I hold the chair for work and organizational psychology at Leipzig University in Germany. Founded in 1409, my university was renamed “Karl Marx University” in 1953 by the socialist party government of the German Democratic Republic (GDR, also known as East Germany). After the collapse of this dictatorial regime (which, in addition to numerous crimes against humanity, in 1968 demolished our university church that was built in 1231 and survived the two Word Wars) and the German reunification, the university’s original name was restored in 1991. Against this personal and historical background, I read the focal article by Mumby (Reference Mumby2019), which, among other philosophers, invokes Marx, with mixed thoughts and feelings. On one hand, I understand and mostly agree with the basics of Mumby’s analysis of the role of paid and dependent work (or wage labor) in people’s lives. On the other hand, I would like to outline three points of criticism on the focal article and “critical organizational scholarship” (including “critical management studies,” “critical organizational communication studies,” and “critical work and organizational psychology”) more broadly. These points of criticism include (a) the lack of a realistic and practical alternative offered by “critical organizational scholars,” (b) the lack of rigorous empirical evidence generated by “critical organizational scholars,” and (c) the frequent use of sweeping generalizations and dramatization by “critical organizational scholars.”
Before I outline these points of criticism, I would like to explain why I use quotation marks for “critical organizational scholars/scholarship.” I believe that the (implicit) distinction made by Mumby (Reference Mumby2019) and other self-proclaimed “critical organizational scholars” into organizational scholars who are “critical” (i.e., focus on issues of power and control at work and in organizations) and organizational scholars who are “uncritical” (or “mainstream”) is problematic. Most organizational scholars I know are critical of (their own and others’) research, including theories, assumptions, methods, and findings, and of the environment in which research, teaching, and service activities are conducted (including issues of power and control). I also like to think of myself as being critical of my own work and organization, but I would not explicitly label myself a “critical organizational scholar.” I argue that categorizing oneself as a “critical organizational scholar” and others, more or less implicitly, as “uncritical” often serves a social identity function (see, for example, Hornsey, Reference Hornsey2008). That is, self-proclaimed “critical organizational scholars” attempt to boost their professional self-esteem and reputation by creating an artificial distinction between an in-group of “critical organizational scholars” and an out-group encompassing “uncritical” or “mainstream” organizational scholars.
What is the alternative?
My first criticism is that “critical organizational scholars,” including Mumby (Reference Mumby2019), analyze and critique the past and current state of work and organizations, but they hardly ever offer a realistic and practical alternative for the future (see also Bal & Dóci, Reference Bal and Dóci2018). The political systems, labor markets, and state-owned organizations in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the GDR are historical examples of “real existing socialism/communism” that are based on the ideas of Marx and Lenin. The dictatorial regimes of these countries committed numerous crimes against humanity and, also due to disastrous economic failures, fortunately disappeared at the end of the last century. Mumby suggests that “capitalism in the 20th century weathered its various legitimization crises,” but he does not mention at all how alternative political and economic systems, particularly socialism and communism, fared in the 20th century. Current self-declared socialist countries include the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Cuba. I believe (hope) that neither Mumby nor other “critical organizational scholars” would suggest installing political and economic systems in the United States or the European Union that are similar to those in China and Cuba. Thus, I challenge these scholars to explicitly outline their ideas for an alternative political and economic system that overcomes the problems they see with current neoliberal (United States) and social democratic (European Union) systems. While I understand Mumby’s analysis of “raw” and “cooked” capitalism, I also believe that these political and economic systems have guaranteed high levels of individual freedom, wealth, and peace for a relatively long time in human history—and we should not hastily replace them (again) with an alternative system (especially not with “a new socialist order” or communism).
What is the evidence?
