I

Apostolic delegates and nuncios were common throughout the world in the early twentieth century, but many in Ireland, especially the leaders of the Catholic hierarchy, were opposed to the prospect of a church authority amongst them who would be responsible directly to the Vatican. Ostensibly, their objections were rooted in the belief that any Vatican intervention would run the risk of raising fears amongst the Protestant populations of Britain and Ireland of a self-ruled Ireland accepting the dictates of the Holy See: the old Unionist anxiety that home rule would actually be Rome rule. However, the bishops saw the added possibility of a Roman representative serving as a check on their power over the national Church, something against which they could raise no complaint. For the Irish bishops, Rome was a useful ally, but one that threatened their hegemony if it became too interested in their activities.

Concerns about a Vatican delegation to Ireland had been circulating since 1921. The main source of these rumours, Monsignor John Hagan,Footnote ⁷ Rector of the Irish College in Rome, was convinced that the Holy See was intent on establishing a nunciature in Dublin, a fear he conveyed frequently to his episcopal correspondents. The day after Cardinal Achille Ratti's elevation to the papacy as Pius xi, Hagan warned about the possibility of a representative of the Vatican being sent to Ireland. In a letter to Archbishop Edward Byrne of Dublin, Hagan theorised that the reappointment of Cardinal Pietro Gasparri as cardinal secretary of state by the new pope meant that the policy of extending diplomatic relations to new states would continue. He expected that an apostolic visitor would be appointed who would eventually be promoted to nuncio. He went so far as to predict that the visitor would be Luzio, who, if an official from Rome had to be appointed, was ‘the best of a bad lot by long odds’. In Hagan's opinion, the British government was as eager to see a nuncio in Dublin as was the Vatican. The Vatican wanted representation in the British Isles, but a nuncio in London would trouble English scruples. Dublin was, therefore, an ideal choice. A representative could serve as a semi-diplomatic mouthpiece for the British when necessary and would be an ideal agent for keeping unruly clergymen in line.Footnote ⁸

In early March 1923 Hagan reported that he had heard a few weeks previously that Luzio would soon be sent to Ireland ‘for the purpose of bringing the warring leaders together and making peace’.Footnote ⁹ He reiterated his well-worn suspicion that the Holy See had ulterior motives. His greatest concern was the news that he had received from his Vatican informant to the effect that the real purpose of Luzio's mission was to ascertain whether or not there would be great objection on the part of the clergy or laity to a permanent delegation. In his usual style, Hagan saw Vatican involvement in Irish affairs as problematic and something which must be opposed:

The rector's warnings seemed to have had an effect on at least some of the bishops. In late 1921 Bishop Joseph MacRory of Down and Connor wrote that he believed that an apostolic delegate, temporary or permanent, would cause nothing but harm.Footnote ¹¹ Upon receiving word from Hagan that a peace mission was in the works, Bishop Thomas O'Doherty of Clonfert deemed the idea ‘ludicrous … There must be some other motive behind his mission, unless people there [the Vatican] have gone crazy’.Footnote ¹²

The single member of the hierarchy who expressed a desire for a Vatican presence in Ireland was Cardinal Michael Logue, archbishop of Armagh and primate of All Ireland. His welcome for a papal delegate in Ireland, though, was predicated on the notion that he was only to be assigned temporarily, to gather information on the present situation.Footnote ¹³ He also operated under the notion that any pronouncement issued by the Vatican would be helpful to the bishops and defend their issuance of the October pastoral.Footnote ¹⁴ Logue's attitude concerned the other bishops and practically enraged Hagan, who informed Byrne in his emphatic and forthright style that he was willing to tell Vatican authorities that the Irish bishops were not in favour of the Holy See involving itself in the Irish situation, ‘but as long as Armagh is knocking at the other side of the door my words are not likely to carry great weight’.Footnote ¹⁵

