Kristoffer Klammer offers a new perspective on economic crises by understanding them not merely as real events, which are defined by clear economic indications, but as a form of political communication. He follows a relatively new conceptual historical approach of historical semantics and argues, in accordance with other recent studies, that the meanings of “economic crises” were constructed through specific semantics and narratives.
By looking at three different crises (1929–1933, 1966–1967, and 1973–1976) in (West) Germany, Klammer identifies semantical differences in the meaning of the phrase “economic crisis,” which were used for political argumentation and justification of policies. For his semantic analysis, he focuses on parliamentary debates, speeches, and interviews by politicians. He further reconstructs narratives of crisis in the media by taking into account newspapers with different political standpoints, as well as quality and tabloid papers.
The book is divided into three parts, each focusing on one economic crisis. Every part begins with a detailed chronological reconstruction of the semantics of “crisis,” which the author understands, in accordance with a discourse linguistics approach, as topoi (45f). With this method, the author is able to distinguish different phases of crises. He then focuses on specific semantical characteristics of each crisis, such as metaphors. Next, he looks at specific actors and how they used the term crisis in order to achieve political goals.
The economic crisis of the early 1930s was often framed by drastic terms such as fight (Kampf) and misery (Elend). The word sacrifice (Opfer) was used in all three crises in order to demand and justify individual austerity measures. Metaphors referring to images of the diseased body were also used in all three crises, such as “reviving the economy” (Wirtschaftsbelebung) or “economic bodies” (Wirtschaftskörper). Although these metaphors suggest an organic understanding of the economic system, images of the economy as a mechanical system or a machine were used as well, such as “‘winding up’ the economy” (Ankurbelung der Wirtschaft) or “economic engine” (Konjunkturmotor).
Although much has been written about the Great Depression and the economic crisis of the 1970s, Klammer offers the first detailed account of the economic growth dent (Wachstumsdelle) of 1966–1967, which has been mentioned only in passing by other historians due to the much more influential crisis of the 1970s. The author argues that the Wachstumsdelle did not diminish confidence in macroeconomic regulation and control—on the contrary, due to the short and only minor economic slump, belief in it was reinforced. Klammer also shows that semantics of crisis were not primarily used in regard to economic developments, but referred to political developments, namely conflicts in the then-governing Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) and the perceived weakness of Chancellor Ludwig Erhardt.
In his conclusion, Klammer offers a concise diachronic comparison. He argues convincingly that an economic problem was not automatically perceived as a crisis. It always needed a combination of changing economic circumstances and political events to create a situation that prompted political actors or journalists to speak of a “crisis.” The peak of the perceived crisis was usually reached before the climax, which economic indicators suggested. In each case, “crisis” was not only used to describe a specific event, as the term's original Greek meaning indicates, but also to describe long-term structural problems, such as when referring to the “crisis of unemployment.”
The author frequently refers to the global financial crisis of 2008. Today's reader might also compare some of his findings to 2020. Klammer comes to the conclusion, for example, that politicians were often freer to act during situations that were perceived as a crisis because decisions could be made faster and fewer explanations to political opponents and to the public had to be made. The author therefore draws the reader's attention to the importance of political communication and how the term crisis determines policy and is in turn determined by political actors.
In accordance with the historical semantics approach, Klammer offers a detailed reconstruction of the semantics of crisis for each case study, which is at times tiresome. The contribution of this theoretical exploration to seeing “economic crises” in a new light is not always clear, especially given the focus is solely on statements by politicians and newspaper correspondents writing about politics. Although the analytical chapters that look at the semantics of crisis from a meta-perspective are informative, the book would have benefited from a significantly shorter reconstruction of when and in which context the term crisis was used. This is especially the case for the already well-researched crises of the 1930s and 1970s. Although the author deals with the research literature at the beginning of each case study, he does not incorporate his findings sufficiently into existing research or scholarly debates. To do so would have highlighted the benefits of Klammer's new approach and perspective on understanding economic crises even more.
Nevertheless, the events of 2020 and the specific semantics of crisis underline the importance and promising perspective of this book. It is a valuable addition to the research on economic crises, which has until recently been dominated by economic history approaches.
