Introduction
If you were to turn on the only national TV channel in Denmark in the 1980s, you might be met with a short information broadcast informing citizens that in the event of hearing three 12-second siren signals that were repeated after one minute, they were to go indoors and turn on the radio. This TV broadcast was part of an extensive public information campaign advertising the special signal, which was the result of a 1981 agreement between the Danish Civil Defence Directorate (Civilforsvarsstyrelsen; CDD) and the Danish public broadcasting corporation, Denmark’s Radio (Danmarks Radio; DR), on disaster communication and management. Outdoor sirens on rooftops in towns and cities, originally installed to warn the population about air raids during wartime, would now also be used to alert citizens in peacetime and signal to them that more information were to be given via radio. The public campaign was intended to make people aware of, and adhere to, the new siren signal, and it was framed around the slogan ‘Go indoors and listen to Denmark’s Radio’. This article asks: what were the origins of this agreement and campaign, and how was it implemented within Danish society? By investigating these questions, the article not only contributes to knowledge on the development of emergency planning from a wartime to an all-hazards approach, but it also explores this evolution against the backdrop of the wider (geo)political setting.
Existing research has explored the cultural, emotional, imaginary and disciplinary aspects of civil defence and preparedness. However, until the early 2020s, this was almost exclusively done in a national or, at best, a comparative context.Footnote 1 A recent boom in Danish historical research on civil defence and emergency planning has continued to investigate the topic in the context of imagined futures and emotion regulation, thus engaging with international research trends.Footnote 2 The Danish research has also significantly contributed to scholarship on the transnational aspects of civil defence and preparedness. In earlier work, I have identified how Danish civil defence and preparedness knowledge and practices were circulated within NATO, whereas Frandsen shows how NATO recommendations were implemented within the Danish context.Footnote 3 Farbøl, myself and Cronqvist have further shown how Scandinavian practices circulated transnationally.Footnote 4
Findings on the development of civil defence are supported more generally by research on knowledge and technology circulation as transnational entanglements during the Cold War.Footnote 5 Entanglements are defined here as ‘intended or unintended, obvious or hidden, structured or chaotic interrelation(s) in space, knowledge or time’. They can be ‘reciprocal, symmetrical or asymmetrical’ and show up as ‘overlapping, convergence, divergence, dissemination, transfer, imperialism, adoption, resistance, adaptation, encounters, hubs, crossovers, interference, translation, and hybridization’.Footnote 6 These terms also underline the fact that transnational transfer does not happen as a straightforward process, but rather is situated in, and entangled with, local conditions.Footnote 7
Drawing upon these insights, this article shows how Danish warning practices arose out of developments and contexts specific to their time. By tracing the development of siren warnings between the 1960s and 1980s, the article examines how the siren transformed from a wartime to a peacetime technology. In doing so, it highlights important shifts in the political and societal contexts both regionally and locally that occurred alongside a broader shift in attitudes to risk and disaster.
The article makes use of Sheila Jasanoff’s notion of socio-technical imaginaries, defined as ‘collectively held, institutionally stabilized, and publicly performed visions of desirable futures, animated by shared understandings of forms of social life and social order attainable through, and supportive of, advances in science and technology’.Footnote 8 The concept builds on social imaginaries; in the words of Taylor, an almost contractual ‘normative order’ in which ‘the members of society (…) behave like the rational and sociable creatures they are’ for the greater good.Footnote 9 Thus, the social imaginary is based on ideals of civility, orderliness and (self-) discipline.Footnote 10 Jasanoff’s addition of technology to the social imaginary shows how material/technological efforts can be supportive of desired social behaviour.Footnote 11 Socio-technical imaginaries travel through extension, often across borders, and are embedded ‘into local constellations’ often ‘with institutions of governance [operating] as some of the most effective agents of extension’.Footnote 12 While Jasanoff does not necessarily indicate a straightforward or linear process, Farbøl explicates this by showing that ‘embedding-extension [is a] two-way process that might be analysed separately but, in reality, was complex, messy and impossible to disentangle’.Footnote 13 These entanglements, then, are similar to the ones identified by the research on knowledge circulation outlined above.
