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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 June 2004
This is the second volume of Niall Ferguson's much acclaimed history of the House of Rothschild, which began with volume 1, “Money's Prophets, 1798–1848.” Volume 2, “The World's Banker, 1849–1999,” traces how the Rothschild family tried to maintain the preeminent position they had attained in the previous half-century as industrialization, nationalism, militarism, and imperial rivalries took hold throughout the European continent. The revolutions of 1848 essentially put paid to the Holy Alliance that restored monarchies had tried to maintain after the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars. As the Holy Alliance fell apart, so did the House of Rothschild, despite the efforts of James Rothschild in France until his death in 1868. The separate branches in Naples, Vienna, Frankfurt, Paris, and London all adapted to the changing political and financial circumstances of their respective nation-states, rather than sustain the family loyalties under the direction of a single patriarch. According to Ferguson, World War I effectively finished off the House of Rothschild as the dominant banker for European government finance. Only after World War II, and especially since the reemergence of today's global financial markets has the House of Rothschild resumed the international financial functions it carried out in the nineteenth century, albeit now playing a much reduced role in global finance.
Ferguson was privileged to examine the correspondence of the London branch with the various other branches of the family over the period from 1798 through 1918, with the hitherto undecipherable script in Judendeutsch read aloud to him by Rothschild assistants. From this mass of confidential material, Ferguson unveils much of the mystery and misapprehensions that have plagued the Rothschilds since their emergence from the Jewish ghetto in Frankfurt over two centuries ago. The Rothschild correspondence and personal diaries dispel many of the myths about their unrivaled power and influence over the commanding heights of European finance and governments— myths that fueled virulent outbreaks of anti-Semitism throughout Europe culminating with the Holocaust during World War II. For the period after 1918, however, Ferguson was forced to rely mainly on coverage in the European financial press, so the coverage of the twentieth century is much briefer and less original, if still quite useful as a guide to the increasing complexities of international banking. Summary statistics of the accounts of the Rothschild firm for the late nineteenth century are included as appendixes.
Three themes recur as Ferguson takes us from 1848 to 1999. First, the Rothschilds were, and are, a large family with unusually tight family ties. But, being a family also meant that they were subject to internecine disputes and rivalries, and sometimes differing concepts of what were family responsibilities and goals. Second, the Rothschilds were immensely wealthy, encumbered with the same cares about social status and responsibility as other wealthy families. Third, they were Jewish, so concerns of family and wealth had to be reconciled with maintaining their Jewish identity and faith. These three characteristics motivated how the House of Rothschild dealt with the changing demands and opportunities for government finance over the period 1849–1918, and then how they coped with the breakup of Europe after 1918.
The emphasis on family determines the structure of the book: “Uncles and Nephews” from 1849 to 1870; “Cousins” from 1870 to 1914 and “Descendants” from 1915 to 1999. The successive generations of the family tree illustrate the increasing diversity of the extended family, as well as the weakening of the blood ties over time. Each part begins with the varied experiences of members of the family, emphasizing their increasingly visible role as essentially the royal family of European Jewry while gradually obtaining formal political influence within Britain, France, Austria, and Germany (the Naples branch withdrew from the firm in 1863). The separate efforts of each branch of the family to obtain political influence within their respective countries tended naturally to weaken their business ties over time as well as the family ties. But the Prussian-Austrian war in 1866 and the Franco-Prussian war in 1870 made the national fractionation of the family definitive, while strengthening the connections of the English and French branches.
In the interval between the Paris Commune and the defeat of Napoleon III in 1870, the Rothschilds were dominated by James Rothschild in Paris, who, as the youngest of the original five Rothschild brothers, increasingly assumed the role of family patriarch after the death of Nathan, the London brother, in 1836. James also took the initiative in financing of railroads, first in France and then in much of southern and eastern Europe. Here Ferguson takes issue with the standard interpretations by Rondo Cameron and Alexander Gerschenkron that emphasize the leading role of the Pereire brothers and their Crédit Mobilier. Style, rather than substance, differentiated the joint-stock investment bank of the Pereires from the private merchant bank of the Rothschilds. Both emphasized investment in railroads; both benefited initially from Napoleon III's liberal granting of rail concessions; and both tried to finance railroads in the rest of Europe through affiliated banks. But James was risking his own capital and pursuing profit only whereas the Pereires were risking their shareholders capital and pursuing a Saint-Simonian ideology. Ultimately, the Crédit Mobilier was challenging the conservative monetary policy of the Banque de France, while James was relying on its conservatism to protect his wealth. In the next generation, James's son, Alphonse, became a dominant regent of the Banque de France, bringing the French branch of the Rothschilds into a dominant role in the French financial sector while the other branches were losing their relative standing, even in Britain.
