It is generally recognized that political philosophers require some knowledge of Plato and Aristotle; the same has not, however (to put it mildly), always been held regarding medieval political thought. This book, while based largely on previously published articles, confronts head-on the question of the relevance of medieval political thought today, of what contribution it can make to political theory, and of its place in a political science or political philosophy curriculum. Nederman begins with a judicious appraisal of the historiography of medieval political thought, in particular of the medieval/modern divide, before ranging widely over dissent and constitutionalism, republic and empire, and political economy.
Many have turned to medieval political thought in the expectation of finding correctives or supplements to what they see as the imbalances or defects of modern political thought (and perhaps practice): for example, statism and liberal individualism. One can hardly blame them. This was one of the motives of Otto von Gierke, the first to explore systematically this field (though Nederman does not discuss him). This led, especially in Gierke, to the exaggeration—one might almost say the invention—of a corporatist-communitarian mentality in the Middle Ages. Others, more realistically, have scoured the Middle Ages in search of the origins of Western constitutionalism. As Nederman argues, this was indeed the area in which medieval thinkers—but above all perhaps politicians and activists—contributed something new, indeed unique: the practice—and only consequently and a good deal later the theory—of parliamentary representation.
Nederman further identifies a specific notion of political economy in the Middle Ages. It was (surprisingly perhaps) a new idea that rulers were responsible for the material as well as the spiritual welfare of their subjects. The king had economic responsibilities (“economic stewardship and prudent management formed the cornerstones of loving concord between king and subjects,” 123). One aspect of this was the limit upon the power to tax, usually involving (once again) constitutional controls on the monarch. Monarchical offences may, in the last resort, justify rebellion—another favorite medieval topos. In the tradition of estate management (as Oakeshott called it), the ruler is responsible for charitable donations and “saving for unforeseen future needs” (133). Here Nederman succeeds in teasing a modern concern out of a medieval theme without distortion. He is alert both to the tensions of present-day political thought and to the possibilities and limitations of the historical sources.
In his explication of Brunetto Latini's “commercial republicanism,” Nederman uncovers a still more surprising connection between the promotion of material welfare and republican government: “self-governing institutions both depend upon and are especially well suited to sustain a society whose conception of the common good includes centrally the creation and exchange of … material necessities” (143). This, Nederman rightly observes, differentiated medieval from ancient republican thought (though not necessarily, one must add, from ancient practice). It further links medieval to modern concerns. There are “common needs” as well as “a plurality of private … interests” (159). Further, there is a third arena of public life between the citizen and the state, namely, membership of groups, in particular craft guilds. “Such vertical pluralism … may capture more faithfully the experiences of citizens of large modern democratic republics than either Rousseau's unitary or Tocqueville's localized frameworks” (159). Come in, Robert Putnam and Michael Sandel.
The degree of historical continuity between medieval and modern political ideas has been much disputed. Here Nederman might have let his desire to integrate medieval political thought into the political science curriculum disguise the fact that, as he puts it in his critique of Tierney and others, continuity of language should not be mistaken for continuity of ideas. On the other hand, Nederman rejects Skinner's conception of history as “wholly composed of discrete ideological conflicts” (21). He finds a more balanced approach in Alexander Passerin d'Entreves who, while observing that “one must not confuse resemblance with identity in the realm of ideas” (53), also insisted that “the absence of the language of the state during the Late Middle Ages” (55) did not mean they had no conception of the state. D'Entreves held “that philosophy and history were compatible and mutually reinforcing angles from which to study concepts” (59–60).
At times one wishes Nederman had thought more beyond the framework of his individual articles. For example, he recognizes Hegel as one who thought he found something useful in the Middle Ages that had been lost sight of, namely, the corporation. But he does not pursue this, as the historical data require one should, by considering the role of “medieval corporatism” in the political thought of Gierke and Durkheim, and indeed of Figgis, G. D. H. Cole, and the English “Guild Socialists,” in their attempt to direct the labor movement in Britain towards a less centralist ideology.
This book should be read by everyone who is concerned with the history of ideas and the defects of modernity.
