Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion: why the poorest countries are failing and what can be done about it? New York: Oxford University Press (hb £16.99 – 978 0 19531 145 7). 2007, 195 pp.

Let us start with the positive. This is a brisk, bold and ebullient book. It is written clearly. It is presented simply. The argument is plain and easy to follow. It is jargon free. It steers clear of ponderous academic debate. It is appropriately politically incorrect. It engages the reader at every turn. It is focused. It is practical. It kindles hope.

Let us now set the scene. Collier believes the notion of the Third World is obsolete since most has developed or is developing. However, he has identified a core of countries that are stuck at the bottom of the heap and are unlikely to develop in present circumstances. He has worked out that this is due to a combination of four lethal factors – the conflict trap, the natural resource trap, the trap of being landlocked with bad neighbours and the bad governance trap. These countries have missed the boat of development, which sailed in the seventies and eighties and, left to their own devices, they cannot escape their predicament.

Let us clarify one point: despite protestations to the contrary, the book is definitely about Africa – as the jacket picture confirms – even though it claims to look at the poorest, and least developed, countries across the world.

Let us present the solution. By means of the judicious use of four key instruments – aid, military intervention, laws and international charters and appropriate trade policies – the author suggests clear and workable policies that would trigger development in the BB. Such a solution is not complicated technically, Collier argues, but it requires enormous political will on the part of the West, which only the heads of state can muster. This ought to be at the top of the G8 agenda. It is a moral, political and security imperative, which the West cannot escape. Our future depends on it.

Let us now reflect. Although judging by the information provided in the author's website, to which he refers in the bibliography, the book has been universally praised, there are three fundamental problems: it is a-contextual, it is a-historical and it is largely ignorant of Africa. I take them in turn.

It is a-contextual in that it takes for granted that the intense study of statistics will, ultimately, provide a sufficiently clear picture of causalities. By poring over the quantitative indicators of human (political, social and economic) activities, it is possible to work out sufficiently coherent correlations as to make sense of trends and causally significant factors. This has the advantage of dispensing with most contextual complications, or fuzz. However, it is a leap of faith that borders on the religious. Even if statistics were reliable, which they are not, and meaningful, which is doubtful, there is simply no way in which such an approach can deliver on the analytical claims made. Without context, we have no way of knowing whether the statements made are plausible or merely common sense.

It is a-historical in that it considers these countries wholly outside of their historical trajectory: they are defined by indicators, regardless of their genealogy and their socio-cultural sedimentation. The only real-world factor that is taken into account is geography since the author believes that a key reason for their condition is being landlocked (with bad neighbours). Now, the fact that, other than Africa, the other BB countries would appear to be the formerly Soviet Central Asian states is surely not an irrelevant historical consideration. Nor is the fact that many non-landlocked African countries are failing to develop.

It is ignorant of Africa in that none of the examples given provides evidence of a deep understanding of the country concerned. Indeed, these countries are seen merely as ciphers: they illustrate more general arguments about the BB. The author has clearly travelled in Africa, as he tells us, but he seems to have limited his activities to the perusal of statistical documents and the offering of policy advice to officials. In point of fact, the book's most interesting concrete material does not come from his study of African evidence but from discussions with African colleagues who worked in international organizations and then took on official responsibilities in ‘reforming’ governments – in his words, the ‘heroes’.

Let us now assess. The book instructs us about what we can do about the non-developing BB. It does that with gusto and it will certainly help to reset the policy-making agenda. It ticks the right boxes: it is ostensibly ‘scientific’ and it offers simple, step-by-step, policy recommendations. Just what bureaucrats and politicians demand of consultants. But is it right? And does it matter?

Paradoxically, it is most convincing in its analysis of the failure of aid and development policies. The critique of the development industry and of the NGOs is both trenchant and apposite – and much to be enjoyed. Yet, the book displays the same naïveté and missionary zeal that has characterized development gurus since the fifties. Just consider. The author claims he is the first to connect the factors that explain the plight of the BB. And he claims that there are simple, ifpolitically onerous, formulae that will deal with the problem once and for all.

Let us now raise a few questions. (1) The author argues that the BB are now facing world market conditions that prevent them emulating the apparently successful East Asian policies for development. But if that is so, why did African countries like Ghana that were in more propitious circumstances than, say, South Korea, fail to use their comparative advantage to develop in the sixties? (2) The author argues that one of the most potent ‘traps’ is to be blessed with natural resources. But if that is the case, why is Botswana a success story in developmental terms? (3) The author argues that bad governance is another key ‘trap’. But if that is the case, how is it that relatively good governance in a particular country, say Côte d'Ivoire, can collapse overnight? (4) The author assumes that the BB leaders are dedicated to the development of their countries. But if that is the case, why is it that (with a handful of exceptions) none of their governments has ever put general interest over partisan gain? One could multiply questions but the point is clear.

Let us conclude. The Bottom Billion is a powerful and heart-warming book, which is receiving widespread endorsement not just because it makes an apparently compelling argument but also because it assuages our Western guilt. If the blueprint fails, it will be said that the West did not do enough. So it is unlikely the blueprint will be challenged. But challenged it should be.

The world is complicated and is not possessed of easy answers, pace the economists. When easy answers fail to work, despondency sets in. Africa is in developmental trouble but the causes for such a situation are far more intricate and deep-rooted than Collier would admit, or perhaps even realizes. As a guide to what is likely to happen in the next twenty-five years in Africa I would recommend reading Africanist historians and anthropologists rather than The Bottom Billion.

Although one would like to believe that the BB recipe could lead to a developmental ‘revolution’ that would eradicate poverty once and for all, one is left wondering whether this bestselling volume will not in due course rejoin the well-furnished ranks of the well-intentioned ‘How to Succeed in Ten Steps’ books. If that happens, let us hope that hope will not fizzle. Perhaps, after all, Africa's agency is more cunning than the reason of statistics.