John Searle’s stated aim in Making the Social World is “to offer a logical analysis of the fundamental ontology of the entities studied by the social sciences” (pp. 200-201; unless otherwise indicated all citations are to this work). An earlier book, The Construction of Social Reality, charted similar territory; however, we are now told that the theory developed there should be seen as a special case of the more general theory delineated in this latest book. For many years, going at least as far back as Speech Acts, Searle treated constitutive rules having the logical form “X counts as Y in C” as the principal representational vehicles by which social ontology is created. Institutions were glossed as systems of constitutive rules, and social reality was held to consist of facts existing within such institutions, such as that a certain piece of paper counts as U. S. currency or that the upraised arms of the referee signals a touchdown. Under the new dispensation, what is said to lie at the foundation of social ontology are Status Function Declarations having the logical form “We (or I) make it the case by Declaration that a Y status function exists in C” (p. 101). Constitutive rules turn out to be just one type of Status Function Declaration, though they are perhaps “the most common form for advanced complex civilizations” (p. 122). This shift in Searle’s thinking has two important implications. The first is a broadening of the notion of “institutional fact” to include facts existing outside of institutions proper, and the second a recognition of the possibility of status functions not inhering in any particular entity or object, i.e., there need be nothing playing the role of the “X” term in a constitutive rule. Toward the end of the book there are extensive discussions of the nature of power, political and otherwise, and of what constitutes a human right. Anyone familiar with Searle’s oeuvre should not be surprised to find him exploring territory normally the preserve of social and political philosophers, for he has long shown himself to be a philosopher of wide-ranging interests. More importantly, Searle continues a venerable tradition in philosophy of “system building,” and in none of his previous books is this made more apparent than in Making the Social World. He has written separate books on speech acts, intentionality, consciousness, rationality, and social ontology, and for those interested in knowing how he draws the logical connections between these seemingly disparate topics, they can do no better than the present volume.Footnote 1 I begin this essay with a summary of the main lines of argument in the text, and proceed from there to a critical examination of four issues arising from the discussion.
I
“We live in a sea of institutional facts” (p. 90), and this more than anything else is what sets human existence apart from other forms of animal life. “The existence of institutions,” Searle contends, “is enormously enabling in human life, and gives us all kinds of possibilities that we could not otherwise conceive of” (p. 124). So the important questions are these: How are institutional facts created and maintained in existence? What is their nature? And how do they operate in human affairs?
Institutional facts are created by speech acts of a special sort, what Searle calls Status Function Declarations. The roots of this idea go back to Austin’s work on performative utterances such as “I now pronounce you husband and wife,” “I appoint you secretary of this committee,” “I find the defendant guilty as charged.” Austin noted that performatives have the peculiar property of allowing a speaker to do something simply by saying that that is what he is doing. Thus, a speaker who chairs a committee of which Smith is a member can say, “I appoint Smith secretary,” and in so doing Smith is appointed secretary.Footnote 2 Searle recognized that what is philosophically interesting about performatives, viz., the creation of facts through linguistic fiat, is not limited to utterances having the form of the explicit performative. In our example, the chair could have achieved the same result by pointing to Smith at the start of a meeting and saying, “You’re secretary.” Thus he introduces the classification of Declaration to capture this broader class of speech acts of which performatives constitute just one type. What is distinctive about Declarations is that they have the double direction of fit, both language-to-world and world-to-language. This means that they are capable of creating institutional facts by representing them as existing.Footnote 3
The logical form of a Status Function Declaration is as follows:
We (or I) make it the case by Declaration that a Y status function exists in C (p. 101).
Once created, status functions are maintained through “continued usage of the institution and institutional facts, and this requires the usage of the corresponding vocabulary” (p. 103). Speech acts performed in the course of operating within an existing institution such as marriage or private property can function like Declarations even if they don’t share their logical form, since they serve to “maintain and reinforce both the institution and institutional facts within the institutions” (p. 104). Searle thinks that this points to a deep fact about the ontology of social reality, which is that it is ontologically subjective, i.e., intentionality dependent. Institutional facts are what they are only because we say and think that they are. The contrast here is with what Searle calls brute facts, such as the fact that the sun is roughly ninety-three million miles from the Earth. These are ontologically objective, i.e., intentionality independent. Such facts are what they are irrespective of what anyone thinks or says.Footnote 4
Status functions are deontic powers, i.e., powers expressible in terms of such deontological notions as obligations, requirements, duties, permissions, rights, prohibitions, and entitlements. To make this fully explicit, we can add the concept of deontic power to the representation of the logical form of Status Function Declarations, giving us the full dress formulation as follows:
We (or I) make it the case by declaration that a Y status function exists in C and in so doing we (or I) create a relation R between Y and a certain person or persons S, such that in virtue of SRY, S has the power to perform acts (of type) A (pp. 101-102).