It was the profitability of French railroads that made the Paris Rothschilds immeasurably wealthier during the Second Empire. But the Rothschild archives reveal constant distrust of Napoleon's imperial ambitions and his willingness to take on military adventures in Savoy, Mexico, and ultimately Spain. Revolution and war create uncertainty; markets in government bonds fall when uncertainty increases, and the bulk of Rothschild holdings were in government bonds. Obviously, they cared little for either revolution or war, and all Rothschilds feared the risk-taking irrationality of a charismatic politician, regardless of nationality. Nevertheless, they did very well in this period, as all the warring states needed to float bonds, not having the tax base necessary to finance increasingly expensive modern wars.
But the key to Rothschild success in this period, Ferguson argues, was the strategic decision taken by the London and Paris branches of the firm to invest in mines. In Spain they had already obtained control of the famed mercury mines of Almaden, a much more reliable source of income than the bonds issued by successive regimes of the Spanish state over the nineteenth century. From 1880 on, under the umbrella of the Exploration Company, the fortunes of the Rothschilds were sustained by moving into gold mining on a huge scale in cooperation with other leading merchant bankers in London and Paris. Eventually, this made them the managers of the world's gold market, enabling the London and Paris branches to help equilibrate the money market pressures that seemed perennially to threaten the stability of the gold standard, especially after 1905. The fascination with gold and the spread of the gold standard also led to profitable investments in other minerals—copper under the Rio Tinto Company, diamonds with the DeBeers, and petroleum in Russia. Throughout these foreign ventures, Ferguson insists, the Rothschilds were always wary of revolution and war, but each branch backed its respective government resolutely whenever it did face these financial shocks.
World War I was devastating to the fortunes of the family despite the huge increases in war finance that massive modern warfare required. It did not help that the initial German advance threatened Paris itself and forced the Paris Bourse, the Banque de France, and the House of Rothschild to depart to Bordeaux. More important was the lack of Rothschild contact with the New York financial center, which proved to be the ultimate source of war finance for the Allied powers. Finally, Ferguson notes with regret, the banking abilities of “Natty,” the grandson of Nathan Rothschild and patriarch of the London branch were not up to the level of his forebears, or, for that matter, of his competitors in the London money market. It turns out that double-entry bookkeeping was resisted by the head bookkeeper in the London bank even after Natty's death in 1915, because it would take too much effort!
After 1918 only the London and French houses remained viable, and the fortunes of the fabled Rothschilds were in disarray without any strong family patriarch to focus its energies and talents. Efforts to resume their role in government finance led to ill-fated investments in reconstruction loans that defaulted in the collapse of the gold exchange standard after 1931. Only when international capital markets began to reemerge in the 1970s did the Rothschild fortunes improve, especially in Britain under the leadership of Evelyn de Rothschild after 1980. Today, NM Rothschild group is alive and well, with branches in 30 countries, a resuscitated operation in Paris, and a foothold in New York. Its rebirth, according to Ferguson, rests on reasserting the international family ties and by focusing leadership once again on one dominant individual—Sir Evelyn de Rothschild of the London branch at present. But, even with reported profits in 2001 of $134 million, the Rothschild bank is a minnow in today's financial markets compared with a whale such as Citigroup (before tax profits of over $21 billion in 2001).
In the process of revealing the Rothschild family disputes, concerns, and efforts to maintain their Jewish identity, their wealth, and their political influence in England, France, Germany, Austria, and Italy over the past century and half, Ferguson has done the Rothschilds a great service by dispelling the most egregious myths of their power in the past. But he has also provided the history profession with a classic work. Both volumes of his history of the House of Rothschild are essential reading for economic historians and will remain so for many years to come.