The concept of the socio-technical imaginary lends itself well to conceptualise a system in which sirens were supposed to encourage the population to engage in a specific behaviour. However, according to its definition, it deals with desired futures, war or disaster are not desirable. Indeed, as Jasanoff notes, ‘imaginations of desirable and desired futures correlate, tacitly or explicitly, with the obverse – shared fears of harms that might be incurred through invention and innovation, or of course the failure to innovate’.Footnote 14 It is not entirely clear if this ‘obverse’ can be contained in the imaginary. Willim infers that imaginaries are not necessarily positive: they can be ‘nightmarish’ and hold ‘dystopian potentials’.Footnote 15 Kalmbach, Marklund and Åberg resolve this tension by employing the term ‘crisis imaginaries’ to show that not only a wish for the desirable, but also a fear of the undesirable, can inform technological development.Footnote 16And while technology and human behaviour can be harmful, even a dystopia can hold a vision of something desirable: given the right socio-technical advancements, the undesirable can be handled and mitigated.Footnote 17
Thus, the siren is not only the ‘sonic sideshow to the destructive narrative of the twentieth century’, but also offers the remedy for destruction: if you behave in the correct manner upon hearing it, the catastrophe can be mitigated.Footnote 18 The siren can be read as an ‘efficient sound’ that is not only stripped of unnecessary elements and seeks to foster ‘efficient behaviour in those who heard it’, but that also demonstrates modern man’s mastery over nature or, in this case, catastrophe.Footnote 19
If civil defence has a sound, it may well be the siren. Danish civil defence information campaigns, such as the film Air Raid (Luftangreb, 1959) and the pamphlet If War Comes (Hvis krigen kommer, which was distributed to every household in 1962), prominently featured sirens in the opening scenes and on the cover, which placed them centrally within Danish Cold War iconography.Footnote 20 Weekly tests further cemented this status, as sirens could be heard in cities every Saturday at noon between 1951 and 1967 and then every Wednesday at noon until 1993.Footnote 21 The weekly test integrated the siren into the urban Cold War soundscape.Footnote 22 Through these processes, the siren became part of the sensory Cold War and represented another front in the geopolitical contest.Footnote 23
I propose the term ‘normative sound’ to describe the siren’s function. Radder argues that all technologies are inherently normative, as ‘the (actual or anticipated) realization of a technology (…) implies one or more norms about what the people who (might) interact with the technological system should, or should not, do’.Footnote 24 While this definition includes the prescriptive normativity of, for example, an instruction manual, Christians defines normativity as both prescriptive and as a carrier of value systems and thus ‘view[s] technology (…) as a human process value-laden throughout’.Footnote 25 The siren is normative in both these senses, It is prescriptive as it tells you what to do (take shelter or listen to the radio), and it carries the norms and values contained in the socio-technical imaginary of civil defence: the ideal of disciplined citizens, calm yet alert, responsible and prepared, who act within and comprise an orderly and rational society.Footnote 26 This further underlines the ‘normative and aspirational dimensions of socio-technical imaginaries’ which make them ‘comparable with vision statements in business management’ because they aim to homogenise and unify by ‘instilling moral order’.Footnote 27
This article is based on a qualitative analysis of sources from the archives of the Danish Emergency Management Agency (Beredskabsstyrelsen; DEMA), which contains the collections of the former CDD. The sources are collections of different working groups and committees (including meeting minutes, letters, memoranda and notes), the civil defence communications manager, annual reports and general memoranda. Moreover, I use material from meetings between Scandinavian civil defence directors that are held in the archive of Danish Civil Defence Director Erik Schultz. These meetings were informal and not officially summarised, but from the agendas and Schultz’s notes, it is possible to piece together at least part of their content.
I would have liked to analyse the effects of the public campaign around the siren, but I was only able to identify two public opinion polls in the archives. I was unable to find additional polls even after corresponding with Kantar Gallup, which holds old Gallup polls, and searching Danish newspapers using the Mediestream service.Footnote 28 Therefore, while I am able to draw some tentative conclusions based on the available material, a comprehensive assessment of the campaign’s impact is beyond the scope of this study.
In the article’s first two sections, I outline discussions about warning mechanisms at the Scandinavian civil defence director’s meetings in the 1960s and examine the imaginaries of the participants. Thereafter, I assess how broader Western debates on security and environmental policy in the 1970s shifted views on crisis and war among governments and civil preparedness practitioners. Having laid out these contexts, I turn to the Danish case and explore how national developments both reflected local conditions, transnational influences and the broader regional context, while at the same time reflecting the central and unchanged imaginary.
Normative Sound
Already from its establishment in 1949, the Danish CDD looked to Denmark’s neighbours for collaboration and inspiration. This was primarily for the practical reasons of knowledge and resource sharing, but it also tied into a general tradition of Scandinavian cooperation. Arthur Dahl, the Danish civil defence director from 1949 to 1962, turned to his Swedish and Norwegian counterparts for collegial discussions and advice, and mutual visits were commonplace. While Denmark and Norway also participated in NATO’s Civil Defence Committee, there was a long-standing tradition of Nordic cooperation that was rooted in a sense of political and cultural similarities, as well as the premise that the nations faced similar challenges. Sweden expended greater resources on civil defence and was a frontrunner in research and development, which made cooperation particularly attractive for Denmark.Footnote 29 In 1964, this cooperation was formalised when civil defence directors from Denmark, Norway and Sweden (plus, occasionally, Iceland) began to meet twice a year, often accompanied by higher-ranking officials.Footnote 30
Warning mechanisms were on the agenda from the beginning of these meetings.Footnote 31 At a 1965 meeting, a Norwegian delegate spoke about the social and societal functions of warnings and emphasised the role of interpretation. A functioning system depended not only on material assets but also on the personal qualities of the civilian population, such as the will and ability to protect oneself, a positive attitude and trust. If people possessed those qualities and thus could interpret a warning correctly, the state could provide them with a large measure of freedom during wartime in return. For those who did not have the right attitude, however, warning also signalled the commencement of the emergency laws that would come into effect in wartime. Through its information work, the Norwegian civil defence organisation sought to secure not only goodwill and trust from the broader population, but also to foster an engaged citizenry or, as the Norwegian delegate put it at the 1965 meeting, ‘active opinion’. Another Norwegian delegate expressed concern about the public’s ability to maintain a positive attitude in prolonged emergencies, such as fallout warnings, where it could be necessary to shelter for long periods of time.Footnote 32 This concern resurfaced in discussions at a civil defence directors’ meeting in 1967. While seeking shelter ought to be an ‘automatic reaction’ to a siren sounding, providing people with information was required to ensure that they remained in shelters for longer periods. How to get in contact with people while they were inside shelters were one of the items on the agenda for the meetingFootnote 33
From these deliberations, we see that sonic warnings not only carried direct instructions such as ‘take shelter’ but also declared that a specific social (and sometimes legal) order would take effect. The delegates, both directors and higher-ranking civil defence officials, displayed a clear awareness of the normativity of the warning sound in the discussions, not only as directly prescriptive for a certain set of behaviours, but also as a transmitter of a specific type of mindset (a positive attitude, goodwill, trust, engagement): the socio-technical imaginary. Warning systems held an almost Hobbesian contractual nature in which adherence to norms was the ticket to a greater degree of freedom. However, the minutes from the meetings also reveal concern among the Scandinavian civil defence directors and officials about how much could be asked of the population and what would be required in terms of information to achieve the desired order.
