Introduction
Populism is commonly defined as an ideology (Hawkins Reference Hawkins2009; Kriesi Reference Kriesi2018; March Reference March2017; Mudde Reference Mudde2004; Rooduijn, De Lange and Van Der Brug Reference Rooduijn, De Lange and Van Der Brug2014; Stanley Reference Stanley2008; Taggart Reference Taggart2000). Those who see populism as a frame, discourse, or style (Aslanidis Reference Aslanidis2016; Jagers and Walgrave Reference Jagers and Walgrave2007; Laclau Reference Laclau2005; Moffitt and Tormey Reference Moffitt and Tormey2014) integrate the political level into their definition but rely heavily on ideas. With these approaches, the ideological level takes precedence in defining populism.
Mudde’s (Reference Mudde2004) ideological definition focuses on motifs such as people-centrism, anti-elitism, popular sovereignty, and a Manichean worldview (March Reference March2017: 283). It was hailed for its minimalism and precision and for its clear conceptual boundaries (Kaltwasser Reference Kaltwasser, Fitzi, Mackert and Turner2018). It is also easily operationalized and quantified, allowing for statistical analysis (Hawkins Reference Hawkins2009; Meijers and Zaslove Reference Meijers and Zaslove2021; Rooduijn, De Lange and Van Der Brug Reference Rooduijn, De Lange and Van Der Brug2014).
Yet ideology is not the only level relevant for analyzing populism. De la Torre and Mazzoleni (Reference De la Torre and Mazzoleni2019) claim that ideational scholars of populism are often unclear about why we should focus on the ideological level. Not surprisingly, some scholars focus on the political-strategic level when defining populism (Jansen Reference Jansen2011; Weyland Reference Weyland, Kaltwasser, Taggart and Espejo2017). Others emphasize different political aspects of populism (De Cleen, Glynos and Mondonet Reference De Cleen, Glynos and Mondon2018; Laclau Reference Laclau2005; McDonnell Reference McDonnell2016; Ostiguy Reference Ostiguy2020).
The paper contributes to the growing literature that criticizes the ideological approach to populism (eg De la Torre and Mazzoleni Reference De la Torre and Mazzoleni2019; Katsambekis Reference Katsambekis2022; Weyland Reference Weyland, Kaltwasser, Taggart and Espejo2017) by offering a multifaceted understanding of populism that includes structural conditions, forms of mobilization, ideas, and patterns of anti-elite conflict. Ideological definitions of populism define populist ideologies, not populism as a real, living political movement that is influenced by different social structures (economy, culture, and politics) and, in turn, influences these structures (Joseph Reference Joseph2003). Just as we would not define the workers’ movement only by its ideology, the same should be true for populism.
Politics is not only a struggle over power and influence, or a struggle over liberal institutions, but also a hegemonic struggle between dominant and dominated groups (Gramsci Reference Gramsci2011). Following the early writings of Laclau (Reference Laclau1977), I suggest that populism involves a real attempt to generate conflict with dominant elites, either by a popular movement or by marginal elites. A political actor that does not satisfy this criterion is not populist.
Since ideological definitions disregard the political criterion of producing conflict between the masses and elites, they can lead to false-positives. Hawkins’ (Reference Hawkins2009) method famously identified George W. Bush as a populist. Others see populism as potentially relevant to all political actors (Bickerton and Accetti Reference Bickerton and Accetti2021; Mair Reference Mair, Mény and Surel2002; Mudde Reference Mudde2004). Consequently, scholars have identified mainstream politicians such as Emmanuel Macron and Tony Blair as populists (Bickerton and Accetti Reference Bickerton and Accetti2021; Mair Reference Mair, Mény and Surel2002). The result is that some scholars distinguish ‘hard’ anti-elite populism from ‘soft’, mainstream populism (Jagers and Walgrave Reference Jagers and Walgrave2007; Moffitt and Tormey Reference Moffitt and Tormey2014; Snow and Moffitt Reference Snow and Moffitt2012).
After developing the theoretical arguments for a multifaceted understanding of populism, I try to empirically demonstrate that ‘soft’ cases of populism are indeed distinguished from ‘hard’ cases by conflict with elites, and thus that the ideological definition of populism is overstretched. The paper demonstrates that dominant economic elites held markedly different attitudes toward Emmanuel Macron and Tony Blair compared to Jean-Luc Mélenchon and Jeremy Corbyn, drawing on articles from The Economist, Financial Times and Les Échos. Despite Macron and Blair employing certain populist ideas, they did not seek to generate conflict with dominant elites. Mélenchon and Corbyn, by contrast, advanced policies perceived by elites as dangerous, leading to a sense of alarm among elites.
What is populism?
A popular academic understanding of populism sees it as an ideology centered on ‘the people’ and directed against ‘elites’ (Hawkins Reference Hawkins2009; Kriesi Reference Kriesi2018; March Reference March2017; Mudde Reference Mudde2004; Stanley Reference Stanley2008; Taggart Reference Taggart2000). Despite involving political-strategic aspects, I agree with Mudde that other central definitions of populism – those viewing it as a discourse, style, or frame (Aslanidis Reference Aslanidis2016; Jagers and Walgrave Reference Jagers and Walgrave2007; Laclau Reference Laclau2005; Moffitt and Tormey Reference Moffitt and Tormey2014) – ‘consider populism to be, first and foremost, about ideas in general, and ideas about “the people” and “the elite” in particular’ (Mudde Reference Mudde, Kaltwasser, Taggart, Espejo and Ostiguy2017: 29). Indeed, while Aslanidis acknowledges the political-strategic dimension of populism, he defines it primarily as a discourse about popular sovereignty usurped by elites (Aslanidis Reference Aslanidis2016: 96). Moffitt and Tormey, by contrast, claim that populism is a performative style. When explaining this style, they point to practices that convey ideas: an appeal to ‘the people’, a ‘perception of crisis, breakdown, or threat’, and a use of ‘bad manners’ that seems to express an anti-elite message (Moffitt and Tormey Reference Moffitt and Tormey2014: 391–392). Katsambekis (Reference Katsambekis2022) suggests that populism is a discourse articulated around the nodal point of ‘the people’, presenting society as divided into two antagonistic camps: ‘the people’ versus ‘the elite’. In all these accounts, populism ultimately circles around ideas.
The ideological approach was criticized for different reasons. Some questioned whether populism is an ideology at all, since its ideational content is too ‘thin’ (eg Moffitt and Tormey Reference Moffitt and Tormey2014). Others (eg Katsambekis Reference Katsambekis2022; Aslanidis Reference Aslanidis2016) do not see populism as an ideological quality actors possess but rather as a logic or frame they can employ. For Seferiades (Reference Seferiades, Charalambous and Ioannou2019), ideational definitions are normatively geared toward defending liberal institutions. De la Torre and Mazzoleni (Reference De la Torre and Mazzoleni2019) and Olivas Osuna (Reference Olivas Osuna2021) see the ideological definition as reductionist, focusing on only one level of reality.
De la Torre and Mazzoleni (Reference De la Torre and Mazzoleni2019) correctly argue that it remains under-theorized why definitions of populism should focus on a single level of reality and specifically on ideology. Most ideational scholars do not justify their focus. Hawkins (Reference Hawkins2009) is an exception, and this is why I follow his argument to its logical conclusion. Responding to claims that ideological definitions disconnect ideas from political practices, Hawkins said:
Is populism really populism if it is spoken but never followed? […] I am not claiming that manifestations of populism can exist without some material component. A discourse is meaningless unless believed and shared by actual human beings. However, the important point made by advocates of the discursive definition is that actions alone – raising the minimum wage, calling for a constitutional convention, repressing the opposition – are insufficient conditions for populism. Actions are ultimately ‘populist’ because of the meaning that is ascribed to them by their participants, not because of any objective quality that inheres in them (Hawkins Reference Hawkins2009: 1047).