The upshot is that what are created via Status Function Declarations are systems of power relations which exist only because we collectively represent them as existing. There is nothing more to social ontology than such deontic powers. Thus, to take a simple example, owning a car is a status function that confers both positive and negative powers on owners and non-owners alike. If a piece of paper counts as the title of a vehicle with Smith’s name on it, then Smith has certain positive powers such as being able to sell it (assuming there is no lien on the vehicle) and to drive it to work without having to get anyone’s consent. On the other hand, Jones as a non-owner has corresponding negative powers. She can’t sell the car, nor can she drive it without getting Smith’s consent. And if Smith does consent to Jones’s driving the car on a given day, then Smith’s obligation has the form of a negative power. Smith does not have the power not to allow Jones to drive the car on the appointed day (though this is obviously defeasible, as are most positive and negative powers). It is in this way, Searle urges toward the end of the book, that “all the strange and diverse human institutions are cases of shaping and reshaping the distribution of power by repeated applications of Status Function Declarations” (p. 202).
In order for systems of deontic powers to function they must “lock into” human rationality, which is characterized by the experience of the gap. This is the experience of not being causally necessitated, and Searle claims that rational human agency is marked by causal gaps at three points: reasons do not causally necessitate decisions to act, decisions do not causally necessitate actions, and, in actions of non-trivial duration, the onset of the action does not ensure its continuation until completion.Footnote 5 Because of this sense of freedom, deontic powers must assume the role in deliberation of desire-independent reasons for acting. They must serve as reasons because decisions made in the gap are generally based on reasons, and they must be desire-independent because otherwise the deontology could not operate properly. If deontic powers can do no better than appeal to our pre-existing desire set, then we will simply decide in accordance with our strongest inclinations (save for cases of weakness of will). In order to get the full force of the deontology, duties, obligations, rights, and all the rest must apply irrespective of our pre-existing desire set.Footnote 6
An important question concerns the standing of language itself. On the one hand, Searle holds that it is part of social reality. Thus the fact that uttering particular noises in certain circumstances counts as promising to meet someone for lunch, thereby placing the speaker under an obligation to honour the promise, is a status function imposed by the meaning conventions of the speaker’s language. And yet, on the other hand, it seems that language can’t be simply just one institution amongst equals, for on Searle’s account all institutional facts are said to be created, and partly constituted, by Status Function Declarations, a type of speech act having the double direction of fit; moreover, the maintenance of institutional facts over time requires the performance of speech acts that function like Declarations. This is precisely why Searle acknowledges the primacy of language, calling it the “primary social institution” (p. 109). But now we seem faced with a problem: if all of institutional reality consists of status functions created by Status Function Declarations, and if the latter are themselves status functions, then they too would require separate Status Function Declarations, and these in turn would need further Status Function Declarations, and so on without end. Turtles all the way down.
Searle blocks the infinite regress by acknowledging that meaning is a special form of status function not requiring Status Function Declarations. How does it work? The key is speaker meaning. We create meaning, Searle says, by imposing conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction. We produce certain sounds or marks intentionally, and we intentionally impose content or meaning on those sounds or marks. In the simplest cases, the content we impose matches the content of one or more of our intentional states, states such as beliefs, desires, or intentions. The ability to do this is simply a basic fact about human intentionality. Each of us has the capacity to do this, on our own, independently of any institution or social structure. What we create are indeed status functions. We produce sounds or marks that count as speech acts having propositional contents and illocutionary forces, but we do so without having to represent ourselves as doing so. We create status functions without Status Function Declarations.
Now, the reason we typically produce a meaningful utterance is to communicate with someone. We wish to apprise someone of how things stand in the world, or what we intend to do or want him or her to do, or what our feelings are, and so on. And it is here, in these public performances where the aim is to inform someone of something, that the deontology characteristic of the various speech acts gets its foothold. Thus, for example, when I promise to do something, I am doing more than merely indicating my intention to do it. I am publicly undertaking an obligation; I am “giving my word.” And when I make a statement, I am doing far more than simply indicating that I have a certain belief. I am publicly indicating how the world is, and in so doing “I am committed not only to revision in the case of falsehood” – which is all that having a belief commits me to – “but I am committed to being able to provide reasons for the original statement, I am committed to sincerity in making it, and I can be held publicly responsible if it turns out to be false” (p. 82). Of course, communication is greatly facilitated when we follow collectively accepted conventional procedures for making speech acts. Our interlocutors can more easily recognize our communicative intentions when we use sentences that the conventions of the language associate with the speech act we are performing: “[S]entence meaning is the standing possibility of speaker meaning” (p. 79).Footnote 7 And the fact that we are following linguistic conventions as an aid to communication serves to amplify the deontology associated with speech acts. But the possibility of performing communicative acts of speaker meaning, with the accompanying deontology, must be logically prior to the establishment of conventional procedures for doing so; otherwise, one faces the infinite regress problem. For then the rules would be functioning as Status Function Declarations. An utterance would count as a speech act of a given type only by dint of its being performed in accordance with the linguistic conventions. And these Status Function Declarations, being a type of speech act, would require further linguistic conventions, and so on and on.Footnote 8 The point, then, is that the fundamental deontology of language, upon which all of the deontic powers of institutional reality ultimately depend, is a function of the social commitments that devolve from the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction for the purposes of communication.