The issues of warning and communication did not disappear from the agenda of the Scandinavian civil defence directors’ meetings over time - quite the contrary. What had started as meetings within a relatively small circle became a network that grew and spawned working groups for specific topics such as fallout warning (1979) and communication (1982).Footnote 34 In 1982, amidst renewed Cold War tension and at the time of the Danish ‘Go indoors …’ campaign, Schultz described the Scandinavian cooperation as ‘intense’.Footnote 35 Thus, transnational cooperation remained an important backdrop to the development of Danish civil defence measures and policies.
Efficient Sound
A 1974 Swedish report on sonic warning states that public knowledge is a prerequisite for the function of a warning system and that ‘The signal must convey minimal information in a characteristic manner.’Footnote 36 This was also something of which the Scandinavian directors were aware. In 1962, official civil defence information booklets from Scandinavian countries showcased different siren signals. Sweden had three: preparedness alert (which meant that people with wartime positions in the armed forces or civil defence should make their way to their place of service), air raid and all clear.Footnote 37 Norway had four: mobilisation alert (which had the same function as the Swedish preparedness alert), air raid, all clear and radioactive fallout. Denmark also had four: air raid, all clear, forewarning of fallout and fallout proper.Footnote 38
In 1963, a new version of the Norwegian booklet introduced a siren signal meaning ‘Important message – listen to the radio’, which replaced both the mobilisation and fallout alerts.Footnote 39 Thus, it not only slimmed down the number of signals, but also explicitly introduced radio as part of the normative sound system, pairing it with the siren. This was not new as such: across Scandinavia, the radio was the main conveyor of emergency news, and in some rural areas, it entirely stood in for sirens.Footnote 40 Other civil defence information would also instruct people to listen for news on the radio in an emergency. The new Norwegian signal merely formalised and solidified this arrangement. Still, a Norwegian poll presented at a 1965 Scandinavian directors’ meeting showed that while 75 per cent of the population had general knowledge about siren warnings, only 25 per cent knew what the specific signals meant.Footnote 41 Sweden, in addition to booklets and information campaigns, also included civil defence information in phone books, a practice which began during the Second World War and showcased the different siren signals.Footnote 42 In 1974, in connection with a general overhaul of the warning system, Norway also adopted this practice.Footnote 43
These developments show that a significant amount of thought and intention went into developing not only the normativity but also the efficiency of siren signals, that is, conveying their message properly and working towards a more streamlined system that would give the populations the greatest amount of clarity. Civil defence officials in Scandinavian countries clearly took inspiration from one another, discussing both their respective systems and how to go about reaching their goals.
Shifting Contexts
The Cold War climate shifted during the 1960s, heralding the period known as Détente, which saw decreased tension, arms control negotiations and deals, a more cooperative climate between the superpowers and especially the European East–West blocs. In this context, Scandinavian civil (and military) defence spending slowed down. Détente also reflected shifts in NATO military planning, where the all-or-nothing doctrine of ‘massive retaliation’ was gradually replaced by a ‘flexible response’ in 1968, which introduced the concepts of grey zone warfare and crisis events below the threshold of war.Footnote 44 Within the NATO framework, civil defence and civil emergency planning were extended to include a wider range of contingencies.Footnote 45
Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, Scandinavian civil defence directors also discussed the need to shift towards a greater peacetime role for civil defence, perhaps in a bid to stay relevant in an era of a decline in the perceived need for their services.Footnote 46 The Danish civil defence organisation became increasingly involved in peacetime disaster relief amidst rising concerns about the discontinuation of the organisation.Footnote 47 A representative from Iceland, which had neither a military nor a civil defence programme, explained at a Scandinavian directors’ meeting in 1970, that their emergency planning was entirely directed towards disaster relief. In their planning strategy, war was deemed to be a ‘big disaster’, and therefore, disaster and war preparedness were two sides of the same coin.Footnote 48
Superpower Détente was not the only reason behind this broadening of civil defence activities. The question of nuclear energy was also an important factor. Western governments looked to alternative energy sources to ease dependence on OAPEC countries (Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries), after the 1973 oil crisis. However, a growing environmental grassroots movement simultaneously raised public debates about, and resistance against, nuclear energy in a number of Western countries, including Denmark.Footnote 49 At a Scandinavian directors’ meeting in 1974, the Norwegian delegation directly linked the issue of nuclear power to shifts in broader attitudes towards crisis management. At this point, the Norwegian government had plans (which were later dropped) to establish nuclear power plants in Norway, and the Norwegian Civil Defence Director J. Nordhaug reported at the meeting that he had domestically raised the issue of safety and the role of the civil defence organisation in making provisions for an accident. Hence, the issue of nuclear power also became a catalyst for greater civil defence involvement in peacetime disasters.Footnote 50
All in all, changing perceptions of threat, both geopolitical and environmental, became entangled with the issue of crisis preparedness and management, and this led to a shift in civil preparedness planning towards what would later be dubbed an ‘all-hazards approach’. This shift is evident in a 1976 report from the Danish Ministry of Finance, which stated that peacetime disaster relief had become more necessary because of industrial and demographic developments (more/bigger plants and increasing population density), which generated a higher risk of disaster. The report proposed an amalgamation of peace and wartime emergency planning structures, predicated on the idea that war ought to be regarded as just one option in an array of potential disasters and, therefore, wartime civil defence was merely an extension of peacetime disaster mitigation.Footnote 51 This mimicked the Icelandic model in which war and disaster were different points on the same spectrum.