Hawkins rightly acknowledges that, for ideas to have political significance, they must produce consequences outside people’s heads. To recognize this active dimension of populism and still insist on the primacy of ideas, one has to rely on additional assumptions. Perhaps Hawkins suggests that ideology is the defining level of all social reality – or at least of politics – assuming all acts follow ideological logic. But that is certainly not the case. We know that many political acts follow political rather than ideological logic – politics has its own logic of struggle over power and influence (eg Strøm Reference Strøm1990), and even ideologically driven political projects adjust to the rules of the political field (Przeworski and Sprague Reference Przeworski and Sprague1986). If Hawkins does not make this assumption, then why should ideology alone define populism?
Furthermore, for a phenomenon to count as populist – if Hawkins’ criterion is to make any sense – core populist ideas must be translated into action. ‘Populism [understood ideationally] is about the antagonistic relationship between the people and the elite’ (Rooduijn, De Lange and Van Der Brug Reference Rooduijn, De Lange and Van Der Brug2014: 3); thus, this antagonism is a core idea. Turning this idea into practice involves not only employing antagonistic rhetoric but also antagonizing dominant elites. The specific policies through which this occurs are context-dependent. In some settings, elites may accept a rise in the minimum wage, while in others they may denounce such a move as dangerous demagoguery. Using populist ideas merely for electoral gain while appeasing or serving dominant elites can hardly be considered populist, since the core populist principle of elite antagonism is not enacted. Thus, following Hawkins’ logic leads to a political criterion for populism – namely, the active antagonization of elites.
Thus, a more complex understanding of populism appears to be required. De la Torre and Mazzoleni (Reference De la Torre and Mazzoleni2019) urge scholars to recognize that populism is a multileveled phenomenon that encompasses a political strategy for gaining and exercising power, a set of ideas, and a performative style. In defining fascism, Malm (Reference Malm2021: 229) distinguishes ‘between fascism as a set of ideas and fascism as a real historical force. A definition of the latter must go beyond doctrines and diction’. He then offers a multilevel definition that incorporates ideas, crisis, relations with dominant classes, and forms of governance (Malm Reference Malm2021: 235).
I share their views. Populism is a multifaceted phenomenon that cannot be reduced to a single element. While it contains ideas, it is not merely a body of doctrines but a popular political movement. Ideas are important, but they do not, on their own, define populism. Popular political movements act at the intersection of social structures – economy, ideology, and politics – seeking to reshape the relations among these structures (Joseph Reference Joseph2003). Within this structural complexity, ideology cannot be considered separately from other levels of reality (Anderson Reference Anderson1968: 13). Ideological definitions define ideas, not mass political movements. The workers’ movement, for example, is not defined solely by socialist ideas. It had distinctive ideas, but also a structural basis in capital–labor relations, as well as unique forms of political organization and patterns of conflict. Similarly, ethnic conflicts are not reducible to racial or national ideology. They may contain such ideologies but are far more multileveled.
Populism is no different. Populist movements are shaped by structural conditions – marginalized groups frustrated with ‘the establishment’ (Laclau Reference Laclau1977, Reference Laclau2005), in recent decades often identified with neoliberal globalization; political strategies that transform latent structural tensions into political movements (Jansen Reference Jansen2011; Weyland Reference Weyland, Kaltwasser, Taggart and Espejo2017); ideas deployed by populist actors to mobilize and justify their actions (Mudde Reference Mudde2004) and recurring patterns of conflict with different elites (Art Reference Art and Mudde2016; Dar Reference Dar2024; Feldmann and Morgan Reference Feldmann and Morgan2023).
Populism, therefore, has an irreducible political dimension. I rely on a specific, Gramscian understanding of politics, perceiving politics not only in terms of electoral conflict or conflict over liberal institutions, but as the attempt by dominant groups to construct hegemony – rule through consent as well as coercion (Gramsci Reference Gramsci2011; Poulantzas Reference Poulantzas1975). Such groups try to achieve hegemony by offering limited economic concessions to appease the masses, while constructing ideological frameworks to secure consent, thereby creating a ‘historical bloc’ of dominant and subordinate groups. When these attempts fail, subaltern groups may develop or become involved in counter-projects aimed at extracting further concessions or transforming the system altogether.
At the political level, understood in Gramscian terms, populists generate, rather than neutralize, conflict (Laclau Reference Laclau1977). Populism is a counter-hegemonic project that destabilizes the status quo and mobilizes frustrated groups against dominant elites. Vergara (Reference Vergara2020: 11) correctly states that populism is not ‘aimed at radically changing society, but [is] reformist, demanding the state allocate more resources to the popular sectors’.Footnote 1 Thus, counter-hegemonic here does not mean revolutionary, but an attempt to develop a hegemonic political bloc against existing dominant forces. Populism may emerge as an authentic movement of subaltern groups, or be initiated by marginal elites seeking to expand their power by mobilizing popular support against rival elites (Laclau Reference Laclau1977). In either case, populism is an anti-elite movement.Footnote 2
With popular mobilization against the status quo, populism generates conflict over key aspects of the rule of dominant groups. At a minimum, to meet the political criterion for populism, some dominant elites must feel threatened by the populist actor and react in alarm (Dar Reference Dar2024). This does not mean elites find effective ways to contain the threat. Elites can reject a political actor because they disagree with its policies, but that does not necessarily amount to what I mean by conflict. It is when policies threaten existing structural and institutional arrangements, and thus threaten power relations, that disagreements over policies generate conflict that involves alarm and a sense of urgency to stop or contain the challenger (see Haugaard’s (Reference Haugaard2020) distinction between conflict within or over structures).
Which elites react with alarm depends on the nature of the existing order but also on the choices made by populist actors. Populist movements actively construct not only who ‘the people’ are but also who ‘the elite’ is (De Cleen and Ruiz Casado Reference De Cleen and Ruiz Casado2024). While left-wing populists target economic elites for exploiting popular classes, right-wing populists direct their antagonism toward ‘liberal’ or ‘cosmopolitan’ elites, accused of supporting immigrants or advancing non-national economic models (Mudde Reference Mudde2007; Worth Reference Worth2019). In any case, some dominant elites have to react in alarm and for a conflict to develop for a populist phenomenon to occur, even though the pattern of conflict may differ between left- and right-wing populism. It follows that populism is not only a quality but also a relation. Thus, if stably contained, populist actors can become non-populists, as the conflictual relations with elites dissolve.
Populism is not the only form of elite–mass conflict. Such conflicts can also take class-based, ethnic, feminist, or environmental forms, for example. Populism is a unique form of elite–masses conflict, as it does not claim to represent specific groups like classes or oppressed ethnic minorities. Usually lacking a mass organized base, unlike class conflicts, populist political actors try to articulate and channel diffuse popular frustrations (Jager and Borriello Reference Jager and Borriello2023), to ‘actualize’ a latent conflict. Nevertheless, subaltern groups retain some agency, since populist actors require their consent to gain and maintain power. The agency of subaltern groups – for example, through social movements – can signal to populist actors that they have political opportunities (Della Porta, Fernández, Kouki et al. Reference Della Porta, Fernández, Kouki and Mosca2017). Yet this agency is often limited. From the right, populism can represent what Gramsci (Reference Gramsci2011) called ‘a passive revolution’, change initiated from above. From the left, populist supporters have less agency compared to class conflicts, given the low level of collective capabilities they usually possess (Dar Reference Dar2024).
