To deserve, to acquire, and to enjoy the respect and admiration of mankind, are the great objectives of ambition and emulation (Smith, Reference Smith2004 (1759): I, iii, 3).
If I've learned one thing covering world affairs, it's this:
The single most underappreciated force in international relations is humiliation (Friedman, Reference Friedman2003).
Not unlike persons or social groups in the domestic arena, decision makers, nations, and religious communities increasingly demand respect from their peers in the global arena – particularly from the United States, but also from other western states (Woodward, Reference Woodward2004: 312; Iweala, Reference Iweala2007; World Economic Forum, 2008: 131; Fathi, 2009). Apparently, the current US administration intends to heed such calls. At least, it vowed to show more respect in its policies vis-à-vis Islamic, Latin American, and European countries (Obama and Biden, Reference Obama and Biden2008a, Reference Obama and Bidenb; Obama, 2009, Reference Obama2010: 11, 14), Yet, can such a reorientation make a real difference? Or is respectful behavior merely a matter of style with no substantial consequences for international cooperation? Unfortunately, to date, International Relations (IR) scholars have hardly started to ask such questions.
To lay the necessary groundwork for systematic research, this article presents an interdisciplinary proto-theory about the international impact of respect and disrespect. It argues that foreign policy decision makers have ample grounds for heeding the intuition that respect facilitates cooperation, while disrespect breeds conflict. To this end, I will derive concepts and hypotheses from insights and findings in other theoretical fields, especially from moral and social philosophy, sociology and social psychology. As will become clear, the experience of respect and disrespect touches upon many aspects of human interaction beyond cost–benefit calculations, which still figure prominently in mainstream IR. Unlike most IR topics, respect and disrespect cannot be properly understood without focusing simultaneously on an actor's normative expectations, social needs and emotional reactions. The promise and challenge of respect research therefore resides in the requirement to systematically integrate these factors and the insights of related fields of research.
Respect, it will be argued, is particularly important because of the implicit acceptance that it signals for an actor's rank. When the nature of the interaction confirms one's self-ascribed value and importance, it promotes sympathy, trust, mutual identification, and open deliberation – all of which increase a cooperative attitude. Disrespect, on the other hand, challenges an actor's self-respect or self-esteem by denying her the degree of esteem or attention she feels entitled to. It is usually experienced as an inacceptable mismatch between the social position one is assigned by the Other and the position one expects to deserve according to prevailing standards or norms. As such, disrespect tends to arouse anger and a self-protective urge to re-establish one's ‘rightful position’. While these effects may be less strong among collective actors interacting in a thinner social environment such as the international system, there are sufficient empirical and theoretical grounds suggesting that they are strong enough to warrant systematic empirical research. As will become clear presently, these propositions often build on earlier works on recognition. In fact, they should be seen as a specific contribution to this broader problem.Footnote 1
However, in some respects I deviate from this tradition, both with regard to the conceptual underpinnings of recognition theory and with regard to some of its motivational assumptions. For two reasons, I put special emphasis on the status dimensions of recognition: first, by stressing the status effects of interactions I try to outline an argument that is particularly relevant in an IR context where highly unequal actors interact in a thinly institutionalized environment. Second, this emphasis on status also facilitates the application of psychological insights. An increasing body of research in social psychology uses the concept of ‘respect’ to analyze the close relationship between a person's status perceptions, moral expectations and emotions. Hence, by applying this concept we can hopefully provide IR research with a solid micro-foundation that builds on systematic empirical findings. Accordingly, the concept of respect I am going to use is intimately linked to an actor's interest in the preservation of her social status. As I understand the term, an actor feels disrespected when others – directly or by implication – lower her rank or question claims on which she grounds her status position – as she herself perceives it! In this sense, respectful behavior is experienced as an appropriate confirmation of one's rightful position, whereas acts of disrespect are seen as disregard for it.Footnote 2
Thus, compared to prominent conceptualizations of recognition, the semantic extension of ‘respect’, as it will be used here, is both smaller and wider: it is smaller in that it is strongly linked to one's sense of entitlement. Hence, it covers only consideration (we feel) others must show. Recognition – as understood by Honneth and Taylor – goes beyond that point by extending to other, wholly subjective forms of positive evaluation, such as love. It seems self-evident that we always ‘owe’ respect to other humans, whereas sometimes we have greater moral discretion when it comes to recognizing other people. On the other hand, the extension of ‘respect’ is larger, as it also covers non-evaluative forms of consideration that confirm one's sense of importance, and which are so relevant for international status. By including these dimensions, the concept can also be used for explaining conflicts that arise in situations where actors feel ignored, not being taken seriously, or being taken for granted. It is this non-evaluative dimension of status recognition which a Brazilian WTO representative and a Russian NATO ambassador had in mind when claiming that the essential benefits in confronting Western governments in trade negotiations and over Georgia, respectively, lay in (re)gaining the latters’ ‘respect’ (BBC News, 2003; Heller, Reference Heller2010: 19).
A concept of respect that understands (dis)respect as (mis)recognition of an actor's status can also make better sense of strong emotional (and sometimes wholly irrational) reactions to respectful and – even more so – to disrespecting behavior.Footnote 3 Not every misrecognition of an actor's identity will stimulate anger. Therefore, in my view, recognition theory is too indiscriminate to the extent it assumes that misrecognition of an actor's identity will always provoke a negative sentiment (Taylor, Reference Taylor1995: 233; Ringmar, Reference Ringmar1996: 80–83; Wendt, Reference Wendt2003: 511). When people exaggerate our social status or when they fail to recognize important parts of our identity narrative, which have no status implications, we may feel bewildered or surprised, yet we do not react with anger.Footnote 4 Status depreciating behavior, however, regularly stimulates an instinctive response pattern that seems to be deeply engrained in the human psyche. According to evolutionary psychologists, a known tendency for instantaneous reactions against status challenges enhanced our ancestors’ reproduction chances – even though it sometimes entangled them into conflicts where its situational costs exceeded expected benefits. This goes a long way in explaining the ubiquitous outrage against disrespect and the instant desire ‘to get even’ with alleged perpetrators. Contrary to Erik Ringmar's theory of international recognition (Ringmar, Reference Ringmar1996, Reference Ringmar2002; see also Wendt, Reference Wendt2003: 511–514), which stresses actors’ epistemic needs, I claim then that struggles for recognition do not so much escalate because humans must get a particular Other's confirmation for their identity, lest they feel insecure about who they really are. Instead, I contend that such struggles originate because, in a given situation, actors are quite certain about both their social status and about the fact that it justifies being treated with more consideration.Footnote 5 Actors start such conflicts in order to get the treatment that they feel entitled to insist upon.
Given the need for conceptual clarification in a neglected field, the article starts with a thorough discussion of ‘respect’ and ‘disrespect’ before differentiating them from related concepts, such as ‘honor’, ‘reputation’, and ‘prestige’. The section thereafter will discuss if and how insights on interpersonal (dis)respect can be applied to the level of international interactions. In the next section, I draw upon findings from social and political psychology to explain why respectful treatment increases the chances of cooperative behavior. This will be followed by a section that will present evidence and hypotheses indicating that the experience of disrespect breeds international conflict. In the section ‘Implications for future research’, I will discuss why respect has thus far received so little attention in IR, before presenting some methodological suggestions as to how it could be studied.
The meaning of respect
Most of us use the word ‘respect’ every single day in one of its various meanings: thus we talk about respecting the law, the risks of a polar expedition, the judgment of a colleague, the Catholic church, the achievements of our brothers, the rights of business partners, the presence of a neighbor, the needs of our students, and much more (Darwall, Reference Darwall1977; Hudson, Reference Hudson1980; Dillon, Reference Dillon2007b). In the US inner cities ‘respect’ has achieved special prominence as a signifier of social standing in a hazardous environment (Anderson, Reference Anderson1999; Bourgois, Reference Bourgois2003). If there is one common thread in all of these examples, it is a rather thin one: giving due consideration to another object, be it natural, human, or institutional.