“Critical organizational scholars” typically base their critique on theoretical analyses of the current state of work and organizations. In contrast, there is a lack of rigorous empirical methods and evidence to substantiate their claims or to support a potential alternative system (if such a system is suggested at all, see previous section). In a recent commentary article, Anseel, Van Lysebetten, Van Es, and Rosseel (Reference Anseel, Van Lysebetten, Van Es and Rosseel2018) suggested that “Prior to engaging in a substantive discussion on the supposed influence of neoliberalism on research in work and organizational psychology (WOP), it is important to verify the empirical basis of the trends” (p. 549) advanced by “critical organizational scholars” (in this case, by Bal & Dóci, Reference Bal and Dóci2018). Anseel and colleagues (Reference Anseel, Van Lysebetten, Van Es and Rosseel2018) conducted a content analysis of more than 740 abstracts of empirical studies published in leading organizational journals in the years 2006/2007 and 2016/2017. Interestingly, their results demonstrated that the trends (i.e., increased instrumentality and individualism in organizational psychology research) proposed by Bal and Dóci (Reference Bal and Dóci2018) could not be empirically supported. They conclude that Bal and Dóci’s (Reference Bal and Dóci2018) article on the influence of neoliberalism on work and organizational psychology “does not provide a solid basis for discussion” (p. 549), but also call for more empirical research in our field that focuses on macrolevel and societal issues.
Analyses by “critical organizational scholars” may also be problematic from a conceptual and methodological perspective. Also in response to Bal and Dóci’s (Reference Bal and Dóci2018) article on neoliberalism in work and organizational psychology, Rudolph and Zacher (Reference Rudolph and Zacher2018) argued that neoliberalism can only be a distal, exogeneous influence on psychological processes (i.e., human experience and behavior) and that the mechanisms that translate this ideology into work and organizational psychology science and practice remain unclear. Their critique also relates to the issue of independent conceptual and analytical levels. While neoliberalism is a factor that should influence all individuals in a given society, work and organizational psychologists are mainly interested in variations in human experience and behavior within societies and organizations, as well as the moderating role of higher-level factors on between- and within-person relationships. In sum, I suggest that “critical organizational scholars” should be more critical with regard to their own theories, assumptions, and, if used at all, their empirical methods and results.
What is the writing style?
The editorial team of Industrial and Organizational Psychology: Perspectives on Science and Practice placed a cautionary note on the focal article, thanking Mumby (Reference Mumby2019) “for his willingness to be polemic in order to inspire commentaries and generate meaningful discourse.” However, I believe that Mumby’s (Reference Mumby2019) writing style is not particularly polemic in comparison to other articles written by “critical organizational scholars” (see Bal & Dóci, Reference Bal and Dóci2018, for another recent example). These scholars often use sweeping generalizations and dramatization to make a point, and I question whether this writing style actually leads to a “meaningful discourse.” For example, in his title and introduction, Mumby (Reference Mumby2019) even compares work (“a strange thing with a very checkered history,” p. 429) to war, thus relativizing war (which, again based on my personal and historical background, I find unacceptable). It is exaggerated to state that “Work was performed out of necessity, or through coercion, but (almost) never as a matter of choice and rarely with alacrity” (p. 429); for example, what about early craftsmen, artists, and scientists? Other instances of sweeping generalization and dramatization (and with an unclear empirical evidence base) by Mumby are wordings such as “the entire history of management thought” (p. 430), “work as a marginal, rather distasteful activity not discussed in polite society” (p. 430), “corporate colonization” (p. 431), “Everyone is a venture capitalist but of their own human capital” (p. 438), “all aspects of life create the potential for capitalist valorization” (p. 438), “constantly preoccupied with burnishing their individual brands” (p. 439), and “a tyrannical manager telling us to work harder” (p. 440). My criticism regarding writing style can be extended to other “critical organizational scholarship.” For example, in another commentary on Bal and Dóci (Reference Bal and Dóci2018), Guest and Grote (Reference Guest and Grote2018) lamented that these researchers’ “overall conclusions are rather pessimistic, because WOP [work and organizational psychology] appears to be more or less doomed to operate in support of neoliberalism” (p. 554).
Conclusion
In sum, I suggest that Mumby (Reference Mumby2019) and other “critical organizational scholars” should be more critical with regard to the underlying reasons for and outcomes of their self-categorization as “critical scholars,” and their distinction from colleagues in the field who are (implicitly) assumed to be “uncritical” and often labeled “mainstream.” In addition, I think that “critical organizational scholars” should move beyond theoretical analysis only and explicitly lay out their alternative ideas for organizing (paid) work in organizations and society. Morever, they should critically reflect on the validity of their assumptions (e.g., levels of analysis) and support their claims with empirical evidence based on rigorous research methods. Finally, I suggest that “critical organizational scholars” reconsider the use of sweeping generalizations and dramatization in their writing to facilitate good scientific discourse on work and organizations.
