of the most important political movements of our era” (Reference Ainsworth and Hall2011, 14), referring to the advancement of civil rights for women. Focusing on domestic abortion policy in the House of Representatives, they find that some members of Congress take more extreme positions (in contrast to incremental change) on abortion in order to send signals to their electoral base, increasing the divisiveness of the issue. They illustrate the pervasiveness of abortion policy, showing how bills introduced that address abortion come from multiple committee jurisdictions. Even though American foreign policy is supposed to focus on advancing U.S. national interests, such as reducing national threats or advancing global liberal values, the constraint of abortion politics on American foreign policy is evident. The entire U.S. Foreign Assistance Act has been stalled in committee on several occasions because of antiabortion politics (Carter and Scott Reference Carter and Scott2009). Although one may expect antiabortion policy entrepreneurs to place the issue on the agenda, the broader question is why antiabortion politics are so effective at constraining all women's foreign policy legislation in Congress. I suggest three reasons: (1) party polarization and power, (2) the subjectivity of global women's rights, and (3) the lack of U.S. electoral constraint or incentive.
Party Polarization and Power
Republicans and Democrats are deeply divided on how to represent women's policy issues broadly speaking, and this distrust is pronounced on women's policy issues in foreign countries. “You have communities that are inherently distrustful of each other, and very, very little dialogue between those communities” (Republican legislative staff member). Members on both sides of the aisle do not trust their counterparts when it comes to language. Veteran Democratic and Republican legislative staff members described their history in this policy arena:
So, in the House, I would say that the pro-life agenda makes it very difficult to get bipartisanship on a women's issue and I mean any women's issue—at least when you are talking about international assistance. Maybe domestically too. It really makes it hard. And sometimes you're thinking: “Really? Like, [frustrated laugh] Wait. How is this an issue? What does this have to do with pro-life?” And then, someone will say to you, “Well, this member thinks that the term, women's rights is too broad and could be read to include access to abortion, which some liberals, or Democrats, think is a right for women.” And the Republicans, or some Republicans, but certainly enough that they have political power in the party, are so opposed that the ranking member cannot agree to the terms “women's rights” anywhere in this nonbinding resolution, and won't let you move the resolution until you change that. And you're like: “Oh, come on!” Like, it's on a resolution that might have been on International Women's Day or something. (Democratic legislative staff member)
As a Republican staffer, when you look at certain legislation, you look for certain triggers—references to CEDAW or, you know, certain choice language and certain phrasing. And if you're not experienced on the issue, you don't know to look for that. But then, the problem on this issue is that Democrats and Republicans view language so differently sometimes. (Republican legislative staff member)
The term “women's rights” is connected to abortion for many members of the Republican Party. According to my respondents, even a nonbinding resolution celebrating International Women's Day was not allowed to include a triggering set of terms, including “women's rights.” This culture of distrust between the parties reduces all foreign women's rights to one issue: abortion access.
Amid heightened party polarization, party leaders hold greater power and authority. During the 111th Congress, these cases illustrate a lack of support for women's foreign policy from party leaders and strong support by one specific group: Democratic women. In the 111th Congress, Democratic congresswomen were disproportionately overrepresented as lead sponsors and cosponsors of these bills.Footnote 12 Although a Democratic congresswoman was Speaker of the House (Nancy Pelosi, D-CA) at the time, this did not ensure that Democratic Party leadership could protect these bills from antiabortion politics. Perhaps the unified support from Democratic women fostered resistance. Republican women were disproportionately underrepresented as bill sponsors or cosponsors on these cases, potentially signaling a partisan gender divide.
The Subjectivity of Global Women's Rights
Women's foreign policy legislation differs from women's domestic policy legislation because the aim of U.S. foreign policy is to represent U.S. national interests abroad, whereas the aim of U.S. domestic policy is to represent the interests of one's own constituents. The connection between global women's rights and U.S. national interests abroad is subjective. One legislative staff member described how the uncertain political structure, in which the “Mexico City [a U.S. foreign aid policy on aid and reproductive health] comes and goes” created a “more tenuous” political climate for discussing international women's issues or more politically charged global women's rights. In contrast, this staff member felt that “domestically, we've come to accept certain things will not be funded . . . So, it's just a little bit more baked and concrete domestically. But, internationally, we see it on every Appropriations bill, every time Mexico City comes and goes.” Women's rights in domestic policy apparently have a far more agreed-upon set of policy terms than in American foreign policy.
As a result, members who work on women's foreign policy legislation are perpetually ensnared by ambiguity. A Democratic legislative staff member, when describing two pieces of legislation their boss had put forward in which “neither one dealt with abortion,” found that abortion politics “got injected into the conversation for no reason.” They described how this member of Congress, though she is pro-choice, was trying to create separate conversations on global women's rights, specifying different dimensions of the definition. “Like, let's have a conversation on the role of family planning. But that's over here. This [reference to policy] is a separate issue.” Ultimately, the subjectivity of global women's rights creates ambiguity and openings for exploitation, where political actors can more readily insert antiabortion politics, regardless of relevance.