In an IR perspective, respect for particular actors seems to be both the most interesting and least researched aspect of respect. Problems of compliance, legitimacy, and acceptance have already been addressed by scores of international lawyers and political scientists. The same observation applies with respect to international risks and threats, which have also been extensively studied by a large number of security scholars. In contrast, respect for international actors, such as states, international organizations, movements, or individual decision makers, has been grossly under-researched.Footnote 6 Accordingly, for IR the most useful definition of ‘respect’ might be gained from philosophical, sociological, and psychological writings that dwell on the respect that is given or due to other persons.
Towards a working definition of social respect
Building on Hegel's early lectures on social philosophy, Axel Honneth has provided what amounts to the most elaborated theory of social recognition to date. Like Kant and Hegel, Honneth puts special emphasis on the importance of acknowledging other people's rights. People cherish their rights not only for the particular opportunities and material benefits that come with them but also for the symbolic significance of these rights as indicators of social standing, which is even more important. According to Honneth (Reference Honneth1996: Ch. 5), holding equal rights under the law means that we are socially accepted as fully autonomous persons. Conversely, being arbitrarily denied some of these rights can easily harm peoples' self-respect as it implies that they are merely second-class citizens. (In the most humiliating cases, people may even be stripped of all capacity for autonomous action, thereby being reduced to mere objects without human dignity.) Being disrespected in these ways causes frustration and anger on the part of the individual. If similarly experienced by a large enough number of citizens, patterns of disrespect bring about collective identities, turning individual victims of discrimination into social movements fighting for the recognition of their equal rights. Accordingly, such interactions can be seen as instances of antagonistic identity constructions (Wendt, Reference Wendt1999: 328, 333) where disappointed moral expectations result in a form of negative altercasting that enhances conflicting elements of collective identities (which had been constructed in prior interactions with different actors).
As Honneth points out, a similar dynamic operates in the realm of self-esteem. Individuals may be particularly interested in being respected as legal equals. Yet, they also want society to acknowledge their specific efforts for the common good. Being denied this kind of recognition is a frustrating experience that tends to undermine people's sense of self-worth. Again, groups struggling for general respect of their specific contributions or qualities will set (and keep) in motion a continuous process of evaluative disputes (Honneth, Reference Honneth1996: Ch. 5; see also Taylor, Reference Taylor1995). The ensuing ‘struggles for recognition’ may affect the dynamics of social transformation just as profoundly as contests fought solely for material benefits.Footnote 7
Although Honneth's concept of recognition provides a very useful starting point for establishing the contents and dynamics of respect-seeking behavior, it largely ignores the non-evaluative dimensions of human existence that people equally want to see respected. Thus, simply being ignored or overlooked, be it on purpose or as a result of mere negligence, is perhaps the most hurtful form of disrespect. Indeed, it may hurt us more than a negative evaluation.Footnote 8 Failing to catch other people's attention in situations where we can reasonably expect to be noticed implies that we ‘do not count’. When people ‘look through us’, the way colonial officials often did with local servants, they deal with us as mere objects without any social meaning. Implicitly, such officials treated their personnel as utterly unimportant or as mere automatons whose reactions were completely predictable, thereby denying their capacity for autonomous action (at least in the presence of their masters). Such behavior compromises core elements of human worth which define the very dignity of persons. It is perhaps the most humiliating denial of respect (Margalit, Reference Margalit1996: Ch. 6).
Closely related to disrespect for our presence are the various other forms of hurting our sense of importance. Often, people may take notice of our presence but without giving us as much attention as we deem appropriate. They might acknowledge that we take part in a conversation and they might even listen to our contributions. Yet, in their own statements, they may hardly refer to our ideas. By failing to address our statements they indicate that our opinions are unimportant and that we ‘do not matter’. Again, this kind of aloofness can hurt even more than receiving a lot of critical responses to our statements. It seems that people want to feel important; they want to experience themselves as influencing their social or physical environment (Lachman and Firth, Reference Lachman and Firth2004). They cherish a sense of control even if others dislike their particular actions. Even adults sometimes act as enfant terribles when they sense a lack of influence or attention.
Finally, respect can also entail giving adequate consideration to other actors’ needs (Sennett, Reference Sennett2004: Ch. 2). Even when there is no clear obligation to help or support other groups or persons, simply ignoring their basic physical needs not only diminishes their welfare but also hurts their status as valuable actors who ‘count’.
For a working definition of social respect, we may thus conclude that respect is an attitude we expect others to show by the way they treat us. Because we cannot read other people's minds, respect has to manifest itself in behavior towards us. When striving for respect, actors seek adequate consideration of their
• physical presence,
• social importance,
• ideas and values,
• physical needs and interests,
• achievements, efforts, qualities and virtues, and
• rights.Footnote 9
While giving full respect for the ideas and needs of others does not call for their active endorsement (but only for taking them seriously in debates and decision making), with regard to the last two dimensions ‘adequate consideration’ requires both taking them into account as important ‘facts’ and accepting them as authentic. Thus, even when somebody does not actively support my needs he can still fully respect me in this dimension by taking these needs into account. His attitude amounts to disrespect only if I also feel entitled to his support, that is, if he seems to ignore a relevant right.
Identifying respect and disrespect
As will become clear below, the crucial term in this definition is ‘adequate’, since those who seek respect and those who are supposed to grant it may profoundly disagree as to the level of adequacy. This gap may result from mere misunderstandings, from lack of information or from conspicuous differences of opinion. No matter what the particular cause, a perceived lack of respect can easily thwart cooperation and bring about intense conflict (see ‘Respect and international cooperation’ section). Therefore, by provoking anger and resistance an act of disrespect is usually much more conspicuous than respectful behavior.
Obviously then, the identification and measurement of (dis)respect cannot be guided by universal and objective criteria alone. Instead, such criteria must be tailored to the case at hand, that is they have to focus on an actor's subjective expectations and understandings, both of which are strongly affected by cultural settings. While sometimes an objective observer may be able to determine an actor's specific identity and status needs on the basis of official texts and other forms of self-representation (Abdelal et al., Reference Abdelal, Herrerra, Johnston and McDermott2009), the degree to which such expectations are met by interaction partners fundamentally depends on that actor's interpretation of its partners’ behavior. Therefore, the most conspicuous indications of disrespect would be verbal complaints by decision makers about the way they (or their states and nations) are treated by foreign officials.Footnote 10 To assess the authenticity of such claims and the actual degree of disrespect experienced by executives, researchers can also look at ensuing decision-making processes for circumstantial evidence. A strong indicator for anger and other types of emotional arousal would be quick and premature decisions taken with little attention to material risks or consequences, missing information, or contradictory data (Rosen, Reference Rosen2005: 55). The level of perceived disrespect could also be gauged by the extent to which normative claims and rationalizations, such as the categorical insistence on legitimate rights or status claims, marginalize an actor's strategic calculations concerning the possible material consequences of various options. Finally, the specific object of disrespect can provide an important hint: Ceteris paribus disregard for an actor's achievements, views, faculties, or merits is to be considered a milder form of disrespect than inadequate consideration for its overall importance and rights.