Luzio's mission was announced on 15 March. Logue, who had been convinced that if there was to be a mission, Cardinal Gasparri, out of respect for Logue's position as the leader of the Church in Ireland, would have mentioned it in one of his many letters,Footnote ¹⁶ received no advance notice. Once the mission had been made public, it was common knowledge among clerical circles that the cardinal ‘must feel a bit put about’ that Gasparri had not sent word of Luzio's visit.Footnote ¹⁷ Given Logue's pride, this is something of an understatement, and the perceived insult certainly played a large part in establishing his attitude towards Luzio. Lack of communication with the hierarchy also served further to hinder episcopal co-operation with the mission by playing to widespread hierarchical fears. It indicated possible papal dissatisfaction with the activities of the hierarchy and, as a result, probably served to increase the bishops' suspicions that the mission was intended to lead to a permanent delegation. As one priest reported, ‘To the man in the street the visit means that the Pope was doubtful of the theology of the Joint Pastoral and he sent his man over to find out whether the Republican appeal against it should be upheld!!!’Footnote ¹⁸ Whether this was true or not, such public perceptions were harmful to the bishops' authority. In retrospect, Luzio postulated that the Vatican's intentional secrecy regarding his mission had been interpreted by the bishops and the government of the Free State as indicating a lack of respect and served, particularly in the case of the bishops, to create a hostile attitude towards him. Luzio informed his superiors that ‘in such a situation it is easy to imagine the coolness and suspicion with which the Bishops received me. Even my closest friends were trying to avoid me’.Footnote ¹⁹

To make matters more disconcerting for Irish leaders, the Vatican's secrecy was compounded by official ambiguity regarding Luzio's task and goals. In his letter to Logue, Cardinal Gasparri wrote that Luzio

Lack of defined objectives was not intended to allow the mission to serve as a gauge for a permanent delegation, as the bishops feared, or as a way of imposing the Vatican's substantial weight on an un-cooperative Free State government. It appears that Pius xi was genuinely concerned about his lack of knowledge regarding the situation in Ireland and so structured Luzio's mission as both a fact-finding initiative and as an opportunity to offer the Holy See's services in bringing about peace in whatsoever manner would be best received. In the 21 April issue of Freeman's Journal, after the Free State government had expressed its displeasure at Luzio's intervention in national affairs, a Press Association representative in Dublin was authorised by Luzio to say that ‘[The pope] merely intended to exercise an act of Christian charity, which he believes is not foreign to his duties … But if, for some reason or other, such an act of charity becomes inopportune or not welcome, the Holy Father and Monsignor Luzio have not the least desire to obtrude where their intervention is not necessary or wanted.’

Rather than quietly accept the Holy See's intervention in Irish affairs, the hierarchy engaged in a campaign to reduce the importance and meaning of Luzio's mission. Its first move came on 15 March, when Freeman's Journal published an interview with ‘a distinguished city priest’ who was, in all likelihood, a mouthpiece for the bishops.Footnote ²¹ He declared that Luzio was not being sent to the Free State in a diplomatic capacity, as that would have required negotiation between the Free State government and the department of the cardinal secretary of state. Further to reinforce the prerogative of the bishops to speak on Irish issues, the priest speculated about Luzio interfering in their decisions. When asked to comment on the probable outcome of the mission, the priest responded:

In the same issue, the Freeman reported that an unnamed Church authority described Luzio's mission as ‘purely private and unofficial … The law of the Church is that the Irish Bishops are supreme, and that the Bishops of any country, speaking as a body, are supreme in matters of dogma as a teaching authority, and you may take it that this mission is one to make sure of certain facts and not to upset or interfere with the jurisdiction of the Irish Hierarchy’.Footnote ²³ This surprising and transparently defensive statement marked the culmination of the bishops' press campaign aimed at showing the Irish that they maintained full control of the Irish Church and signalling to foreign audiences, especially those in London and Rome, that they were ceding no power without a fight.

