Among contemporary scholars of American religious freedom, Andrew Koppelman and Steven Smith are two of the most esteemed. They address, in their respective books, a broad range of important issues.Footnote 1 Space limitations constrain me to be selective in this review essay; I comment here on what Koppelman and Smith say, and don't say, about two of the most fundamental issues regarding American religious freedom: the meaning of the nonestablishment norm and the constitutionality of granting conscience-protecting exemptions only to religious believers.
According to the Constitution of the United States, as interpreted and enforced by the Supreme Court of the United States, neither the federal government nor state government may prohibit the free exercise of religion or establish religion.Footnote 2 However, it is controversial among the justices of the Supreme Court and also among constitutional scholars both what sorts of government action constitute “prohibiting” the free exercise of religion and what sorts constitute “establishing” religion. I begin with the controversy with which Koppelman and Smith are principally concerned.Footnote 3
The Nonestablishment Controversy
There is widespread agreement that the nonestablishment normFootnote 4 forbids government action of this sort: government action according to which (a) a particular church—or a particular range of theologically kindred churches, such as “the Christian church”—is treated as the, or an, official church of the political community (nation, state, county, municipality, township, etc.) or (b) one or more religious doctrines or practices of a particular church are treated as official religious doctrines or practices of the political community. Let us call the proposition that the nonestablishment norm forbids government action of the sort just specified “the central meaning of the nonestablishment norm.” The nonestablishment controversy arises in response to this question: Does the nonestablishment norm forbid government action of any sort in addition to the sort forbidden by the central meaning of the norm? More simply, is the central meaning the only meaning of the norm?
Koppelman's position is that the central meaning is not the only meaning, that the nonestablishment norm is best understood also to forbid government action that affirms, by treating as “true,” any religious tenet whatsoever; according to Koppelman, government may not affirm even a religious tenet whose affirmation by government does not (or would not) violate the central meaning of the norm.Footnote 5 Government must be “neutral,” insists Koppelman, on the question whether one or another religious tenet, no matter what the tenet, is true: “What [government] may not do—what [nonestablishment] doctrine properly forbids it to do—is declare any particular religious doctrine to be the true one, or enact laws that clearly imply such a declaration of religious truth.”Footnote 6
In discussing his position, Koppelman writes: “If government cannot declare religious truth, then its cannot use its coercive powers to enforce religious truth. . . . If [government] may not declare religious truth, or take sides in live theological controversies, then of course it cannot persecute heresy or blasphemy.”Footnote 7 It bears emphasis, however, that if government may declare religious truth, it does not follow that government may “use its coercive powers to enforce religious truth.” And, indeed, if under the nonestablishment norm government may affirm some religious tenets, it is nonetheless the case that because government may not prohibit the free exercise of religion, government may neither coerce one to affirm or otherwise conduct oneself in accord with any such tenet nor discriminate against one for refusing to do so.Footnote 8 (More about the free exercise norm below.)
In support of his position that the nonestablishment norm is best understood to forbid government to affirm the truth of any religious tenet whatsoever, Koppelman lists “a number of considerations:” (1) government “is incompetent to determine the nature of [religious] truth”; (2) “the use of [government] power to resolve religious controversies is terribly divisive and does not really resolve anything”; (3) government “involvement in such [controversies] has tended to oppress religious minorities” and, further, (4) “tends to corrupt religion.”Footnote 9 Koppelman's four considerations—the last of which he puts the most weight on and spends an entire chapter elaboratingFootnote 10—explain why he believes that government should stay out of the business of affirming religious tenets. However, the considerations do not show, and so far as I can tell Koppelman does not try to show, what a defense of a particular understanding of the nonestablishment norm—of the norm, that is, as a constitutional norm, as part of the constitutional law of the United States, and, as such, judicially enforceable against government—must show, whatever else it must show, if the defense is to be broadly persuasive: that as compared to any competing understanding of the norm, the understanding at issue is, if not more congruent, not less congruent with the original understanding of the norm, or with a widely shared historical understanding of the norm, or, at least, with well-settled constitutional doctrine.