This broadening of the perception of risk also shows up in discussions of siren warnings. One of Danish Civil Defence Director Erik Schultz’ notes from a 1968 Scandinavian directors’ meeting mentions the need to ‘lend out’ sirens in peacetime, hinting at least at a discussion of the utility of siren warnings for purposes other than war.Footnote 52 While the 1963 Norwegian booklet that introduced the ‘Important message – listen to the radio’ signal pertained only to war and mobilisation, Norway’s next general booklet from 1972, entitled To Survive (For å overleve), specified that this signal was also to be used in peacetime disasters.Footnote 53 At a Scandinavian directors’ meeting in 1977, the Norwegian delegation informed the group of a new system for warning against dam bursts and flooding, where civil defence sirens would sound a signal that meant ‘go up the mountainside’. This was discussed at some length between the Swedish and Norwegian delegations but was, in Schultz’ words, ‘not relevant for Denmark’.Footnote 54 Nevertheless, a signal for flooding was added to the Danish repertoire at some point before 1980.Footnote 55
Thus, Scandinavian warning practices adapted to the geopolitical, environmental and cultural shifts occurring in the world around them. Still, the central meaning of the siren and imaginary was the same: efficiency in communicating a desired social order, be it in war or peacetime crisis.
The Danish ‘Warning Issue’
In 1973–4, a group of so-called ‘warning officers’ (civil defence volunteers who manned the warning system) sounded the alarm(!) about the (in)sufficiency of the Danish warning system.Footnote 56 One of them, P.B. Nielsen, had submitted a proposal on improving the civil defence warning service in 1971, where he also suggested extending it to peacetime disasters, but his proposal was ignored.Footnote 57 The warning officers now proposed establishing a committee to assess warning issues, which the CDD rejected in summer 1974. In autumn, the officers’ criticism was leaked to the press.Footnote 58 The press coverage discussed a number of issues, including the fact that the Swedish nuclear power plant Barsebäck was to open in 1975, just 23 km from the Danish capital of Copenhagen. The CDD was involved in contingency planning for an accident or leak at Barsebäck, assisting the Danish Environmental Protection Agency (Miljøstyrelsen; EPA, founded in 1972 and responsible for nuclear energy issues) in drawing up plans and would serve several functions in the case of an accident.Footnote 59 A local environmental group campaigned for a system to issue warnings in the event of accidents at Barsebäck, and an MP recommended utilising the civil defence organisation’s warning system. CDD Director Schultz rejected this, stating that the public would be alerted through the radio.Footnote 60 However, a newspaper reported that the CDD had no formal agreement with the Danish public service and the monopoly-holding radio and TV broadcaster DR on issuing information in crisis or war. This was despite the fact that the 1962 booklet If War Comes clearly stated that the radio would be a primary tool for communicating messages to the population in wartime.Footnote 61 From its own annual reports, it seems that since at least 1964, the CDD had worked on formalising an agreement with DR about fallout messaging, but made no progress.Footnote 62 In 1974, If War Comes from 1962 still contained the most up-to-date public information on what to do if the siren sounded. As mentioned above, it showcased four signals: air raid, forewarning of fallout, acute fallout and ‘all clear’. In rural areas not covered by sirens, loudspeaker cars and ringing church bells would provide warning. Fallout messages would also be transmitted via radio.Footnote 63 Thus, in 1974, the warning imaginary had neither been entirely formalised, nor was it actively upheld. Bringing it back on the agenda was due to a convergence of issues, from environmental concerns to concerns regarding the efficiency of the warning system itself.
The CDD’s general response to the press criticism was to dismiss it, stating that the warning system was fully functional and undergoing continuous development and that an agreement with DR was underway.Footnote 64 In early 1975, the issue reached parliament, and the minister of the interior overruled the CDD by heeding the warning officers’ call to establish a committee to investigate and make recommendations for the civil defence organisation’s warning service. The committee’s terms of reference did not mention nuclear accidents or a formal agreement for the delivery of information to the public, but stated that the committee should be in contact with the Ministry of the Environment and its subsidiary EPA and DR.Footnote 65
The ‘warning issue’, as it came to be dubbed within the CDD, highlighted a discrepancy between the Directorate and some of the volunteers tasked with doing the job of warning the population regarding perceptions of how well the system functioned. It also revealed that the system largely rested on old assumptions and informal agreements about business as usual, without the framework or content of said business being entirely clear. In the Détente period, the wartime warning system and the communication about it seem to have faded to the background. Both issues would now be subject to renewed debate.