In the final two chapters, Searle uses his analysis of the logical structure of social reality as the basis for an examination of central topics in social and political philosophy. Chapter 7 discusses the nature of power and chapter 8, human rights. The central element in the concept of power is the capacity of an agent A to get a subject S to do B irrespective of whether S wants to or not. Searle identifies two subsidiary notions that also count as forms of power: the ability of A to get S to want to do B though S would not otherwise have wanted to do B, and the ability of A to so restrict S’s perceptions of the options available that S comes to want to do B though S would not have formed that desire had S had a fuller view of the available options. The sorts of powers here described are deontic powers, which must be distinguished from powers deriving from brute physical force. Nevertheless, certain forms of deontic power, especially those inhering in governmental institutions, can be backed by the ability to exercise force against recalcitrant individuals. It can happen that a deontic power is exercised over an individual largely because of the threat of the use of force in the case of non-compliance, as when someone obeys the law for fear of being arrested. Searle argues that government is the ultimate institutional structure because “governments have the power to regulate other institutional structures such as family, education, money, the economy generally, private property, and even the church” (p. 161). The ability of the government to exercise such wide-ranging powers is due in no small measure to its monopoly on organized violence and territorial control. But Searle points to another factor in cementing the power of the state, and that is its standing “as the ultimate focus of collective loyalty in a society” (ibid.), a phenomenon he describes as “one of the most stunning cultural developments of the past few centuries” (ibid.).
The concept of power is marked by two constraints. The first, the intentionality constraint, holds that it must be possible to specify the intentional content of any exercise of power, since the latter is always an intentional action. This means that any unintended consequences of the wielding of power are not to be considered part of the power being exercised. The exactness constraint requires that in any power relation it must be possible to specify who has power over whom to do precisely what. Thus the mere fact of a social or cultural influence on the shaping of a person’s desires, as some might argue happens with sexual desire, is not enough to mark it as a case of the genuine exercise of power, since “one cannot answer the question: who exactly is exercising power over whom exactly?” (p. 160).
One fly in the ointment is what Searle calls Background/Network power (Background power, for short). This is a form of power that is “not codified, is seldom explicit, and may even be largely unconscious” (p. 155). Background power typically takes the form of pervasive social pressures dictating everything from our sartorial choices, our selection of topics of conversation, the sexual acts we are willing to engage in, our political and social views (at least those to which we give voice), the manner in which we express our disagreement with others at meetings, and so on and on. These (mostly unspoken) social pressures bear all the hallmarks of genuine power relations. They constitute ways in which a group of individuals constrain the behaviours of others, forcing them to behave in certain ways irrespective of whether they wish to or not. Violation of these norms can be met with sanctions ranging anywhere from ostracism, rebuke, scorn, and vilification, to lethal violence. Given our Background sensibilities, these forms of social dislocation can be acutely felt, and thus the mere threat of such sanctions can be an effective exercise of power. In those cases where one doesn’t wish to engage in the forbidden behaviour or entertain the forbidden ideas, then power is not actually being exercised; nevertheless, the fact that unwanted sanctions would be imposed were one to have a change of heart shows that the power exists here as a capacity.
Background power poses a prima facie problem for Searle’s account because it appears to violate both the intentionality and the exactness constraints. The first problem is brought out in the fact that the power is said to reside in Background processes, dispositions, practices, and stances that are not themselves intentional phenomena. These pre-intentional capacities serve as the background for intentionality, making it possible for our thoughts and utterances to express conditions of satisfaction. The seeming failure to satisfy the exactness constraint stems from the decentralized and diffuse manner in which Background power is exercised. There is generally no formal authority in which power is vested to enforce social norms. Instead, we keep each other in check, and when individuals impose sanctions, they do so in the knowledge that others share these norms and are willing to enforce them. Under these circumstances, how are we to say who has power over whom to do exactly what? Searle counters that Background power violates neither constraint. Intentionality is indeed present, if only implicitly, in each instance of Background power since “the predictable sanctions make sense only if you suppose that they are imposed because of a failure to conform” (p. 158). The intentionality is expressed in the form of a standing Directive with a content such as “Conform!” or “Don’t dress like that in public!” or “Don’t do that to your friend!” or “Don’t perform that sexual act!” and so on. And the fact that a collectivity can impose sanctions on an individual for nonconformity means that in cases of Background power, anyone can exercise power over anyone else to conform to a specific norm.Footnote 9
Searle closes the chapter by making a number of observations about the nature of political power. The institutions of government are systems of status functions and as such depend on collective acceptance for their existence (this is no less true for totalitarian regimes than for democratically elected ones). Like all status functions, political institutions have associated with them deontic powers that constitute desire-independent reasons for action. Nevertheless, in order to function as the ultimate institutional structure, government must have a monopoly on armed violence via its control of the military and police (themselves systems of status functions). Interestingly enough, it is in the nature of political institutions in modern liberal democracies to condone non-violent group conflict over social goods, criticism of those in authority, and the temporary distribution of power. These are precisely the sorts of things that religious institutions are not adept at tolerating, and it is for this reason, Searle suggests, that healthy democracies have erected barriers separating ecclesiastical from state authority. Finally, he points out that politics works best when there is a clear demarcation between the public and private spheres, with politics being relegated to the former. The upshot is that “few, if any, of the important problems of life are determined by elections” (p. 172).