The focus on conflict does not risk ‘degreeism’, that is, ‘seeing populism as (potentially) present everywhere, albeit to different degrees’ (Dean and Maiguashca Reference Dean and Maiguashca2020: 14). Aslanidis (Reference Aslanidis2016: 92) rightly remarked that some ideational writers study populism as a matter of degree, while ideology is dichotomous – one either holds it or not. Aslanidis himself, and others who see populism as a discourse, style, or frame that actors can use with strategic intent, think of populism in terms of degrees (De Cleen, Glynos and Mondonet Reference De Cleen, Glynos and Mondon2018; Moffitt and Tormey Reference Moffitt and Tormey2014) ‘a given actor can be more or less populist, following a more or less consistent populist strategy’ (Katsambekis and Kioupkiolis Reference Katsambekis, Kioupkiolis, Hough, Keith, Katsambekis and Kioupkiolis2019: 11).
This discursive criterion of populism is indeed a matter of degree. However, populism also contains dichotomous criteria – conflict. Indeed, there are degrees and patterns of conflict, yet all cases that exhibit conflict are populist, regardless of the level or pattern of conflict. With this approach, populism is not ‘present everywhere’, since my criterion reduces the number of cases identified as populist, as we will see.Footnote 3
While populism is not reducible to ideas, it is deeply entangled with them. I suggest we should understand the ideological dimension of populism in the context of the struggle between dominant and subordinate groups. Dominant ideologies justify the existing order and its hierarchies, seeking to reproduce them (Laclau Reference Laclau1977; Scott Reference Scott1990). When subordinate groups engage in ideological struggle, they may adopt ideologies that completely negate the existing order (revolutionary ideologies). Alternatively, they may appropriate elements of the dominant ideology that resonate with popular aspirations and demand that these promises be fulfilled (Scott Reference Scott1990). Populism fits the latter, as it draws on the modern state’s promise to reflect the will of the people (Poulantzas Reference Poulantzas1975: 130–135). Thus, populist ideology is an antagonistic and rebellious twist on the dominant ideology embedded in the modern state. By ‘dominant ideology’ here, I do not mean the ideology of a particular political bloc (eg conservatism, liberalism), but the popular ideology of the modern state.
Populist ideas are widespread (Hawkins, Read and Pauwels Reference Hawkins, Read, Pauwels, Kaltwasser, Taggart, Espejo and Ostiguy2017) and tap into the deepest roots of political legitimacy, since the ‘populist democratic ideology is more or less deeply entrenched in the political culture of most established democracies’ (Canovan Reference Canovan, Mény and Surel2002: 38). This allows them to justify defiance and mobilize mass discontent. Furthermore, populist ideas enable subordinate groups to legitimize their claims, since acts of popular confrontation require justification (Moore Reference Moore1978; Pappas Reference Pappas2019: 109).Footnote 4
Two populisms?
While populist ideas are important, ideational focus can overstretch the concept. By defining populism as a set of ideas, almost any political actor can be populist. Mair (Reference Mair2013) claimed that in recent decades, mediating structures between society and the political system have declined or disappeared, while mainstream parties have lost their representative function and ended up ‘ruling the void’. Following Mair, Bickerton and Accetti (Reference Bickerton and Accetti2021) suggested that the reduced mediation between voters and party systems encourages all parties to mobilize support based on a direct appeal to ‘the people’, resulting in a ‘populist political logic’. For Mudde (Reference Mudde2004), this process, among others, has created a ‘populist zeitgeist’. Allegedly, all political actors can be influenced by this logic or zeitgeist – radical actors like Podemos and Rassemblement National, as well as mainstream politicians like Macron and Blair (Bickerton and Accetti Reference Bickerton and Accetti2021; Mair Reference Mair, Mény and Surel2002; Mudde Reference Mudde2004). For some scholars, mainstream actors might use populist ideas when responding to populist challengers (Mudde Reference Mudde2004), as ‘political leaders or parties borrow the political rhetoric of populism for electoral opportunism’ (Mény and Surel Reference Mény, Surel, Mény and Surel2002: 13).
This reasoning leads writers to see populism in terms of degrees, such as ‘soft’ and ‘hard’, allowing for the possibility of ‘mainstream populism’ (Jagers and Walgrave Reference Jagers and Walgrave2007; Mair Reference Mair, Mény and Surel2002; Moffitt and Tormey Reference Moffitt and Tormey2014; Snow and Moffitt Reference Snow and Moffitt2012). With this approach, anyone can be populist, if they use populist ideas, regardless of how and to what purpose.
While both radical and mainstream actors may use populist ideas for different reasons, we are dealing with two distinct phenomena. First, mainstream parties that use populist ideas in reaction to low levels of mediation between the party system and voters, or in response to populist rivals. Second, political actors who mobilize frustrations against elites to change important aspects of the existing order.
How can we understand this distinction? If politics is seen merely as a struggle for votes, policies, and office among ontologically equal actors, this distinction has little relevance. However, I perceive politics primarily as a struggle in which dominant groups seek to stabilize their rule, while dominated groups accept or attempt to subvert it. In that case, whether a would-be populist actor subverts or tries to stabilize the existing order is of prime importance, and cases of ‘soft’ populism are not populists.
Another way to interpret this political distinction is to preclude the possibility of ‘soft’ populism and claim that the ideological criterion is enough to prevent politicians like Blair and Macron from being considered populists. Perhaps a more demanding ideological criterion, comprising all of Mudde’s elements – people-centrism, anti-elitism, popular sovereignty, and Manicheanism – would preclude ‘soft’ populism, as mainstream parties would reject anti-elitism and Manicheanism. This criterion would allegedly save ideology as the sole defining feature of populism. However, there is no guarantee that pro-elites politicians like Blair and Macron would not use this ‘hard’ discourse, bringing us back to the problem of combining pro- and anti-elite actors under the same category. Insisting that ‘hard’ populists, with a blatant anti-elite rhetoric, are necessarily anti-elite politicians would apply a political criterion to the study of populism.
Research design
In the remainder of the paper, I empirically demonstrate that ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ cases of populism are distinguished by conflict with elites, implying that there are strong grounds for using political criteria – specifically, a conflict between populists and elites, that consists of populists’ attempts to subvert key elements of the existing order and elites’ rejection of the populist actor – in defining populism. Cases in which actors use populist ideas are differentiated politically: some would-be populists are accepted by elites, while others elicit elite fears and potentially generate conflict. Only the latter are populists. Thus, populism is irreducible to ideas.Footnote 5
I compare two mainstream politicians – Tony Blair and Emmanuel Macron – with two radical-left actors, Jeremy Corbyn and Jean-Luc Mélenchon. Based on ideological reasoning, Blair has been considered a populist by several authors (Bickerton and Accetti Reference Bickerton and Accetti2021; Mair Reference Mair, Mény and Surel2002; Moffitt and Tormey Reference Moffitt and Tormey2014; Mudde Reference Mudde2004), as has Macron (Bickerton and Accetti Reference Bickerton and Accetti2021; Fougère and Barthold Reference Fougère and Barthold2020; Perottino and Guasti Reference Perottino and Guasti2020). Corbyn and Mélenchon have also been described as populists (Jager and Borriello Reference Jager and Borriello2023; Mouffe Reference Mouffe2018). I examine whether elites’ attitudes help differentiate these cases. That elites are alarmed and engage in conflict does not by itself make the actors populist (conflict can be class-based, ethnic, etc.), unless other criteria for populism are met (structural, political, ideological, conflictual). Since I criticize the ideological approach, I chose cases that, according to the literature cited in this paragraph, satisfy the ideological criteria for populism. While I look at elites’ perception of these four actors, I do not infer their populist status solely from what elites do, as all four actors satisfy populism’s ideological criteria.Footnote 6 Thus, the research design by itself does not provide us with a mechanism to distinguish populist from non-populist actors but to distinguish conflictual from non-conflictual relations with elites.