Debates and Recommendations
The need for efficient sound was on the agenda of the new warning committee early on. In 1976, one of the meeting participants stated that it should not be the task of the population to figure out what each signal meant themselves.Footnote 66 By 1980, the Danish civil defence warning system had no less than seven different siren signals: the four wartime signals outlined in If War Comes and three additional peacetime signals: mobilisation of defence, mobilisation of local fire departments and flooding. The CDD was aware of the need to reduce this number to make things clearer for the general public.Footnote 67 The Danish warning committee also discussed adopting the Norwegian model of having a signal instructing the population to go inside and turn on the radio as a way to simplify the system.Footnote 68
In 1976, civil defence volunteer P.B. Nielsen again argued in the warning committee that the siren system ought to be activated in peacetime disasters.Footnote 69 Civil Defence Director Shultz at this point still mainly thought of siren warnings in terms of war, and his main aim was to create a system covering both fallout and gas without adding yet another signal. In 1977, he consulted his Scandinavian colleagues and received the response that both Sweden and Norway had just three signals. Besides air raid and all clear, Sweden still had ‘preparedness alert’, but officials were contemplating adopting the Norwegian ‘listen to the radio’ signal instead, as the instruction to mobilise could then be broadcast on the radio.Footnote 70
As for the issue of a formalisation of agreements with DR on broadcasting, a civil defence official informed the warning committee in 1975 that there was an agreement and procedures in place for transmitting and broadcasting fallout warnings, but that it had not been formalised in writing.Footnote 71 In 1977, DR’s programme director stated that a formal agreement was not needed, but also that they could not guarantee functioning service due to the lack of secure locations. He asked the CDD to specify exactly what was needed before DR could establish the necessary installations. The discussion was referred to the Committee for Press Preparedness.Footnote 72 In 1979, the warning committee noted that if DR was to have a central place in the warning system, an agreement should provide for technical as well as personnel aspects and discussed obtaining copies of similar Norwegian and Swedish agreements to inform the talks.Footnote 73
In September 1980, the warning committee submitted its report, recommending an organisational and technological overhaul of the Danish warning system. It also recommended a clearer system for instructing the population.Footnote 74 As it noted, it was not likely that the population would remember the signals outlined in If War Comes eighteen years earlier, if they still even had a copy of the pamphlet.Footnote 75 The report also stated that different warnings demanding different reactions risked people having a ‘wrong reaction’.Footnote 76 The report directly referenced the fact that Norway and Sweden both had just three signals, even if it incorrectly stated that they were the same. Still, it recommended implementing a system like the Norwegian and noted that the population should be ‘carefully instructed’ on the meaning of different signals, including the special ‘disaster signal’.Footnote 77
Meanwhile, the CDD had been busy preparing its own report on the future of civil defence, which it released in June 1980, just months before the warning committee’s report. This report was penned during an uncertain period for Danish civil defence. Funding had decreased throughout the 1970s, and Director Schultz seems to have been genuinely worried that the civil defence would be discontinued.Footnote 78 The report marked the warning system as deficient and welcomed the warning committee’s report. It also recommended overhauling the siren system, including extending its coverage.Footnote 79 Thus, the CDD had moved from a defensive to a cooperative position on the ‘warning issue’, likely in the face of decreased funding, as well as substantial political and public criticism.
Against the backdrop of these two reports, the Ministry of the Interior sanctioned further planning of a new warning system.Footnote 80 This eventually led to the implementation of a new siren system, which was completed in 1993.Footnote 81
Through these debates, we clearly see the influence of the discussions that occurred within the Scandinavian forum. Schultz, and likely other civil defence officials, brought these insights to the warning committee not only discussing similar themes, but also making direct reference to other Scandinavian practices and especially the Norwegian model. However, local issues significantly moved the agenda along: the ‘warning issue’ raised by the civil defence officials, the Barsebäck nuclear power plant DR’s role in the warning system. Here, the Danish EPA turned out to be a central player.
The EPA Gets Busy
Throughout 1978 and 1979, the warning committee sporadically touched upon the warning system in case of a Barsebäck accident, but did not settle on any concrete recommendations.Footnote 82 However, while the CDD and warning committee did not make any progress on this issue, the EPA was hard at work making its own arrangements with significantly more success. In January 1979, at the behest of EPA, the Church Ministry issued a provision allowing church bells to ring as warning in the case of a Barsebäck accident. Shortly thereafter, the EPA made an agreement with DR on broadcasting in the case of that event.Footnote 83
This development occurred almost simultaneously with the Three Mile Island nuclear accident in USA in March 1979, further increasing attention to (and funding for) Barsebäck contingency planning.Footnote 84 In October 1979, Danish media reported that an EPA working group had proposed the implementation of a warning signal using the civil defence sirens, which would instruct people to go inside and listen to the radio.Footnote 85 I have not found trace of this proposal in the CDD archives and therefore cannot provide insight into how it was received or negotiated, but it is reasonable to assume that media attention helped to facilitate CDD cooperation. In any case, the CDD agreed to this in June 1980, around the same time as the release of their report.Footnote 86 EPAs own agreements with DR and the Church Ministry, along with the press reports, likely strongly influenced the CDD’s decision to cooperate rather than risk looking regressive and perhaps even irrelevant. Still, it took until May 1981 before the media could inform the population about the new signal, which was, at this point, still Barsebäck-specific.Footnote 87 Thus several actors and developments converged for the CDD to reach the decision.
‘Listen to the Radio’
The EPA not only pushed for a peacetime siren signal in case of a nuclear accident, but it also paved the way for an agreement between DR and the CDD on radio broadcasting.
In September 1980, when the warning committee released its report, there was still no formal agreement between CDD and DR on broadcasting in times of war or crisis, and the agreement with EPA was Barsebäck-specific. In their report, the warning committee wrote that in the case of nuclear war, DR was to broadcast information about fallout locations. However, the report also noted that there was a lack of secure broadcasting locations because both circuits between the CDD and DR and FM transmitters were vulnerable to nuclear detonations.Footnote 88 As had been conveyed at the meetings, DR was willing to broadcast messages but lacked the necessary infrastructure to do so in wartime. As such, the 1979 agreement between DR and EPA on the Barsebäck contingency plan had been easier to reach, as it pertained ‘only’ to a peacetime accident.