Apparently, this approach to gauge experiences of disrespect is less useful for detecting and measuring the experience of (positive) respect. Of course, public officials may sometimes articulate their agreement with the way their nation and its representatives are treated – especially in more private settings. Or they may point out the absence of status disagreements. In general, however, actors are less prone to comment on a kind of treatment they feel entitled to. In this case, the experienced behavior is simply seen as ‘normal’. Accordingly, actors would feel less need to express their satisfaction. In principle, respect might thus be detected by the very absence of both complaints about disrespect and emotional styles of decision making. However, this method would be burdened by the well-known problems of proving negatives. A more practical approach to identify the experience of (positive) respect and to assess its level and impact would therefore focus on respectful behavior that corrects previous demonstrations of disrespect – for instance, when state representatives meet foreign demands for repeated and close consultations, for high-level meetings, for relinquishing alleged double standards, for more voting rights in international institutions, or for publicly acknowledging a country's contribution to a common cause. In those instances, it also seems far more likely that respected actors would voice their interpretation of latest changes in their interaction partner's attitude. When doing so, they will often put these changes into a larger symbolic context, thereby providing hints whether they now feel fully respected or still expect some further changes in another dimension of respect. Moreover, to gauge the experienced increase of respect resulting from such a change, an analyst could draw upon the previous level of disrespect assessed according to the approach outlined above. This might be particularly useful to investigate the short-term dynamic effects of respectful behavior as opposed to long-term level effects (see section ‘Disrespect, resistance, and conflict’). In fact, the Obama administration's wide-spread efforts to correct America's image as an arrogant nation oblivious to foreign interests (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2005: 23), could provide useful material for researching such effects in various bilateral relationships.
‘Respect’ and related concepts
Obviously, this understanding of respect reveals many similarities and conformities with related concepts, such as ‘esteem’, ‘prestige’, ‘status’, ‘dignity’, and ‘honor’. Given the inherent vagueness of the term ‘respect’ itself, it is essential to discuss these other concepts in order to prevent some unnecessary confusion.
First of all, ‘respect’ needs to be differentiated from various forms of esteem, such as love and adoration, which can go far beyond an adequate consideration of some particular qualities based on normative expectations. Hence, most of us accept that it is entirely up to other people if they admire, love, or adore us. By contrast, we feel that others actually ‘owe’ us respect. When we subjectively meet relevant standards of achievements, virtues, etc., it must be granted to avoid ‘inadequate consideration’ (Dillon, Reference Dillon2007a: 203). Otherwise, we feel discriminated vis-à-vis similar people who get more positive attention.
This difference between respect and other forms of esteem has two crucial implications: on one hand, it makes clear that, as far as respect is the sole motivation, the subjective aspiration does not exceed the levels we deem appropriate in light of widely accepted standards of estimation. On the other hand, when being denied the level of esteem we think we truly deserve, we feel far more frustrated and annoyed than in cases where we would just appreciate some more admiration. This is one of the reasons why we often feel entitled to openly ‘demand’ respect, whereas it can easily become self-defeating to frankly ask for a higher level of appreciation.Footnote 11
In politics, the most important form of esteem is usually called prestige. Put very simply, enjoying prestige means being widely accredited with having achieved valuable political ends or with having special abilities for achieving such ends.Footnote 12 Prestigious political actors thus are considered capable, important, and valuable (Markey, Reference Markey2000). Obviously, this comes close to a common use of the term ‘respect’, for instance when we say of a legislator that ‘she enjoys the respect of her colleagues in the Senate’. However, this is actually a statement about the senator's prestige or reputation as a capable politician, for we cannot know if she really deems the consideration of her achievements to be adequate. While she may get a lot of credit for her legislative record, she may think nevertheless that, based on widely applied criteria, she ought to get a lot more.
Honor is another concept that partially overlaps with the meaning of ‘respect’. Honor refers to an actor's public reputation based on her public compliance with the code of a particular status group. Typically it entails norms mandating honesty, courage, calm composure, or generosity (Berger, Reference Berger1970; Offer, Reference Offer1995; Lebow, Reference Lebow2008: Ch. 2). The experience of (dis)respect, by contrast, largely depends on the relationship between others’ behavior and one's own subjective expectations, in particular to one's own standards of social worth and importance. Honor is based on the opinion of the broader social environment; it is not a specific attitude that a particular actor is supposed to display in a specific social encounter. In contrast, the experience of respect and disrespect intrinsically depends on an actor's subjective sense of her self-worth and -importance. Accordingly, in some instances an actor may not feel disrespected even though somebody has tarnished her honor (or reputation or prestige): for instance, if she is well aware of the fact that the honor she publicly enjoyed was actually based on fraud or cover-up.
Like ‘respect’ the concept of dignity appears to be more in line with the social realities of highly individualistic and thus very heterogeneous societies. ‘Dignity’ delineates the core area of human worthiness as inter-subjectively defined by the prevailing culture. Usually, a person's dignity rests on its recognition as an autonomous agent with a moral worth of its own (Dillon, Reference Dillon2007a: 207, Reference Dillon2007b; Kelman, Reference Kelman1977: 531). As the abstract core of human worth, dignity is not related to specific individual traits, characteristics, or biographies that actors also want to see recognized. Therefore, it is not really part of a specific identity but rather the foundation for acquiring one. Thus, even though everyone seeks respect for this inner core of self-worth, uncompromised dignity falls short of full respect.Footnote 13 However, its violation is the most hurtful form of disrespect: humiliation (Saurette, Reference Saurette2005: 9). For nation states, this culturally defined core currently consists of their rights to sovereignty, to territorial integrity, and to freedom of development (Kelman, Reference Kelman1997: 187; Simpson, Reference Simpson2004: 54). National dignity thus largely coincides with a nation-state's material interest in security.Footnote 14
To sum up, when actors expect respectful behavior they demand the level of consideration they feel entitled to on the basis of prevailing social norms. Being respected, therefore, is experienced as a dutiful social affirmation of one's subjective sense of importance and worth in relation to wider society. Disrespect, on the other hand, is always seen as an unjustifiable denial of social rank, as a symbolic attack on an actor's self-perceived place in and meaning for society. It thus may even be regarded as desecration of a ‘sacred’ self-image that an actor seeks to uphold by playing the role of her own priest (Goffman, Reference Goffman1967: 95). Not surprisingly then, psychological research has clearly established that both respect and disrespect can have profound consequences for the way a (dis)respected actor responds to her social environment.
From interpersonal to international respect
Obviously, the greater complexity and thinner interaction density on the international level complicates using insights from social psychology and social philosophy for IR purposes. Large groups and institutional actors need not react to respect or disrespect in the same manner as individuals.Footnote 15 While states may often act like persons, they have neither conscience nor feelings (Neumann, Reference Neumann2004; Wendt, Reference Wendt2004; Wight, Reference Wight2004). Moreover, psychological studies on the impact of (dis)respect tend to operationalize this concept in a more narrow way. These are important caveats one should bear in mind before making any rash predictions concerning state reactions to (dis)respect. However, as will become clear below, they hardly rule out making circumspect use of psychological findings for generating hypotheses concerning international contexts.
First of all, it should be taken into account that the concept of respect, as it is widely used in social psychology, does not perfectly match the concept of respect as it was defined above. Thus, the survey questions mostly used in research on procedural justice primarily focus on others’ appreciation of one's group membership and on their respect for one's ideas and work contributions, while seldom directly addressing respect for a person's rights, personal importance, and needs. Although for leading researchers the subjective experience of ‘[r]espect reflects judgements about one's status within the group’ (Tyler and Blader, Reference Tyler and Blader2001: 211), each particular survey and experiment captures just parts of the status dimensions outlined in the preceding section.Footnote 16 Still, this does not invalidate the explicit suggestion of these social psychologists (Tyler and Blader, Reference Tyler and Blader2000: 198) to make use of these insights and findings in an IR context. Nor does it prevent their application for my specific project. There is sufficient overlap between the respect concept developed by social psychologists and the more encompassing one, which, based on the philosophical literature, I propose here for international interactions. In particular, both of them clearly focus on the self-evaluative and normative implications persons draw from other peoples’ behavior. Thus, the psychological research on respect also addresses the subjective status effects of interactions that are essential for the discussion here.