The final chapter of the book deals with the conceptual intricacies involved in the notion of a universal human right. The possibility of there being these rights poses a prima facie problem for a view like Searle’s, since one is said to have them simply by virtue of one’s humanity. Rights, as a form of deontic power, are associated with status functions and these are ontologically subjective, i.e., intentionality dependent. A status function exists only because we represent it as existing. Does this mean that our humanity is “merely” a status function, and thus that we are human because someone represents us as such? Fortunately, Searle shows how it is possible to have one’s cake and eat it, too. Our biological humanity resides in brute facts that are ontologically objective, i.e., they do not depend for their existence on human intentionality. And it is indisputable that these biological facts underlie the deontic ones. Nevertheless, where the concept of a human being is associated with deontic powers such as rights, that notion is serving as a status function that is contingent on collective intentionality.Footnote 10
But now a new problem arises, since the typical way in which deontic powers get apportioned to status functions depends on the purposes of the institutions in which they function. Thus, the rights and responsibilities of husband and wife accrue from the complex purposes served by the institution of marriage (it is important to keep in mind that many of these deontic powers are uncodified).Footnote 11 The whole point of having universal human rights is that these are alleged to transcend all institutions. One is said to possess such rights by dint of one’s humanity alone, and not because one is a citizen, a spouse, a property-owner, and so on. How then do we decide what deontic powers ought to be associated with the status function of being a human being? In other words, how ought we to settle on a list of universal human rights? To answer that question, Searle suggests, we need two things. The first will be a theory of human nature, one that delineates our most fundamental inclinations and dispositions, especially those that seem most central to what makes us human. Thus, an important part of the justification of the universal right of free speech is the fact that we are “speech-act performing animals,” whose “characteristic capacity of self-expression is innate in us as a species” (p. 189). But that alone is not sufficient to justify the deontology of rights, since there are many natural human inclinations, such as a tendency for male sexual jealousy to erupt in violence, which don’t rise to the status of rights (just the opposite, in fact). What is needed in addition is an account of what matters most about our humanity. In short, “the justification for human rights cannot be ethically neutral,” Searle argues, since it “involves a conception of what is valuable, actually or potentially, about our very existence” (p. 190). Thus a right to free speech is justified on the grounds that our speech-act performing abilities constitute a deeply important facet of human nature, and that in restricting the opportunities for self-expression we are inhibiting human flourishing. Other candidates for universal rights that Searle suggests include many of the usual suspects, such as “the right to life, including the right to personal safety; the right to own personal private property; . . . the right to associate freely with other people and to choose with whom one associates; the right to believe what one wants to believe, including religious beliefs as well as atheism; the right to travel; and the right to privacy” (p. 191). One surprise is his endorsement of a universal right to silence (in an increasingly noisy world).
Searle complains that discussions of rights often fail to recognize the important logical connection with the notion of obligations. A right, he says, is always a right against somebody, and thus a right always implies a correlative obligation. Thus if x has a right to do A, such as the right to express his political views publicly, then the rest of us are under an obligation to refrain from preventing x from doing A. Following common practice, Searle refers to this as a negative right, i.e., the right not to be interfered with in the exercise of that right. A positive right also imposes an obligation on someone else, but with this important difference. To say that x has a positive right to do A implies that someone else has an obligation to assist x to do A should x decide to exercise his or her right. Thus, if Fred has a right to adequate housing, and wishes to exercise that right, then others have to take steps to ensure that Fred has a decent roof over his head. And since this is supposed to be a universal right, the obligations it imposes apply to all of humanity. Searle contends that there can be no rights that require “costly efforts from all the members of humanity” (p. 194).Footnote 12 It is a different matter altogether when positive rights and obligations are imposed on the citizens of a state by a duly elected authority. In these kinds of cases, “rights and obligations become matters of statutory law” (p. 193). In other words, it is part of the deontic powers associated with the status function of being a government that it be able to enact legislation imposing such rights and duties on its citizens, and thereby creating desire-independent reasons for action. But this is a far cry from universal positive rights.
This closes the exegetical portion of the paper. In the next section, I will look at four topics that raise interesting philosophical issues and, if nothing else, merit further discussion.