These discussions paved the way for a general agreement between the CDD and DR, which was signed in June 1981. It stated that DR was obligated to broadcast crisis information to the population on behalf of the Ministry of the Interior/CDD, Ministry of the Environment/EPA, Ministry of Defence/Defence Command, the police director of Copenhagen and local police chiefs. The signal (three notes of twelve seconds each, repeated after one minute) meant ‘Go indoors, listen to the radio where further information and instructions will be given’.Footnote 89 Notably, this initial agreement between pertained to peacetime only. In reality, it was merely an extension of the Barsebäck arrangement to cover other peacetime catastrophes.Footnote 90
Still, public communication around the new signal stated that it was for both peacetime and wartime. This was not entirely correct, as the latter was not spelled out and did not have formal approval. This meant that, technically, two different signals for nuclear fallout during war were still in force. However, the CDD wanted to extend the agreement to war.Footnote 91 During 1982, the CDD was still ‘seeking confirmation’ that the arrangement was applicable in wartime, even if they publicly communicated that it was.Footnote 92 In 1983, the Committee for Press Preparedness provided this formalisation.Footnote 93
As for DR’s request for appropriate infrastructure for wartime broadcasting, the agreement was followed up with funding for a secure emergency studio in the basement of the DR headquarters, which became operational in 1986.Footnote 94 Simultaneously, efforts to secure regional broadcasting facilities continued.Footnote 95 Moreover, the agreement included a mandate for the police to sound the signal locally, which, until this point, had to be done from civil defence commands.Footnote 96 Infrastructural work began in 1982, and in March 1985 the installations were completed to enable all police stations to activate the siren.Footnote 97
The agreement was renewed in 1985 and in 1987, DR’s obligations were written into the radio and television laws. The explanatory notes for the law stated that DR and the CDD would be in continuous contact regarding technical and structural developments.Footnote 98 In 1989, DR’s monopoly on television was broken with the founding of a new national TV station, TV2, which had the same public service obligations as DR.Footnote 99
Thus, with the formalisation of the siren-radio pairing, embedding its functionality began. Physically, it was embedded into technical infrastructures structures such as emergency studios, regional broadcasting facilities, circuits from police stations to DR and backup systems. Societally, it was written into law.
But this was not all. As stated by a participant at a 1982 Civil defence seminar, ‘you cannot say warning without saying communication’.Footnote 100 Therefore, we now turn to the further societal embedding of the agreement’s core message.
Communication Campaigns
A general rise in public, political and media interest in civil defence followed the escalation of Cold War tensions from 1979, the warning committee’s report from 1980 and the civil defence memorandum of the same year.Footnote 101 This served as a starting point for new communication efforts from the CDD. As they noted, the traditional policy of keeping a low profile had only led to weakened interest and budget cuts, which may also explain their changed attitude towards the issue of the warning system from rejecting the proposed changes to embracing them.Footnote 102
Efforts to strengthen the CDD’s communication strategy significantly increased in 1981. In January–February, the CDD formed a working group on information, conducted a large information seminar and appointed its first full-time information manager.Footnote 103 It also formed a working group specifically for information about warning signals, focusing on four components: precise and easily understandable signals, popular knowledge of them, further information upon contingency and general information about warnings as part of a continuous information strategy.Footnote 104 The new special signal also required some promotion. The agreement was announced in a press release of late July 1981 and a swathe of local and national newspapers reported on it in July–August.Footnote 105
Another major puzzle piece fell into place simultaneously: the publication of civil defence information in local directories. Sweden and Norway already published instructions in phone books, and Schultz showed interest in this arrangement (and its costs) at a 1978 civil defence directors’ meeting.Footnote 106 The Danish CDD had tried to implement this throughout the 1970s, but had been unsuccessful because of funding issues.Footnote 107 What seemed to get the ball rolling was a local initiative in 1980 from the Elsinore municipal government, which paid to include information from the local civil defence chapter in the local directory. Schultz began to push for an extension of this arrangement to other municipalities, and negotiations with the publisher started in 1980.Footnote 108 The CDD would provide a standard text and layout free of charge, which could then be amended by the municipal governments as needed.Footnote 109 This plan was successful, and the majority of local directories for 1981/2 included civil defence information. However, the early editions still only pertained to wartime.Footnote 110
As not all Danish municipalities distributed free directories to households, information in nationwide phone books remained a goal of the CDD. The inclusion of civil defence information in local-level directories paved the way for the realisation of this goal. After a series of negotiations between municipal governments, publishers and the State Telephone Authority, the funding issue was settled so that publishers and municipalities would be responsible for funding things locally, whereas the State Telephone Authority would cover the costs for the phone books at the national level.Footnote 111 In the 1982/3 edition of the national phone book, civil defence information was included for the first time, taking up two pages in the back or front (depending on region).Footnote 112
It is possible that the finalisation of this arrangement was helped along by the CDD/DR agreement. At any rate, they occurred in tandem, and the content for the national phone books was ready by September 1981.Footnote 113 One page displayed the meanings of the different siren signals and the other gave information on sheltering, aid, evacuation, self-protection and radioactive and chemical pollution. At the top of the first page (the first thing you would see), was information about the new siren signal. Next to a pictogram of the three siren notes was the headline ‘Important message – listen to the radio’ and, in smaller font, ‘Go indoors and listen to Denmark’s Radio’. On the right-hand side, images of church bells and loudspeaker cars illustrated the arrangement for areas outside siren coverage. Next came the signals for air raid and ‘all clear’. Everything was illustrated with simple drawings in a pictogram style.Footnote 114 Simple language and illustrations were used intentionally.Footnote 115 The pages stated that the signal was valid for both war and peace (not entirely correct before 1983) and the Copenhagen phone books also had a special note on the Barsebäck contingency plan.Footnote 116
An accompanying poster from this period was even simpler: it featured a silhouette of a siren on a rooftop and a visualisation of the three siren notes (reminiscent of the front and back covers of If War Comes) centralising the iconography of the siren. Big all-caps font stated ‘Go indoors and listen to Denmark’s Radio’ and the bottom left corner featured a picture of a telephone crossed over with a red line, signalling for people not to block the phone lines by calling authorities (or each other) but to rather await information on the radio (see figure 1).Footnote 117 Thus, the simplicity and effectiveness desired of the sound was also present in the messaging about it.
‘Go indoors and listen to Denmark’s Radio’ poster by the Civil Defence Directorate. Undated, 1980s.

