The election of Barack Obama generated a flurry of policy reports recommending a new US stance towards Latin America. The Washington Office on Latin America produced a progressive policy blueprint entitled ‘Forging New Ties: A Fresh Approach to US Policy in Latin America’. The Inter-American Dialogue produced a moderately liberal set of recommendations entitled ‘A Second Chance: US Policy in the Americas’. In advance of the US election, the determinedly centrist Council on Foreign Relations issued a task force report, ‘US–Latin America Relations: A New Direction for a New Reality’.
The volume edited by Lowenthal, Piccone and Whitehead grew out of a Brookings Institution project that brought together a panel of prominent US and Latin American leaders who issued yet another set of recommendations for Obama, ‘Re-Thinking US–Latin American Relations: A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World’. Several of the overview essays in this volume began as briefing papers for the Brookings panel, and the panel's final report closely tracks their recommendations. Nine other chapters cover what the editors call ‘hard cases’: Colombia, Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia, Mexico and Haiti.
It is striking how similarly all these different policy reports frame the problem of contemporary US relations with Latin America, and how closely their policy recommendations agree. All share the view that President George W. Bush left hemispheric relations a shambles, due to a combination of neglect, imperious unilateralism and utterly unrealistic policies on trade and Cuba. As Piccone's chapter reports, polling data confirm that the reputation of the United States in Latin America stood at low ebb in 2008. Moreover, the election of social democratic and left populist governments in much of the region demonstrated that the popular will in Latin America was sharply at odds with the Bush administration's unwavering faith in unfettered markets and minimalist government.
All the recent policy reports, and this volume as well, recommend that President Obama inaugurate a new approach to Latin America based on greater multilateralism, greater reliance on soft power rather than hard, and greater openness to dialogue with friends and adversaries alike. They differ principally in how sweeping a vision of the new relationship they advocate. This volume opts for modesty, urging Obama to focus on a handful of key issues, since US foreign policy priorities are likely to lie elsewhere.
The essays in this book are written by highly respected experts, sophisticated in the ways of Washington's policy debates. The overview essays are especially valuable, providing both a good assessment of the current state of US–Latin American relations and a coherent vision of what a new relationship might look like. The country-specific chapters provide a quick briefing on the political and economic coyuntura and how each country arrived there. Each country chapter then proceeds to recommendations for US policy. If these authors' collected recommendations were all adopted, US policy would be light years ahead of what it has been in the past eight years – though, granted, that may not be a high bar. Yet in places the authors are almost too sensitive to what the Washington policy debate will bear, too bound by their knowledge of the limits of the possible. Most of these recommendations are solid, sensible, middle-of-the-road proposals designed to appeal to a broad swath of policymakers from centre-left to centre-right, which, of course, is precisely the political terrain the Obama administration's policy is likely to occupy. Most of the proposed changes are incremental rather than representing significant new departures.
Crafting policy proposals with such broad appeal is not without its pitfalls. Maintaining broad appeal comes at the price of sometimes sidestepping tough issues rather than confronting them head-on. In a number of the country chapters on ‘hard cases’, the authors dodge hard decisions by simply describing difficult problems without offering clear solutions, or without acknowledging the trade-offs their solutions entail. The drug war is a good example. While Lowenthal's overview chapter offers the specific suggestion that Washington shift its focus from fumigating the crops of small farmers to following money transfers, the two chapters devoted to Colombia simply say that Washington has let the drug war distort policy on bilateral relations. Neither, however, offers any alternative to the failed policy of the supply-side war on drugs. They proceed instead to discuss all other aspects of US–Colombian relations, while effectively ignoring the elephant in the room.
Should the Colombia Free Trade Agreement (FTA) be conditioned on human rights improvements? While the authors acknowledge the shortcomings of Colombia's human rights record and admit that conditionality like that embodied in the Leahy amendment has produced human rights gains, they argue for disconnecting Colombia's FTA from human rights. They make sound arguments for the importance of the FTA to US–Colombian relations, but they are less than candid, in my view, about the loss of leverage on human rights that such delinkage inevitably entails.
The chapters on Haiti make a valiant attempt to argue that this unfortunate island is important to the United States and deserves attention, but their recommendations – support for strengthening Haitian state institutions and poverty reduction – are not much different from past US policies that proved spectacularly unsuccessful.
The chapter on Mexico offers a detailed assessment of that country's problems, in particular the fragility of its democratic institutions, but it does not provide much guidance for prospective policymakers other than advising them to treat Mexico with respect and as an equal. The controversy over the Mérida Initiative goes unmentioned.
The chapter on Venezuela makes explicit a fact that is less overtly acknowledged elsewhere in the volume, but which may account for the modesty of its recommendations. Washington no longer has all that much leverage in Latin America, especially over large countries like Venezuela, Colombia and Mexico. There is, therefore, not much the United States can do to assure its preferred outcomes. Indeed, the recent case of the Honduran military coup puts in stark relief the current limits of US influence. If Washington cannot bend the Honduran political elite to its will, even when acting in concert with the entire Organization of American States (OAS), then the days of the hegemonic presumption are clearly past.
Despite the Summit of the Americas in April 2009 and the OAS General Assembly in June, at the time of writing we still do not know many details about President Obama's Latin America policy. Mexico will be a priority because the escalating violence of the drug war is spilling across the border. Brazil will be a priority because of its economic heft and its growing diplomatic leadership in the region. Cuba will be more of a priority than Obama would prefer, because Latin America is insisting on it.
Few US analysts would have predicted that the issue of Cuba would dominate both the Summit of the Americas and the OAS Assembly. Cuba is not central to any of the substantive issues between Latin America and the United States, but it has clearly emerged as the symbol of Washington's historic imperial disdain for Latin American opinion. Latin America is looking for a change in Cuba policy as evidence that Obama is serious about a new relationship. Modest changes in Cuba policy that simply return to the policy pursued by President Bill Clinton will not suffice.
Herein lies the biggest risk that Barack Obama may face in the western hemisphere. Confronting many domestic and international issues of higher priority than Latin America, his hemispheric policy may default to one of modest change at a time when Latin America is demanding a thorough rethinking of hemispheric affairs and a new relationship of equality with Washington. For now, the stark difference between Obama and George W. Bush is enough to give Obama a Latin honeymoon, but it will not last forever.