The bishops' desire to maintain their authority in the face of Vatican interference came across just as strongly in their treatment of the delegate. Dermot Keogh states that they engaged in an almost complete boycott of Luzio,Footnote ²⁴ but that is too strong a term. Unlike the episcopal snubbing of Archbishop Daniel Mannix of Melbourne, a vocal opponent of the Free State government, during his visit in 1925,Footnote ²⁵ the bishops had no choice but to display reserved courtesy towards the Vatican's representative. Mannix came of his own accord and had the option of declaring his visit unofficial, but Luzio was ordered to Ireland by Pius xi, and so any affront to him was an insult to the Church itself. They could not criticise Luzio or work against him for fear of the repercussions from Rome. As a result, for the most part the bishops did little other than hope that the issue would resolve itself in their favour.

It also seems that the distance between the delegate and bishops was not solely the fault of the hierarchy. Luzio appears to have limited himself to visiting the more important members of the hierarchy and those men with whom he had personal ties. This interpretation is supported by Monsignor Pádraig de Brún, who recalled in an interview that Luzio ignored all the bishops except those who had been fellow faculty members with him at Maynooth.Footnote ²⁶ Monsignor James MacCaffrey, president of St Patrick's, Maynooth, found the visitor to be quiet and distant. When visiting the seminary, he was eager to leave at the first convenient moment and did not speak of Irish affairs.Footnote ²⁷ Luzio's reticence extended beyond the clergy. He refused to discuss his mission with reporters. There was an element of paranoia to his silence. He was convinced that he was being watched around the clock, to the degree that ‘a person sent from England’ booked himself into the same hotel. Fearing that this unwanted attention was intended to catch him ‘at foul play’, Luzio ‘always beat a gentle path’.Footnote ²⁸

Luzio considered Armagh his first port of call, and so paid a visit to Logue almost immediately upon his arrival to Ireland. He was received kindly, but told that he was expected to bring approval from Rome for the bishops' actions in relation to the October pastoral, and therefore to reject the appeals made by the republicans. ‘[Luzio] answered that that was not [his] mission, but that [he] did not believe that the Holy See would ratify the Bishops' decision on the legitimacy of the government of the Free State, since in doing so it would enter into a political question in which it did not wish to be involved.’Footnote ²⁹ He further upset Logue by requesting that he join him in a mission to the republican leadership. With the cardinal's noted disapproval of the republicans and their methods, this was a foolish mistake and one of two tactical blunders, according to Keogh, from which Luzio's mission never recovered.Footnote ³⁰ At the same meeting, Luzio asked for letters of introduction to persons of influence, especially President Cosgrave. Logue responded that he did not feel that he had authorisation to provide them. At this point, Luzio was aware that he did not find himself in a favourable environment.

Upon arriving at the palace of the archbishop of Dublin in Drumcondra, the visitor found Byrne to be as indignant towards the mission as Logue. Demonstrating attitudes suspiciously similar to those of the Church representatives quoted in the 15 March issue of Freeman's Journal, Byrne told Luzio that the Holy See should not concern itself with Irish matters. For politics in Ireland, there was the Free State government, and for religion, there were the bishops, neither of which needed unwanted mediation. Luzio summed up his interactions with the archbishop simply: ‘I had lost.’Footnote ³¹ Keogh largely credits Byrne's attitude to what the archbishop felt was an insult on Luzio's part. Despite using Dublin's Shelbourne Hotel as a base, Luzio had not visited Byrne until after his trip to Armagh.Footnote ³² It is difficult to believe that a mistake as trivial as this could have been more influential to the outcome of Luzio's mission than the bishops' loss of face due to the Vatican's insistence on maintaining the secrecy of the mission. Even if Luzio had visited Drumcondra first, thereby potentially upsetting Cardinal Logue further, it is probable that he would have faced an irascible Byrne.

