In the conclusion to her book, Amy Zegart summarizes its central thesis in two words: “organization matters” (p. 196). But her argument goes far beyond that. It is not simply that organization matters but that the ability of the CIA and FBI is impeded, if not subverted, by a set of intractable organizational pathologies. They are 1) cultural pathologies that lead intelligence organizations to resist new technologies, ideas, and tasks; 2) perverse promotion incentives that improperly reward intelligence officials; and 3) structural weaknesses that date back to the very founding of the U.S. intelligence community, preventing it from operating as a coherent whole (p. 4). Taken together, these organizational pathologies prevented the intelligence community from adapting to the end of the Cold War and caused the intelligence failure that led to 9/11.

Zegart's accounting of the intelligence community's performance as epitomized by the activities of these two key organizations is put forward as a corrective to the emphasis given to individual actions in recounting the 9/11 story. She argues that seeking explanations at the level of individual actions is dangerous because it will lead to inappropriate remedies. She is quick to note that individual actions and leadership do matter, but that while individuals made mistakes, “it was the system that failed us” (p. 10).

To buttress her case, Zegart reviews the work of 12 pre-9/11 commissions that looked into the operation of the U.S. intelligence community. Only 10% of the 340 recommendations they made were fully implemented, and 79% led to no action at all. Included among these 340 recommendations were calls to improve human collection capabilities and intelligence sharing, to rethink strategic missions and priorities, and to remedy the overarching problem of corporateness. Each was a major area of concern post-9/11, as discussed in the concluding chapter.

In accounting for the inability of intelligence organizations to adapt to the end of the Cold War, Zegart looks beyond organizational factors (p. 43), attending also to the rational self-interest of political officials and the fragmented structure of the federal government. The first caused policymakers to shy away from executive branch reorganization, while the second undermined legislative reform initiatives.

Spying Blind sits clearly within the broader literature on intelligence and intelligence reform. Zegart's account, with its emphasis on endemic organizational factors that are resistant to change, stands at one end of a continuum of explanations of intelligence failures. At the other end stand explanations that emphasize failings in the analytical skills and mindsets of intelligence analysts. The remedy here, as Richard Russell argues, is not so much to improve organizational structure as it is to improve the capabilities of analysts. Occupying a conceptual middle ground are those scholars, such as Richard K. Betts, who identify formal and informal organizational failings but see them as inherent enemies of intelligence that do not lend themselves to permanent solutions. Betts and others argue that these failings require constant attention, but that even such attention will only yield modest returns, perhaps improving the batting average of intelligence estimates but not preventing surprise.

The structure of the book's argument is not beyond reproach. Referencing the volume and nature of recommendations made by intelligence commissions as evidence of the well-established need for organizational reform is somewhat problematic, though it does offer an opportunity for additional research. Presidential commissions are established for many reasons beyond making reform proposals. These include directing blame at others, educating the public so as to make reforms possible, and providing an image of action where none was ever intended. Commissions operate on a tight time line, tend to be populated by trusted people, and exist to make recommendations. It is not clear, therefore, how to interpret a simple counting of reform proposals. Are intelligence reform proposals different from the reform proposals of other national security bureaucracies or of bureaucracy in general? Do these proposals simply mimic one another or reflect the biases of members who reappear on commission after commission, or do they demonstrate a growing sense of awareness of a problem and preferred solution?

While Zegart effectively makes the case for the importance of organizational factors in causing the 9/11 intelligence failures, one can still legitimately ask if these inherent organizational features are the root cause of intelligence failures, and how, if they have been present since the founding of the CIA (as she argues in an earlier work, Flawed by Design, 1999), the United States even survived the Cold War. What is it that earlier allowed the intelligence community to overcome these organizational features and give policymakers warning or insight into the problems they faced? Or throughout the Cold War, was the U.S. intelligence community just lucky rather than good?

These questions go beyond the purpose of Spying Blind, a book about 9/11 and the intelligence trail not followed by the CIA and FBI. But to fully make the case for the role of organizational factors rather than individual leadership or skill in causing the 9/11 intelligence failures, a comparative case analysis needs to be undertaken.

One possible answer for why these organizational features produced a failure on 9/11 and not during the Cold War is that the intelligence question has changed. As many have argued, during the Cold War the intelligence challenge was to uncover secrets in order to solve puzzles. Puzzles have solutions. It is a matter of finding the missing piece. Today, puzzles still exist but they have been overtaken by the need to solve mysteries. By their very nature, mysteries do not lend themselves to linear analysis. They contain multiple end points and plot twists.

A shift in mission from solving puzzles to solving mysteries does not negate Zegart's argument about maladaptation, but it does raise the question of the environment to which the intelligence community is forced to adapt. Her analysis points to the centrality of American political institutions and processes. One could argue that so long as Congress and the presidency remain the same, there is no need to adapt. Evidence of change in Congress is hard to come by for, as Zegart and others point out, intelligence oversight remains divided. On the other hand, there is evidence of change in the presidency. The Neustadtian model of the president as bargainer-in-chief now competes with visions of a strong presidency and a partisan presidency. Unilateral action, including the creation and reorganization of bureaucracies, is an important aspect of contemporary presidential power that perhaps changes the context in which the intelligence community functions.

With her emphasis on the enduring impact of organization and the role of organizational deficiencies in contributing to intelligence failures, Zegart has made an important contribution to the literature on intelligence. Spying Blind is likely to be one of the core texts for students of the tragedies of 9/11, and for scholars of the intelligence community more generally.