Afghanistan has been called the “graveyard of empires” because so many foreign armies have come to grief there in spite of their superior military assets. As such, the country is an appropriate venue for Martin Ewans' study on asymmetric warfare. The book's main foci are the three Anglo–Afghan wars fought by the British and the Soviet invasion and occupation. There is a short section on the American invasion, comparing and contrasting it to its predecessors.
Given the complex history of these wars and their international context, Ewans does an excellent job of condensing the material for this relatively short book. As a retired British diplomat with considerable direct Afghan experience, he argues that these wars were largely the result of diplomatic failures, misconceptions, or short sightedness in which events often outpaced reason. Afghanistan itself was never the prize that was sought, but it was always a pawn in some larger Great Powers geostrategic rivalry. The British were always concerned that a European rival would enter India overland through Iran or Afghanistan. For much of the 19th century, tsarist Russia's expansion into Central Asia enhanced this fear, which often verged on paranoia, into what became known as the Great Game. In the second half of the 20th century it was the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union that took center stage. The collapse of the Soviet Union appeared to end Afghanistan's geostrategic importance, and the country fell into anarchy that attracted minimal international attention or assistance. Such a failed state, however, proved the perfect habitat for radical Islamists who plotted the 9/11 attacks on the United States. The American invasion to displace them put Afghanistan back in play, not as a geographic buffer state but as an ideological one.
Ewans makes it clear that bright proposals to invade Afghanistan were invariably opposed by the regular military that had to carry them out. In the premodern period the questions of logistics and communications were daunting and usually underestimated. Once engaged, invading armies found that they could rather easily defeat organized armies, but they were ill equipped by training and temperament to deal with irregular warfare. In particular, there was the dangerous tendency to underestimate the Afghans. This led to many pronounced disasters, most notably the destruction of the whole Kabul expeditionary force in 1841–42. Afghanistan may have been a pawn, but it proved a costly one to move.
By contrast, the diplomatic approach was underutilized even when it had much to offer. Afghanistan's traditional rulers knew how to negotiate a deal that met the strategic needs of its more powerful neighbors but still left the country autonomous. Ewans argues that the whole of the ill-fated first Anglo–Afghan war could have been avoided if the British had sought serious negotiations with Amir Dost Mohammad instead of replacing him with the unpopular (and incompetent) Shah Shuja. Dost Mohammad's second reign underscores this conclusion. His foreign policy was one of accepting subsidies in return for neutrality even when domestic forces urged a more aggressive approach, particularly during the Indian Mutiny of 1857 when Afghan support might well have tipped the balance. Successive Anglo–Afghan wars demonstrated the same thing: the British recognition of Amir Abdur Rahman ended the second Anglo–Afghan war in 1880 and allowed them to withdraw with a friendly but autonomous ruler in place in Kabul. A decision to recognize Afghan independence in 1919 ended the third Anglo–Afghan war (and the only one started by the Afghans) within months.
It is less clear that diplomacy would have worked as well in the last part of the 20th century. The Soviet invasion was designed to replace its own client regime, one that had become so problematic that Moscow concluded only direct intervention could bring it to heel. The Russians feared the loss of a nominally socialist state would make them look weak, but occupying Afghanistan did that and worse. When the Soviets decided to withdraw, a diplomatic agreement with the United States might well have avoided the decade of anarchy that followed. This option was forgone largely because the Americans had no real interest in a postwar Afghanistan and allowed Pakistan to sabotage any solution that did not put its Islamist clients in control, a policy that led eventually to the Taliban. Failing to anticipate that the rise of such radical Islamists groups might run counter to American interests was in retrospect a blunder that compares favorably to others that litter the pages of this history.
Although Ewans believes that stronger attempts at diplomatic suasion could have induced the Taliban to abandon al-Qaʿida and thereby avoid the American invasion, this is unlikely. The days of the amirs who adroitly exploited international politics and changed policies as one might change clothes to strengthen themselves and keep foreigners at bay was long gone. Mullah Omar lacked both the experience and vision (and was too much a true believer) to play that sort of game.
The latter highlights both the strengths and weakness of the book. We are provided with excellent descriptions of the thinking, strategies, and politics that drove the British and Russians into and out of Afghanistan. However, the reader does not gain similar insights into Afghan politics or thinking. Why was opposition to foreign occupation so much stronger in some parts of the country than others? To what extent has twenty-five years of war so changed the country that older lessons no longer apply—and if they do not, what new factors are at play? This last point is vital to both the U.S. and NATO policies in Afghanistan today. At the very least, reading Ewans should provide the following lesson: complacency and underestimating the Afghans remains the simplest way to join the historic queue of fools who in Kipling's words “tried to hustle the East.”