Second, most of the research on the effects of respect has largely focused on interactions within small groups. So far, there are extremely few psychological studies on the impact of respectful behavior across group boundaries, let alone on the effects on interactions between different bureaucratic communities or nations. It stands to reason that, in the latter condition, the experience of respect should be a weaker cause for cooperative behavior. Interacting groups often lack a common identity that otherwise serves the self-esteem aspirations of the group's members. Thus, respectful behavior on the part of out-group members might be comparatively less valued for its positive identity implications (Smith et al., Reference Smith, Tyler and Huo2003: 160, 170). This ‘discount effect’ presumably is even stronger when groups with very different cultural backgrounds interact (Smith et al., Reference Smith, Tyler, Huo, Ortiz and Lind1998: 471 with further references). In this case, due to contrasting values and standpoints the experience of respect should be less valued for the information it provides for personal (or group) self-assessment (Turner et al., Reference Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher and Wetherell1987: Ch. 4; Johnston, Reference Johnston2008: 9, 156). On the international level, therefore, reactions to respect or disrespect often will be less direct, spontaneous, and predetermined than in personal interactions (Reference WolfWolf, 2011).
Moreover, one might seriously question if large groups or organizations can experience emotions (or their effects) in patterns established for face-to-face interactions. True, recent advances in Intergroup Emotions Theory (IET) have convincingly demonstrated that social groups, including large ones such as whole nations, may often experience common moods and emotions: Depending on the salience of group membership and the level of personal identification, physically remote individuals may feel exactly the same emotions as group members personally engaged in cross-group interactions (Mackie et al., Reference Mackie, Smith and Ray2008; Rydell et al., Reference Rydell, Mackie, Maitner, Claypool, Ryan and Smith2008). Yet, little is known about the impact of individual emotions on group processes (Kelly and Spoor, Reference Kelly and Spoor2006: 313). No doubt, complex institutions mediate such effects. However, they will hardly neutralize them completely, but may even amplify them at times. As Hymans (Reference Hymans2010: 462) has aptly put it: ‘states are not gigantic calculating machines; they are hierarchically organized groups of emotional people’.
These caveats notwithstanding then, many international reactions to respect or disrespect may be just as strong or even stronger than responses on the interpersonal level, depending on the intensity with which people identify with their nations, states and their leaders – and leaders with their states or nations (Bloom, Reference Bloom1990: 38, 81; Stern, Reference Stern1995; Horowitz, Reference Horowitz2000: 143–147, 181, 226; Johnston, Reference Johnston2008: 95–99). This seems particularly true with regard to collective experiences of disrespect. Norms demanding loyalty to the group can gravely inhibit benevolent interpretations of an out-group's acts (Kelman, Reference Kelman2008: 175–177), thereby making collectives sometimes even more touchy about alleged insults than individuals. The history of nationalism is full of vivid examples. Evidently, a lot depends on how influential individuals frame the public interpretation of foreign behavior (Bloom, Reference Bloom1990: Ch. 4). Research on nationalism has repeatedly demonstrated that endangered oligarchies try to steer public emotions towards hatred for foreigners (Van Evera, Reference Van Evera1994: 30–33; Snyder, Reference Snyder2000: Ch. 2; Kelman, Reference Kelman2008: 176). Moreover, even when threatened elites refrain from pouring oil into the fire, they need to accommodate ‘pressure from the street’ – just as democratic decision makers must systematically take into account status views of their electorates (Reference HonnethHonneth, 2011). On top of this, international interactions involve many face-to-face encounters in which many scholarly findings on small groups are directly applicable (Kelman, Reference Kelman1965: 566). Often, political leaders experience hostile foreign moves as if they were meant as personal affronts (Steinberg, Reference Steinberg1996) and will be inclined to react accordingly.Footnote 17 Ultimately, it is for empirical research to determine how these mechanisms interact and to what extent and under what circumstances international behavior mirrors findings in psychology.
The focus of this article is on the impact of (dis)respect between small groups of key decision makers that represent interacting nation states, for it is on this level that all the various effects of (dis)respect should come to the fore. This applies first and foremost to the profound emotional consequences such experiences, particularly disrespect, may have on foreign policy decision-making.Footnote 18 Unlike ordinary citizens, key decision makers are exposed to all causal pathways where (dis)respect can play a role:
1. they can experience personal (dis)respect in face-to-face interactions with foreign leaders,
2. they can feel (dis)respected as official representatives of their states or nations (or both),
3. they can feel disrespected in their roles as (ordinary) citizens or nationals, and
4. they may see some political advantages in acting upon (dis)respect experienced only by influential domestic groups or by the ‘masses’ on the street.
Obviously, these pathways will often intersect and interconnect. There can be various reinforcing and cross-cutting effects which cannot be detailed here (for a more extensive discussion see Reference WolfWolf, 2011). For the moment, it seems safe to assume (a) that most leaders, in reacting to perceived (dis)respect, will not make a big distinction between the first three causal pathways and (b) that experiences of (dis)respect will have a greater impact
• the more widely they are shared (by both leaders and domestic groups),
• the less formalized foreign policy decision-making is,
• the weaker the domestic political position of leaders is, and
• the more attached a nation is to collectivist norms and honor codes which mandate the citizens’ loyal efforts to uphold the national image.
When the latter three conditions prevail, political leaders will be especially inclined to act upon emotional domestic complaints about alleged acts of disrespect. Under such circumstances, ‘pressure from below’ could well force a more confrontational stance on decision makers which personally do not sense any misrecognition of their nation's international status.Footnote 19
Respect and international cooperation
Prior experience of respect increases the chances of cooperative behavior. This causal relation has repeatedly been established by social psychologists for small groups interacting in the workplace. As will be shown below, there are also good reasons for expecting a positive link between respect and international cooperation (for a similar claim see Larson and Shevchenko, Reference Larson and Shevchenko2010). Specifically, the experience of respect should promote mutual trust as well as solidarity and should facilitate bargaining over the distribution of common gains. Perhaps most important, mutual respect seems vital for creating the conditions conducive to a deliberative exchange of ideas over the best definition and solution to a shared problem.
Research by social psychologists clearly shows that the experience of respect promotes cooperative behavior. Both laboratory experiments and surveys of people's experiences at the workplace demonstrate significant effects of respect on pro-social behavior. When people feel respected by fellow group members for their work and ideas, when they think they are accepted as group members, they demonstrate greater compliance with work norms, meet performance expectations to a greater extent, and show greater willingness to engage in extra work on behalf of the group. Moreover, respected employees also identify more strongly with their work group, which further promotes their pro-social activities. In fact, taken together with personal pride in the group, respect by fellow group members has a far greater impact on these kinds of pro-social behaviors than the amount of resources a group provides to its members (also Doosje et al., Reference Doosje, Ellemers and Spears1999; Tyler and Blader, Reference Tyler and Blader2000, Reference Tyler and Blader2001; Mercer LLC, 2008a: 14, 2008b). In line with expectations derived from procedural justice research, survey studies demonstrate that the subjective feeling of respect is strongly influenced by perceptions of fair and polite treatment, which people take as an indication of high personal status within their group. Institutionalized voice opportunities were particularly important in this regard (Tyler and Blader, Reference Tyler and Blader2000: 136, 171, 178). Not surprisingly then, respected individuals report significantly higher commitment to the success of their groups (Tyler and Blader, Reference Tyler and Blader2000). In the Mercer study (Mercer LLC, 2008a), employees from 22 countries named ‘being treated with respect’ as the factor that had by far the greatest impact on their engagement for their company. These survey results have been confirmed by laboratory experiments that simulated problematic social situations. When confronted with a public goods dilemma, students who felt respected by their group showed greater willingness to forego personal gain in favor of collective interests (De Cremer, Reference De Cremer2002). Findings in social psychology thus clearly demonstrate that respectful actions and procedures promote cooperative attitudes and activities within a given group.
