Jeremy Black, professor of early modern history at Exeter University, has written a timely essay about Britain and Europe, the aim of which is to assess to what extent Britain is different from the rest of Europe. The result, Britain and Europe: A Short History, is an easily read and witty book that covers an impressive array of domains, from military to cultural issues. Black's primary focus is politics, despite a sweeping timeline that runs from the Ice Age to the present day. The work, however, with a mere handful of footnotes, is also at times frustratingly superficial.

Black's central thesis is that the root of British exceptionalism lies in its political system. For Black, the turning point should not be the 1215 Magna Carta, despite its status as a landmark text, but rather the upheavals of the seventeenth century, setting England on a different tack from the rest of Europe, thus embarking toward absolutism (49). Since then, the parliamentary system has remained in place, evolving progressively without revolution or upheaval. Contrary to the most of Europe, political parties of republicans, socialists, communists, fascists, and Christian Democrats had scant presence. Black expounds on the Whig narrative, according to which the Glorious Revolution is held up as “a recovery of original freedoms,” those of the German tribes replacing the Roman Empire, subsequently lost following William I's victory in 1066 (59). Beyond merely providing a description, Black seems to adhere fully to the narrative of exceptionalism, thus downplaying internal conflicts such as the Irish question, or even ignoring other aspects such as the Luddite social movement or the Peterloo massacre.

Another feature that set England (though not Britain) apart from the rest of Europe is its anti-French obsession, a recurring theme that courses through the entire book. To some extent, this focus begins with the brutal imposition of the Norman yoke after 1066, even though England's new masters were as much Vikings as part of the French nobility. After the conclusion of the Hundred Years War, a brief but hostile spat with Spain ensued, culminating in the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588. Thereafter, anti-French animus bounces back, fueled by anti-Catholicism and hostility toward absolutism. Black even extends this anti-French sentiment to popular culture. He dwells on the eighteenth-century cultural disparity between the aristocracy's affinity for French cuisine and sophisticated affectations, and the quasi-total rejection of this by the general population as un-English (53). As he puts it: “French were seen as fawning followers of Horace, civilised, urbane, sophisticated, fashionable servants or slaves; the English as Rugged, no-nonsense, plain-speaking followers of Juvenal, hence free” (60). This French obsession is enshrined today in landmarks such as Waterloo and Nelson's Column in Trafalgar Square.

This argument is less convincing when Black extends it to the postwar period. For example, the author considers the complex and dramatic 1996 “mad-cow” disease (bovine spongiform encephalopathy) crisis as mainly a Franco-British contest, disregarding critical health, safety, and institutional issues (180). It is true that the history of the difficult relationship between Britain and the European Economic Community and the European Union has often been compounded by a difficult relationship with France, especially under de Gaulle. However, French influence over European integration is somewhat overstated. It would probably have been more convincing to follow Wolfram Kaiser's vision, stressing that Britain's traditional concept of Europe was closer to the one prevailing in Northern Europe—in the Netherlands and Scandinavia in particular—than to the one visible in regions more influenced by a Catholic culture. This could explain why those countries have frequently sided with the United Kingdom, at the expense of France, which often failed to convince its partners of its grand schemes.

The other features of British exceptionalism put forward by Black are less original: the English Reformation, the largest colonial Empire in the world, and a commitment to free trade—merely a necessity since Britain was more dependent than other countries on imports. This was due to the pioneering role that Britain played in the Industrial Revolution. While Black certainly mentions this factor, it is not afforded the coverage that it merits. Black is correct to place an emphasis on the role of the rule of law, of the right of absolute ownership, and of the landowner's right to the minerals and coal under the surface of his property (72). However, it would have been appropriate to discuss other factors, too—underlined, for example, by David Landes—such as the role of the Calvinist ethic (following Max Weber), of rationality and of empiricism (that is, Francis Bacon). More recently, Kenneth Pomeranz underlined the role of environmental factors such as the availability of easily accessible coal. A temperate climate and the absence of mountains might also have helped. Lastly, another neglected factor was the role of dynamic migrants—persecuted elsewhere—but welcomed in a more liberal England. French Huguenots, for example, helped establish the Bank of England in 1694.

Another neglected factor of British exceptionalism is the fact that Britain is an island, and a rather large one at that. This deterred foreign invasion and allowed the British to focus on their navy, and later on their air power—free from the obligation to build costly fortifications and to support large ground forces. This is not to downplay the resilience of the British people during the Blitz. As Black rightly underlines, this heroic resistance set Britain apart from the rest of Europe, composed as it was of countries that had either lost the war or were defeated at some point. As a consequence, there was no need for Britain to revamp its political system and international alliances following 1945.

The final part of the book is the least convincing, with various musings about European integration that are littered with small errors: for example, the European Union was created in 1992 not 1982 (143); Jenkins was president of the European Commission, not deputy head (145). There are also important omissions: the invitation of Britain to be part of the negotiation at Six that eventually led to the 1957 Rome Treaty and the fact that British trade tariffs were higher than were those of the European Economic Community when it joined—so it was hardly a protectionist block.

In the end, the book comes to resemble a Thatcherite pamphlet, dismissing Heath and Major's pro-European economic policy as “foolish economics and bad politics” (162), whereas Thatcher's Bruges Speech is praised (169). Black sometimes verges on parochial anti-elitism when he writes, without any supporting facts, that since the 1960s, “Not only the intellectual elite but also, to a degree, the political leadership of the parties withdrew from engagement with the needs and concerns of most of the population,” citing as an illustration, two sentences later, the fact that “Cameron came to criticise, and apologise for, the imperial legacy” (183). Fortunately, Black recognizes himself how perilous it is for a historian to write on current events.