II
The Problem of the Missing Intentionality
Recall Searle’s notion of Background power. It consists in the main of social norms that operate principally at an unconscious level; that is to say, the norms go mostly unsaid (and unthought-of) until such time as violations occur and sanctions are imposed. Calling such norms pervasive risks understatement. It is hard to imagine any areas of our social lives that are not subject to such norms. And since these are largely informal social norms, they are enforced by all the members of the group against all the members of the group. The upshot is that Background power is supposed to satisfy both the intentionality and the exactness constraints. It is the former of these claims that is of especial concern. For in those cases where social norms are generally invisible, operating below the level of conscious linguistic or mental representation, in what sense can there be sufficiently rich intentional content to satisfy any intentionality constraint worthy of the name? Searle tells us that we know the content is there, since otherwise the imposition of sanctions for alleged transgressions would make no sense. Furthermore, when called upon to justify said sanctions, people seem perfectly able to articulate in what the violations consist: treating a friend improperly, engaging in disgusting sexual acts, dressing in ways inappropriate for the workplace, and so on. But are these considerations really enough to satisfy the intentionality constraint? The problem stems from the nature of the Background itself. It is said to consist of stances, dispositions, practices, tendencies, and skills that are non-intentional; that are, indeed, pre-intentional in providing the foundation without which mental states would fail to express determinate content.Footnote 13 To underscore their non-intentional status, Background capacities are said to operate by blind, brute, physical causation, and not by Intentional causation, the form of causation appropriate to intentional states.Footnote 14 So it seems that in the exercise of power, consisting largely of the enforcement of norms, the Background is being asked to do something it is ill equipped to do. What we are talking about, after all, are deontic powers – obligations, duties, requirements, entitlements, permissions – and these are intentionality relative (ontologically subjective). The roles of friend, professor, conversational partner, restaurant customer, or baseball player constitute status functions, and as such they are sources for desire-independent reasons for action. But they exist only because we collectively represent them as existing. The intentionality must be there if the exercise of Background power, which needn’t amount to anything more than the threat to impose sanctions, is indeed the imposition or enforcement of status functions, and yet intentional content is nowhere to be found in the Background itself.
This problem is reminiscent of one that arises in Searle’s treatment of rule following, and it might be thought that his proposed solution there could be refashioned to fit the case of Background power. What is supposed to distinguish a genuine instance of rule following, where an agent can literally be said to be acting in accordance with a rule, from a simulacrum of rule following in which someone merely behaves as if he were conforming to the rule, is that the rules are causally explanatory of the behaviour in the former case but not in the latter. A rule-governed process, in short, is one in which the rules are causally efficacious. It is precisely because the requisite intrinsic intentionality is lacking in modern computers that no genuine rule following is taking place in their operations. Such machines function causally according to blind, brute, physical processes. It is no accident of course that characterizations of computers as following rules, performing computations, or carrying out the steps of an algorithm are both useful and convenient. They are so designed that their changes of states will nicely map onto a “software” level of description, making it possible to manipulate and predict their behaviour using the language of rules and algorithms. Nevertheless, such ascriptions have validity only instrumentally; “as if” intentionality is a form of make- believe.Footnote 15
Since deontic powers can be captured in systems of rules that provide agents with desire-independent reasons for acting, Searle sees social reality as providing ample opportunities for actual rule following. In the most straightforward of these cases, where an agent consciously thinks of the rule or norm and acts accordingly – thinks, for example, “I ought to shake his hand” and proceeds to do so – the rule is causally efficacious. These are full-blown cases of Intentional causation whereby conscious states represent the states of affairs they bring about. Ironically, relatively few instances of rule following fit this mold. “In many situations,” Searle tells us, “we just know what to do, we just know how to deal with the situation. We do not apply the rules consciously or unconsciously” (1995, p. 143). But then how can these be counted as genuine cases of rule following when there are no internal representations of the rules in the Background capacities that figure in the aetiology of the behaviour? Searle’s answer is that the rules figure causally in the acquisition and shaping of the Background abilities; “we develop skills,” in other words, “that are responsive to that particular institutional structure” (ibid.). A person new to baseball learns that one runs to first base upon getting a hit, perhaps by explicitly being told the rule, or simply by watching what others do when they get hits, seeing that running directly to any other base (or not running at all) elicits criticism and leads to being called out, and so on. Eventually the player acquires a disposition to run to first base after getting a hit without having to think of the rule at all, either consciously or unconsciously. All the same, when running to first the player can be said, in a literal way that implies causal efficacy, to be following the rules of baseball.Footnote 16