Archbishop Thomas Gilmartin of Tuam met Luzio in early April but did not comment beyond saying that his visitor had already met prominent republican leaders and was preparing to meet government leaders.Footnote ³³ Bishop Patrick O'Donnell of Raphoe, Logue's coadjutor, finally met the monsignor in mid-April. He wished him all success in his mission of peace, but was not optimistic. By this late stage in Luzio's trip, he believed that doing anything beyond collecting information would prove difficult.Footnote ³⁴ Archbishop John Harty of Cashel was the sole voice in the hierarchy that found Luzio's intervention encouraging and potentially beneficial. He had expressed the hope that Luzio could help resolve a situation that was, in his opinion, nowhere near reaching a settlement.Footnote ³⁵

One of the most striking aspects of the hierarchy's attitude towards the apostolic delegate is their deliberate reluctance to articulate their opinions or reactions. Apart from very occasional letters and press statements delivered through an intermediary, most of the bishops remained silent on Luzio's trip. This is not altogether surprising. Their lack of communication with Luzio, generally because of his decision not to call upon them, coupled with his almost total public silence, left many of them in the dark. They knew little about his trip or his intentions. They made little attempt, though, to learn anything for themselves.

This is evident in the lack of material in the Irish diocesan archival sources on Luzio's mission. The bishops wrote very little about it to each other, which is truly surprising. Letters were their primary means of communication, and they wrote to each other in extensive detail about national, local, personal and religious issues: they expressed concerns, fears and hopes that they would never dare to air in public. This was not the case with Luzio's delegation. Even more telling is the lack of communication between bishops and Hagan. For several members of the hierarchy, Hagan was a valuable and trusted correspondent on all matters. He was in regular communication with most members of the hierarchy and was the recipient of many letters from Gilmartin, O'Donnell, Mulhern, Fogarty and MacRory which displayed levels of openness and friendship that are rare among the guarded missives of bishops. Yet, despite the fact that the number of letters from bishops arriving in the rector's post did not diminish during Luzio's trip, only a handful mention him, and only a few of those with anything more than a passing reference. It seems that, despite their concerns about Luzio's trip and its possible implications for their control of the Irish Church, they had very little to say. As the unofficial representative of the Irish hierarchy in Rome, and the primary source of ideas and rumours circulating through the Vatican's halls, Hagan would have been the natural choice for correspondence even for those who were not close to him. Cardinal Logue is a perfect example. His letters to the rector demonstrate a formal, business-like relationship between the two men, which makes perfect sense as the cardinal, with some justification, did not completely trust Hagan's political orientation. In his letters to Hagan, he was perfectly open on the Luzio affair, but even he had little to say about Luzio once the mission was underway.

Undoubtedly, Luzio's attitude was due in part to the rejection he faced within clerical circles. Though he tried to explain episcopal coldness and suspicion toward him as to be expected given the secrecy maintained by the Vatican, he had surely been excited to return to the country that he had called home for thirteen years. Some of the men who were now members of the hierarchy had been at the seminary in Maynooth during his tenure there, and the fact that he refers to his ‘closest friends’ in his report indicates that he was eager to see them. Even if he had been expecting aloofness, it could not have been easy to experience it from men he considered friends. His attitude was also influenced by the reception that he received in republican circles. Dermot Keogh contends that with no real assistance from the hierarchy or Free State government, Luzio inevitably fell prey to the designs of the anti-Treaty politicians.Footnote ³⁶ However, Luzio was moved more by the rank and file republicans, who turned to him for support and reassurance, than their political leaders, though he displayed great respect for them as well.

