J. B. Shank's project is ambitious: to debunk the myth of the French Enlightenment as the direct intellectual descendant of Isaac Newton. For Shank, there was nothing inevitable about the uses made in France of Newton's work. Shank argues that French Newtonianism was a fluid concept, moulded by often contradictory contingencies. Individual and institutional honour, nationalism and ambition challenged and reshaped Newtonian doctrine through the 1730s and 1740s, when the debate between Cartesians and Newtonians was at its peak. At the centre of all was the Newtonian Voltaire, who exploited these divisions in increasingly public and polemical ways to forge that emblematically Enlightenment figure, the philosophe.
Shank's book is in two parts, progresses chronologically and concludes with a coda. In Part One, he argues that Newton's Principia was received cautiously by the French in the late seventeenth century. Cartesian difficulties with gravitational force were smoothed by the Académie secretary Fontenelle, who sought to cultivate a pax analytica, where moderation and civility underpinned intellectual discussion. This polite intellectual culture started to shift after the publication of Newton's Opticks in 1706, when a new critical discourse over the physicality of gravity arose in subversive Dutch and French periodicals. Disagreement grew more tempestuous in the priority dispute on the origins of the calculus from 1713 to 1718, exemplified in the Clark–Leibniz correspondence, as the Newtonian belief in the reality of mathematical objects became more clearly juxtaposed to the Leibnizian conviction that maths were merely clarificatory tools of reasoning. Shank argues that this correspondence, and the reporting of it in periodicals, normalized a more disputative intellectual culture in France through the 1720s, concentrating debate on whether the truth of mathematics was more a matter of Newtonian empiricism or Cartesian rationalization.
Part Two argues that the fiercely contested conversion of French science to Newtonian physics between 1734 and 1758 was triggered by two things: Maupertuis's careful initiating of scientific debate within the Paris Academy in 1732, and Voltaire's wider-ranging, public defence of Newton from 1734. Here Shank closely follows Mary Terrall's biography of Maupertuis, The Man Who Flattened the Earth (Chicago, 2002). Seeking an identity as both a Newtonian and an Academician, Maupertuis offered in his Discours sur les différentes figures des asters (1732) a carefully constructed Malebranchean defence of Newtonianism. Attraction was as reasonable as mechanical impulse, was mathematically sound, and was simpler than Cartesian vortices. Voltaire, by contrast, was blunt and uncompromising, as an intellectual outsider trying to cause a controversy. He celebrated Newtonian attraction in his 1734 Lettres philosophiques as the only truth based on Lockean empiricism, and contrasted English liberty with French despotism. Shank maintains that Voltaire's originality lay in shaping the Newtonian debate into a critical, publicly oriented one, and in such a way as to launch the Enlightenment persona of the philosophe. At the same time, whilst the minimally controversial Maupertuis carefully strengthened the Newtonian cause through his Newtonian proof of an oblate earth in 1736, Voltaire's notorious manner and scandalous escapades produced the bitter opposition that defined the Newton Wars.
On Shank's telling, the triumph for the Newtonians came – ironically enough – through the return of Leibnizianism in the 1740s. Maupertuis's increasingly Leibnizian convictions that matter had been endowed by God with organizational properties generated accusations of Spinozism. Similarly, the marquise du Châtelet's blend of Newtonian physics with Leibnizian metaphysics in her 1740 Institutions de physique resulted in pamphlet wars where Leibnizian metaphysical complication was contrasted with Newtonian simplicity. Leibnizianism superseded Cartesianism as a target for the Newtonians. Shank regards d'Alembert's 1743 Traite de dynamique as marking the resolution of this debate. In Cartesian language, d'Alembert proved that kinematics was a purely mathematical conception of force that avoided the metaphysical implications of Leibnizian dynamics. Thereafter, French thinkers became increasingly united in their rejection of the philosophical system implicit in Cartesianism and Leibnizianism. In his coda, Shank suggests that the 1751 Encyclopédie was the culmination of this Newtonian acceptance as well as the crystallization of the philosophe movement.
Unsurprisingly, fellow scholars of the period will cavil at aspects of Shank's treatment. There are occasional errata: Louis XV was not the grandson, but the great-grandson, of Louis XIV (p. 87), and William Derham, not George Derham, was the author of the Physico-Theology listed in the bibliography. More consequentially, one might query the place of religion in this story. Shank too readily subsumes religious belief under the rubric of individual self-fashioning. For example, the divergent Newtonianisms of Voltaire and Maupertuis, and their subsequent intellectual split in the 1740s, reflected not just differing social positions and desires, but fundamental differences in belief. Maupertuis, as Shank shows, sought to discern the wisdom of God in the behaviour of matter, whereas the good deist Voltaire consistently dismissed providence as a marginal mystery. If anything, Maupertuis's metaphysical interests suggest that he had a much deeper, theological interest in causation than Voltaire.
Overall, however, this is a good book, well researched and readable. Aside from a brief flirtation with Foucault on dissociative genealogy, Shank lets his materials speak for themselves as he develops his case for historical contingency – and this is refreshing. The Newton Wars and the Beginning of the French Enlightenment is grand and nuanced history, weaving together political, social, philosophical and natural-philosophical strands to impressive effect. It should be noted, however, that the upshot of all the revisionism is ultimately conservative: a re-establishment of a unification thesis about Newtonianism and the French Enlightenment, in explicit challenge to Jonathan Israel's argument, in Enlightenment Contested (Oxford, 2006), that Spinozist radicalism, not Newtonian mechanics, drove the Enlightenment. By avoiding simple binaries, and showing instead how metaphysical discussion among the disputants entangled Spinozist, Cartesian, Leibnizian and Newtonian theory, and also how personal ambition and mathematical need produced a Newtonian simplification, Shank has advanced the debate over Israel's thesis considerably. In this light, the major virtue of Shank's study is not that it offers an entirely new interpretation of the origins of the French Enlightenment, but that it provides a novel perspective on traditional accounts.