In addition to the recent advances in IET mentioned above, there are also specific findings that make it plausible that the pro-social effects of respect shown within groups may also be anticipated for interaction between groups. Research on stereotyping between different groups has shown that mutual agreement on the nature and valuation of respective group features affects the quality of intergroup relations: ‘[M]utual respect for the consensually shared stereotypes of each group’ promotes intergroup harmony, while a ‘mismatch between our self-stereotypes and the out-group's stereotypes about our group, or a mismatch in the perceived valence of the groups’ attributes can lead to intergroup conflict’ (Wright and Taylor, Reference Wright and Taylor2003: 439). Moreover, research on subgroups sharing a common, if weaker, superordinate identity indicates that respect for those subgroups can significantly affect their members’ affective relation with the more encompassing group (Huo and Molina, Reference Huo and Molina2006: 371; see also Smith et al., Reference Smith, Tyler and Huo2003: 167–170). What is more, once a weak sense of common identity has evolved, members of this new group become even more sensitive to positive signals received from the group. Indeed, respect shown by other group members increases one's sense of belonging (Hogg and Abrams, Reference Hogg and Abrams2003: 417), which, in turn, should make one yet more receptive to the pro-social effects of further instances of respectful behavior.Footnote 20 Therefore, it appears rather plausible that respect can also promote transnational identification and thus may help to alleviate not only local but also international collective action problems (Wendt, Reference Wendt1994). Overall, it seems that self-enhancement effects reported by social psychologists should also operate in various cross-border contexts.
There are also more IR-specific considerations that suggest that different forms of respect can help to overcome the classic problems of international cooperation extensively discussed in the discipline. Respect can mitigate the harmful effects of mistrust, of differences over the distributions of gains, of the quest for autarchy, and of disagreements over the assessment of shared problems. In the first place, respect helps to generate and maintain higher levels of trust (Kelman, Reference Kelman2005). This becomes evident once we think of the implications of comprehensive respect. As defined here, adequate respect for another actor includes proper consideration of the latter's importance, needs, merits, and rights (including privileges due to some special status). Feeling respected in all these dimensions provides important information on both the type of the current interaction partner and the social relation that one shares with it (Kelman, Reference Kelman2007: 73–78, Reference Kelman2008: 174). Thus, if an interaction partner has respected one's rights over an extended period of time this should decrease the likelihood of its future defection, as continued compliance with cooperative norms tends to promote their domestic internalization via bureaucratic habitualization or identity transformation (Keohane, Reference Keohane1984: 111–116; Checkel, Reference Checkel2005; Johnston, Reference Johnston2008: 49–51). Respect that has been shown for another actor's needs also tends to diminish the risk of a collapse of cooperation. Past awareness of the partner's interests indicates a thorough knowledge of that actor's stakes in the cooperative endeavor. This should lessen the potential for underestimating the partner's reaction to defective moves and thereby should reduce the risk of careless unilateral moves (Kelman, Reference Kelman2005: 649).
Confirming another actor's self-attributed importance, faculties, or merits also signals important information that tends to further trust on the part of the respected actor. Treating an actor in this way indicates that one basically shares her positive self-concept. Apparently, one esteems this actor almost as much as she does herself. This has two consequences for compliance with cooperative norms: First, it signals that cheating this partner would carry a higher price tag in terms of self-esteem. After all, all kinds of actors tend to especially care for the approval of those they like best (Turner et al., Reference Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher and Wetherell1987: Ch. 4; Druckman, Reference Druckman1994: 60–62). Second, an actor that is highly esteemed by oneself may be assumed to enjoy considerable prestige in the eyes of third actors belonging to a common peer group. In this case, a cooperative association with the highly esteemed actor will also enhance one's prestige among those other actors (Brennan and Pettit, Reference Brennan and Pettit2004: Ch. 3). This should further enhance the interest in continued collaboration. Finally, as trust cannot be reduced to a calculation of one's partner's incentives but also must be seen as ‘an emotional belief’ concerning the overall nature of a social relationship (Mercer, Reference Mercer2005: 95–97, Reference Mercer2010), a history of respectful interaction will further enhance habitual confidence in the partner's commitment to pro-social behavior. After all, when somebody continually treats us the way we deem appropriate, she also signals her firm understanding of and dedication to pertinent social norms (Kelman, Reference Kelman1996). True, depending on circumstances, each of these mechanisms can be rather weak. Taken together, however, they may well have a significant effect on trust in the cooperative intention of one's partner.
This greater trust can in turn alleviate two other impediments to collaboration: relative gains concerns and the desire for autarchy. The latter is often due to fears that commercial partners could make political use of one's dependence on some good or commodity. Under anarchy, this concern may sometimes induce even cost-conscious actors to forego the economic advantages of the international division of labor (Carr, Reference Carr1946: 120–124; Waltz, Reference Waltz1979: 106; Mearsheimer, Reference Mearsheimer2001). Greater trust among partners should thus make them more willing to tolerate vulnerability for the sake of efficiency. Basically, the same reasoning also applies to relative gain concerns, which also often result from fears that a partner may exploit its powerful position, in this case by transferring its bigger gains from cooperation into greater power resources, which he might then use against his erstwhile partners (Waltz, Reference Waltz1979: 105; Grieco, Reference Grieco1990; Mearsheimer, Reference Mearsheimer2001: 52). Again, enhanced confidence in the cooperative intentions of the partner would directly affect the source of this problem.
Mutual respect should also make partners less concerned about the status effects that might result from a particular distribution of benefits. Frequently actors do appreciate material rewards not only for the material benefits that come with them, but also as symbols of their rank. In other words, they consider the distribution of material goods as a ‘test’ of their social standing (Reference HonnethHonneth, 2011; Ross, Reference Ross2001: 163). If, however, mutual respect implies mutual acceptance of each others’ status, cooperative partners can more often focus on the material gains for their own sake, that is, on absolute gains. Bargaining should thus become easier, as one motive for insisting on a bigger share of the spoils loses importance (Snidal, Reference Snidal1991). In some cases, a pre-existing consensus on relative status may even suggest an implicit formula for the division of resources or other benefits. For instance, the distribution of votes, high-level positions, or other kinds of privileges in international organizations may be facilitated by mutual acceptance of the states’ international status.Footnote 21
Finally, mutual respect is also vital for deliberative problem solving in that it facilitates mutual learning and persuasion and thus tends to make cooperative agreements both more attractive and more legitimate (Kelman, Reference Kelman1996: 106; Conover and Searing, Reference Conover and Searing2005; Goodin, Reference Goodin2005; Lalljee et al., Reference Lalljee, Laham and Tam2007: 453, 461). This applies above all to situations where a small number of officials or experts debate the nature of a common problem and the best ways to tackle it. In such settings, successful persuasion by the rational force of the better argument can only work when the persuadee is convinced that (a) he had a proper chance to voice all his needs and arguments and that (b) these points were seriously considered by the persuaders. Otherwise, the persuadee can hardly be assured that the persuader's views really are more accurate. Moreover, mutual respect for importance, standpoints, values, and achievements is crucial for avoiding status conflicts in deliberative debates. As mutually accepted status difference facilitates persuasive efforts by the higher ranking actor (Chaiken et al., Reference Chaiken, Wood and Eagly1996: 726) and while mutually agreed status equality promotes mutual understanding (Hogg and Abrams, Reference Hogg and Abrams2003: 420), domineering behavior and disagreements on relative status easily poison the open exchange of ideas (see Kelman, Reference Kelman1965: 570; Risse, Reference Risse2000: 10, 17; Deitelhoff and Müller, Reference Deitelhoff and Müller2005: 169–173; also Wright and Taylor, Reference Wright and Taylor2003: 438, 447). In fact, usually ‘inter-group relations are characterized by a struggle over status and prestige’ (Hogg and Abrams, Reference Hogg and Abrams2003: 422) and actual intergroup encounters, especially intergroup bargaining, further accentuate competitiveness (Hogg, Reference Hogg2001: 193). Hence, it requires a high level of mutual respect to cleanse an argumentative exchange from such rivalry. Once respect becomes questionable, competitive group identities readily reassert themselves (Kelman, Reference Kelman2007: 78–80). As a result, factual issues and disagreements will also assume a prestige dimension, so that each ‘side’ is tempted to stick to its points ‘as a matter of principle’ in order to defend the group's rank. Moreover, as the debate (again) becomes a competition over status this will further stimulate group salience and thus will also consolidate group identities. Arrogant or condescending treatment, in particular, tends to undermine personal self-confidence, thereby increasing both one's attachment to the in-group and one's dependence on the affirmation it can provide. This, in turn, stimulates stereotyping, polarization, and greater trust in the in-group's views. As a consequence, confidence in the in-group's value will rise. Yet, this comes at the price of blocking the unbiased appreciation of out-group arguments. Finally, the experience of arrogance or other forms of disrespect may further inhibit learning by provoking sheer anger which will further compromise rational reflection (McDermott, Reference McDermott2004a: 696; Huddy et al., Reference Huddy, Feldman and Cassese2007; Geva and Sirin, Reference Geva and Sirin2008). For all these reasons, mutual respect is a sine qua non for an open exchange of ideas required for jointly identifying the most efficient solution for a common problem. Therefore, it plays a crucial role in the search for more beneficial, more legitimate, and thus also more durable agreements.