My main concern is with economic elites – particularly financial, globally mobile elites – and the political elites who support them. These groups are what Sklair (Reference Sklair2001) and Robinson (Reference Robinson2004) refer to as the transnational capitalist bloc of economic, political, and cultural elites. Such elites wield enormous influence and have a significant stake in preserving the status quo (Harris Reference Harris2008; Sklair Reference Sklair2001; Strange Reference Strange2015; Streeck Reference Streeck2014). In other cases, other types of elites may be alarmed by populist actors, but in this paper, which involves more left-leaning would-be populists (as Macron also tried to portray himself in 2017), economic elites are the most relevant ones to examine.
My strategy is to examine what economic elites thought about the potential rise to power of Macron, Blair, Mélenchon, and Corbyn. I do so by analyzing news reports from two newspapers – The Economist and the Financial Times – in the weeks preceding the general elections, when these four candidates appeared to be approaching power. In the two French cases, and to corroborate my findings with more localized data, I also consulted Les Échos. I expect the two international papers to portray Blair and Macron positively and Corbyn and Mélenchon negatively – even alarmingly.Footnote 7
I focus on the pre‑election period to capture elites’ views of the prospects of these actors gaining power, rather than the post‑election period, when elites may have had to adjust to a new government or when the threat of a radical-left government has subsided. I selected these newspapers because of their consistent commitment to ‘free markets’, low taxes and regulation, financialization, and free movement of capital – all reflecting the worldview of financial and other economic elites with strong stakes in globalization. Moreover, as we will see, the papers frequently report on and directly cite the opinions of economic elites regarding political actors. I chose these papers to examine the response of the core of the ‘transnational capitalist bloc’ (transnational capital). When possible, I also rely on these newspapers in conjunction with secondary sources to determine the attitudes of other elites within the transnational bloc toward these actors.
Altogether, I analyzed 146 articles, retrieved through searches in the Nexis Uni and ProQuest databases, using the names of the four politicians and their parties (eg Corbyn, Labour) as keywords during the weeks before the 1997 election in Britain (Blair), the 2017 election in France (Macron), the 2017 election in Britain (Corbyn), and the 2022 and 2024 elections in France (Mélenchon; in this case, I examined two campaigns, since the first did not yield enough material).
Indeed, the empirical material is rudimentary. Alternatively, I could have used interviews, publications by business associations, or stock market trends (eg Johnston Reference Johnston2024). Yet the material is approachable (unlike elite interviews) and relevant for all cases (as business associations and the stock market might not respond to every political actor, if they do not seem like reaching power). Furthermore, my main goal is to make a first step in pointing to the possibility that conflict is a necessary criterion for populism, and in that regard, the evidence paints a clear picture and lays the groundwork for further research. Last, the economic press might be biased and only report opinions that support its narrative. However, if there were significant disagreements regarding the four leaders within the transnational capitalist bloc, the economic press would probably reflect that, which was not the case. Thus, the empirical evidence at least points to the attitudes of significant portions of the transnational capitalist bloc. Secondary sources about economic and political elites from this bloc also support the findings.
I selected articles that described the attitudes of economic elites toward the four politicians. I also selected articles that contained the author’s judgment of the four politicians, since these papers have clear editorial lines, so authors usually follow this line, and thus their opinion is indicative. I classified articles as positive, negative, or mixed in relation to the actors. Positive articles expressed a favorable view of the actors and their policies, while negative articles rejected them. Mixed articles contained both positive and negative assessments (for example, a critical view of some policies accompanied by a generally favorable assessment of the actor). Positive or negative articles were identified by the use of positive or negative language. For example, investors were reported as being ‘appalled’ by Mélenchon and his ‘unworkable’ policies, while ‘hailing’ Macron’s victory. They were also identified by descriptive language that points to policies or actions the two papers, or cited elites, favor or reject, like liberal or socialist economic policies.
The number of positive or negative articles was not my sole criterion for evaluation. Elites can be negative toward political actors without necessarily perceiving them as an alarming threat. Another criterion I used was whether the articles indicated a state of elite alarm, conveying urgency to block the actor. Phrases such as ‘business alarm/appalled/spooked’, ‘dangerous’, ‘loony’, ‘fatal’, or ‘demagogue’ – which, as we will see, were used in the cases of Corbyn and Mélenchon – point to alarm, urgency, and a state of conflict, rather than merely a negative assessment. This is a dichotomous distinction, not a matter of degree: elites are either alarmed or not. Repeated use of such alarmist terms indicates the presence of conflict, when accompanied by a significant majority of negative articles.
Populism without conflict?
In this section, I demonstrate that Macron and Blair were either eagerly supported by political and economic elites (Macron) prior to their ascent to power or were tolerated and viewed positively despite concerns about their party and agenda (Blair).
Macron
Emmanuel Macron was an economic adviser to PS President Hollande and later served as his economic minister. In August 2016, Macron left the government to distance himself from its unpopular policies, although he voiced ‘soft criticism of what he deemed was Hollande’s too-timid reformist agenda’ (Evans and Ivaldi Reference Evans and Ivaldi2017: 81). Taking advantage of PS’s disintegration and ‘Voter demand for political renovation and elite renewal’ (Evans and Ivaldi Reference Evans and Ivaldi2017: 46), Macron launched an independent presidential campaign and a new party (En Marche!).
From the outset, and despite a fragmented field with several mainstream politicians aspiring to the presidency, Macron obtained support from political, media, and economic elites (Evans and Ivaldi Reference Evans and Ivaldi2017: 81; Georgiou Reference Georgiou2017). Gaining the backing of both center‑left and center‑right politicians, Macron was also endorsed by ‘Most national political parties and leaders’ as well as European elites (Evans and Ivaldi Reference Evans and Ivaldi2017: 89) after the first round of the presidential election – demonstrating he was acceptable (if not desirable) to elite circles.
Macron was not the candidate of the ‘popular classes’. His support came largely from what Palombarini and Amable (Reference Palombarini and Amable2021) call the ‘bourgeoisie block’: managers and top professionals, the highly educated, middle‑class and affluent voters, and those describing themselves as ‘the winners of globalization’. Opposed to reversing globalization or EU integration, and generally optimistic about France’s future, Macron’s voters were not seeking a sharp change of course. The composition of Macron’s base does not, by itself, determine whether his project was populist, but, in this case, it is significant, since his electorate’s preferences aligned closely with those of economic elites.
Macron presented himself as a candidate of change and renewal (Evans and Ivaldi Reference Evans and Ivaldi2017: 151). Yet, although he publicly tried to distance himself from the elite, ‘En Marche relied heavily on contributions near the upper limit’ of the elite (Pedder Reference Pedder2019: 115). The campaign was largely financed by ‘the moneyed French elite’; thus, ‘En Marche was a product both of the elite and of civic participation’ (Pedder Reference Pedder2019: 116). Macron had an elitist background, studying at elite schools and working as a banker at Rothschild & Company. His elite ties were vital in the early stages of the campaign, when he urgently needed funds (Plowright Reference Plowright2017: 208). Seeking contributions, ‘Naturally, the targets were rich, often in banking and finance, law, lobbying or business – the sort of people Macron and the rest of the team knew socially and professionally’ (Plowright Reference Plowright2017: 209). Many of Macron’s campaign staff, as well as advisers on his political career, came from the financial, media, and high‑tech elite (Georgiou Reference Georgiou2017; Pedder Reference Pedder2019; Plowright Reference Plowright2017).
