Harriman vs. Hill presents a detailed account of one of the most fascinating episodes in Wall Street history: the fight for control of the Northern Pacific Railroad in 1901. At first glance, it would be possible to underestimate this wonderful book as a case study analysis. But in Larry Haeg's capable hands, the Northern Pacific corner acquires enormous relevance. Besides providing a meticulous description of the events that led to the “rich man's” stock market panic in May 1901, and the ensuing federal efforts to enforce antitrust statues, this book reveals much about the functioning of financial markets, the limited regulatory frameworks that exposed investors to substantial risks, and the potential pitfalls of the governance of American corporations in the early twentieth century.
In 1901, two groups of railroad barons and financiers—Harriman, Schiff, and Stillman on one side, and Hill and Morgan on the other—fought to obtain control of two western railroads: the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy, a successful independent line, and the Northern Pacific, a poorly performing railroad that had failed repeatedly in the nineteenth century. (As an indication of the interconnectedness of financial institutions at that time, Morgan was the mastermind of the railroad's reorganization in 1896, and Schiff and Stillman were part of the refinancing syndicate.) Hill was interested in acquiring the Burlington to facilitate western traffic for his system. With Morgan, he developed a plan to exchange bonds of the Great Northern and the Northern Pacific, which they controlled, for the Burlington's stock. Harriman wanted to influence the Burlington's policies because it competed with the Union Pacific, one of the railroads under his control. Morgan and Hill denied Harriman's petition to jointly purchase the Burlington, and his attempts to acquire control of the company on the stock market failed.
On April 19, 1901, the Burlington was sold to Hill and Morgan, and the shares of the railroad were evenly split between the Great Northern and the Northern Pacific. Whoever controlled the Northern Pacific, controlled the Burlington. Harriman and Schiff cleverly decided to acquire the Northern Pacific. Although Hill and Morgan had working control of the railroad, a significant fraction of the shares traded in large blocks by “plungers,” large speculative investors. Harriman and Schiff began secretly to use a variety of brokerages to purchase blocks of shares of Northern Pacific directly from their owners. It took almost a month for Hill and his associates to realize that something was going on. On 3 May, Hill approached Schiff only to find that Harriman's group owned more than 50 percent of the preferred shares of the company, and almost one-half of the common shares, giving them majority of the total shares outstanding. Since the preferred shares had voting rights, Harriman had control of the company. Hill then decided to exploit an obscure clause in the 1896 charter of the Northern Pacific that allowed the common stock shareholders to retire the preferred shares and retain board control. The battle for the Northern Pacific was on.
And what a battle it was. Haeg's description of the madness in the exchange as the price of the shares of Northern Pacific increased from $110 on 6 May to $1,000 only four days later is exhilarating. By then, both sides of the corner realized that their desperate attempts to buy any available shares of the company, compounded with the speculation of short-sellers, had resulted in a full blown panic. The reputation of the most important investment banks was at risk. Morgan and Schiff swiftly and jointly worked to calm the markets, and the panic was resolved without any failures.
Following the panic, Morgan understood that utilizing a controversial charter clause to obtain control of the company would infuriate the justifiably upset public. Instead, the two sides finally agreed to share the control of Northern Pacific. They did so in an ingenious manner: they established the Northern Securities Company, a holding company that controlled the Great Northern, the Northern Pacific, and the Burlington. This was a shrewd move. Northern Securities was the second largest firm in the world by capitalization; a merger of these railroads would have likely exposed the firm to antitrust prosecution under the Sherman Act, even by McKinley's pro-big business administration. Instead, forgiving politicians could perceive the holding company as a financial corporation that separately administered competing railroads.
But these clever financiers and businessmen could not anticipate that an anarchist would assassinate the President, and that his trustbuster vice-President would take the leadership of the country. Northern Securities was the first, and one of the most salient, antitrust cases of the Roosevelt administration. The bill questioned the legality of railroad mergers, and the court's mandate to dissolve the company clarified that the mere intent to restrain trade constituted a violation of the Sherman Act. The lawsuit also changed the balance of power—the actions of the most important financiers were no longer outside the government's purview, and emboldened the regulatory efforts of politicians.
This episode in Wall Street's history also helps illuminate the evolution of financial markets over the last century. The modern regulatory framework prohibits many of the actions that took place during this event, such as a secret acquisition of a large block of shares of a publicly held company. It also highlights the significant influence that financiers had over corporations and government policies in the past. The power of these important individuals perhaps stems from the limited protection and access to information of minority investors, but the financiers’ interconnection through boards of directors and corporate deals also gave rise to potentially damaging conflicts of interest. Finally, the antitrust doctrine and the regulatory efforts that emerged following the corner of the Northern Pacific are the beginning of a major transformation in the American corporate sector that is still ongoing.
In sum, Haeg's account of the Great Railroad War is impeccable. The research is careful and thorough, and the writing is superb. This book is a must-read for anyone interested in American business and financial history.