Perhaps, then, this is how the exercise of Background power, involving as it does the enforcement of social norms, can satisfy the intentionality constraint. That constraint is imposed, remember, because the wielding of power is always an intentional action, and this implies that it must be possible to identify the intended consequences of a given exercise of power. It might be suggested that the rules play a causal role in the acquisition and fine-tuning of the Background capacities in terms of which the rules are enforced. Thus although the skills, dispositions, and stances making up the Background do not contain internal representations of social norms, they are nonetheless capable of enforcing them. Unfortunately, many of the cases in which Background power is exercised involve the enforcement of uncodified norms. Because these status functions are nowhere represented, it is hard to see how rules could play even the indirect causal role adumbrated above. The requisite intentionality just isn’t there. Keep in mind that the sorts of social norms that we are talking about here are such things as how to behave in a restaurant, what not to wear for an interview, which topics to avoid in small talk, how to treat one’s close friends, and so on and on. Even where these social dos and don’ts are codified in books of etiquette, self-help manuals, or anthropological treatises, these merely serve to document practices that are ongoing, and typically of long standing. Participants can imbibe the norms and enforce them without having to consult any such works. Moreover, the deontic structure of many social practices can be complicated, often requiring the drawing of quite subtle distinctions. The complexity can be such that when these norms are spelled out as a series of propositions, they can require a high degree of intellectual sophistication to parse.Footnote 17
This points to a serious problem for Searle. It is absolutely crucial that the social norms enforced in the exercise of Background power be represented in some fashion, since the intentional contents of these norms must play a role in their enforcement. Absent the requisite intentionality, it is hard to see why these cases shouldn’t be classified as examples of “as if” intentionality. People simply behave as if the norms are in place and being enforced. If that’s right, then the exercise of Background power is nothing more than a simulacrum of the enforcement of norms, not the real thing. Moreover, social norms are grounded in status functions. The reason why people are discouraged from treating their friends in a cavalier manner is that being a friend is a status function that recognizes that friends are entitled to a certain level of consideration from one another. Similarly, being a participant in small talk is a status function that carries with it the understanding that certain topics, tones of voice, and body language are to be avoided. But status functions exist only because they are represented as existing. They are intentionality-relative, and so the intentionality must exist somewhere, somehow, in order for the exercise of Background power to constitute the enforcement of social norms grounded in status functions.Footnote 18
There is thus considerable internal pressure from within Searle’s view to posit representations of social norms. But these can’t be part of the Background proper, since this consists of non-intentional capacities. Nor are they consciously represented, at least not in a way that would allow them to play a causal role in the acquisition and development of the relevant Background skills, dispositions, abilities, and so on. It would seem that the only remaining option is to posit a level of unconscious intentionality at which social norms are represented and function causally, a suggestion that is anathema to Searle. Consider, in a related vein, what he has to say in Intentionality about gaining expertise in a complex physical skill like downhill racing. He finds it implausible to claim that in competing in a race, the expert skier “is making a very rapid series of unconscious calculations applying unconscious rules” (p.151). The correct thing to say instead is that “the body takes over and the skier’s intentionality is concentrated on winning the race” (ibid.). At least when it comes to the learning of complex physical skills explicit representations do have a role to play, since linguistic representations are often instrumental in the acquisition process. Thus, for example, “the beginning skier is given a set of verbal instructions as to what he is supposed to do: ‘lean forward,’ ‘bend the ankles,’ ‘keep the weight on the downhill ski,’ etc.” (ibid., p.150). It is only as the person transitions from novice through intermediate to expert skier that “the rules become progressively irrelevant” (ibid.); however, because social norms are mostly uncodified, no such explicit representations play a role at any stage of their operation. And therein lies the problem. There doesn’t appear to be sufficient intentional content in the exercise of Background power to satisfy the intentionality constraint on the wielding of power.
One possible suggestion here would be to claim that the intentionality involved in Background power is an interpolation of the intentionality present in surrounding states, both conscious and unconscious. The idea is that a sufficiently rich network of intentional states could license an intentional gloss of the operations of otherwise non-intentional Background capacities. But it is hard to see how this would be anything other than a matter of “as-if” intentionality, which, as a form of make-believe, is incapable of explaining anything. Such faux intentionality would be too thin a reed on which to satisfy the intentionality constraint on the exercise of power. How to demonstrate the satisfaction of this constraint in the exercise of Background power remains a lingering problem for Searle’s account.Footnote 19
Relevance to Theory and Practice in the Social SciencesFootnote 20
Searle’s book is, first and foremost, a work of ontology. It should come as no surprise, then, that it is pitched at a rather high level of abstraction. It attempts to “get a clearer understanding of the mode and existence of social reality” (p. 5), which, because of the supposed propositional or conceptual structure of social phenomena, turns out largely to be an exercise in logical analysis. Notwithstanding the non-empirical bent of his methodology, Searle states quite confidently in the book’s opening pages that his efforts will “deepen our understanding of social phenomena generally and help our research in the social sciences” (ibid.). Toward the end of the book he revisits the question of relevance, and offers a somewhat more circumspect response. In considering the matter of what implications, if any, his theory might have for “actual research in the social sciences” (p. 200), he candidly admits to not knowing. Part of that caution stems from the recognition that “it is impossible to tell in advance what is going to be useful for actual research” (ibid.). But there is a deeper and more philosophical worry having to do with whether, and to what extent, theories in the social sciences, which treat of “higher-level” phenomena, need to be informed by theoretical results concerning the most basic, foundational levels of reality. He admits to not having a knockdown argument either way, though his “instinct” inclines him to the view that getting straight about the ontology is essential if the social sciences are to progress.