Smith's position in the nonestablishment controversy is that the broad understanding of the norm for which some, prominently including Koppelman, contend—the “neutrality” understanding—is much too broad to be a plausible interpretation of the norm. What I am calling the central meaning of the nonestablishment norm is essentially what Justice Scalia understands to be the meaning of the norm.Footnote 11 I cannot tell whether Smith thinks that the most plausible interpretation of the norm is narrower even than what Justice Scalia understands it to be.Footnote 12 In any event, Smith rejects Koppelman's “neutrality” understanding of the norm; according to Smith, the nonestablishment norm is best understood to permit government to affirm at least some religious tenets.Footnote 13
In criticizing and rejecting the position for which Koppelman contends, Smith does not rely on the original understanding of the nonestablishment norm; Smith is acutely aware of the difficulty, to the point of impossibility, of identifying the original understanding of the nonestablishment norm. As Smith explains, “there has never been a single moment and deliberate or authoritative decision to which we can look back in order to figure out what the constitutional commitments [to nonestablishment and free exercise] actually mean. Instead, courts have given those commitments meaning through an unmoored process of constructive interpretation and perhaps invention.”Footnote 14 Nor does Smith rely on well-settled constitutional doctrine; Smith knows that constitutional doctrine regarding nonestablishment is anything but well settled—or even coherent.Footnote 15 Instead, Smith marshals more than ample historical evidence to demonstrate that an understanding of the nonestablishment norm much narrower than the broad “neutrality” understanding for which Koppelman contends is much more congruent with what has been the dominant understanding of the norm throughout most of American history. As a federal court put the point in 2001: “[The nonestablishment norm] was not. . . understood to be a prohibition against employing generalized religious language in official discourse. The notion that the First Amendment was designed to impose a secular political culture on the nation would have struck most nineteenth-century judges as absurd.”Footnote 16 Consider this data:
Fully twenty-seven, or two-thirds, of the 1868 state constitutions contained an explicit reference to God in their preambles. A typical such reference stated, “[W]e, the people of the State of Indiana, grateful to Almighty God for the free exercise of the right to choose our own form of government, do ordain this Constitution.”
In addition to these references to God in the preambles of state constitutions, thirty state constitutions in 1968, or more than three-fourths of the total, contained reference to God. . . . Examples. . . include the use in constitutional texts of such phrases as “Almighty God,” “Supreme Being, the Great Creator and Preserver of the Universe,” “Author of the universe,” “[A]uthor of all good government,” “Sovereign Ruler of the Universe,” “Divine Being,” “Great Legislator of the Universe,” and “[O]ur Creator.”Footnote 17
It is a virtue of Smith's position in the nonestablishment controversy that, unlike Koppelman's position, Smith's does not entail a conclusion that most citizens of the United States, present as well as past, would greet, or would have greeted, as ridiculously extreme: that having “under God” in the Pledge or “In God We Trust” as the national motto, or beginning a session of court with “God save the United States and this Honorable Court,” is unconstitutional.Footnote 18 Although Koppelman accepts that conclusion, he manages to steer clear of the related, and unrealistic, prescription that the Supreme Court so rule only by accepting that those practices—and kindred remnants of “ceremonial deism”—have acquired immunity to constitutional challenge in consequence of their having been “grandfathered.”Footnote 19
Smith does not rest content with showing that the broad understanding of the nonestablishment norm for which Koppelman and some others contend is implausible as a matter of constitutional interpretation. Smith goes on to explain, at length, why even just as a practical matter, he strongly prefers, for us Americans, a state of affairs in which questions about whether government should affirm one or another religious tenet are decided by the citizenry, or by their political representatives, or by both, in the context of ordinary political discussion and decision-making.Footnote 20 Smith's preferred state of affairs—which he calls “the American settlement,” and which, according to Smith, prevailed unchallenged throughout most of the nineteenth century up to the middle of the twentiethFootnote 21—contrasts sharply with the state of affairs constituted by Koppelman's position, in which the Supreme Court has removed all such questions from the domain of ordinary politics by ruling that the nonestablishment norm forbids government to affirm any religious tenet whatsoever. However, because the controversy about how the nonestablishment norm is best understood is fundamentally a constitutional controversy, one can be agnostic, or even skeptical, as I am,Footnote 22 about the praises Smith sings in support of “the American settlement” and nonetheless conclude, as I do, that what Smith says in rejecting Koppelman's broad interpretation of the nonestablishment norm—the norm qua judicially enforceable constitutional norm—is persuasive.