A major information drive in November 1981 highlighted both the agreement and the information in the upcoming phone book issues. 200,000 special prints of the two phone book pages were distributed to public locations such as post offices, libraries, police stations and local civil defence offices, where they would be free to take home. They could also be acquired upon request. Special TV and radio broadcasts aired on 18 November, the same date as the release of special prints.Footnote 118 A press release was sent out, and most local newspapers reported that the information would appear in phone books. Some also showed the graphics from the phone book and special print as an illustration.Footnote 119
Embedding the message in the institutions of daily life, especially phone books, was deliberate: ‘In this way, we have ensured that most homes will always have easily available information at hand.’Footnote 120 Unlike special pamphlets and booklets, which could disappear after a while, the phone book was a standard household item. Almost everyone had one and could always find it.Footnote 121 As they were regularly reissued, the information could be kept up to date or changed as neccesary.Footnote 122
In its annual report for 1981, the CDD stated that the year had been marked by an all-time high in terms of public interest, which was reflected in press coverage, political debates, public meetings and conferences.Footnote 123 Sweden also noted increased popular support for civil defence in 1981.Footnote 124 This could obviously be attributed to increasing international tension, but at least the CDD also felt that was the effect of their increased communication activity and resources as part of their ‘new profile’.Footnote 125
More TV broadcasts aired in 1982, followed by newspaper advertisements and the production and distribution of posters and stickers.Footnote 126 A third round of TV broadcasts aired in November 1983, preceded by newspaper ads.Footnote 127 That year, following the general increase in information initiatives and a shifting geopolitical situation, the CDD also issued a new general pamphlet on self-protection. Whereas If War Comes had been a direct translation of the Swedish title, the new title, On Surviving (Om at overleve), was an almost direct translation from the Norwegian. The pages on siren signals displayed ‘Go indoors and listen to Denmark’s Radio’ first, followed by air raid and all clear. The slogan was repeated in blue bold print in three separate places across the two pages.Footnote 128
On Surviving was not household-distributed like its predecessor, partly because of budget restrictions, but the minister of the interior also appeared concerned that it would rise to ‘anxious questions’.Footnote 129 Instead, like the special print on the siren signal, 200,000 copies would be produced and laid out in public spaces and offices, like police stations, libraries, schools and social offices, and it could also be required upon request.Footnote 130 The idea of distributing to ‘the press and especially interested citizens’ rather than general household distribution had apparently also come from Norway.Footnote 131 However, it became necessary to print an additional 100,000 copies due to high demand. Among other things, the pamphlet was widely used in schools.Footnote 132
Schools are thus another public institution in which this imaginary was embedded. In 1984 and 1987, the CDD collaborated with the Danish School for Journalism to produce teaching materials primarily directed at senior primary school classes and students in secondary education.Footnote 133
A 1988 policy document stated that household-distributed pamphlets in peacetime were no longer an appropriate information channel, as they tended to end up in the bin. Rather, the civil defence organisation ought to use the channels that reached most citizens, namely TV, radio and the education sector. The document also noted that public interest in civil defence diminished when threats were absent. On the flip side, events such as the Chernobyl disaster of 1986 spurred massive interest. Therefore, information campaigns ought to be concentrated around peacetime disasters, and preferably distributed in connection with a current event, as civil defence tasks in war and peace were now looked upon as nearly identical.Footnote 134
These statements, as well as the decision to lead with peacetime disaster rather than war in civil defence communication, show how the CDD had not only embraced an all-hazards approach, but even found it useful in its communication as it was closer to the everyday lives of citizens than the more abstract and absent war. The extensive communication and embedding efforts also show the centrality of an imaginary that aimed to elicit the ‘correct’ reactions within the population via normative and efficient sound.
Public knowledge and reception
At a meeting of the Committee for Press Preparedness in 1983, a DR representative noted that for the ‘go indoors …’ signal to function, it was paramount that the population knew what it meant.Footnote 135 Whether they did or not is difficult to determine.
Initially, the CDD wanted to conduct two surveys per year to establish the campaign’s effect.Footnote 136 This seems not to have happened, but a survey from May 1982 showed that between 49 and 55 per cent of 20–49-year-olds would listen to the radio if the siren sounded and that knowledge of the signal was best within the Copenhagen area. Between 12 and 24 per cent (depending on the age group) would have a ‘wrong reaction’, such as using the telephone to contact the police, fire services, or family.Footnote 137 The CDD deemed this situation to be unsatisfactory and concluded in December 1982 that general knowledge of civil defence was poor, although the information campaign following the agreement had had some effect.Footnote 138 Another survey from 1983 showed that a total of 54 per cent would turn on the radio if the siren sounded, with 20–39-year-olds topping the poll with 63 per cent.Footnote 139 This seems to be the last time that the issue was thoroughly investigated. A 1985 survey only asked about knowledge and image of the civil defence, not alarm signals.Footnote 140
The first time the new signal was used was in the town of Nyborg in 1982, when a chemical plant had a toxic leak.Footnote 141 The accident revealed that too many people did not know what to do, and only half of the people in the municipality were within hearing range of a siren.Footnote 142 This incident and the lacklustre poll of 1982 prompted the second round of TV broadcasts mentioned above, as well as a reissuing of posters and advertisements in local papers.Footnote 143 An exercise was held in Nyborg in April 1983, and more posters and stickers were distributed.Footnote 144 Moreover, an eight-page information pamphlet was distributed to households, although only in the Nyborg municipality.Footnote 145
In January 1983, a fire broke out at a painting factory in the town of Fredensborg, potentially spreading toxic smoke, but the local police decided not to activate the sirens. This was due to practical issues (the command centre was far from the place of the incident and coverage was inadequate), but also because of the desire not to generate panic. The local police decided that sounding the siren would be overly dramatic, especially because people did not know what it meant. This gave rise to a discussion in the reference group for the warning project established after the publication of the warning committee’s report to oversee the implementation of its recommendations. The discussion focused on how to further spread awareness about the signals and what people ought to do upon hearing them.Footnote 146
In an interview with a local Fredensborg newspaper, the CDD information manager stated that the ‘go indoors’ message was to be repeated again and again. The paper also asked people in the street about their knowledge of the special signal and concluded that it was minimal. However, if one reads the answers, the picture is a little different: the paper asked six people, and just one answered that she knew the ‘go indoors …’ signal and what it meant. One had no clue about siren signals at all. Three others, while they might not have known the specifics of each signal, answered that if they heard the siren, they would go indoors and turn on the radio. One participant answered that she lived in an area without sirens but usually kept informed about contingencies via the radio. Thus, five of the six would actually do the ‘right’ thing.Footnote 147
However, not everyone did. After a sounding of the siren (false alarm) in the city of Aarhus in 1985, the police had to issue a statement instructing people to go indoors and listen to the radio rather than calling them.Footnote 148 Hence, it seems that knowledge of the signal was mixed and that despite a clear intention and extensive embedding effort, not everyone displayed ‘correct’ behaviour. Thus, while the imaginary and all the efforts surrounding it were still firmly in place from an official viewpoint, this raises questions as to the reception and success of an imaginary envisioned and embedded by authorities.