Macron’s agenda reflected the preferences of these elites and could be read straight from the neoliberal textbook. His politics focused on securing enough support to implement pro‑market reforms that, according to many in the political and economic elite, were necessary to boost the French economy. Far from attacking elites and their sources of power, Macron’s agenda further entrenched dominant elites. To achieve this, given the anti‑establishment mood in France, Macron incorporated some populist themes into his campaign (Fougère and Barthold Reference Fougère and Barthold2020). Yet he did not ‘actualize’ a core populist idea, since he avoided direct conflict with dominant elites.
Of the 45 articles in The Economist and the Financial Times that I analyzed, 39 were positive, two skeptical, and four mixed skepticism with positive assessments. Most articles were enthusiastic about Macron’s agenda, which included policies such as ‘scrapping France’s 35-hour working week for younger people and making it easier for businesses to lay workers off’ (Chassany Reference Chassany2016), ‘target €60bn in savings over five years and cut up to 120,000 civil service jobs […] [and] keep budget deficit below the EU-required threshold of 3 per cent of gross domestic product’ (Chassany Reference Chassany2017a), and cutting the tax burden (The Economist 2017c).
Particularly at the beginning of the campaign, when Macron was still somewhat of an unknown entity, some articles described his agenda as liberal ‘in a Nordic sense’, combining pro-business deregulation with expansion of the welfare state (Chassany Reference Chassany2016). For example, Macron ‘called for broader unemployment benefits, argued that older workers should be able to work fewer hours and advocated more money for schools in poor suburbs plagued by unemployment and crime’ (Chassany Reference Chassany2016). Yet this ‘Nordic’ element was not seen as a major problem – certainly not compared to more radical presidential alternatives. Macron’s ‘Scandinavian economic model […] clashes with that of Benoît Hamon, the Socialist presidential nominee, who supports a universal basic income and a reduction in the 35-hour working week’ (Chassany Reference Chassany2017c). More than two months before the election, despite his ‘blend of deregulation and traditional social protections’, the FT implied that Macron’s reform agenda was the best option (FT 2017c), and eventually, The Economist openly endorsed him (The Economist 2017a).
Except for four articles that highlighted both positives and uncertainties about Macron, the other articles were clearly positive, depicting him as a pro-business, pro-EU candidate. He was portrayed as one of two pro-business presidential contenders, alongside François Fillon (Chassany Reference Chassany2017a; The Economist 2017c, 2017f). According to The Economist (2017a), given the populist danger from Le Pen and Mélenchon, ‘either of the two pro-market candidates [Macron and Fillon] would be a blessing […] On balance, we would support Mr Macron’. It was also suggested that Macron’s less radical plan of economic reform, compared to Fillon’s, would stand a better chance of being implemented in a pro-welfare country like France, as it avoided ‘big taboos that would have been a no go for unions’ (Chassany Reference Chassany2017f), or bypassed union power rather than confronting it head-on (The Economist 2017a, 2017c). Macron’s record as a minister under President Hollande was hailed as ‘Those reforms were all in the right direction […] More of the same – much more – is just what France needs and its youth in particular’ (Sandbu Reference Sandbu2017).
The articles also provided evidence of business and political elite support for Macron. In the early stages of the campaign, before it was clear whether he had a serious chance of winning, the FT declared: ‘For Brussels and investors abroad he [Macron] has embodied France’s newfound reformist drive by pushing through a basket of liberalising laws’ (Chassany Reference Chassany2016; see also Chassany Reference Chassany2017e). Centrist candidate François Bayrou’s endorsement of Macron was said ‘to provide some relief to financial markets spooked at the prospect of a victory for the far-right Marine Le Pen’ (Chassany and Khan Reference Chassany and Khan2017). Bayrou’s support even reduced France’s benchmark 10-year bond yield, suggesting that financial investors viewed Macron positively (Khan Reference Khan2017). Four days before the first round of the presidential election, the FT wrote: ‘Amid the anti-euro populism, centrist candidate and ex-banker Emmanuel Macron is the pin-up for many investors. If he wins the election, whose first-round poll is on Sunday, expect to see a relief rally in French bonds’ (FT 2017d).
Furthermore, ‘Investment managers’ saw Macron’s first-round victory ‘as a boost for European equity and bond markets and a critical vote of confidence in the future of the EU […] The French stock market has rallied 4.6 per cent so far this week’ (Flood Reference Flood2017). The Economist reported that ‘The likely election of Emmanuel Macron as France’s president, in a run-off vote on May 7th, has corporate leaders in a state of high anticipation […] Markets rose and bond yields fell after Mr Macron won the first round on April 23rd’, as Macron pursued many pro-business policies (The Economist 2017c). Bernard Arnault, one of the richest men in the world, hailed Macron for carrying ‘a program of freedom and stimulation of economic success’, based on conviction in private enterprise (Les Échos 2017).
Macron secured the backing of French and European political elites. After winning the first round of the presidential elections and facing Le Pen in the second, ‘Senior figures from the defeated Socialist party and centre-right Republicans were quick to call on their supporters to vote for Mr Macron for the run-off in two weeks’ (Chassany Reference Chassany2017d). Barber (Reference Barber2017b) argued that Macron’s victory ‘would be the crowning achievement of reform-minded circles in the French state, academia, high finance, the media, and to a lesser extent the world of politics who have quietly backed Mr Macron’. Those circles, according to Barber, observing the anti-establishment mood in France, sought to run a trustworthy candidate who could appear as an outsider (Ibid.). Thus, ‘it is misleading to portray Mr Macron as a complete outsider. He is, in fact, the preferred candidate of wide sections of the French political and technocratic elite’ (Barber Reference Barber2017a). If anything, Macron’s image and rhetoric functioned as an establishment strategy to advance neoliberal reforms while exploiting the anti-establishment wave – clearly not how I understand populism.
Importantly, Macron was not seen as a populist by the FT, but rather as an ‘antidote to the wave of anti-EU populism’ (Blitz Reference Blitz2017). Indeed, if he won, France ‘will have resisted the populist tide’ (Chassany Reference Chassany2017b). For The Economist (2017f), ‘A victory for Mr Macron would be evidence that liberalism still appeals to Europeans’. While Le Pen, Mélenchon, and even Hamon were described as populists or economically radical, Macron was consistently presented as their ‘antidote’. The chief concern raised by the FT regarding Macron, after the early reservations about the ‘Nordic model’, was whether he would have enough parliamentary support to implement his policies (Flood Reference Flood2017; The Economist 2017a). In other words, the papers not only backed Macron but wanted him to be strong enough to push through his programme.
Blair
Under Tony Blair’s leadership from 1994, the Labour Party embraced the Thatcherite consensus and abandoned most of its social-democratic policies. This shift was intended both to reflect what was believed to be the public mood after 18 years of Conservative rule (as of 1997) and to appease business interests (Hay Reference Hay1999). Policy-wise, Labour adopted neoliberal measures – economic deregulation, low inflation, privatization, reductions in income tax, and weakened trade unions (Panitch and Leys Reference Panitch and Leys2001: 241) – as well as a more individualistic, meritocratic worldview (Faucher-King and Le Galès Reference Faucher-King and Le Galès2010: 88–109). Although this process had begun before Blair, he took it furthest, pledging ‘no new rights for workers’, abandoning many leftist policies (Hay Reference Hay1999: 113), and changing Clause Four of the Labour Party Rule Book, which had committed the party to nationalizing ‘the means of production, distribution and exchange’ (Panitch and Leys Reference Panitch and Leys2001: 230). To prevent leftist activists and leaders from exerting influence, Blair centralized power in his own hands, and the influence of trade unions over the party was eroded (Faucher-King and Le Galès Reference Faucher-King and Le Galès2010: 62–87; Panitch and Leys Reference Panitch and Leys2001: 228–236, 284). Famously, Margaret Thatcher remarked that her greatest achievement was ‘Tony Blair and New Labour. We forced our opponents to change their minds’ (quoted in Murray Reference Murray2019: 65).
