How does oil wealth shape the durability of political regimes in the developing world? Rentier-state theories suggest that hydrocarbon wellsprings breed resilient authoritarianism. When oil exports saturate governments with easy money, incumbent elites can purchase mass acquiescence through blanket welfare policies while building coercive agencies to crush domestic opponents within civil society. In contrast, resource curse analysts contend that regimes reaping oil windfalls suffer precarious instability and opposition. Not only do natural-resource spoils present incentives for rebels to challenge central authority but also the state's extreme dependence on global energy markets holds it hostage to external economic shocks.
Enter Benjamin Smith's book, which launches the most sophisticated intervention into the literature on oil wealth since Michael Herb's 1999 study of the Persian Gulf. Not just students of Middle East politics but also scholars of political economy would do well to absorb what should become the new hallmark in this field. Smith contends that both rentier-state and resource curse theories have it wrong. Scanning the postcolonial world, he argues that oil is not some macrostructural variable that uniformly predicts regime outcomes but is rather a contingent political resource whose long-term effects are mediated by its timing relative to late development. The real story is not about hydrocarbon endowments per se but rather how oil revenues were incorporated into the social coalitions and governing institutions assembled by rulers during the early decades of state building. Thus, as Smith dictates in the opening pages, “we should ask not whether countries become oil rich but when” (p. 4).
What follows is an impressive manual in how to marry different methodological strategies in the service of causal inference. Smith sets the stage by exposing key shortcomings in rentier-state and resource curse theories through statistical regressions. Iterated tests suggest that oil-rich states exhibit more robust levels of regime resilience than oil-poor ones, but this endurance occurs through means other than repressive violence and economic performance. Retreating back to the theoretical furnace, the author then deduces several new propositions that focus less on geology and more on politics. Disclosing a penchant for comparative historical analysis, Smith then suggests two critical variables present at a regime's birth—its underlying social coalition and institutional organization—to better explain patterns of stability and opposition within oil-exporting countries in the latter half of the 20th century.
Herein lies the analytical driver of this volume. Smith distills his hypotheses into an elegant pair of state-building models that reveal how the timing of oil-rent availability shapes the dynamics of coalition formation and institutional configuration. First, when rulers could not harvest the bounty of oil revenues and also faced intense opposition at the onset of late development, they secured power by erecting broad cross-class coalitions and responsive popular organs that linked ruling elites to local interests. Such autocrats brandished the institutional infrastructure to rally domestic allies and disarm opposition groups during future economic crises. Second, when incumbents enjoyed copious income from oil exports in conjunction with weak opposition, they chose to anchor state authority through exclusionary means. They constructed narrow ruling coalitions that excluded broader societal interests and failed to create the political institutions that could mobilize grassroots support and organize popular cadres during crises.
These arguments come to life through structured case studies of post-1950s Indonesia and Iran, which Smith constructs using data culled from historical research and intensive fieldwork. The Indonesian New Order regime of Suharto exemplifies the first pathway, representing a “high-capacity” state driven to consolidate power through a broad coalition of indigenous social forces. With the oil sector laying fallow, Suharto's government was forced to solidify national control by organizing the hegemonic Golkar party, sustaining a functional tax bureaucracy, and implanting local agencies to carry out central policy. When hydrocarbon exports boomed in the early 1970s, the regime used its discretionary revenues to strengthen these preexisting institutions. By contrast, the Pahlavi regime exemplified a “low-capacity” state predicated upon a narrow coalition of societal support. The quick restoration of the oil industry by the late 1950s, thanks in large part to U.S. assistance, enabled the Shah to reap profuse oil revenues early on and thus ignore the interests of traditional constituencies like the ʿulamaʾ and the bazaar. Shielded by repression and detached from its mass base, the new Iranian state neglected to deepen its power by developing an autonomous party apparatus, enlarging its feeble extractive policies, and establishing effective municipal and provincial administrations.
By systematically tracing the evolution of these Indonesian and Iranian structures over two decades, Smith borrows from the macroanalytic toolbox of path dependency. Initial choices constrain future outcomes, and so late developmental strategies that diverged early on due to the accessibility of oil revenues persist and amplify over time. Although both regimes faced urban protests due to rising inflation and economic downturns in the late 1970s, only Suharto's government enjoyed the institutional mechanisms to defray social dissent and bargain with moderate opponents to prevent the coalescing of a cross-cutting rebellion. The Pahlavi regime, by contrast, lacked the organizational instruments necessary to mobilize local supporters and engage opposition leaders. It could only command its coercive guardians to crush public discontent, which ultimately contributed to the emergence of a mass revolutionary movement.
Of course, a cynical reader might wonder if Indonesia and Iran are simply exceptional cases, cherry-picked to fit the hypothesis. However, Smith preempts this suspicion by returning to statistical analysis in the final chapter. Several regression tests reinforce the cross-national significance of rent scarcity and opposition strength in predicting regime durability and breakdown in nineteen other oil-exporting countries. Brief but adequate case studies of Congo and Egypt further accentuate the argument's relevance beyond the initial paired comparison. Such analysis again demonstrates the complementary advantages of wedding the cross-national breadth of statistical analysis with the depth of case-oriented research.
In sum, Smith has produced a commanding work of scholarship that will redefine the received wisdom on oil politics. However, even touchstones have blemishes. For instance, the first chapter's regression models are presented rather quickly, which might overwhelm readers unfamiliar with statistical methods. Further, the Indonesian and Iranian case studies do not devote enough historical detail to parse out a distinctive “preinstitutional” phase of coalition formation that temporally precedes later institutional arrangements. Finally, initial U.S. involvement in each of these countries is framed as equivalent in order to emphasize domestic actors, but in empirical terms American support for the Shah during Iran's early nationalist conflict is incomparable: the Pahlavi regime lived off Washington's patronage until its oil industry revived in the late 1950s, suggesting a critical period of rent scarcity and foreign intervention that the explanatory model disregards.
Such minor flaws, however, should not detract from this volume's theoretical contribution, which reshapes our prevailing understanding of oil wealth. In doing so, it presents an enduring lesson for not only political economists of developing states but also contemporary analysts studying the resilience of authoritarianism in the Middle East. Smith's comparative insights suggest that we cannot understand the durability of autocratic regimes without attending to their historical origins, specifically the initial choices made by incumbents facing social opposition and foreign constraints. Yet if ruling elites in states as varied as Tunisia, Kuwait, Jordan, and Libya maintain power today largely due to their inheritance of coalitional bargains and political institutions forged half a century ago, then perhaps we should not expect momentous change for another five decades.