The 1986 Chernobyl disaster sent clouds of radioactivity over Scandinavia and prompted people to ring the EPA for information to the extent that it blocked their telephone system. A following survey revealed that four out of five felt underinformed about protective measures.Footnote 149 The disaster was followed by reprints of the phonebook pages and information on contingency plans.Footnote 150 Moreover, a pamphlet on Barsebäck was distributed to households in the Copenhagen region.Footnote 151 It seems the CDD were right when they noted in 1988 that people were mainly interested in preparedness and contingencies when one actually happened.
Conclusion
The agreement between the CDD and Danish national radio about a special signal to go indoors and listen to the radio transferred a practice in another Scandinavian country, Norway, through a forum of continuous transnational cooperation. However, the path was not straightforward. Rather, it was full of obstacles in the form of resistance, negotiations, comparisons and amendments arising out of specific national and local conditions. We see different paths of development across the Scandinavian region. Denmark was the last to include preparedness information in phonebooks, a practice first seen in Sweden. Sweden was the last to adopt the siren-radio signal in 1986, a practice first seen in Norway. This made for a multi-faceted web of transnational entanglements, which further converged with local developments. Regular meetings and conferences between the Scandinavian civil defence directors seem to have functioned almost as a knowledge or inspiration bank that representatives of each country could draw upon as needed.
The special siren signal prompting citizens to go indoors and listen to the radio appears to have been distinctly Scandinavian. At least in the mid-1980s both the Danish and Swedish civil defence organisations found that no other Western European countries had a similar arrangement.Footnote 152 Whether any other countries adopted a similar practice is outside the scope of this study. Still, while this particular signal along with its meaning seems to have been particular to Scandinavia, all three countries existed and were influenced by a wider context of Western and Western European events and developments. The increasing amalgamation of war and peacetime emergency management in the 1970s occurred alongside rising environmental awareness, nuclear power debates and a geopolitical Détente. These developments fostered changing attitudes towards risk and preparedness from a dichotomy of war and peace towards an all-hazards approach where war and disaster were points on a spectrum.
In Denmark, this changing context converged with local developments, including a public debate on the (in)sufficiency of the Danish warning system and the construction of a Swedish nuclear power plant less than 25 km from the Danish capital. As such, the issue of nuclear power, raised by the Environmental Protection Agency, drove developments more than the initially resistant CDD, embodied by Erik Schultz. It seems that under these circumstances, as well as a fear of becoming irrelevant the CDD had no choice but to embrace developments and follow suit. This uneven road towards a transformation of civil defence shows that the same actor(s) can hold positions of resistance and extension, depending on the context.Footnote 153
The arrangement for a special siren signal prompting citizens to go indoors and turn on the radio has most of the markers of a socio-technical imaginary, as defined by Jasanoff: it was a ‘vision of a desirable future’ (or at least a desirable reaction to undesirable circumstances) that was ‘institutionally stabilized’ by being embedded into law, as well as social and technological infrastructure.Footnote 154 It was ‘publicly performed’ through weekly siren tests, iconography, information and education campaigns, TV and radio airtime and it was embedded further into everyday institutions and artefacts. It was ‘animated by shared understandings of forms of social life and social order’ among those who devised and planned it, and it was ‘attainable through and supportive of, advances in science and technology’ as it both stemmed from, and further pushed, developments, not only in sonic technology (sirens and radio) but also in the material infrastructure needed to make it function.
At its core were two phases of normative sound: the siren and subsequently, instructions via radio. These sounds were supposed to instil correct behaviour, a starting point from which a well-ordered crisis imaginary could be created and directed as deemed necessary by the authorities. Catastrophe was manageable so long as the desired social order was upheld through correct behaviour, and the sounds carried by siren and radio were the tools to communicate this. However, socio-technical imaginaries are also ‘publicly held’ and received differently. While (at least) half of the population stated that they would behave ‘correctly’, there was also evidence of undesirable reactions. While Jasanoff speaks of resistance to an imaginary, the Danish public’s reactions perhaps point more to a type of inertia.Footnote 155 Thus, while the socio-technical imaginary of the siren-radio pairing and the order it envisioned existed as a top-down process, its reception from a bottom-up perspective is murkier.
Acknowledgements
I would like to extend a warm thanks to the Soundscapes of Warning research group led by Professor Marie Cronqvist, for invaluable discussions, sparring and comments on earlier manuscripts. I would also like to thank Bodil Frandsen at the REGAN VEST museum for providing me with a scan of the original ‘Go indoors …’ poster. Last, but by no means least, I thank the anonymous peer reviewers for their comments and insights, helping me tease out important main points. I also want to extend a warm thanks to CEH editor Dr Siobhan Hearne for her work on the manuscript.
