Toby Dodge's Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied is possessed of two chief virtues: it is a good book, and it is timely.
Few books in modern Middle East history have had such mass appeal, garnering favorable notices from a diverse group of reviewers. U.S. Senator Joseph Biden, National Public Radio's Mike Schuster, and blogger extraordinaire/former MESA president Juan Cole all endorsed it; it even received the coveted “recommended” from Choice. It seemed to say the right thing at the right time about the impossibility of the success of America's war in Iraq and more broadly helped to confirm the colonial nature of that war.
This review will neither detract from those reviews nor render yet another description of the text; rather, it will place the work within the emerging literature on late colonialism, embodied primarily in the comparative study of the interwar French and British League of Nations Mandate system, and reflect on the problems that arise when history is employed as a guide to contemporary policy choices or merely to provide “background” for the now.
Dodge's book is part of a larger movement to ask questions about colonialism in the Middle East in a way that transcends traditional Arab nationalist-inflected and usually uncomplicated narratives of anticolonial national liberation. It also seeks to understand how the transition was made from high colonialism to neocolonialism. It sees the Mandate system as both an epilogue to the 19th century's dominant forms of formal empire, especially in the way it integrated Orientalist ways of knowing, and a prologue to neoliberalization or “globalization” as British and French policy embodied an ambiguous relationship with liberal idealism, free-market capitalism, and Wilsonianism.
Dodge contributes to this project by bringing a degree of complication to the British colonial presence in Iraq: unraveling the larger divisions between London-based and India-based colonial officials; exploring conflicts among and between bureaucrats, Arabists, and military officers; and showing how the requirements imposed by the League of Nations tempered the British experience. In this respect the book complements work first done by Peter Sluglett, in Britain in Iraq: 1914–1932, and benefits from the final declassification of the British diplomatic archives on Iraq, the availability of the private papers of most of the key players of the period, and a growing body of comparative and theoretical literature on late colonialism.
The richness of this approach is best shown in the way Dodge blends the archival and theoretical in his discussion of how colonial officials brought their own romantic notions of the Arab to the modern management of rural society through the invention of a complex patronage system based on tribal shaykhs. His discussion of the methodical use of airplanes as a new tool of social control is masterful and makes good use of notions of surveillance and power derived from his reading of Michel Foucault.
Nevertheless, one does not see much of Iraq or Iraqis in this book. Moreover, although Dodge makes no claims that his book is about the way those who became Iraqis in the course of the Mandate were integrated into or resisted that project, it still shows the chief weakness of European archive-based Mandate studies. Building an account of the period by drawing exclusively from the wealth of information contained in the British, French, and League of Nations archives is seductive, but it must be done in concert with other kinds of material. Dodge's work certainly should have been enhanced by Arabic primary or secondary sources, and by not doing so he cannot immunize his work from the prejudices and blind spots of the colonial officials he examines.
This gaping hole in his source material is ironic in that much of his criticism of the American colonial presence in Iraq—the basis of his new preface and concluding remarks—revolves around the United States's conspicuous lack of understanding of Iraqi society, which is presumably best alleviated through the use of one of Iraq's two native languages.
Still, Dodge's book should serve as an antidote to that lack of understanding. Thankfully, it is one of the books that has tended to populate the shelves of Coalition Provisional Authority bureaucrats ensconced in the Green Zone. I often took note of seeing a worn copy of it alongside Sarah Shields' Mosul Before Iraq: Like Bees Making Five-Sided Cells, Yitzhak Nakash's The Shiʿis of Iraq, a DVD of Gillo Pontecorvo's “The Battle of Algiers,” and unfortunately, but tellingly, that classic of contemporary racist thought, Raphael Patai's The Arab Mind.
However, origins are not causes. The lesson taken away by several reviewers of Dodge's book, especially Roger Adelson, in the American Historical Review, is that Iraq as a political community was doomed from the very beginning and now has slim prospects for unity or emerging from the category of “failed state.” This is not the point that Dodge makes, but by situating Iraq within the “presentist” discussion of links between nation inventing then and nation reinventing post-2003, it is hard to resist drawing that lesson. One is then left to wonder, among other things, why diverse “invented states” like India and South Africa—both products of British colonialism—seem to work when Iraq does not?
Ultimately approaching the questions of modern Iraq in this vein resurrects a kind of problematic and largely discredited form of historicist thinking that passes back through Meinecke and Ranke to Vico and his notion of corsi e ricorsi. Dodge's book has in fact been marketed and situated in just this way by its publisher, reflecting less a new embrace of historicism than the fact that books on Middle East history are being asked to do things that books in other fields just are not asked to do. This reviewer's complaints are not new. However, the decisions made in regard to this book exemplify a vicious circle in the current state of Middle East history publishing: only books that inform the “now” and are relevant to “our” experience in the region sell, and therefore, only those books will be published, regardless of the possibility that the growing interest in the larger field of Middle East studies has created an audience for our books, ultimately undervaluing the intelligence and willingness of a body of specialists and nonspecialists to buy them, use them, and have students read them. It contributes, as well, to the larger problem that Middle East history is not considered by much of the mainstream history industry to be real history, but rather an imperfect subspecies thereof, excluded thereby from any possible contribution to larger discussions of ideology, colonialism, or theory.