II

Many on the republican side flocked to Luzio shortly after his arrival, and most were delighted at the warm reception that they encountered and the sympathetic ear he seemed to possess. Mother Stanislaus of the Loreto Convent described Luzio as quiet but very approachable: ‘It is a comfort to think we are not utterly abandoned and that the Holy Father is mindful of his “erring” children.’Footnote ³⁷ Sister Mary O'Daly wrote to Hagan that ‘When I saw Mgr. Luzio in Dublin he gave me the impression that he realized the justice of our cause – the Irish Republican cause; he said among other things that he believed the Republicans to be the better of the two parties. Told me to send those Republicans who were refused absolution to him.’ In her opinion, this was very powerful. For a representative of the Holy See to accept tacitly that republicanism was not contradictory to the Church made it ‘a just fight and not displeasing to almighty God’.Footnote ³⁸ Sean T. O'Kelly's wife, Cait, described Luzio as very kind and patient, adding that it required patience to sit and understand, or even pretend to understand, the republicans' grievances.Footnote ³⁹ She was convinced that he was eager for peace and believed that a free election would settle the whole matter. Once there was peace, there would be no need for the sacraments to be used as a weapon and they would cease to be a state monopoly.Footnote ⁴⁰ De Valera was completely convinced of Luzio's sympathetic attitude; he saw it as the primary reason that so many thronged to him. He had one interview with the monsignor during which they discussed matters generally. De Valera was pleased to say that the views Luzio expressed ‘were the proximate cause of my recent public offer. If peace is the outcome you certainly will have more than a share in bringing it about’.Footnote ⁴¹ When he did not feel obligated to resort to flattery, de Valera expressed fondness for Luzio, but he believed that he had succumbed to the peacemaker's temptation of pressuring the weaker side to give in when he should have stood rigidly for impartial justice.Footnote ⁴²

Very few republicans refused to see the mission as potentially beneficial to their cause. Patrick Browne was the sole contemporary republican rhetorician who challenged the notion that Luzio was as sympathetic to the cause as was believed. While it was true, Browne argued, that Luzio did not agree with the bishops' actions, in order to allow them to save face he had held back from urging the pope to speak out against their statements.Footnote ⁴³ Judging from the voluminous amount of republican correspondence praising Luzio months after his mission, it would appear that Browne did not convince many people. In an interview with Ernie O'Malley years later, Browne seemed to have changed his attitude toward the monsignor. He told O'Malley that ‘Luzio was a consolation to the Republicans, as he was very nice to them’.Footnote ⁴⁴ Years later, a person writing as ‘MacDara’, the Christ-martyr hero of Patrick Pearse's ‘The singer’, informed Bishop Michael Browne of Galway, who, as professor of moral theology at Maynooth, had been a quiet republican sympathiser during the civil war, that it had been a pity that Pius had sent Luzio instead of ‘another Rinuccini’.Footnote ⁴⁵ MacDara was distraught that Luzio had allowed himself to be browbeaten by the bishops, but was thankful that he had failed to influence the pope.Footnote ⁴⁶ Obviously, even more than a decade after the event, Luzio's recommendations remained unknown to the majority of Irish Catholics.

There was an element to republicanism, though, that indicates that Luzio's clerical position was of less significance than his willingness to appear sympathetic to the cause. Despite possessing a strong moralistic message in their political rhetoric, republicans maintained strong links to their nineteenth-century Fenian forebears. The result was a national movement that rejected the supremacy of either the hierarchy or even the Vatican in political matters. Fr Patrick Browne (Pádraig de Brún), who had a strong interest in promoting clerical involvement in politics, wrote that neither bishops nor even the pope had the right to pronounce with any certainty on matters of Irish politics: ‘We will not submit the political question to the Pope. We do not take our politics from Rome.’Footnote ⁴⁷ During the preparation of the formal appeal to the Vatican against the October pastoral, Conn Murphy, secretary to the appeal committee, wrote to Archbishop Gilmartin that the committee had no intention of asking Pius to settle the political question: ‘We are of opinion that the decision of such a question of political fact will be acknowledged by the Holy See to lie entirely outside the province not merely of the Irish Hierarchy, but even of the Church itself as a whole.’Footnote ⁴⁸ In his report, Luzio noted that the republicans had made numerous appeals to the pope to use his good judgements to intervene, but never with the intention of having the Holy See decide the political question.Footnote ⁴⁹ Years later, Mary MacSwiney, a fanatical republican and devout Catholic, informed the Revd Dudley Fletcher that it would not have mattered if the pope had approved of the Treaty. She and her fellow republicans were not going to cease their demands for Ireland's freedom.Footnote ⁵⁰ These examples would seem to indicate that had the apostolic delegate been less approving of republicanism, his reception within the movement might have been as chilly as it was elsewhere.