Perhaps the thing to ask at this point is how Searle thinks his views about social reality are supposed to bear on the social sciences, at least in broad outline. The essential ontological claim being made is that “all the strange and wonderful diverse human institutions are cases of shaping and reshaping the distribution of power by repeated applications of specific forms of linguistic representations, Status Function Declarations” (p.202). This is supposed to imply that “the different social sciences ought to be transparent to one another” (ibid.), that they should not view one another as if “they dealt with fundamentally different subject matters” (ibid.). What this means for how social scientists ought to go about their work is hard to say. It is certainly not obvious that current practices are plagued by a lack of transparency or that practitioners harbour beliefs about the incommensurability of their respective fields. But even if social scientists are benighted in these ways, it is far from clear how things would be different were they to get the ontology straight.
One thing not entailed by Searle’s views on social reality is the wildly implausible notion that there is nothing social scientists could discover about human institutions of which participants in these institutions are unaware. That result might be thought to derive from the purported intentionality-relative status of social reality, i.e., from the supposition that institutional facts are what they are only by virtue of being represented as such. Searle makes very clear, however, that this is true only of “ground-floor” institutional facts that carry deontological implications. It doesn’t apply to the “fallout” from such facts, which are amenable to descriptions “from a third-person, anthropological, point of view” (p. 117). These include the multifarious unintended, unanticipated consequences of activities taking place within institutions, which may very well be invisible to or at least ill understood by the agents themselves. The existence of such phenomena, examples of which include economic recessions and the statistical advantage that baseball pitchers have over same-handed batters, does not threaten Searle’s account of social reality since “they carry no additional deontology, so no new power relations are created by fallouts” (ibid.).
It might be thought that progress could be made in this matter by turning the question of relevance on its head. Instead of asking what implications a highly abstract ontological thesis such as Searle’s might have for social science, we should ask what theoretical results could conceivably refute the Searlian hypothesis. Short of positing supernatural causes or reducing social processes to blind, brute physical causation, neither of which are likely prospects, it is hard to envision any discoveries that social scientists might make that would serve to undermine Searle’s account. Part of the difficulty, as Searle himself notes, is that we are engaged in speculation about how theories in the social sciences will develop over time, and this is a bit of a mug’s game. A more important consideration is the fact that this is really a symptom of a much deeper philosophical controversy concerning the degree of autonomy that special sciences enjoy from “lower-level” theories.
If Searle is correct, then the subject matter of the social sciences consists of institutional facts created and maintained by special sorts of speech acts, and third-person “fallout” facts from such activity. I don’t see that a convincing case has been made that progress in the social sciences will be stymied should social scientists remain blissfully ignorant of the lay of the ontological land. By the same token, it should not be taken as a knock against Searle’s logical analysis of social reality if it turns out to have little bearing on theory and practice in the social sciences.
The Role of the Imagination
Searle argues that there is an element of the imagination in the creation and existence of social reality, since it requires treating “something as something that it is not intrinsically” (p. 121). Such a “double level” of intentionality is nowhere more evident than in the logical form of a constitutive rule, “X counts as Y in C,” where we must be able to represent X as an x and, separately, as a y (where the latter connotes a status that does not devolve from X’s physical properties alone). He speculates, following suggestions made by Rakoczy and Tomasello, that our ability to create institutional facts through Status Function Declarations has its roots in childhood play-acting, whereby a child pretends to be a certain character or treats an ordinary object as if it were something else (a stick doubling as a sword, say). States of imagination and fantasy constitute a distinct category of intentional state with very interesting properties associated with them. Searle cites two definitive characteristics of intentional states: propositional content and direction of fit.Footnote 21 Even the emotions are amenable to this analysis, since he treats them as combinations of desires and beliefs.Footnote 22 While there are indeed types of psychological state lacking a direction of fit, such as generalized feelings of anxiety, fear, or elation, these also lack propositional contents. Imagination and fantasy differ from ordinary intentional states in that they express propositional contents while lacking a direction of fit. They are also unique in being amenable to voluntary control.Footnote 23
Although “freed” of having to achieve fit (in either direction), states of fantasy and imagination are capable of having functional roles that closely parallel their more intentionally robust cousins. Thus fantasy plays an important role in human sexuality, enhancing both arousal and pleasure. Flights of fancy can stir our emotions, and they appear to engage the same cognitive strategies and Background capacities that we rely on in our social interactions to figure out what those around us are thinking and feeling. Zunshine, for example, argues that novelists implicitly invoke their audience’s “theory of mind.” This allows readers to expand upon what is written in the text, thus creating a richer, more complex “world of the novel.” Indeed, she suggests that in certain genres such as mysteries, authors deliberately try to lead readers down garden paths by exploiting the predictable inferential tendencies licensed by their theory of mind.