These findings and insights can be summed up by the following propositions on the link between past experiences of respect and future cooperation:
Hypotheses on respect and cooperation:
H1: The stronger the respect between two actors, especially for their rights and individual needs, the less they will worry about their partners’ possible defection.
H2: The stronger the respect between two actors, especially for their rights and individual needs, the less they will worry about relative gains or about compromising their autarchy through greater dependence.
H3: The stronger the respect between two actors, the easier the parties will agree on the distribution of cooperative gains.
H4: The stronger the respect between two actors, especially their respect for each other's achievements, faculties, and importance, the easier they will arrive at a common definition and solution for a problem at hand.
Disrespect, resistance, and conflict
Disrespectful behavior causes resistance and thus tends to intensify conflict. Forceful reactions to contempt or outright humiliation are the most powerful indicators of the social importance of respect. Just as with oxygen, being denied respect suddenly brings to the fore how vital the ‘stuff’ actually is. Thus, the majority of disrespected people and collective actors almost immediately respond with efforts to redress the situation. Depending on the subjective severity of the transgression (and the means at hand), those reactions range from verbal protest or defection from ongoing cooperation to violent retribution. At least three intertwined mechanisms contribute to these responses: the need to protect one's public image, the desire to maintain self-esteem and self-respect, and the profound emotional effects of disrespect that exacerbate both negative perceptions and risk-taking.
Concern for one's public image obviously stimulates open resistance against acts of disrespect. Open denial of respect can severely harm an actor's reputation as a resolute defender of her interests. Therefore, condoning an open violation of her rights or needs may compromise an actor's capability to deter or compel in some future crisis (Offer, Reference Offer1995; Gould, Reference Gould2003: Ch. 2). Hence, it seems rational to forcefully react to such provocations (a) the more obvious they are, (b) the wider the audience is, and (c) the more likely it seems that the offended actor will soon get involved in similar crises where future opponents could draw analogies from current conflict behavior.Footnote 22 A second (and often related) motive for public resistance is the interest in protecting one's soft power. In contrast to the concern for a tough reputation, this motive can also be affected by disrespect for achievements, standpoints, and faculties. Just as with a disregard for one's rights, having these valued features overlooked or ridiculed can weaken an actor's overall prestige and thus can diminish its chances for influencing all kinds of debates and negotiations (Nye, Reference Nye2004; Johnston, Reference Johnston2008: 83).
Additional motives for such resistance, which evade rationalist theories, stem from actors’ needs to uphold their self-esteem and self-respect in the social arena. Individuals and groups also look to the symbolic value of public recognition (Harré, Reference Harré1979; Ringmar, Reference Ringmar1996: Ch. 3; Horowitz, Reference Horowitz2000: Ch. 4–5; Lebow, Reference Lebow2008: Ch. 2). Being denied social confirmation of one's rights, faculties, or merits usually is seen as an undeserved discrimination vis-à-vis those who are recognized in these respects for reasons which could also be applied to oneself. As such, this kind of disrespect can threaten an actor's self-esteem in at least two ways: on one hand, it can amount to a denial of the social value of some specific feature which is of central importance to a group's identity. For instance, playing down some of its historic achievements or denigrating one of its essential cultural values can put the very foundation of the group's self-esteem into question (Taylor, Reference Taylor1995; Honneth, Reference Honneth1996: Ch. 5). As long as the group tolerates this affront it cannot be sure of the specific value it has for its social environment. To reassert its self-ascribed status, the group must resist this stance by engaging in a redefinition of historic memory or standards of evaluation. For instance, it can apply some broader cultural standards in order to convince the wider audience that an underestimated effort or achievement actually meets the superordinate criteria from which more specific criteria follow. If it prevails in this dispute it has also succeeded in reassuring itself of the value of its defining characteristics. Yet, even during such struggles for status recognition the group can already achieve part of its symbolic aims: the mere fact that the group starts an open fight for the recognition of its special features makes a public point concerning the great value it attaches to those features. It clearly demonstrates that it deems these features so important that it will not shrink from costly fights to defend their worth. Thus, in effect, by the very act of fighting the group partly pre-establishes the very public recognition it is still fighting for (Honneth, Reference Honneth1996: Ch. 8). In that sense, the group may value the struggle in its own right.
On the other hand, disrespect can also result from a refusal to acknowledge a group's possession of a feature whose value is commonly accepted. For instance, an actor may fail to acknowledge a group's economic prowess or may deny it the rights usually enjoyed by this type of group. In this case, the sufferance of undeserved status discrimination is even more obvious. Accordingly, this form of disrespectful behavior arouses an even stronger sense of injustice. It directly attacks an actor's status as an equal, for it denies this actor the recognition that other actors with the same features routinely receive. Practically, this kind of disrespect amounts to the statement: ‘Although you may share the criterion in question with xyz, I do not give you the same amount of credit, simply because you are not xyz but abc’. This is a direct attack on an actor's status and thus can hardly be condoned without profoundly hurting one's self-respect. Once again, fighting for the equal rights that a group claims may come to be seen as an end in itself, for to some extent the mere act of fighting already establishes greater social equality, as it tends to force the transgressor to take that group seriously as an opponent that ‘matters’.