Free Exercise and Religious Exemptions
Like the nonestablishment controversy, the free exercise controversy pits a narrow understanding of the norm at issue against a broad understanding. The free exercise norm is a right: the right to the freedom both to practice (“exercise”) one's own religion and not to practice a religion not one's own. That the free exercise right is an antidiscrimination right is not disputed; whether it is more than an antidiscrimination right is disputed.
As an antidiscrimination right, the free exercise right forbids government to discriminate against a person—to treat a person, A, less well than another person, B—on the basis of a religion-specific reason regarding the person's conduct.Footnote 23 Examples of such religion-specific reasons: A (unlike B) is engaging in Islamic conduct; A is engaging in religiously based conduct;Footnote 24 A is not engaging in Christian conduct; A is not engaging in religiously based conduct.Footnote 25 An instance of treating A less well than B can take the form of punishing A, of otherwise imposing a burden on A, or of withholding from A a benefit that is granted to B.Footnote 26
In Employment Division v. Smith,Footnote 27 five justices of the Supreme Court ruled that the free exercise right is nothing more than an antidiscrimination right.Footnote 28 According to a broader understanding of the right, however—an understanding that attracted the support of the four other justicesFootnote 29—the free exercise right is more than an antidiscrimination right: the right not only forbids government to discriminate on the basis of a religion-specific reason regarding conduct; the right also requires government, even if it is not discriminating on the basis of such a reason, to accommodate a religious believer by exempting the religiously based choice she wants to make from a law (or other government action) that significantly burdens her ability to make the choice—her ability, that is, to act in accord with her religious convictions and commitments—unless not exempting the choice is the least restrictive means of serving a compelling government interest.Footnote 30
Constitutional scholars too, no less than Supreme Court justices, are divided about which of the two understandings of the free exercise right—the narrow, antidiscrimination understanding that prevailed in Employment Division v. Smith or the broader, accommodationist understanding—is the more defensible understanding, in the sense of more faithful to the original understanding of the right.Footnote 31 Although Koppelman and Smith each discuss the free exercise controversy, neither indicates which understanding of the right, narrow or broad, he judges to be the more defensible understanding.Footnote 32 (Again, Koppelman and Smith are principally concerned, in their books, with the nonestablishment controversy.) However, both Koppelman and Smith approve of government's sometimes accommodating religious believers by exempting religiously based conduct,Footnote 33 which, as the Supreme Court emphasized in Employment Division v. Smith, government is constitutionally free (though not constitutionally required) to do.
An important question arises when government chooses to grant what we may call a “conscience-protecting” exemption (a) to religious believers, so that they can act in accord with their religious convictions and commitments, including their religiously based moral convictions and commitments, but (b) not to persons who are not religious believers but who nonetheless want to be able to act in accord with their moral convictions and commitments: Is it constitutional for government to grant conscience-protecting exemptions only to religious believers?