Despite seeking the economic elite’s favor, Blair represents a more complicated case than Macron. While Macron was greeted with enthusiasm by economic elites, Blair was praised for his efforts to make Labour more business-friendly, yet was also viewed with suspicion, as the Labour left could not be trusted, and Labour still relied on social forces and expectations that were not aligned with the interests of economic elites. Of the 34 articles I analyzed, 17 were positive, while the others were negative (8) or mixed (9).
Both The Economist and the Financial Times commended Blair for the changes he enacted within the Labour Party, including dropping the ‘notorious’ Clause Four, shifting the party’s economic policies, and weakening the influence of trade unions (The Economist 1997a). Economic policies such as ‘tough targets on spending, borrowing and inflation’, refraining from increasing income-tax rates, and granting independence to the Bank of England were deemed ‘good economics’ (The Economist 1997c, 1997d). In fact, Labour was described as hardly distinguishable from the Conservatives in ‘economics, in social policy, on the welfare state, in dealing with crime, even on Europe and the single currency’ (The Economist 1997f; see also The Economist 1997b). Blair was credited with so effectively transforming Labour that, whereas in the past business was ‘in horror at the threat of a spend, tax and borrow socialist government’, Blair ‘has largely banished such demons. As a result, investors can be fairly relaxed’ (FT 1997d).
Yet both papers raised concerns that if Labour won, the party’s left wing might prove uncontrollable (FT 1997c; The Economist 1997a). There were warnings that ‘Mr Blair might not be able to force his party to vote for the tough limits on public spending needed to get the government’s finances in shape’ (The Economist 1997e). Business leaders also expressed doubts about Blair’s ability to control the party’s left (FT 1997c). In some areas, Blair was closer to business than his party – ’Although Mr Blair’s willingness to contemplate privatisation is certainly brave, could he persuade his party to support much of it?’ asked The Economist (1997e). Blair might mitigate accusations of ‘betrayal’ from the left by managing expectations, but ‘there are unwarranted expectations as well as justified ones, especially after 18 years in opposition’ (The Economist 1997a). In other words, despite Blair’s intentions, he might not have been able to control everything, since Labour’s base carried expectations that contradicted capital’s interests.
The Economist was nevertheless hopeful that a decisive Labour victory would expand Blair’s authority vis-à-vis the party’s left, indicating personal trust in Blair himself. Thus, ‘A Blair landslide would not necessarily be a bad thing for Britain. Broadly, the larger the parliamentary Labour Party following the general election, the more Blairite, and less left-wing, it will be’ (The Economist 1997h).
At the same time, while Labour had become a pro-market party, ‘it retains a belief in regulation and in the desirability of government direction of private behaviour’ (The Economist 1997g), raising the risk ‘that a Labour government would be drawn more extensively into the continental framework of active state intervention and high social costs’ (FT 1997a).
The concern expressed by both newspapers was not only that the party’s left was potentially untameable, and its vision of capitalism more regulatory, but also that ‘in office, Labour will be more leftwing’ than Blair had led business to expect (The Economist 1997c). Labour’s different social base compared to the Conservatives made it less reliable for business (The Economist 1997b). Labour’s perceived instinct to support the poor and unemployed risked clashing with the imperative to reduce public spending (The Economist 1997i). A survey of 20 business leaders found that ‘many have yet to be assured that he [Blair] will be able to control trade unions if he wins the election’, with expectations of more strikes if Labour prevailed – though one chairman was convinced that ‘Tony Blair’s a tough guy’ and could handle the unions (Wagstyl and Peel Reference Wagstyl and Peel1997).
Many complaints were voiced by both newspapers and business leaders about Labour’s policies, including raising the minimum wage, signing the EU’s Social Chapter, and introducing a windfall tax on privatized utilities (FT 1997a; Kampfner Reference Kampfner1997; The Economist 1997g). The FT suggested that investors in utilities would not welcome a Labour government (FT 1997b). At a meeting with 50 chairmen and CEOs of Britain’s largest companies, Blair and Gordon Brown, while welcomed positively, faced pointed questions about the minimum wage and the Social Chapter (FT 1997c).
Blair actively attempted to address these business concerns during the campaign. In the aforementioned meeting, he defended Labour’s position by stressing that the ‘social chapter contained only modest provisions’ (FT 1997c). Blair was also attentive to business worries about the minimum wage – he had inherited the policy from the previous Labour leader and tried to dilute it by setting it at a level acceptable to business (FT 1997e). During the campaign, Labour also ‘abandon[ed] one of its most controversial proposals to reform competition policy amid concerns it might lose votes from the business community’ (Rice and Wagstyl Reference Rice and Wagstyl1997).
All in all, The Economist (1997b) concluded that ‘Although most business leaders will go to bed on May 1st having voted Tory, most of them will wake up on May 2nd relaxed about life under Labour’. With the prospect of a Labour victory, ‘Wealthy investors do not appear to be rushing to take money out of the country or set up elaborate structures to protect their wealth’ (FT 1997a). According to a poll reported in the FT, ‘Half of the UK’s industrialists hope for a Labour victory in the general election’ (Kampfner and Bolger Reference Kampfner and Bolger1997). The FT further claimed that ‘The City has taken a relaxed view of the possibility of a Labour victory at the general election’ (Kampfner Reference Kampfner1997). Michael Cassidy, chairman of the Corporation of London, said that ‘the strength of sterling and of the financial markets suggested confidence in the ability of Labour to maintain the City’s competitive edge’ (Ibid.). The Economist (1997e) calculated that the Tories were somewhat better for the economy, but their advantage was only ‘on points’. Yet ‘across the range of their policies, the Tories still match more of our template than Labour does’ (The Economist 1997g). In any case, businesses’ structural power and cross-border mobility would ensure that Labour could not renege on its commitments once in office (FT 1997a; The Economist 1997d).
Even if some businesses remained wary of certain Labour policies, Blair himself was largely trusted by economic elites, who did not seek to block his rise. Moreover, regardless of elite attitudes, Blair did not ‘actualize’ the conflictual core of populist ideas. Thus, there is no basis for portraying Blair as a populist, even if he sometimes employed populist discourse.
Populist conflict
In this section, I demonstrate that political and economic elites viewed Mélenchon and Corbyn as dangerous threats to business as usual. Elites were alarmed by their potential rise, unlike their attitudes toward Macron and Blair.
Mélenchon
Formerly the leader of the left wing of the Socialist Party (PS), Jean-Luc Mélenchon left the PS in 2008 to found PG (the ‘Left Party’) and allied with the Communist Party (PCF), creating the Front de Gauche (FdG – ‘The Left Front’). Despite his campaign pledges, PS President Hollande, elected in 2012, implemented an austerity budget that significantly eroded his public support (Bell and Criddle Reference Bell and Criddle2014: 197–199; Evans and Ivaldi Reference Evans and Ivaldi2017: 5). The controversial El-Khomri labor reform further fueled discontent, sparking the Nuit-Debout youth protest movement (Béroud Reference Béroud2018). Capitalizing on the PS’s waning popularity, Mélenchon sought to fill the void. Following the dissolution of the Left Front in 2016, over disagreements about cooperating with the PS, he founded La France Insoumise (LFI – ‘France Unbowed’).
In the 2017 presidential election, Mélenchon finished third with nearly 20% of the vote, narrowly missing the second round (Escalona Reference Escalona, Escalona, Keith and March2023: 226). However, LFI failed to replicate this success in the 2017 parliamentary elections; Mélenchon’s popularity declined, and the party was unable to capitalize on social movements and growing discontent with Macron’s government.