The republicans' attitude to Luzio was due, in large part, to the belief that his treatment at the hands of the bishops and government had made him more sympathetic to their cause. After Luzio had returned to Rome, de Valera reported to Hagan that while Luzio was in Ireland, he had received ‘scant courtesy from the Bishops’.Footnote ⁵¹ P. T. Keohane, republican editor of the Catholic Bulletin, hoped that Pius would not take umbrage at the indifference and discourtesy shown to his representative by the bishops and the government. He worried that Orangemen and Freemasons would have a good laugh over the whole affair.Footnote ⁵² Some republicans seemed genuinely outraged at the way in which Luzio was treated. Regarding the attitude of the Free State government towards Luzio, Art O'Muireadaig, a young seminarian finishing his studies in Quebec, proclaimed that ‘[i]t was scandalous. Imagine the “Draper's Curate” Bill Cosgrave requiring Credentials from the Holy Father's Representative’.Footnote ⁵³

Luzio's supposed republican sympathies are worthy of closer examination. It is true that by the time he wrote and presented his report to Gasparri, Luzio had definitely become convinced that republicans displayed greater devotion to the Church than their political rivals. He referred to the ‘Republican government’ as the ‘more religious, preferring the ancient and genuine Catholic faith of the Irish people’. In contrast, he reported that President Cosgrave had chosen eighteen Freemasons, by which he had to mean Protestants, for the senate, and that article eight of the Free State's constitution guaranteed equality of religion, ‘Something which seems incredible in Catholic Ireland! And to think that this is the government supported by the ecclesiastical hierarchy.’Footnote ⁵⁴ He made no mention, however, of the superiority of the republican political philosophy or the merits of their movement. This points to a preference for the people rather than their ideas, and had to be the product of the circumstances of his trip rather than any pre-existing prejudice he possessed before arriving. Furthermore, Luzio could not have supported the republican cause as a political ideology because of past experiences in Ireland. He had left Maynooth in 1910, when Irish republicanism had practically no proponents. Sinn Féin was still a small organisation that subscribed to Arthur Griffith's notion of a dual monarchy for Britain and Ireland along the lines of the Austro-Hungarian model. The founding of the Irish Volunteers, the forebears of the IRA, was three years off. Nearly all nationalists, including Patrick Pearse and Éamon de Valera, were firm supporters of home rule. Luzio could not have left Ireland in 1910 a republican, and his report indicates that he did not depart as one in 1923 either. Rather, it indicates that Luzio's supposed sympathies were the result of the treatment that he had received.

III

Luzio left Ireland on 6 May 1923, two weeks after the Free State government petitioned Gasparri to end the mission and recall the monsignor. It was already well known that Luzio was upset at how he had been treated. Hagan wrote to Archbishop Mannix that it was common knowledge in Rome that Luzio was very bitter against the Free State ministers, especially Kevin O'Higgins and Desmond FitzGerald, ‘and that he has formed a higher idea of the Republicans as a body and individually than of their opponents’. He added that even Gasparri was very upset with the bishops for what he felt was the cold shoulder that they had shown to the papal delegate.Footnote ⁵⁵ Hagan's theories were rarely closer to the mark than they were in this instance. Luzio had developed a severe dislike of O'Higgins. He described him as ‘arrogant and fanatical’, hoping to annihilate the republicans because they had killed his father.

Luzio was especially critical of the resistance displayed to his intervention in the peace process. Despite receiving ‘hundreds and hundreds of telegrams, letters and agendas’ calling for peace and proposing that he act as an intermediary, Luzio found that several Free State ministers, bishops and representatives of the ‘English’ government viewed his involvement and his mission ‘less than favourably’. He was stunned at the attitude of the bishops in regarding the public's voice on the matter of peace as non-existent and therefore not to be heard.Footnote ⁵⁶ He presented the situation as one in which those in power were unjustifiably suppressing a minority and keeping the nation in a state of war when peace was so desired. This notion was very similar to those circulating throughout the republican movement. Many republicans believed that the Free State's attitude was caused by its government's desire to eliminate rather than pacify the republican threat: ‘The Free State people are settling themselves in their armchairs and do not intend to be disturbed by any clamours for peace. They are not at home to any peacemaker whether he be an archbishop or a papal legate.’Footnote ⁵⁷ Similarly, de Valera announced that Free State ministers were moving heaven and earth to keep themselves in power.Footnote ⁵⁸