There is an interesting parallel here with Searle’s (Reference Searle1974-75) analysis of fictional discourse, which ought not to be surprising since fiction directly engages the imagination. He argues that works of fiction are governed by the same semantic rules as govern works of non-fiction (words have the same meanings in novels as in newspapers, generally speaking). They differ in that certain pragmatic rules governing assertive speech acts are suspended in fiction. The author merely pretends to make assertive speech acts, and this invokes a set of conventions “which suspend the normal operation of the rules relating illocutionary acts and the world” (p. 67).Footnote 24 But beyond that it is the same suite of cognitive and linguistic abilities that enable us to process both fictional and non-fictional discourse.
The upshot is that imagination and fantasy constitute distinct forms of intentionality that play important roles in our cognitive and affective lives, and lie at the foundation of social reality. This is an area that merits further scrutiny. As a final note, there are interesting ethical questions that can be raised about fantasy and imagination that don’t arise, or arise in a very different way, with intentional states having a direction of fit.Footnote 25
Ethics, Values, and Deontology
One of the principal claims of the book is that in constructing social reality we create deontological systems consisting of rights, duties, prohibitions, permissions, obligations, and so on. In so doing we provide ourselves with desire-independent reasons for acting. All of social reality is created and maintained by language, specifically through the performance and collective recognition of Status Function Declarations. There is thus an important sense in which the public deontology of institutional facts is merely an extension of the more basic deontology of the constitutive rules of speech acts. Such linguistic rules demand of the speaker a certain level of commitment, where this involves both the notion of “an undertaking that is not easily reversible” (p. 82) and that of “an obligation” (ibid.). Speech acts are public performances, and insofar as they are acts of communication they are attempts to inform someone about the world: about how things stand, about what a speaker intends to do or wants the hearer to do, and so on. In making a statement, promise, request, prediction, or declaration, Searle says, I “give my word” (p. 84). The degree of commitment is even greater when speakers utilize conventional devices for performing speech acts, because this creates expectations in hearers that the conventional procedures are being followed properly (at least in literal speech). Interestingly, although he traces the emergence of genuine deontology to the development of linguistic communication, he is reluctant to claim that such commitments typically rise to the level of moral obligations. Thus Searle (Reference Searle1969) imagines a “very common sort of example” (p. 188) where someone promises to do something, attend someone’s party, say, only to renege at the last minute for no very good reason. The person certainly ought to have gone, and is remiss for not having done so. Had the person really needed to be there, failing to attend might have constituted a moral transgression, “but then the immorality would derive from the importance of going, and not simply from the obligation undertaken in promising” (ibid.).
This raises two interesting questions. First, what sorts of (non-intentional) Background capacities underlie the creation and maintenance of systems of deontology? Clearly it says something about the kinds of creatures we are that we feel the pull of social commitments, but what exactly? Secondly, how do full-fledged moral commitments emerge out of the non-moral or pre-moral deontology of speech acts? At what point does a Status Function Declaration carry with it implications for morality? Searle has little if anything to say about the first matter, which is not unwise given the considerable empirical dimension to the question; nevertheless, the temptation to engage in a little armchair speculation is hard to resist. Presumably, what make possible the creation of obligations on the basis of public performances are Background abilities rooted in our social character. This is likely to include a capacity for empathy, as well as propensities to care about what others think about us, a willingness to conform, a need to please, and so on. Obviously, this is an important area about which much more needs to be said.
Turning now to the second question, we have seen Searle’s willingness to embrace universal human rights such as freedom of speech and belief, freedom of association, the right to travel, the right to own private property, and so on. He holds that, as with other forms of deontology, these are created by Status Function Declarations, thus making them intentionality-relative. We do not discover the existence of human rights in the same way we discover that human beings have toes; nevertheless, the choice of what to count as a human right can be rationally defended, and need not be seen as arbitrary.Footnote 26 Ideally, these decisions will reflect basic facts about human biology, as well as fundamental assumptions about what is valuable in human life. This means that Status Function Declarations concerning human rights are not ethically neutral. Thus, for example, in his defence of a universal right to free speech Searle not only points out that we are “speech-act performing animals” (p. 190) but also that, in the exercise of free speech, we see “something essential to our achieving our full potential as human beings” (ibid.). The upshot is that ethical judgments about what matters most are logically prior to declarations of human rights. Searle doesn’t say how the former are to be arrived at, which leaves unresolved the question of what values a normative ethical theory ought to be structured around. Also left open is the meta-ethical matter of the ontological status of such values.Footnote 27
While some may find these to be serious lacunae in his overall system, I remain unconvinced. Not that it wouldn’t be nice to have plausible answers to these questions that fed into an overall account of rational agency, mental causation, intentionality, consciousness, linguistic communication, and social ontology. But it would be unfair, if not churlish, to demand this of a philosopher, even one as ambitious as Searle.