In 2022 – unlike 2017 – several other left candidates participated in the presidential elections. Yet once Mélenchon gained momentum and appeared to be the best-placed left candidate to reach the second round, he concentrated much of the left vote, winning 21.95%, again just short of advancing. In summer 2024, following the radical-right RN’s significant gains in the European Parliamentary elections, Macron announced early parliamentary elections to regain legitimacy. Since NUPES – the left alliance in 2022 – had dissolved in 2023, and given growing competition among the left parties, Macron likely expected to benefit from this fragmentation. Contrary to his expectations, however, the left – LFI, PS, the Greens, and PCF – managed to unite, forming the New Popular Front (NFP). With strong support in the 2024 election, the Front denied Macron a parliamentary majority, generating concerns among elites.
Of the 39 articles about Mélenchon analyzed, 38 were negative, rejecting both his policies and his candidacy. One article, written by an economist rather than a business leader, could be interpreted as positive, defending the distributive policies of ‘the left’. Mélenchon’s agenda – including ‘guarantee jobs for all, cancel public sector debt, cut the retirement age from 62 to 60, reverse the privatisation of infrastructure, sharply increase taxes on the rich and seize inheritances of more than €12mn, ban factory farming, pull out of Nato, liberalise immigration and legalise cannabis under a state monopoly’ – was rejected as ‘unashamedly radical’, ‘unworkable’ (Mallet Reference Mallet2022), and ‘unaffordable’ (Quinio and Mallet Reference Quinio and Mallet2022). According to The Economist (2022), ‘Mr Mélenchon would seek to reverse most of Mr Macron’s reforms, which have encouraged private investment and job creation’, and thus his policies would harm the economy.
In 2024, The Economist reiterated that left-wing policies such as ‘imposing punitive wealth taxes […] and scrapping Mr Macron’s reforms of the pension system, so that France can go back to one of the earliest retirement ages in the world […] are committed to doing things France cannot afford’ (The Economist 2024a). Again in 2024, the NFP’s programme was described as ‘totally at odds with the president’s business-friendly brand of supply side policies’ (Abboud Reference Abboud2024).
Mélenchon himself was attacked as having ‘a leftist obsession with class conflict’ and using ‘worn-out and misleading slogans’ (Barber Reference Barber2022), and for being ‘a charismatic demagogue – with a streak of authoritarianism’ (Jackson Reference Jackson2024). ‘Finance minister Bruno Le Maire, in an interview with Le Parisien, compared Mélenchon to the late Venezuelan president by dismissing him as “Gallic Chávez”’ (Quinio and Mallet Reference Quinio and Mallet2022).
All three newspapers provided evidence of elite rejection of Mélenchon. Capitalists were said to be alarmed by his proposals. ‘Investors, French and foreign, are appalled by ideas they see as unworkable and likely to trigger capital flight’ (Mallet Reference Mallet2022). His policies were ‘dismissed as unaffordable and viewed with alarm by French and foreign investors’ (Quinio and Mallet Reference Quinio and Mallet2022). Ahead of the 2024 parliamentary elections, ‘The possibility of a far-right government with the left as the largest opposition force – both of which have massive unfunded spending plans – has rattled financial markets, prompting a sell-off of French debt and equities this week’, as the left’s ‘radical tax-and-spend agenda [was] adding to investors’ jitters’ (Hall Reference Hall2024a). The left front’s achievements in the 2024 election ‘has spooked investors […] Fears that both the left and the RN would step up spending and strain relations with the EU had led to big stock market falls after the first-round vote’ (White and Johnston Reference Johnston2024).
According to Patrick Martin, head of the business lobby Medef, writing in Les Échos, ‘The program of the NFP would be fatal for the French economy’ (Abboud Reference Abboud2024). The Economist (2024b) warned that the prospect of a radical-left (or radical-right) government ‘has led to alarm in financial markets […] Both blocs’ agendas are “dangerous for the economy,” according to Patrick Martin, the head of MEDEF, a business federation. The hard left’s tax and spending splurge could lead to a “catastrophe,” according to Oliver Blanchard of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology […] Mr Blanchard argues the result would be an exodus of entrepreneurs, and that the increase in the minimum wage would make employment costs unsustainable for many businesses and prompt redundancies’. Some business elites actively tried to block Mélenchon: ‘A wave of Mélenchon-bashing is sweeping the media, fuelled by the billionaire Vincent Bolloré, who owns a vast array of journals, magazines and TV channels’ (Roy Reference Roy2024). Les Échos also reported that retail businesses were concerned about the NFP’s price-freeze programme and that ‘Given the choice between Le Pen and Mélenchon, many would choose Le Pen’ (Quiret Reference Quiret2024).
Mélenchon was likewise rejected by many mainstream political elites. Macron condemned ‘the protectionist and Eurosceptic manifestos of Nupes and Le Pen’s National Rally as recipes for chaos and obeisance to Russia, and pointed out that he is not obliged to name Mélenchon as prime minister’ (Quinio and Mallet Reference Quinio and Mallet2022). Before the second round of the 2024 parliamentary elections, figures within Macron’s camp even suggested forming a ‘republican front’ not only against the radical right but also against the left (Hall Reference Hall2024b; Jackson Reference Jackson2024), reflecting the belief among some political elites that business-as-usual could not be maintained with a strong left. The PS did cooperate with LFI, but only reluctantly – driven by electoral weakness – and its moderates were reported to be ‘horrified’ by the party’s alliance with Mélenchon’s LFI (Barber Reference Barber2022).
European elites were also wary of Mélenchon’s platform. For example, European Central Bank president Jean-Claude Trichet told Bloomberg TV that the NFP and RN ‘massive spending’ programmes ‘would be catastrophic’ and would ‘aggravate the situation in many respects as regards the credit worthiness of the country’, making them ‘not feasible at all’ (White and Johnston Reference Johnston2024).
With Mélenchon, for the first time we encountered a genuine populist political phenomenon – a leader advancing policies directly detrimental to the interests of economic elites, thereby generating open conflict with them, to which elites responded with alarm and active attempts to block his rise.
Corbyn
The Labour left had been a marginal force within the party since Blair became leader (Panitch and Leys Reference Panitch and Leys2020). However, riding a wave of discontent among members and a new layer of activists and young people outside the party who sought change, and taking advantage of new one-member-one-vote election rules, Jeremy Corbyn became party leader in 2015 (Cowley and Kavanagh Reference Cowley and Kavanagh2018: 83; Seymour Reference Seymour2017).
Mainstream political elites were hostile to the Corbyn project. One claim was that under Corbyn, ‘the hard left leadership wants to build a socialist movement instead of an election-winning force’ (Mandelson Reference Mandelson2017). Yet the so-called ‘unelectability’ argument appears to have served mainly as an excuse. Blair, who had committed Labour to a pro-business stance, famously said, ‘I wouldn’t want to win on an old-fashioned leftist [i.e., Corbyn’s] platform. Even if I thought it was the route to victory’ (Stone Reference Stone2015).
The non-left Labour leadership was not merely hostile but sometimes actively sought to sabotage the party’s left. A leaked internal party report suggested that staff members spied on left-wing members on social media to find grounds to expel them, did expel such members using dubious arguments, sabotaged the party’s own efforts in the 2017 election, and slowed down the handling of anti-Semitism complaints, knowing Corbyn would suffer (Fin Reference Fin2019; Jones Reference Jones2020).
