This book begins with a rather messy attempt at defining liberty and liberalism. To Hilary Gatti, professor emerita at Rome's Sapienzia University, the Western postwar liberty project “has to defend itself against many enemies,” some of whom are “masked by a deceptive layer of affable libertarianism,” a rather allusive locution that goes undefined (1). The author complains that “liberalism” nowadays is “often derided by those people who claim to be the most ardent defenders of liberty” (2). Here, her example is America's Republican Party, which has twisted “liberalism” into “a deplorable preference for liberal governmental bureaucracy, and tolerance of such things as public support for those in need, the right of abortion and same-sex marriage” (2). Aside from the rather mangled conflation of cultural and social issues here, Gatti seems unaware that the “New Liberalism” of the early twentieth century, typified by Franklin D. Roosevelt (a Democrat, for what that is worth), quite consciously redefined the term in ways that eventually left Americans linguistically marooned from much of the Western world, even today.
This initial stumble is unfortunate, because once she settles in with her chosen topic—which is “liberty” during the long sixteenth century—Gatti proves to be a thoughtful and mostly trustworthy guide who has things of interest to say to historians of political thought. A lifelong specialist on the Italian thinker Giordano Bruno, burned at the stake for his cosmological views in 1600, Gatti somewhat broadens her field of vision in this slim volume. She begins by arguing that the distinction between positive and negative liberty, so important to Anglo-Americans since Isaiah Berlin's famous essay on the subject in the 1950s, is unhelpful in understanding the “liberty” that mattered most in the age of the Renaissance and Reformation. For that period featured a greater congruence between individual liberty and republican liberty.
On Gatti's account, the long sixteenth century was mainly defined by growing monarchical power—both ecclesiastical and lay—that triggered resistance at both the personal and the constitutional level. Her Machiavelli, for example, is concerned not only with republicanism—as Pocock and his followers underlined—but with representative institutions and individual liberty as well (15). And Thomas More, whose devout Catholicism has often made him seem at odds with the author of The Prince, is actually similar in his republican leanings and fervent search for an alternative to the new Renaissance prince (21).
In her chapter on the Reformation, Gatti emphasizes how, at a time of princely absolutism, Luther successfully displaced liberty into the recesses of the individual soul (34). Meantime, his archrival Erasmus had a view of the “mental sanctuary” of conscience that was remarkably similar. For Luther, Erasmus, and Machiavelli, liberty and duty are combined in ways that confound the positive-versus-negative liberty framework. For Machiavelli, no republican citizen is free unless he offers his services to the polity. For Luther, no Christian is free unless s/he heeds the word of God and thereby becomes “servant of all” (33). And for Erasmus, it is a “sense of responsibility assumed by the human will” that informs his mental sanctuary of toleration (39).
Gatti's account of ecclesiastical tyranny emphasizes a kind of religious logic that led church leaders from Augustine forward to begin their careers preaching toleration, only to end them by supporting persecution. Augustine himself had not endorsed capital punishment for heresy, but in the sixteenth century, reformers such as Martin Luther and Johannes Brenz took the whole trip from toleration to capital punishment of doctrinal enemies. Even Calvin's Geneva, conceived to emulate the Christian purity of the early church, unleashed its wrath against sundry heretics. The Papal Index, established in midcentury, Gatti describes as the most “mercilessly oppressive exercise in censorship known to modern times” (57), noting that it was only fully disbanded in 1966.
Later chapters underscore the ways in which Italian republicanism (Venetian as well as Florentine) and Erasmian humanism shaped the challenges to princely and ecclesiastical absolutism in the decades around 1600. Bruno himself, for example, is presented as a more Erasmian figure than usually depicted, with his use of rhetoric to persuade church and state authorities during his trial (65). Jacobus Arminius, too, founder of a more voluntaristic version of Calvinism, was more Erasmian than recent scholarship has allowed (74). Alternatively, Richard Hooker emerges as a more partisan and more republican figure than usual (68).
Though a long discussion of free speech in sixteenth-century England seems a bit inconclusive (92), Gatti interestingly revives a republican reading of Hamlet and King Lear (94–98), whose author she ties to Bruno and to a certain end-of-the-century malaise in England, with its increasing impatience toward “oppressive forms of monarchical power and the criminal excesses of absolutism.” Indeed, Gatti sees the whole Hermetic tradition running from Pico della Mirandola to Bruno as containing more political and social content than John Pocock had once suggested (100–101). Bacon and Galileo are treated at some length, mainly for their contribution to freedom of thought and expression. Though there are fine nuances of analysis here and there, this section of the book is mostly familiar material.
A chapter on freedom of the press reprises some of the book's themes. John Milton is the key figure, and his ties to the Italian intellectual community are highlighted. Once again, the interconfessional dimension of toleration theory is emphasized: Milton appears as a less rabidly Protestant writer than is often supposed, a result of close connections he had made with Catholic Italian thinkers during his travels (137). And his republicanism is presented as being earlier and more fervent than is often suggested; he was thinking about regicide from the early 1640s, for example.
In an epilogue that reads more like a regular chapter, the author follows her threads to the Restoration period and the work of Henry Neville. She sees Milton as a possible go-between linking Neville's republican tract Plato Redivivus (1680) back to an unedited manuscript of Machiavelli, seeing similarities in the way the two authors discuss current events in their respective countries. Like much else in the book, the ties she forges are speculative but not implausible.
Ideas of Liberty is a learned, carefully wrought, and fine-grained study. Like many works on the long sixteenth century, the author may exaggerate somewhat the novel features of the period, underplaying for example the impetus of the fifteenth-century Conciliar movement in the anti-Papal arguments that would burst forth after Luther. The book contains a number of bibliographical surveys that, while admirably conscientious, do not always add much to the flow of the argument (24–25, 82–83, and 133–35). Indeed, there are also several places where Gatti summarizes the views of another scholar without clarifying whether she agrees or not (39, 44, and 65–66). But her emphasis on the rise of absolutism (primarily in the state but also in the papacy) as a precipitant of liberty-loving discourse is welcome, and yields insights that, while rarely earth shaking, leave a cumulative impression that makes close engagement with the work a worthwhile endeavor.