Lack of U.S. Electoral Constraint or Incentive
Studies show that members of Congress are more likely to make American foreign policy decisions based on their personal policy preferences because their constituents are less involved (Lindsay Reference Lindsay1994). As such, when antiabortion politics are inserted into U.S. domestic policy, the pro-choice feminist community mobilizes to combat the issue. Though not always successful, members of Congress who advocate for American women's right to safe, legal access to abortion have greater political cover to fight antiabortion legislation when their constituents are engaged and supportive. Antiabortion or pro-life issue advocates have shifted their efforts on state-level abortion policies partially due to the resistance they face in Congress passing legislation.
When it comes to the insertion of abortion politics into U.S. foreign policy, though, there is minimal electoral incentive or constraint. Namely, these bills affect a constituency that offers no direct electoral constraint or incentive. Thus, it is far easier for members of Congress to make decisions based on their own personal policy preferences. As long as members of the U.S. electorate exert no electoral constraint or incentives on women's foreign policy legislation, I expect that this legislation will continue to serve as a vehicle for abortion politics. This will likely deter members of Congress from sponsoring any women's foreign policy legislation, let alone expending the political capital and resources to see the bill pass.
CONCLUSION
I really don't want to work on this issue [women's foreign policy] anymore. Because I cannot stand it. I cannot stand being around it, because I think my personal responsibilities as a staffer, and my first inclination as an individual, is to be a problem solver. And you cannot problem-solve on this issue. You have two sides that are just intransigent.
—Republican legislative staff memberAs the foregoing quote suggests, antiabortion politics constrains the legislative process for all women's foreign policy, regardless of relevance. This global extension of domestic gender politics has far-reaching implications for not only the human rights of women and girls but also for advancing U.S. national interests abroad. This study shows that if the word “women” or “girl” is in the language of proposed foreign policy legislation, if the bill represents the interests of foreign women, members of Congress have been successful in suggesting that it could be a vehicle for abortion politics. Implying that a women's foreign policy bill may support access to abortion, even minutes before the final vote, can lead to members of Congress to vote against it, across party lines and even if they are cosponsors of the bill. Foreign women's bodies appear to be a policy terrain for U.S. legislators to advance antiabortion policy objectives with little to no constraint or consequence.
Although members of Congress, issue advocates, and legislative staff have a far more expansive global women's rights agenda, my comparative case study reveals that the only global women's right that is of concern to many members of Congress, mostly Republican, is access to abortion. This appears to be the boundary of women's representation in American foreign policy, at least for policies introduced by the Democratic members in the 111th Congress. Recently, Republican congresswoman Kristi Noem (R-SD) shepherded the Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017 to passage, and Republican congressman Ed Royce (D-CA) led the passage of the Women's Entrepreneurship and Economic Empowerment Act of 2018. Further research is needed to analyze how these two women's foreign policy bills, sponsored by Republicans, were able to successfully navigate the legislative labyrinth of domestic abortion politics.
Focusing on the case studies of this article, my findings offer new insights into how global women's rights are represented in American foreign policy and the pervasive constraint of domestic gender politics on abortion. The electoral benefit for members to work on global women's rights appears to be minimal, while the cost in resources is high. In addition, I find that although bill cosponsorship can serve as a measure to evaluate congressional support (Koger Reference Koger2003), it is not as reliable a reflection of a member's substantive commitment (Wilson and Young Reference Wilson and Young1997). This study reveals that foreign women's voices are not “heard” or prioritized in the political process; rather, members of Congress, their legislative staffs, and numerous issue advocates construct the U.S. political representation of global women's rights. Future research can offer richer exploration of how women's foreign policies are created, defined, and legitimized.
U.S. foreign policy decisions have a substantive impact on the lives of people of all genders in foreign countries. The United States is the world's largest global donor, has the largest military, and exerts global soft power in terms of cultural influence (Hook Reference Hook2015). Research shows that investing in women reduces poverty (Summers Reference Summers1994), improving women's political rights curbs terrorism and intrastate conflict (Fish Reference Fish2002; Melander Reference Melander2005), and women are more likely to reinvest their income into their children's education and health (Kennedy and Peters 1992). Preventing gender-based violence has been shown to increase the probability of peace and security (Coleman Reference Coleman2004; Hudson et al. Reference Hudson, Caprioli, Ballif-Spanvill, McDermott and Emmett2009). Thus, improving the rights of women and girls has a positive impact on the quality of women's lives, community development, and the achievement of broader liberal policy goals. However, despite the importance of advancing global women's rights for achieving strategic American foreign policy goals (and global liberal humanitarian objectives), domestic gender politics are ultimately shaping how global women's rights are represented. By extension, antiabortion politics are constraining U.S. national interests and the interests of foreign women. Until the American electorate offers a stronger incentive or political party leadership places greater pressure on members, the representation of global women's rights in American foreign policy will continue to be aborted in the U.S. Congress.
