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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 June 2004
This is a highly commendable book for economic historians curious about Mexico. It is essential for historians of modern Mexico interested in the economy during the Porfirian and Revolutionary periods (without a grip on which they will not understand anything else about Mexico, then or since then).
The editors introduce the collection with an essay on “the new institutional economics [NIE],” or “positive political economy [PPE],” and its uses for modern Latin American economic history. Eight substantive papers follow in three parts: financial reforms during the Porfiriato, tariff and customs reforms in the same period, and changes in industrial relations, 1900–1930. All deserve notice.
On financial reforms, Noel Maurer and Stephen Haber show legally “facilitated” heavy concentration in Porfirian banking, and that the big banks, serving as “investment clubs,” hugely favored insider firms “no more productive” than others. NIE-wise, they argue that “more liberal bank incorporation laws” would have created “a larger and less concentrated textile industry,” maybe “more efficient” too. Maurer separately tests NIE theory on Mexican banking, to measure concentration's effects on its efficiency. The Banco Nacional de México (1884–) enjoyed tremendous privileges, but hogged the benefits, reducing competition and efficiency, he argues—“not good for [maximum] economic growth.” Carlos Marichal explains the BNM's privileges as necessary for Mexico's recovery of foreign capitalist trust, which yielded foreign investments (railroads), foreign loans, and political stability; anti-NIE, the bank gave the state “credibility.” Paolo Riguzzi explains why a new Civil Code, facilitating mortgages, did not prevent the Banco Hipotecario's long monopoly in the mortgage market, and “financial repression” in agriculture and ranching. Here is a sharp sentence: “Mexican businessmen aspired to act like brokers of privilege: to obtain a favorable concession from the government for the undertaking of a particular enterprise and then to transfer this privilege to other groups interested in operating the business” (p. 138).
On Porfirian reforms of the rules for foreign trade, Sandra Kuntz Ficker shows a new “developmentalist commercial policy” from the 1890s onward. Both “liberalization” and “protection” (lower average tariffs, but effective rates very low for inputs and high for outputs of selected domestic industries) plus simplification of customs procedures, she argues, increased Mexico's “integration with the international economy” and its industrial development. Edward Beatty discounts other reasons for Mexican industrialization (international markets, ad hoc politics). Focusing on tariff schedules, he explains a “cascading” protection. “… tariff reforms,” he argues, “were increasingly designed to favor developmental rather than fiscal objectives,” and “a strong correlation” exists “between tariff levels and the … concurrent process of import-substituting industrialization.” The structure of protection was “the product of policy-makers' attempts to create incentives to invest in large-scale manufacturing enterprises, whether or not financial interests in them already existed” (pp. 206, 231), which succeeded.
On industrial relations, Jeffrey Bortz sketches some “revolutionary” social and legal constraints on business, emphasizing Veracruz's textile industry, 1912–1927. Aurora Gómez-Galvarriato demonstrates “a substantial transformation in the relative power of workers and employers” in the great Orizaba Valley cotton mills. Workers in strong, militant unions there doubled their average weekly real wage from 1910 to 1929, whereas workers in regions of weak labor movements gained much less. Profits from the Orizaba mills never recovered their Porfirian levels. “Investment collapsed during the revolution, … and remained low in the 1920s” (p. 303). But on the same, ever-older machines, labor productivity did not decline. The institutional changes mattered. Workers won “a greater share of the surplus” (p. 314) and new security. But they also blocked technological improvement and condemned the industry to decline.
Haber concludes according to PPE that nineteenth-century Mexico had a “commitment problem” with only “a second-best solution.” The Porfirian government finally promised a “subset of asset holders” to “enforce [only] their property rights,” in return for their investments. Hence, “crony capitalism,” “official or quasi-official monopoly,” economic growth, but “politically generated rents,” “misallocation,” higher prices, and “goods of lower quality,” instead of “more perfect competition” (pp. 324–27)—and therefore an elite divided between favored and disaffected. “The upshot was the Mexican Revolution,” which “changed the calculus of the division of rents, but … did not do away with the basic rent-seeking mechanisms …” (pp. 331, 333).
Altogether these essays contribute remarkably to modern Mexican history (with interesting implications for modern Latin America at large). They reveal much more clearly than before the strategic businesses in Mexico between 1870 and 1930 (banking and railroads). They prove the deliberate concentration of capital for closed corporate industrialization. They explain most credibly the logic of the domestic conflicts that exploded in a revolution in 1910; if the conclusion is not new, the argument is much more robust. Most significant may be Maurer's and Haber's explanation of grupos, and Rigozzi's of the mortgage market: Mexican capitalism featured not just private, but secret enterprise. Most original and convincing is Gómez-Galvarriato's case that the workers who secured most for themselves during the revolution were in the long run “victims of their own success.” This collection would benefit even cultural historians of Mexico, if they learned its discourse. If institutions are rules, then they are culture.
But questions remain. Why ignore the businessmen who made the deal that saved the first Porfirian government, the Mexican Central Railway, which made them fortunes, and the Mexican republic bankable? Why on finance does no one use the abundant French primary and secondary sources? What about Mexico's biggest corporation after 1905, in its most strategic industry, Ferrocarriles Nacionales? Or the country's most strategic and militant union, the Unión Mexicana de Mecánicos? Or the electrical industry, or the Sindicato Mexicano de Electricistas? Or oil? Or imperialism? Is the argument about more efficient Mexican development positive, or normative (retrospectively prescriptive), or objective, just to suggest what history cost Mexico then? Without partitioning Mexico, was any other development feasible?
Questions remain too about the theory here, its conceptual “priors.” Is the NIE (or the PPE) Douglass North's neo-classicalism, or Oliver Williamson's social economics? Why assume “the priority of political rules”? And whatever happened to Schumpeter's entrepreneurs, not opportunistic, adaptive predators, but innovative, creative organizers? Prevalence of the former does not mean absence of the latter. It means another question of economic history: Why do the former win, the latter lose?