Severe instances of humiliation can be considered an extreme variant of this type of arbitrary discrimination and thus tend to evoke the strongest reactions (Saurette, Reference Saurette2006: 507). As outlined above, humiliation is an extreme form of denigration in as much as it strips an actor of its status as an autonomous actor with some intrinsic worth of its own. Often, humiliation is meant to reduce actors to mere objects with little or no control over their own fate. It thus challenges not only some specific rights or merits, but also calls into question an actor's dignity, that is, its very quality as a subject of rights or moral qualities. In effect, humiliation often amounts to a statement that somebody is not worthy of having any rights or moral qualities. Accordingly, humiliation is the most blatant attack on an actor's self-respect (Margalit, Reference Margalit1996; Lindner, Reference Lindner2006; Fattah and Fierke, Reference Fattah and Fierke2009). It leaves little choice between putting up a fight and publicly giving up one's claim for actor status.Footnote 23
However, resistance to open acts of disrespect may also be motivated by the fact that a strong reaction can directly reconfirm the victim's self-esteem and self-respect, that is, regardless of any observers’ perceptions, judgements, or reactions. This becomes clear by looking at the implicit categorization effects of such interactions.Footnote 24 By initiating an open act of disrespect a transgressor signals that he considers its victim as the kind of actor ‘that can be dealt with in this way’. Often, this may be hurtful in itself. Still, the insult becomes even more cutting if the victim fails to respond, for if it does not even try to resist it actually confirms the transgressor's judgment that the victim really is the kind of actor that can be dealt with in this way (Miller, Reference Miller2001: 540–542 with further references). Practically, by not responding the victim leaves the definition of its social type to the perpetrator (Ringmar, Reference Ringmar1996: 80–83). It effectively consents to its classification as a member of a lower status group. Even in situations without any significant audience, not responding to such acts entails considerable psychic discomfort, especially in humiliating encounters. If, however, the victim responds, the mere act itself implies a successful re-categorization. Once more, resistance seems to be worthwhile just because of its expressive quality. This highlights yet again that actors experience disrespect as a reprehensible instance of altercasting that contradicts aspects of their self-image they hold as non-negotiable.Footnote 25
Finally, the emotional reaction to disrespect is likely to further intensify the urge for open resistance. The emotional path to a forceful retribution is perhaps the easiest to understand. Everybody has experienced strong emotional reactions after having been subjected to other peoples’ contempt. Anger and a painful sense of frustration seem to be the most natural effects of such encounters (Turner and Stets, Reference Turner and Stets2006: 35).Footnote 26 In fact, the link between insult and anger is apparently so strong that people routinely take anger as an indication of insult, when they try to make sense of their own behavior (Miller, Reference Miller2001: 533; Solomon, Reference Solomon2006: 18). Outright humiliation often has the same effect. In both cases, ‘getting even’ with the offender may become an instant desire (Liberman, Reference Liberman2006; Löwenheim and Heimann, Reference Löwenheim and Heimann2008).Footnote 27 Less offensive demonstrations of disrespect tend to provoke less aggressive emotions (Miller, Reference Miller2001: 536). For instance, denying proper credit to a group's achievements will rarely incite collective rage. Still, if such inadequate consideration is experienced over a prolonged period of time it is most likely to stimulate intense feelings of frustration and of injustice.
All three emotions, but in particular anger, are well known to constrain information processing and to promote strong reactions against the disrespectful actor (Tyler and Blader, Reference Tyler and Blader2000: 112; Miller, Reference Miller2001: 532–536; Smith et al., Reference Smith, Tyler and Huo2003: 171; Van Kleef et al., Reference Van Kleef, van Dijk, Steinel, Harinck and van Beest2008). Experiments have demonstrated that anger leads to negatively biased perceptions, reduces the demand for information, shortens decision times, and consequently leads to more risk prone and more aggressive behavior (Lerner and Keltner, Reference Lerner and Keltner2000, Reference Lerner and Keltner2001; Geva and Skorick, Reference Geva and Skorick2006: 214–222; Isbell et al., Reference Isbell, Ottati and Burns2006: 65; Huddy et al., Reference Huddy, Feldman and Cassese2007; Geva and Sirin, Reference Geva and Sirin2008: 7; Van Kleef et al., Reference Van Kleef, van Dijk, Steinel, Harinck and van Beest2008).Footnote 28 The same effects can also be observed in inter-group relations when people categorize themselves as members of an offended group (Mackie et al., Reference Mackie, Smith and Ray2008; Rydell et al., Reference Rydell, Mackie, Maitner, Claypool, Ryan and Smith2008). While collective actors often may have institutionalized procedures mitigating these effects, by no means can such precautions fully neutralize the latters escalatory impact. The transatlantic row over Iraq provides many instructive examples (Gaffney, Reference Gaffney2004; Szabo, Reference Szabo2004). Indeed, identity-related emotions can be expected to have an even greater impact in transformative situations, because leaders naturally succumb to such emotions when they cannot calculate the material consequences of far-reaching decisions (Hymans, Reference Hymans2006: 16–18). Moreover, as pointed out above, even fully rational decision makers must respond to the emotional agitation of their constituents.
Both the fact that respect is not only sought for instrumental reasons, and the escalatory effects of emotional arousal, imply that in fighting disrespect international actors may go far beyond the escalation levels rationalist scholars would expect. Thus, the experience of disrespect may induce actors to bear much larger costs and risks in response to transgressions than they would be willing to incur for material considerations alone (Offer, Reference Offer1995; Varshney, Reference Varshney2003; Löwenheim and Heimann, Reference Löwenheim and Heimann2008: 692). This, in turn, can have three important consequences, which cannot be accounted for by rationalist explanations of conflict behavior. First, the experience of disrespect can lead to more intense reactions to a given transgression. In fact, it may even instigate a reaction where otherwise none would be anticipated (Larson and Shevchenko, Reference Larson and Shevchenko2010: 94). Second, such an experience can cause an actor to persist in its resistance over a surprisingly long period of time. Finally, and related to the first two effects, the experience of disrespect may bring about violent conflicts in cases where a rational calculation of material risks would rule out mutual escalation (Fearon, Reference Fearon1995). In fact, an act of disrespect could even turn a costly war into a positive-sum game if at least one of the combatants comes to the conclusion that resistance to disrespect in itself is valuable regardless of the military outcome. This may go a long way toward explaining the fact that even very weak states rarely react to aggression with immediate surrender. Instead, the great majority of these victims choose to fight against all odds.Footnote 29 A closer look at the respect dimension of social interaction could thus considerably enrich our understanding of military conflict. In fact, it might even help explain the origins and duration of wars which otherwise would remain mysterious (Fukuyama, Reference Fukuyama1992: 145, 255, 259; see also Welch, Reference Welch1995; Ringmar, Reference Ringmar1996; Lebow, Reference Lebow2008: 515–551; Lindemann, Reference Lindemann2010).
Whether evident resistance to disrespectful behavior actually succeeds in (re-) establishing respect in the eyes of others is an open question, the answer to which largely depends on the relation between challenge and response. In some cases of hateful humiliation even the most noble and courageous acts of resistance will not make the transgressor respect its victim. In general, however, the victim stands a good chance of success as long as it can tailor the precise quality of its response to the nature of the challenge. As mentioned, disrespect for an actor's importance may often be easily remedied by a mere act of resistance, which by itself forces the transgressor to take its victim seriously. However, even in this case, the victim needs to comply with norms of reasonableness as understood by the transgressor and the wider audience. An overly aggressive reaction might re-establish the victim as an important actor, yet, at the same time, such an unrestrained application of violence may earn it new disrespect for its immoral conduct. Gaining due recognition for one's rights, standpoints, special achievements, or faculties usually requires even more circumspect reactions. Such acts must not only stay within the bounds of proportionality, they also need to successfully appeal to normative or evaluative standards held by those whose respect is sought. They must also address the audience in a respectful manner! Otherwise, resistance will not bring the audience to re-evaluate the feature(s) that had been denied proper appreciation. To be effective a struggle for respect depends on careful consideration of prevailing social norms and standards of evaluation.Footnote 30
A number of hypotheses follow from the mechanisms just described. All of them presuppose that the (individual or collective) victim has come to the conclusions (a) that the behavior in question must be interpreted as an act of disrespect and (b) that the offending actor anticipated this interpretation. (The term ‘disrespectful behavior’, as it is used below, can relate to both disrespectful acts and mere denials of adequate consideration.)
Hypotheses on disrespect and conflict:
H5: Disrespectful behavior will incite or intensify resistance to the transgressor (ranging from verbal protests to a halt to cooperative efforts to violent forms of retribution).
