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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 November 2004
“At the beginning there was interpretation,” is the theme of Kermani's study of the concept of waḥy in Abu Zayd's book Mafhum al-nass dirasa fi ‘ulum al-Qur

an (Cairo: al-Hay

a al-Masriyya al-

Amma li-l-Kitab, 1990). To understand the thought of a leading and controversial Egyptian intellectual, Kermani integrates Mafhum al-nass into Abu Zayd's larger work and past and present scholarship on the Qur

an. While the subtitle suggests a focus on Abu Zayd's concept of the revelationary process, the author goes well beyond that. Kermani displays his wide-ranging knowledge of the subject and skillfully weaves complex intellectual processes into a flowing, though at times repetitive, narrative accessible to non-specialists. Quotations from interviews with Abu Zayd bring to life the personality and intellectual agenda of the Egyptian scholar. Despite occasional mishaps in the transliteration of Arabic (e.g., pp. 6, 62, 110), in indicating translations from the original (p. 94), and in understanding Abu Zayd's thought, Kermani's book is a welcome contribution to the field of Qur

anic studies and contemporary Islamic thought.
Offenbarung als Kommunikation is divided into three parts. In Part 1, Kermani discusses Abu Zayd's methodological approach. Abu Zayd understands the Qur

an to be a divine message in human and, thus, historical language (pp. 28, 63). He studies it as a literary text subject to linguistic and textual methodologies and hermeneutics (p. 22). Abu Zayd sees the relationship between the message—that is, the Qur

an—and the recipient(s) of this message (the Prophet or any reader of the Qur

an) to be the dialectic relationship of interpretation (ta

wīl). Interpretation, as Abu Zayd emphasizes, depends on the intellectual and cultural horizon of the recipient (pp. 7, 23, 25). Consequently, the interpretation of the Qur

an by a reader in the 20th century must differ from one of the 7th century and cannot be studied in isolation from the cultural and theological contexts of the interpreters (pp. 8, 24, 44–45).
In Part 2, Kermani examines Abu Zayd's concept of waḥy. Abu Zayd maintains that “the revelation of the Qur

an, disregarding its divine origin, was based on the socio-cultural circumstances of that time, in this case, society's belief, in principle, in the possibility of waḥy” (pp. 29–30). In pre–Islamic society, the term “waḥy” was understood as a concealed communication, in particular between jinn and humans, based on a code known only to its sender and recipient (p. 39).
How the communication occurred is another topic addressed in Abu Zayd's analysis of waḥy. The Qur

an states that it may either be in form of inspiration (ilhām) or through a divine messenger such as an angel (pp. 56–58). The question then arises, What exactly was sent down in this communication? Was it the utterance of the Qur

an in its literal form or its meaning and purport, which the Prophet then put into Arabic speech? Kermani's examination of Abu Zayd's position on this question is a weak point in his book, not so much in its overall presentation, but in the author's inaccuracies regarding details. For example, Kermani places this question within the debate over the createdness of the Qur

an (pp. 59–67). However, Abu Zayd himself never refers to its createdness in this context (Mafhum, 48 ff.). Rather, he distances himself, as Kermani rightly points out, from the orthodox belief in the eternity of the Qur

an in its Arabic wording (p. 61). Abu Zayd is not concerned with questions regarding God's essence and attributes, which stand at the center of the createdness debate, but with the divine message as a communication that occurs at a particular point in time. And, as Wilferd Madelung's research shows (“The Origins of the Controversy Concerning the Creation of the Koran,” in Religious Schools and Sects in Medieval Islam [London: Variorum Reprints, 1985], 5:504–25), the belief in the uncreatedness of the Qur

an does not necessitate believing that its Arabic wording is eternal.
In another instance, Kermani misunderstands Abu Zayd's objections to a view held by Ibn Khaldun. Ibn Khaldun differentiated between two stages of the revelation: a non-verbal one in which the Prophet Muhammad moved to the sphere of the angels to receive the divine communication, and a verbal revelation in which the angel took human form and communicated the divine message in Arabic (pp. 70–73). Abu Zayd does not, as Kermani suggests, object to the fact that Ibn Khaldun assigned the non-verbal and verbal revelation to two temporal stages (p. 73). Rather, he opposes the idea that Muhammad changed his ontological state (Mafhum, pp. 56–69). Abu Zayd's rejection of two physical spheres reflects his emphasis that the revelation was communicated in this world in a humanly understandable language. Not surprisingly, Kermani admits his confusion (p. 77) when Abu Zayd, like Ibn Khaldun, proposes two chronological phases for the Qur

anic revelation. In the early phase, according to Abu Zayd, Muhammad received the revelation as dream vision (ru

yā) in a non-verbal code, which he transformed into a linguistic message. Later, with Muhammad's growing familiarity with waḥy, this communication was also possible in a state of waking in everyday Arabic speech (pp. 74–77). Abu Zayd's model poses the question, Who formulated the non-verbal part into Arabic? Kermani attempts to make sense of Abu Zayd's vague statements by proposing that he conceives the linguistic expression of the non-verbal revelation, although carried out by Muhammad, as necessarily given in its formulation (p. 82).
At the end of the second part, Kermani nicely summarizes Abu Zayd's two main concerns in Mafhum al-nass. First, in studying the revelation (waḥy), God as the sender is not scientifically knowable; the only possible object of scholarly inquiry is how God revealed himself in this world (p. 87). Abu Zayd's second concern is a critique of the current religious discourse that contends that there is an absolute, eternally valid understanding of the Qur

an, one that is independent of historical developments and societal circumstances. For him, textual interpretation necessarily includes plurality (pp. 8, 27, 90–93).
In Part 3 of the book, Kermani addresses the question of why Abu Zayd's work evoked such a strong reaction, leading to the charge of apostasy. Kermani observes that Abu Zayd's work does not differ significantly from that of other Muslim scholars (pp. 89–90, 102, 109–10). He sees the main reason for the accusation in the fact that Abu Zayd approaches the Qur

an not only with traditional Islamic but also Western methodologies, introducing a new way of thinking about the Qur

an (pp. 104, 111–14). In addition, Abu Zayd is not diplomatic. He openly attacks prominent figures of the religious and political establishment, accusing them of monopolizing the understanding of God's word and denying Muslims interpretative plurality (pp. 95, 105–106). His opponents retaliated with the charge of apostasy, which Abu Zayd had anticipated (p. 106). They successfully used state courts against Abu Zayd: in August 1996, the Egyptian Court of Cassation declared Abu Zayd an apostate and dissolved his marriage. (Egyptian family law prohibits a Muslim woman from being married to a non–Muslim; apostasy itself incurs no criminal prosecution.) Living with his wife in exile in the Netherlands, Abu Zayd continues his intellectual project “to understand and change the present through the scientific study of the past” (p. 100).