If Ewans' work examines Afghanistan from the outside looking in, Monsutti's War and Migration is an exceptionally well-documented inside picture of contemporary Hazaras and their dealings with the outside world. Based on almost a decade's worth of ethnographic research from 1993 to 2001 both inside and outside of Afghanistan, it is a truly outstanding and innovative ethnography that sets new standards in the field. Based on a study of a tight network of Hazara men from a valley in Jaghori, it moves between their home district where subsistence agriculture predominates, to Quetta in Pakistan where they work in the region's coal mines, and to Tehran in Iran where they engage in construction work as illegal migrants and send remittance back to the Hazarajat using the hawala system.
Monsutti argues that the Hazaras had a tradition of migration that long predated the Soviet invasion and civil war that followed their withdrawal. For more than a century, Hazaras have been leaving their mountain homes to seek work in Afghan cities or abroad and to avoid persecution as Shiʿa Muslims in a Sunni dominated Afghanistan. The Soviet war increased the flow of people and expanded their range, but it was not new, or even necessarily traumatic. In this he challenges the conventional wisdom that refugees are dislocated people who can be made whole only by repatriating them home. Rather, he shows that seemingly remote communities in the Hazarajat have long been tied into regional networks of labor and exchange. Men maintain strong ties to a home district but work abroad and rotate thorough various living sites over the course of a lifetime. The revenue they send home not only is vital to the economic survival of these communities but also underpins a whole complex of trade (nondrug related) that is worth more than a billion dollars annually. This stream of revenue dwarfs international relief efforts and explains why Hazaras tended to avoid refugee camps that offered food but no work, and why movement itself was seen as normative and not dislocative.
Monsutti sharply questions the validity of current models of refugees, particularly the distinction between political asylum seekers and economic migrants. Although welcoming the postmodern critique in anthropology that emphasizes the transnational, he wryly observes that this has tended to produce more jargon than insight. How difficult it is to conduct real multisited research is apparent in his descriptions of his own fieldwork in three different countries and the travel between them. He and the people he worked with regularly passed to and from central Afghanistan through conflict zones while carrying goods or money from Pakistan. Baluch smugglers moved Afghans from Pakistan into Iran where they kept a low profile because they had no papers. To gain the trust of the people involved and get the details of how each system worked required years of building relationships and demanded the appropriate local knowledge to ask the right questions of the right people.
Allessandro Monsutti's primary focus is on his network of men whom we see again and again in different contexts. The starting point is home valley where people exist in a rural world of small landed properties, irrigation rights, houses, and shops in their natal villages. It may be home where families and relatives reside, but it is also a place from which a majority of the men will be absent for many years at a time without severing their rights or obligations to the community. (Monsutti regrets that given the gender segregation characteristic of rural Afghanistan, he is unable to document women's roles in running households over such long periods.) The situation changes in Quetta where Hazara refugees chose to cluster because there was an established Pakistani Hazara community already settled there who helped arrange for work. Ties that bind here are created by cross-cutting networks that provide job opportunities and protection. Although the primary bond is agnatic kinship, this is tempered by relations through marriage, matrilineal ties, and shared locality. These create identifiable communities that can be mapped on the ground. By contrast, the Hazaras working in Tehran and other Iranian cities make themselves invisible, often living at their worksites unless they have the good fortune of obtaining residence permits. They can find each other but are generally separate from Iranian society.
Population flows and the movement of money, information, and goods is the heart of the next section. There has been considerable interest in traditional money transfers, hawalas, but details of how they work have only been broadly sketched. Employing many specific examples, Monsutti explains how this system works and ties men abroad to their natal villages. The issue of trust in such a system is of critical importance because the money passes through many hands. What distinguishes it from a pure money transfer system, however, is its use in financing regional trade. Money collected from workers in Iran is exchanged for merchandise that is exported to Quetta and sold. The cash from this transaction buys goods needed to supply the villages of central Afghanistan. Their sale by local shopkeepers produces the promised cash money that is collected by the intended recipient upon presentation of a receipt that reached him by an entirely different route of message carriers. Based on the average earnings within his own network, Monsutti estimates that the Hazaras in Iran alone remit $200 million annually. This helps explain how such poor regions were able to finance the large food imports needed to weather the drought of the late 1990s in the absence of outside aid. It also explains a feature that has puzzled many travelers to remote parts of rural Afghanistan: the common presence of shops with imported goods in the midst of a subsistence economy that does not produce enough surplus to support them.
The final section is an essay on trust and friendship. Anthropologists have given primacy to kinship as an organizing principle, but there are many other ties that bind people together. Because close kin are often rivals, networks of friends can be particularly important, particularly when engaged in trade or money transfers. This focus on the problems of trust and networks of cooperation is a fine counterpoint to Ewans' study of the Afghan wars. It explains how ordinary Afghans have been able to cope with levels of upheaval that would have destroyed other societies. Conflict may seem endemic in Afghanistan, but so are networks of cooperation that extend into rival and even hostile political factions and ethnic groups. It is these cross-cutting ties that keep ordinary lives afloat even in the worst of times. Monsutti's vivid accounts of people who take the world as it is and then deal with it is an excellent introduction for anyone who wishes to understand the complexity of Afghanistan and the people who come from it.