Contrary to the belief that he deemed his mission a failure, in his report to Gasparri Luzio was very positive regarding his impact on the ending of conflict. He wrote that he believed that he had assumed his duties ‘perfectly regarding cooperation leading to peace’. He had attempted to induce de Valera to end hostilities and re-enter peace negotiations, and that was exactly what had happened. Furthermore, he pointed out, he had included in his report the letter from de Valera declaring that it was Luzio's arguments that had persuaded him to end hostilities and make a peace proposal. Rather than admitting defeat, Luzio proclaimed that ‘it will be in no small part due to me if this peace is concluded’.Footnote ⁵⁹ Perhaps his spirits revived after his confession of failure on 16 April,Footnote ⁶⁰ or perhaps he was merely trying to save face. How much of this was posturing will likely remain unknown, but it ran counter to popular consensus both in Ireland and Rome. If Hagan is correct, it also did not impress Gasparri. He believed that ‘[Luzio] will be made the scapegoat, even though St Michael himself could have accomplished little’.Footnote ⁶¹ Bishop Michael Sheehan, coadjutor of Sydney, feared that Luzio's failure would extinguish any future chances for advancement.Footnote ⁶² Given that the monsignor was not promoted and remained a Regent until his death thirty-six years later, it seems that Sheehan was correct, and that the Holy See was displeased with Luzio's performance and the results of the mission.

For weeks after Luzio had returned to Rome, there was hope within the republican community that the delegate who had been so open and kind to them would move the Vatican into action which would vindicate them and uphold their complaints against the hierarchy. However, the Vatican's continued silence on Ireland left many disgruntled, and fears arose that the end result would be damaging to the Church. While travelling in Ireland, Michael Curran, vice-rector of the Irish College in Rome, reported to Hagan that ‘[t]he prestige of the Secretariate [sic] of State is below zero. The whole situation here is ludicrous if it were not so tragic. The indignation of the republicans in Dublin against the Church (Local and Universal) over the denial of the sacraments is intense and will remain for many a long day’.Footnote ⁶³ P. J. Roughneen of Kiltimagh, Co. Roscommon, a regular correspondent of Hagan's, was of the belief that the visit had not improved the status of the Vatican or the bishops in the eyes of the people and from a religious standpoint it was a ‘failure and a blunder’.Footnote ⁶⁴ Hagan also deemed the mission a mistake. The Vatican had not given its approval of the October pastoral, but once it had sent Luzio to investigate, it was incumbent upon the Holy See to make a pronouncement. The absence of any statement could be taken as a virtual endorsement of what the bishops had done. He was of the opinion that the people in the cardinal secretariat of state did not agree with the actions of the Irish hierarchy, but as the hierarchy's stance was pleasing to England, they dared not interfere.Footnote ⁶⁵

