Yet for a book that presents itself as a work of normative theory, there is surprisingly little normative argument here. Of the six chapters, two are almost purely descriptive (Chapter 1 on the varieties of immigration, and Chapter 4 on the immigration policies of the United States and Germany). Two others—Chapters 2 and 5—are discussions of the literature on immigration and an exploration of the implications of the work of various political theorists for immigration policy. Here, only a small portion of the discussion, the analysis of the respective positions of Joseph Carens and Michael Walzer, is really germane to Meilaender's argument. Other parts, such as the discussion of Will Kymlicka, are engaging, but ultimately have little to do directly with immigration. Meilaender devotes only two chapters, then (3 and 6), to developing his argument for the state's right to restrict immigration, with Chapter 3 being “the theoretical heart of the book” (p. 3).

The argument that Meilaender presents in Chapter 3 is suggestive, but ultimately unsatisfying. He attempts to ground the right to restrict immigration on claims of national identity. He argues that there is a wide variety of national identities, and that “the vast majority of these … national identities are legitimate. By calling them legitimate, I mean simply that they have a right to exist” (p. 92). This right to exist implies a right to protect the national identity from the threat posed by immigration. Hence, “[t]he first question that a people faces in these circumstances, I want to suggest, is this: Who are we” (p. 81)? From the answer to this question, according to the author, the appropriate immigration policy flows. And from the variety of answers to this question for different peoples, it follows that there will be a variety of legitimate immigration policies, some more restrictive than others.

Meilaender assumes that an immigration policy that seeks to protect a legitimate national identity is itself legitimate. But, as he also realizes, this assumption is false if there are independent moral constraints on immigration policy. For example, in Chapter 6, he suggests that refugees and immediate family members of citizens are two classes of people who present strong claims to immigrate, claims that may override the nation's claim to exclude. The question that he never directly addresses is whether there are other principled constraints on immigration policy, such that peoples with a legitimate national identity nevertheless may not protect that identity through restrictive immigration policies. For example, although he discusses the racist immigration policies employed by Australia (pp. 23–24, 53–54) and the United States (pp. 23, 106), he never says what is wrong with such policies. In addition, he never directly confronts the issue of whether the needs and desires of immigrants ought to trump the desire on the part of citizens to restrict immigration. This is the main point of contention between Meilaender and someone like Carens, who argues that liberal principles require open borders.

In light of this, there is something odd in Meilaender's presentation of his argument. At the outset, he correctly states that “at its core, immigration is one manifestation of a fundamental ethical problem: May (or perhaps must) we prefer ‘our own’ … to other people” (p. 3)? Yet rather than addressing this issue directly, most of his discussion presupposes a positive answer to the question. He also states, again correctly: “Logically, though, this question of preference is really prior to the question about national identity,” and a negative answer to the question about preferring our own “renders the whole discussion of national identity … simply irrelevant” (p. 96). This is correct, yet he develops his argument about national identity without first addressing the prior question of whether “we” may prefer “our own.”

Even more odd than the fact the Meilaender reverses the logical order of the issues involved is the fact that he never presents an argument about the more fundamental issue at all: “Settling the question of whether or to what extent we may actively prefer our fellow citizens and the way of life we share with them would clearly be a large endeavor, requiring a book of its own, and I shall not try to accomplish that here” (p. 96). He does go on to make some suggestive remarks on this issue, but, by his own account, these do not amount to an argument for “preferring our own.” Meilaender, then, fails to directly confront the very issue at stake between his position and that of Carens, his main opponent. This is all the more surprising in light of the fact that Meilaender's main criticism of Carens is that Carens fails to defend the liberalism on which he bases his argument.

What Meilaender has demonstrated, then, is simply that in the immigration debate as elsewhere, where you end up depends upon where you begin. Carens's egalitarian (or cosmopolitan) liberalism leads to open borders; Meilaender's (and Walzer's) more communitarian (or “Augustinian” [p. 5]) liberalism leads to a right to restrict immigration to protect the community. What Meilaender has not provided, however, is a convincing argument to prefer his position over that of Carens. The emphasis in the title Toward a Theory of Immigration then, should fall squarely on the first word. As interesting as many of the discussions are, this book is perhaps best viewed as a prolegomenon to a work that will more directly confront the fundamental issues at stake in the immigration debate.