After the left lost the leadership in 2020, new party leader Keir Starmer embarked on a purge of left leaders and activists, including Corbyn, and changed the party rules to prevent another left-wing leader in the future by giving more power to party MPs (Eagleton Reference Eagleton2022: 134–140). The purge was accompanied by a shift to the right on economic policy. Instead of redistribution, nationalizations, and similar measures, the new programme was based on pro-market policies designed to induce markets to support progressive goals (Eagleton Reference Eagleton2022: 149–152). The purge and sharp policy change reflected the animosity between the two wings of the party.
The media were also said to be biased against Corbyn (Cammaerts, DeCillia, Magalhães et al. Reference Cammaerts, DeCillia, Magalhães and Jimenez Martinez2016). One study concluded ‘that Jeremy Corbyn was represented unfairly by the British press through a process of vilification that went well beyond the normal limits of fair debate and disagreement in a democracy’ (Mills, Mullan and Fooks Reference Mills, Mullan and Fooks2021: 1).
Of the 28 articles in the weeks before the 2017 election that I analyzed, all were fairly negative. Corbyn himself was belittled. In one article, implying he was unexceptional, it was claimed that ‘few would mistake [Corbyn] for Alexander the Great […] The smaller politics becomes, the riper it is for capture by ideologues and second-raters (and ideological second-raters)’ (Ganesh Reference Ganesh2017). Another article suggested that Corbyn is a ‘relic of the 1970s’ (FT 2017b) and that ‘For Mr Corbyn’s part, he has never left the 1970s’, claiming he is unfit to rule (Stephens Reference Stephens2017). On another occasion, The Economist (2017d) claimed that ‘Labour’s proposals […] were buried some decades ago because they didn’t work’. Corbyn was described as ‘out of touch and hapless leader’ (Payne Reference Payne2017a).
Describing his agenda as ‘wrong-headed’ and ‘a return to the steam age’ (FT 2017a) was not a subtle way to say they were irrational. The same goes for The Economist (2017b), suggesting that ‘Even by the low standards set by the Labour Party under Mr Corbyn’s leadership, the policy is economically illiterate’. Sometimes it was not even implied – ‘Jeremy Corbyn has taken Labour to the loony left’ with his tax policies, claimed The Economist (2017e).
At the first stages of the campaign, when Labour was far behind in the polls, the FT seemed not to take the Corbyn threat seriously, instead debating the future Labour leadership and the probability that Corbyn would step down (Payne Reference Payne2017b). A heavy Labour loss appeared as the best way to assure a change in leadership (Payne Reference Payne2017a). The paper reminisced about the good old days of New Labour, when ‘So-called ‘anti-aspirational’ language was pretty much banished’, and Labour leaders did not complain about the rich getting richer but were ‘relaxed’ about people becoming ‘filthy rich’ (Pickard Reference Pickard2017). Later, despite not being satisfied with Theresa May, the paper endorsed her, suggesting that ‘the alternative to Mrs May is worse […] Faced with such uncertainty at home and abroad, Mrs May is the safer bet’ (FT 2017b). The Economist (2017e) also endorsed May, claiming that ‘Mr Corbyn poses as a radical but is the most conservative – and the most dangerous – candidate of the lot’.
Corbyn was depicted as an extremist. Peter Mandelson, writing in the FT, said that ‘The Daily Mail’s splenetic demand to ‘crush the saboteurs’, referring to those who oppose a ‘hard’ Brexit, is mirrored by Jeremy Corbyn’s vow to fight a class war’, claiming ‘populists on both right and left’ wish to see the centrist era over (Mandelson Reference Mandelson2017). Corbyn’s ‘political career has been one spent closeted among the various factions of the far left – Trotskyites, Stalinists, devotees of the late Albanian tyrant Enver Hoxha and sundry other splinter groups’ (Stephens Reference Stephens2017). Even if some of these points are factually true, the point is that Corbyn’s extremism was feared, as he seemed to threaten the existing order, as ‘Under the leadership of Jeremy Corbyn, Labour is looking to turn back the clock, abandoning the market economy consensus that has held since Margaret Thatcher and delivered prosperity for Britain’ (FT 2017a).
The papers also gave examples of elites rejecting Labour’s agenda:
Adam Marshall, director-general of the British Chambers of Commerce, told the FT earlier on Wednesday that a plan to raise corporation tax to 26 per cent would ‘alarm’ business unless it was linked to a cut in other levies […] Josh Hardie, deputy director-general of the CBI, sharply criticised the leaked document [Labour manifesto] ‘A number of these policies risk putting our economy into reverse gear rather than moving forward to support business in creating an inclusive, innovative economy’ (Pickard and Parker Reference Pickard and Parker2017).
Labour’s proposal to introduce a financial transaction tax led the FT to cite ‘Financial institutions […] warning that market participants would sooner take their business elsewhere than pay such a levy. They have cautioned that the tax would stall market activity, slow economic growth, and lead to higher costs being passed on to investors’ (Mance Reference Mance2017). In another article, Carolyn Fairbairn, director-general of the CBI business lobby group, was quoted as saying, ‘Labour’s proposals taken as a whole prioritise state intervention over enterprise, and fail to offer the pro-growth and competitiveness agenda the country so badly needs’ (Pickard and Bounds Reference Pickard and Bounds2017).
As with Mélenchon, Corbyn represents another case of populism at the political level, since he advanced policies viewed with alarm by political and economic elites, and was actively resisted by them.
Conclusion and discussion
In this paper, I claimed that there are theoretical reasons not to define populism merely as a set of ideas: the main justification for ideational focus is weak and, taken to its conclusion, implies that populism includes conflict with elites; political movements are multifaceted phenomena irreducible to ideology; and from a Gramscian perspective, political phenomena are judged by their relations to the dominant groups and their political order.
To empirically support this claim, I tried to attack the ideological definition at its weakest point – the separation between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ populism. The research design distinguished between conflictual and non-conflictual relations with elites, revealing that some would-be populists have no conflictual relations with economic elites.
It is hardly surprising that economic elites accepted Blair and Macron and were alarmed by Corbyn and Mélenchon. However, that the results are unsurprising does not mean they bear no significance. They put the spotlight on elites, an important aspect of populism that was mostly neglected in the literature.
Granted, one can interpret these findings in various ways, as they do not ‘speak for themselves’, and their interpretation is theory-dependent. Insisting on the purely ideological nature of populism, these findings are of little consequence. Even if one accepts that populism is also defined politically, it does not follow that conflict with elites is its appropriate political criterion.
My findings obtain their full significance when employing a Gramscian perspective. With this theory, actors’ populist status depends on their positioning vis-à-vis dominant elites. Taking Hawkins’ (Reference Hawkins2009) justification of ideological focus to its logical outcome leads to a similar conclusion. Relying on this theoretical perspective, the research design empirically demonstrated that ‘soft’ cases of populism lack conflict with elites, and thus, according to my theory, are not populist. The implication is that the ideological definition is overstretched. Even if ‘soft’ cases are excluded from being populist for ideological consideration (not containing anti-elitism), I still demonstrated that they are likely to be distinguished from ‘hard’ cases by the political criterion of conflict with elites. However, the findings bear significance even without accepting Gramscian theory, since they distinguish ‘hard’ from ‘soft’ populism by anti-elite conflict. With ‘hard’ populism expected to include conflict with elites, contrary to ‘soft’ populism, we get a political criterion for the most distinct, ‘hard’ cases of populism.
Of course, by only examining left-wing populism, my argument is limited. Further research is needed to demonstrate that right-wing populists generate conflict with elites.
Data availability statement
Data sharing is not applicable to this article as no datasets were generated or analyzed during the current study. The research is based on publicly available newspaper articles.
Acknowledgments
No.
Funding statement
No specific funding was received for this study. The research was conducted as part of a postdoctoral fellowship at the Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics at Tel Aviv University.
Competing interests
The author declares no competing interests.
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