Scholars of Middle East politics still bear the scars of the ideological and epistemological fights that have dogged Middle East studies and the social sciences since the behavioral revolution. The MENA region remains largely excluded from studies of global patterns, and many regional specialists remain marginalized in American political science. The question of democracy has been particularly contentious. As different areas of the world rode successive waves of democratization, Middle East specialists struggled to explain why in “their” region authoritarianism endured. The advent of the “Arab Spring” failed to trigger the long-awaited paradigmatic shift, and highlighted anew the inability to predict important political developments. On the question of democracy, some regional specialists abandoned altogether the transition paradigm, while others focused on the region's exceptionalisms. In parallel to these debates, the thorny policy question of whether Western democracy promotion is good or bad for democratization remains unsettled. In the case of the Middle East, there are plenty of good justifications on opposite sides of the argument. J. N. C. Hill's book, Democratization in the Maghreb, provides valuable insight into these controversies and underscores what scholars of Middle East politics stand to gain and lose when pressed to make the region's politics intelligible in universal social scientific terms.
Democratization in the Maghreb investigates why the regimes of Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, and Mauritania were affected so differently by the Arab Spring. Hill notes that with the exception of Tunisia's democratic progress, the nature and structure of power in the other cases remained intact even as each individual country adapted differently. These four regimes are all authoritarian, confronted by similar social demands and contestation, and threatened by comparable political adversaries. Hill argues that regional specialists misdiagnosed the Arab Spring and overlooked its divergent impact precisely because they focused too much on these regimes’ common characteristics and failed to observe significant differences among them. As a result, they could not foresee the possibility of authoritarian breakdown in separate individual countries, and once the protests toppled the head of states in Tunisia and Egypt, they mistakenly anticipated a democratic wave across the region. In that vein, Hill strives to highlight the distinct features that might account for their divergent outcomes.
Hill contextualizes each case by drawing on Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way's Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). In a nutshell, Levitsky and Way proposed a theoretical model that explains and predicts why some former Cold War satellites democratized while others settled on competitive authoritarianism or relapsed into closed autocracy. In this model, three major factors interact: the depth of a regime's linkage to the West, the extent of Western leverage on a regime, and a regime's organizational capacity to withstand domestic contestation. But the model puts more weight on the role of the West, particularly the US and European Union's (EU) push for democracy in a given country, than on domestic factors. If linkage and leverage are high, then a country is more likely to democratize somewhat irrespective of its organizational capacity.
Conspicuously absent from Levitsky and Way's study is the entire Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Hill takes Levitsky and Way to task for this omission. In four successive chapters, Hill systematically examines how linkage, leverage, and regime capacity interact to explain the Maghrib countries’ divergent political trajectories. The most compelling cases in support of linking Western pressure to political outcome, according to Hill's analysis, should be the liberalized autocracies of Morocco and Tunisia that have no significant natural resources, have extensive political and economic ties with the West, and stand vulnerable to Western democratizing pressure. Yet the two cases could as easily be used to demonstrate the importance of local actors.
Hill sounds oddly too solicitous of Levitsky and Way's model in order to make the broader policy argument: The West never committed seriously to supporting democracy in the MENA region. In Tunisia, Bin ʿAli's “competitive authoritarian” regime was tightly linked to the West, but leverage via democracy promotion was never fully employed. Hill shows that since independence, Tunisia's political and economic ties to the European Union and the United States increased steadily through trade, financial aid, investments, and cooperation. Yet despite the existence of different US and EU democracy initiatives, Hills shows, the West was reluctant or unwilling to press the regime of Bin ʿAli. In terms of organizational capacity, the regime was relatively strong and cohesive. But the orchestrated division between the security services and the military proved fatal when the regime was faced with sustained mass protests. Overall, Hill's analysis of Tunisia during the Arab Spring points to the centrality of local actors and the minimal role of the West. Thus, as the book suggests, it is not clear exactly how Levitsky and Way's model would have explained better the political trajectory of Tunisia and how US and EU democracy programs would have accelerated the collapse of Bin ʿAli's competitive authoritarianism.
Morocco is another case in point. Although Morocco has not engaged in a serious process of democratization as in Tunisia, the regime's long-standing competitive authoritarianism (predating the Cold War) and episodic slides into closed autocracy seem to be driven by internal dynamics (monarchical succession, social movements, civil society activism, and undesirable electoral outcomes) rather than by Western democracy promotion. According to Hill's three criteria, Morocco has strong links to the West and high state organizational capacity but the West has low leverage over the regime. This assessment suggests that the regime should be highly authoritarian during and after the Cold War. Yet, until recently, the Moroccan monarchical system is arguably the closest model to authoritarian pluralism in the region. And the regime's political trajectory, namely, the cyclical periods of reforming and backsliding, does not seem to match Western pressure or leniency. For example, the 2011 constitutional reform and the following competitive elections that the Party of Justice and Development (Islamist) won singlehandedly were the regime's reaction to mass protests, not Paris’s or Washington's edicts. In sum, while the West could certainly be more coherent and genuine in its commitment to democracy, democratic progress might ultimately depend on the size, coherence, and influence of local democratic actors. If democratization in the Maghrib is still a mirage, this could plausibly reflect the weakness of a democratic base. An exploration of the Maghrib's political elites, nature of social movements, and quality of democratic discourse could reveal great insights.
The other two cases, Algeria and Mauritania, present a different kind of challenge to Hill's analysis. Algeria has every reason to remain a tightly closed authoritarian regime. According to Hill's own analysis, the regime's organization capacity is strong (buttressed by rent from gas and a nationalist ideology), links to the US and the EU are moderate, and Western leverage is weak. Yet, the regime in Algeria was arguably more competitive than Tunisia's and, at moments, even Morocco's. As many scholars argued, Algeria was the first in the region to implement serious democratic reforms. These included the establishment of the multiple party system and the organization of free and competitive elections, which the Islamic Salvation Front was poised to win overwhelmingly in 1991. Algeria was also the least affected by the Arab Spring and, as many regional specialists pointed out, the bloody civil war that followed the military intervention (1991–94) is an important factor. Algerians were simply reluctant to take to the streets when the only two realistic choices (remnants of the National Liberation Front/military establishment or the Islamists) were not appealing. Again, the vicissitudes of the authoritarian regime in Algeria could be explained independently from Western linkage or leverage. The absence of a serious democratic alternative that can benefit from external support also motivates the regime's behavior. Likewise, Hill's case of Mauritania illustrates Levitsky and Way's foundational argument that not all political transitions lead to democratization. Yet we have long known that regime transitions are inherently uncertain, which is among the rare consensuses of the literature. In the Maghrib, Mauritania is the least exposed to Western democratization pressure and has the weakest organizational capacity; but like other countries in the region, it experienced episodes of democratic opening and backsliding in which Western behavior mattered little.
In sum, Democratization in the Maghreb illustrates that divergent political trajectories in Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania could be equally explained by gauging the behavior of local actors, and more specifically the relative strength and course of action of democracy advocates, rather than by these states’ linkage to the West or the intensity of Western leverage. This conveys a stark but important question: why should the West and the authoritarian regimes take seriously the democratization path when autocracy remains the only game in town?