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I hold the chair for work and organizational psychology at Leipzig University in Germany. Founded in 1409, my university was renamed “Karl Marx University” in 1953 by the socialist party government of the German Democratic Republic (GDR, also known as East Germany). After the collapse of this dictatorial regime (which, in addition to numerous crimes against humanity, in 1968 demolished our university church that was built in 1231 and survived the two Word Wars) and the German reunification, the university’s original name was restored in 1991. Against this personal and historical background, I read the focal article by Mumby (Reference Mumby2019), which, among other philosophers, invokes Marx, with mixed thoughts and feelings. On one hand, I understand and mostly agree with the basics of Mumby’s analysis of the role of paid and dependent work (or wage labor) in people’s lives. On the other hand, I would like to outline three points of criticism on the focal article and “critical organizational scholarship” (including “critical management studies,” “critical organizational communication studies,” and “critical work and organizational psychology”) more broadly. These points of criticism include (a) the lack of a realistic and practical alternative offered by “critical organizational scholars,” (b) the lack of rigorous empirical evidence generated by “critical organizational scholars,” and (c) the frequent use of sweeping generalizations and dramatization by “critical organizational scholars.”
Before I outline these points of criticism, I would like to explain why I use quotation marks for “critical organizational scholars/scholarship.” I believe that the (implicit) distinction made by Mumby (Reference Mumby2019) and other self-proclaimed “critical organizational scholars” into organizational scholars who are “critical” (i.e., focus on issues of power and control at work and in organizations) and organizational scholars who are “uncritical” (or “mainstream”) is problematic. Most organizational scholars I know are critical of (their own and others’) research, including theories, assumptions, methods, and findings, and of the environment in which research, teaching, and service activities are conducted (including issues of power and control). I also like to think of myself as being critical of my own work and organization, but I would not explicitly label myself a “critical organizational scholar.” I argue that categorizing oneself as a “critical organizational scholar” and others, more or less implicitly, as “uncritical” often serves a social identity function (see, for example, Hornsey, Reference Hornsey2008). That is, self-proclaimed “critical organizational scholars” attempt to boost their professional self-esteem and reputation by creating an artificial distinction between an in-group of “critical organizational scholars” and an out-group encompassing “uncritical” or “mainstream” organizational scholars.
What is the alternative?
My first criticism is that “critical organizational scholars,” including Mumby (Reference Mumby2019), analyze and critique the past and current state of work and organizations, but they hardly ever offer a realistic and practical alternative for the future (see also Bal & Dóci, Reference Bal and Dóci2018). The political systems, labor markets, and state-owned organizations in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the GDR are historical examples of “real existing socialism/communism” that are based on the ideas of Marx and Lenin. The dictatorial regimes of these countries committed numerous crimes against humanity and, also due to disastrous economic failures, fortunately disappeared at the end of the last century. Mumby suggests that “capitalism in the 20th century weathered its various legitimization crises,” but he does not mention at all how alternative political and economic systems, particularly socialism and communism, fared in the 20th century. Current self-declared socialist countries include the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Cuba. I believe (hope) that neither Mumby nor other “critical organizational scholars” would suggest installing political and economic systems in the United States or the European Union that are similar to those in China and Cuba. Thus, I challenge these scholars to explicitly outline their ideas for an alternative political and economic system that overcomes the problems they see with current neoliberal (United States) and social democratic (European Union) systems. While I understand Mumby’s analysis of “raw” and “cooked” capitalism, I also believe that these political and economic systems have guaranteed high levels of individual freedom, wealth, and peace for a relatively long time in human history—and we should not hastily replace them (again) with an alternative system (especially not with “a new socialist order” or communism).
What is the evidence?