H6: The wider the relevant audience that witnessed a provocative act, the less likely the victim is to give in before it has achieved effective rehabilitation.
H7: Disrespectful behavior that apparently was consciously tailored to come across as such will incite more forceful reactions than behavior of actors, which apparently did not care about the symbolic connotations of their behavior.
H8: Disrespect for an actor's achievements, standpoints, faculties, or merits will lead to protest reactions that are less forceful and more norm-governed than reactions to disrespect for an actor's overall importance or rights.
H9: The stronger the symbolic link between the disrespectful behavior and essential elements of the victim's status concept, the more forceful and the more disregarding of material costs the reaction will be.
H10: The more humiliating the act of disrespect (that is the more directly it is targeted against the victim's quality as an autonomously acting moral entity), the more forceful and reckless of both material costs and social norms the reaction will be.
Implications for future research
An analysis of all the likely effects of (dis)respect in international relations provokes the obvious question: if respect and disrespect affect interactions in so many ways, why have IR scholars neglected them for so many years? First, it hardly needs elaboration that, most of the time, being respected concerning one's rights, values, achievements, faculties, and social importance is also useful in material terms. In this way, self-evaluative motives for respect-seeking behavior may simply ‘hide’ behind conspicuous material interests. Hence, in a given case it may be very hard to distinguish between self-evaluative and material incentives.Footnote 31 Second, the greater progress of that other social science, economics, induced political scientists to emulate the methods and ontology of their sister discipline (Brennan and Pettit, Reference Brennan and Pettit2004; Mercer, Reference Mercer2005), and thus to privilege material incentives and expected utility models over identity needs and social meaning. Thus, in case of doubt, rational-materialist explanations took precedence over accounts focused on symbolic interests and social processes. Contemporary scholars therefore readily attribute an escalation of a conflict to an escalation of risks or to an increased interest in the contested material resources, instead of looking for additional incentives rooted in an actor's identity needs.Footnote 32 In this way, many social scientists almost habitually take it for granted that once they have found a plausible explanation based on material incentives there is no further need to look for other motivational factors that might also be involved.
To be sure, the fact that material gains can also enhance an actor's self-esteem should be no reason for treating symbolic needs as the chief motivation throughout. Instead, we have to look for heuristic tools that can help us determine the relative impact of different, yet related kinds of incentives. Fortunately, there are indeed some scenarios where analytical differentiation is possible (Wolf, Reference Wolf2008). For instance, respect motivations are likely to play a role:
• when groups fight costly wars without any reasonable chance of success,
• when retaliation is directed chiefly against targets of symbolic meaning rather than against objects with some strategic value,
• when resisting actors carefully comply with general standards of acceptable behavior instead of consciously targeting the opponent's weakest spot,
• when actors insist on voice opportunities, although they are fully aware that expressing their concerns will not yield additional influence.
Another analytical tool would be detailed investigations of respect effects on foreign policy decisions. For example, it would be worthwhile to study possible covariations between experiences of (dis)respect and the hardening/softening of bargaining positions. As indicated in section ‘The meaning of respect’ of this article, usually, the experience of disrespect is more apparent than the experience of respect. Thus, efforts to ascertain the influence of this variable should probably start with the potential impact of disrespect by investigating the reactions to conspicuous cases of inadequate consideration. If the above-mentioned hypotheses on (dis)respect and conflict behavior are valid, we should observe both synchrone and diachrone covariations: within a group of decision makers the more offended officials should be less accommodating to the offending state than their colleagues, while in the wake of disdainful treatment, state leaderships as a whole should be less accommodating than before.Footnote 33
To determine actual causal links between (dis)respect and policy outputs, such within-case comparisons could be complemented with process tracing. Such studies should focus both on the intra-mural justification of decisions and on the process of collective reasoning. Concerning the former, researchers would try to establish the nature of the arguments that silenced the minority position(s). If disrespect was a decisive factor in the process, we would expect that normative claims and rationalizations, such as the categorical insistence on legitimate rights or status claims, carried the day against strategic calculations that concerned the possible material consequences of different options. Moreover, a researcher could look for circumstantial evidence for the influence of anger on the intricate process of decision making. Strong indicators of anger and other types of emotional arousal would be quick and premature conclusions, especially conclusions that were reached without giving much attention to material risks or consequences, missing information or contradictory data. Further symptoms of the effect of anger would be the selective recall of previous upsetting experiences as well as the biased attention to negative aspects of the opponent's current behavior (Rosen, Reference Rosen2005: Ch. 2; Geva and Skorick, Reference Geva and Skorick2006: 214, 224). Distinguishing the impact of respect motivations may thus be a demanding task, but also one that is far from hopeless.
In light of the fact that respect has been thoroughly neglected by past IR scholarship, the immediate research agenda calls for studies that would clarify whether (dis)respect is sufficiently important to warrant both wider and more elaborate research efforts. This should be established by plausibility probes focusing on most likely cases where researchers have easy access to internal records. Such studies would have to concentrate on bilateral relationships among autonomous powers characterized by (1) an ambivalent pattern of past interactions (rather than by a long history of friendship or rivalry that could largely attenuate the effect of disrespect) and (2) by a dynamic and ambiguous evolution of power and other potential status markers (which would render decision makers more sensitive to conflicting views on relative status). Within such bilateral relationships analysts would need to focus on the decision making of ascending, nationalistic powers with authoritarian systems, since the political elites of such states would probably be more eager for foreign respect than would be the decision makers of established democratic powers (Rosen, Reference Rosen2005: Ch. 5). Suitable case studies might therefore include Imperial Germany's policy towards Britain, Japan's pre-war policy towards the United States, and the Soviet Union's policy during the Cold War, as well as China's current relationship with the United States. If such plausibility probes were to prove a substantial impact of (dis)respect on foreign policy decision making, later studies should focus on interaction effects, particularly between states but also between states and other international actors, such as international organizations, NGOs, and even terrorist organizations.Footnote 34
Finally, for the sake of practical relevance, such a research agenda should not disregard the potential costs and disadvantages of respectful behavior. Given the benefits of mutual respect and the risks inherent in acts of disrespect some might regard respectful conduct not only as a moral duty but also as a political panacea. However, even if future research were to prove that respect is a powerful variable this would hardly imply that treating foreign actors with more respect will always serve national goals. Such a notion would be oblivious to the manifold costs respectful behavior can entail. First of all, as we all know from daily experience, duly appreciating other peoples’ achievements, perspectives, or importance consumes time that could be used for other purposes. Fully respecting their rights and needs may also cost money or other material resources. Second, giving others our thorough attention definitely means that we have less attention available for third parties or other issues. Third, respecting other actors, even when it just means paying attention to them, further opens us to their influence. Thus, respect can result in a transfer of power or control. Fourth and related, showing great respect for someone else can lead to misunderstandings by inadvertently overinflating an actor's positive self-image. Thereby it can blur status differences and hence complicate negotiations or decision making. Fifth, giving more consideration to the status of a given state may offend one of its rivals.Footnote 35 Finally, satisfying another state's respect expectations may run counter to the prestige ambitions or enemy images of domestic groups and consequently compromise the executive's domestic standing (Kelman, Reference Kelman2008: 178).Footnote 36 While some of these costs may be avoidable and some of them may be tolerated in exchange for the beneficial effects of mutual respect, they may still be significant. This, of course, should be seen as yet another reason for carefully investigating the relative significance of showing more respect across borders.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Rainer Baumann, Charlotte Dany, Caroline Fehl, Katja Freistein, Daniel Jacobi, Philip Liste, Gabi Schlag, as well as the editors and reviewers for their useful comments. Of course, I am fully responsible for all remaining shortcomings. Special thanks to Sara Caterall for making my English more accessible to native speakers and to Stefan Wender for bibliographical assistance.