In Welsh v. United States (1970), four members of the Supreme Court avoided the question in the preceding paragraph by construing the conscientious objector provision of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, which by its terms provided only for religiously based conscientious objection, also to provide for conscientious objection that was not religiously based.Footnote 34 In an opinion that supplied the crucial fifth vote in support of the Court's judgment, Justice Harlan answered the constitutional question; he explained that in his view, the conscientious-objector provision “runs afoul of the religion clauses of the First Amendment” by discriminating against those who are not religious believers.Footnote 35 “[H]aving chosen to exempt, [Congress] cannot draw the line between theistic or nontheistic religious beliefs on the one hand and secular beliefs on the other. Any such distinctions are not, in my view, compatible with the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.”Footnote 36
Justice Harlan's sense that “any such distinctions” are unconstitutional was correct, but his reliance on the nonestablishment norm was problematic. It is far from obvious that by granting conscience-protecting exemptions only to (all) religious believers (i.e., who otherwise qualify), government violates even the broad understanding of the nonestablishment norm, much less a narrower understanding: granting such exemptions only to religious believers does not affirm—or presuppose or entail the affirmation of—any religious tenet; it does not, in Koppelman's articulation, “declare religious truth.” The reason: there are secular rationales for granting exemptions only to religious believers.Footnote 37
However, by granting such exemptions only to religious believers, government does violate the prevailing understanding—the narrow, antidiscrimination understanding—of the free exercise right: granting conscience-protecting exemptions only to religious believers discriminates against those who are not religious believers on the basis of a religion-specific reason regarding conduct. More precisely, granting such exemptions only to religious believers is to treat less well those who are not religious believers based on the fact that the conduct that those who are not religious believers want to engage in, unlike the conduct that the religious believers want to engage in, is not religiously based conduct.Footnote 38 Justice Harlan's bottom line was correct: it is not constitutional for government, if it grants conscience-protecting exemptions, to grant them only to religious believers.Footnote 39
That government is not constitutionally free to grant conscience-protecting exemptions only to religious believers is not, in the United States, controversial as a practical—political—matter: it is not at all uncommon for the federal government, when it grants exemptions to religious believers so that they can act in accord with their religiously based moral convictions and commitments, also to grant exemptions to persons who are not religious believers so that they can act in accord with their moral convictions and commitments, even though their moral convictions and commitments are not religiously based. Micah Schwartzman's list illustrates the point:
Federal and state legislation often goes beyond the category of religion to protect non-religious ethical and moral beliefs. For a recent example, the Affordable Care Act. . . includes an exemption from its minimum coverage provision—aka the “individual mandate”—for members of a recognized “health care sharing ministry,” which the statute defines as a non-profit organization whose members “share a common set of ethical or religious beliefs and share medical expenses among members in accordance with those beliefs.” Similar language is used in federal legislation prohibiting public officials from requiring health care providers to perform or assist with abortions or sterilizations when doing so would violate their “religious beliefs or moral convictions.” The federal government is also barred from requiring employees to participate in the administration of the death penalty “if such participation is contrary to the moral or religious convictions of the employee.” Numerous other federal and state statutes and regulations involving foreign aid, counseling services, vaccinations, pharmacies, organ donation, assisted suicide, and, of course, military service follow the same pattern of expressly protecting not only religious convictions but also ethical and moral beliefs, conscience, or some combination thereof.Footnote 40
But then there is RFRA—the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993—which by its explicit terms grants exemptions (when doing do does not disserve a “compelling” government interest) only to religious believers. Specifically, RFRA prohibits the federal “[g]overnment [from] substantially burden[ing] a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability” unless the government “demonstrates that application of the burden to the person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”Footnote 41
Again, both Koppelman and Smith approve of government's sometimes accommodating religious believers by exempting religiously based conduct. Smith, however, says nothing about how he thinks the Supreme Court should respond if one who is not a religious believer seeks a conscience-protecting exemption under a statute that, like RFRA, grants such exemptions only to religious believers. How should the Court respond? Is there, all things considered, a more appropriate way to respond—does Smith think that there is a more appropriate way to respond—than the way the Court responded in Welsh v. United States, in which one who was not a religious believer sought conscientious objector status under the Universal Military Training and Service Act, which by its explicit terms granted conscientious objector status only to (otherwise qualifying) religious believers?Footnote 42 I concur in Douglas Laycock's judgment that responding the way the Court responded in Welsh is optimal, namely, by broadening the coverage of the law at issue rather than by invalidating the law.Footnote 43 At one point in his discussion of religious exemptions, Koppelman expresses support for the Court's strategy in Welsh, Footnote 44 in which, as Koppelman explains, the Court ruled that the Act exempted “from military service all those whose consciences, spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs, would give them no rest or peace if they allowed themselves to become a part of an instrument of war.”Footnote 45
* * *
I have focused here on two of the most fundamental controversies concerning American religious freedom: the meaning of the nonestablishment norm and the constitutionality of granting conscience-protecting exemptions only to religious believers. Much more in Koppelman's and Smith's learned, thoughtful, and constructively provocative books merits comment. Suffice it to say that anyone interested in state-of-the-art discussions of religious freedom under the constitutional law of the United States should read both books—and, ideally, read them seriatim, because, as I have explained, the two books articulate sharply different responses to the question, What sorts of government action constitute the “establishment” of religion?