“Critical organizational scholars” typically base their critique on theoretical analyses of the current state of work and organizations. In contrast, there is a lack of rigorous empirical methods and evidence to substantiate their claims or to support a potential alternative system (if such a system is suggested at all, see previous section). In a recent commentary article, Anseel, Van Lysebetten, Van Es, and Rosseel (Reference Anseel, Van Lysebetten, Van Es and Rosseel2018) suggested that “Prior to engaging in a substantive discussion on the supposed influence of neoliberalism on research in work and organizational psychology (WOP), it is important to verify the empirical basis of the trends” (p. 549) advanced by “critical organizational scholars” (in this case, by Bal & Dóci, Reference Bal and Dóci2018). Anseel and colleagues (Reference Anseel, Van Lysebetten, Van Es and Rosseel2018) conducted a content analysis of more than 740 abstracts of empirical studies published in leading organizational journals in the years 2006/2007 and 2016/2017. Interestingly, their results demonstrated that the trends (i.e., increased instrumentality and individualism in organizational psychology research) proposed by Bal and Dóci (Reference Bal and Dóci2018) could not be empirically supported. They conclude that Bal and Dóci’s (Reference Bal and Dóci2018) article on the influence of neoliberalism on work and organizational psychology “does not provide a solid basis for discussion” (p. 549), but also call for more empirical research in our field that focuses on macrolevel and societal issues.
Analyses by “critical organizational scholars” may also be problematic from a conceptual and methodological perspective. Also in response to Bal and Dóci’s (Reference Bal and Dóci2018) article on neoliberalism in work and organizational psychology, Rudolph and Zacher (Reference Rudolph and Zacher2018) argued that neoliberalism can only be a distal, exogeneous influence on psychological processes (i.e., human experience and behavior) and that the mechanisms that translate this ideology into work and organizational psychology science and practice remain unclear. Their critique also relates to the issue of independent conceptual and analytical levels. While neoliberalism is a factor that should influence all individuals in a given society, work and organizational psychologists are mainly interested in variations in human experience and behavior within societies and organizations, as well as the moderating role of higher-level factors on between- and within-person relationships. In sum, I suggest that “critical organizational scholars” should be more critical with regard to their own theories, assumptions, and, if used at all, their empirical methods and results.
What is the writing style?
The editorial team of Industrial and Organizational Psychology: Perspectives on Science and Practice placed a cautionary note on the focal article, thanking Mumby (Reference Mumby2019) “for his willingness to be polemic in order to inspire commentaries and generate meaningful discourse.” However, I believe that Mumby’s (Reference Mumby2019) writing style is not particularly polemic in comparison to other articles written by “critical organizational scholars” (see Bal & Dóci, Reference Bal and Dóci2018, for another recent example). These scholars often use sweeping generalizations and dramatization to make a point, and I question whether this writing style actually leads to a “meaningful discourse.” For example, in his title and introduction, Mumby (Reference Mumby2019) even compares work (“a strange thing with a very checkered history,” p. 429) to war, thus relativizing war (which, again based on my personal and historical background, I find unacceptable). It is exaggerated to state that “Work was performed out of necessity, or through coercion, but (almost) never as a matter of choice and rarely with alacrity” (p. 429); for example, what about early craftsmen, artists, and scientists? Other instances of sweeping generalization and dramatization (and with an unclear empirical evidence base) by Mumby are wordings such as “the entire history of management thought” (p. 430), “work as a marginal, rather distasteful activity not discussed in polite society” (p. 430), “corporate colonization” (p. 431), “Everyone is a venture capitalist but of their own human capital” (p. 438), “all aspects of life create the potential for capitalist valorization” (p. 438), “constantly preoccupied with burnishing their individual brands” (p. 439), and “a tyrannical manager telling us to work harder” (p. 440). My criticism regarding writing style can be extended to other “critical organizational scholarship.” For example, in another commentary on Bal and Dóci (Reference Bal and Dóci2018), Guest and Grote (Reference Guest and Grote2018) lamented that these researchers’ “overall conclusions are rather pessimistic, because WOP [work and organizational psychology] appears to be more or less doomed to operate in support of neoliberalism” (p. 554).
Conclusion
In sum, I suggest that Mumby (Reference Mumby2019) and other “critical organizational scholars” should be more critical with regard to the underlying reasons for and outcomes of their self-categorization as “critical scholars,” and their distinction from colleagues in the field who are (implicitly) assumed to be “uncritical” and often labeled “mainstream.” In addition, I think that “critical organizational scholars” should move beyond theoretical analysis only and explicitly lay out their alternative ideas for organizing (paid) work in organizations and society. Morever, they should critically reflect on the validity of their assumptions (e.g., levels of analysis) and support their claims with empirical evidence based on rigorous research methods. Finally, I suggest that “critical organizational scholars” reconsider the use of sweeping generalizations and dramatization in their writing to facilitate good scientific discourse on work and organizations.