Polities have specific strategies to deal with opposition. Arthur Bradley offers a new reading of the term “erasure” in the field of what is broadly called political theology (198). His compelling book Unbearable Life: A Genealogy of Political Erasure sets out to revise standard interpretations of the power of the sovereign. This new perspective does not ascribe to the sovereign the capacity to put subjects to death but rather vests her with a given or usurped right to nullify subjects’ lives in advance (7). Inspired by the writings of Michel Foucault and the dictum of dehumanization as an act of “indirect murder,” Bradley's approach includes a review of the canon of Western political theology regarding the question of when and where the sovereign uses the definitory power to assign subjects the label of “does not belong here.” He exemplifies his main argument in seven chapters, dedicated to a new reading in the writings of Foucault (chap. 1), Augustine (chap. 2), William Shakespeare (chap. 3), Thomas Hobbes (chap. 4), Maximilien Robespierre (chap. 5), Carl Schmitt (chap. 6), and Walter Benjamin (chap. 7).
Each study demonstrates a different perspective on how the sovereign annihilates resistance, not only by putting subjects to death but by defining lives as unbearable. Yet this is not without a risk to the sovereign. Bradley identifies moments where the sovereign himself is regarded as unbearable. Although Bradley maintains that his selection of examples was a personal choice to support his argument (10), he could also have chosen different premodern and modern positions on nihilopolitics: to name a few, Bernhard of Clairvaux, Machiavelli, Francis Bacon, and Friedrich Nietzsche. In addition to providing a chronological development of the argument, he shows that each specific historical situation of nullification has a contemporary reflection and that it can and must be interpreted in its significance for today.
Chapter 1, searching for the “unbearable,” begins with Foucault and the paradox that the sovereign who places a political subject in a position outside the order of the living defines that subject as neither living nor dead: hence, unbearable. Sovereignty thus takes the form of the power “to kill a life whose existence precedes its jurisdiction” (11). With this reading of Foucault as a theorist of nihilopolitics, Bradley establishes the perspective from which he interprets the writings of the six authors that follow.
With chapter 2, “Ungood,” Bradley opens the line of his historical interpretations. He argues that in Augustine of Hippo's De civitate Dei contra paganos, book 19, Cacus is a person who stands as the utmost negative to the sovereign power. Augustine did not invent the figure of Cacus but refers to the antique (pagan) motif of Virgil's Aeneid, where he was a terrifying savage who lived by preying upon his fellow men and who was eventually slain by Hercules. Although Cacus interests Augustine only in the sense that even utterly evil persons may have an intrinsic desire for peace, Bradley contends that he must be excluded from the city of God because he constitutes an ontological threat to the theologian's nonplatonic metaphysics.
In chapter 3, “Untimely,” the author focuses on Renaissance thought, ignoring more than twelve hundred years of intense political theology from Augustine up to the sixteenth century. Shakespeare's imaginary and the world of Richard II, Hamlet, and King Lear are seen through the dramatization of sovereign violence in Macbeth. In order to secure his throne, Macbeth kills potential fathers to a new line of kings. In this case, the unbearable is the unborn child, the future to come and to be avoided at all costs. Bradley concludes that unbearable things can be as subjective as the personal fear of possible futures. Yet how is it possible to single out the unbearable in the rational argument of Thomas Hobbes? In chapter 4, “Uncommon,” Bradley shows that in the workings of Leviathan, the sovereign is threatened by the very existence of a human being who could freely choose death over life and hence constitutes such a threat to the common good that he must be rendered unbearable life.
Chapter 5, “Incorruptible,” aims at analyzing the texts of the French Revolution as a reign of terror, mainly the Jacobin leader Maximilien Robespierre. Mechanical killings by guillotine ordered by Robespierre led to the paradoxical situation that Robespierre himself did not consider death through guillotine an act of killing. In his final writings, he styles himself a martyr who had already given his life to the French Revolution, such that even his death would not alter anything. The following chapter, “Unleashed,” focuses on the modern legal and political theorist Carl Schmitt. Bradley is fascinated by Schmitt's reflections on the mysterious figure in the apostle Paul's second letter to the Thessalonians: the katechon. While Paul speaks of the restrainer, which will hold back the appearance of the lawless one, a figure whom the early church associated with the antichrist, Schmitt's katechon is designed to reconcile the competing demands of politics, theology, and history.
The final chapter, “Undead,” raises doubts about the importance of dealing with the “unbearable” in the future, taking its lead from the work of Walter Benjamin. Bradley follows Benjamin into the medieval centuries to ask whether God can make things unhappen, whether he holds absolute power over time and matter. This line of questioning runs far back in Christian theology, yet Bradley and Benjamin focus on Petrus Damiani, Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham. While both Bradley and Benjamin answer the provocative question whether God can retrieve a virgin's virginity if fallen, Benjamin uses these examples for a theory of redemption of history and the immanent rewriting of the concept of divine. In the conclusion, Bradley combines the figures of Cacus, the katechon, the martyr, and the anonymous in an analysis of US foreign policy and contemporary threats to the “subject” in modern sovereign empires.
To avoid the impression that his work is a “history of the past” but not of the present (10), Bradley adds a conclusion to every chapter of his book that illustrates the relevance of the chapter for today. This rigid pattern connects his analysis of (pre-)modern texts to a set of contemporary political questions. Here, the links he draws between Hobbes's Leviathan and the suicide bomber and between the French Revolution and revolutionary movements such as the Mexican Zapatista national liberation army are not fully persuasive.
In general, it seems that the book is more a cultural history than a genealogy of erasure: political annihilation is not something that evolves but, as Bradley shows, exists continuously, although fragmented and always subject to interpretation and perception. However, his usage of the term “sovereign” is problematic as it is not possible to use it in the manner that Robespierre, Benjamin, or Schmitt used it. Sovereign power of the twenty-first century has lost the martial aspect of the guillotine. Even more, sovereignty is not the most appropriate explanation for the social death of persons in the context of having lost their digital life by being banned from their social media accounts on the basis of automated decisions of algorithms. Deleting accounts through artificial intelligence represents a new form of structural erasure.
All in all, however, Bradley offers a very insightful perspective, combining authors from the field of political theology with theorists of biopolitics, such as Foucault, Judith Butler, and Giorgio Agamben. The result is a new, very distinctive interpretation of annihilating politics, past and present. In the end, Bradely leaves the reader with the uncomfortable thought that death starts long before death itself and depends on the sovereign's strategies of rewriting, overwriting, damnatio memoriae, and erasure: in other words, on the ability of the sovereign to declare lives unbearable.