The Vatican's failure to act was nevertheless in no way attributable to Luzio's report. Contrary to the speculations of Browne and MacDara, Luzio was highly critical of the actions of the hierarchy. He referred to the October pastoral as ‘less than prudent … But the worst thing was that of having wished to mix the Sacraments with a questionable political issue, to reach a decision on which they had neither authority nor certain information’.Footnote ⁶⁶ The situation was aggravated by the bishops' clerical supporters, who, in order to show themselves as zealous, took things to the extreme, not only refusing confession to those republicans who had fought and facilitated the use of violence, but also to those who had never been involved in politics but who simply held republican ideals. Luzio portrayed the actions of the bishops as potentially detrimental to the Irish Church, because were it not for the ‘profound piety of the Irish people’, he believed ‘that Ireland would have witnessed the defection of thousands from the Catholic Church’.Footnote ⁶⁷ Contrary to the belief of some republicans that he had not strongly urged the pope to act, Luzio reported that it was necessary to rectify the abnormal situation in Ireland immediately, especially since hostilities had ceased, thereby negating the bishops' objection to the use of force against the legitimate government. ‘And it is also necessary to prohibit the Bishops entirely from taking part in politics, as this has always brought disastrous consequences for the ecclesiastical authorities and for the religion.’Footnote ⁶⁸ Finally, he advised that a permanent delegation, described as vital to the region, be installed in Ireland, regardless of the wishes of the bishops. While, contrary to Hagan's fears, this issue did not seem to be part of Luzio's original remit, the bishops' display of independence and indifference bordering on contempt for the Holy See's involvement in their affairs convinced Luzio that they could not be left to their own devices.

Nor had the Vatican intended to remain silent. At the outset of his mission, Luzio was informed that the pope wanted him to determine whether the publication of a letter would be advisable. Pius hoped that this would help to pacify the Catholics of Ireland.Footnote ⁶⁹ Luzio discussed the possibility of such a letter with Logue and Byrne, both of whom were vehemently against it. He was finally persuaded that it would worsen the situation. As the letter stated that the pope could form no exact opinion, this would serve as detrimental to the Free State government's claims to legitimacy and it would embarrass the bishops.Footnote ⁷⁰ This was the conclusion at which Luzio had arrived before he began to feel victimised by the government and bishops. However, in his report, he noted that because of de Valera's peace proposals, a pontifical letter would not have much effect.

IV

While none of Luzio's recommendations were implemented, at least not immediately, the episode demonstrates that it was not secular leaders alone who were intent on maintaining their independence of the Vatican. The bishops had objected to the delegation and treated Luzio in a manner that angered the cardinal secretary of state. Republicans were much more cooperative, and many were glad that the Church had sent a man prepared to put, as they saw it, the interests of religion first. However, it seems likely that it was Luzio's willingness to be open to both sides of the struggle that originally drew favour with the republicans. As the delegate became soured by the treatment he received from the bishops and government, he moved closer to the republicans, many of whom took advantage of the opportunity, knowing that it would work in their favour when Luzio submitted his report.

The highest echelons of the Vatican were not prepared for such reactions to their involvement in Irish affairs. Despite constant rumours among Irish circles that the Vatican was anxious to get involved, sending Luzio was, in fact, the Vatican's first and last foray into Irish affairs during this turbulent period. The treatment of his delegate by people more concerned with politics and power than religion dismayed the pontiff, who had wanted to speak to the faithful in Ireland on issues which he considered important. It appears that Pius had had enough of the difficulties of getting involved in Ireland, and in fact wanted to hear no more about it.Footnote ⁷¹

Four years later, the British representative to the Holy See reported that in the wake of the papal condemnation of Action Française, Pius was enacting a policy of withdrawing the Church as far as possible from the political arena. He had personally forbidden the creation of a Catholic political party in Mexico. Furthermore, ‘any tendencies on the part of the clergy to mingle politics and religion beyond the prudent limits laid down by the Holy See will be severely suppressed. The Vatican formula in respect to those limits is that the Church only comes into direct contact with politics when politics threaten the altar or the family’.Footnote ⁷² This episode points to two possibilities regarding the Irish affair. First, it seems to suggest that while the Vatican never actually condemned the Irish bishops for their statements and actions during the civil war era, the odds of Pius doing so were much greater than his supporting them. The pontiff was clearly opposed to the mixing of religion and politics, and as the bishops did not feel the need to defend their actions, most of the materials presented to Vatican authorities argued that they had, in fact, combined the two. Second, his condemnation of Action Française demonstrates that he would have condemned the republican movement if he had actually felt the need to do so. It would seem that the ending of armed hostilities gave the Holy See the opportunity it desired to excuse itself from speaking on Ireland.