[‘Prepositional Metaphysics’ is] an unfortunate term, not only because it implies that a certain type of metaphysics is involved (rather than a certain language for referring to causes), but also because it suggests in any case that there is some doctrine, or line of influence, or rigid aetiological scheme to be inferred from the use of this idiom… But it is just an idiom – one with roots in the aetiological language of Plato (see Tim. 28a–30c…) and Aristotle (e.g. Metaph. 1032a12–25…).Footnote 1 , Footnote 2
In his characteristically stimulating and wide-ranging essay, ‘Mind the (Ontological) Gap! The Collateral Loss of the Pauline-Stoic Creation “From God” in the Joint Attack of the Arian-Nicene Creation “From Nothing” on the Platonic Creation “From Disorderly Matter”’, George H. van Kooten argues ‘that Paul’s own cosmology is deeply Stoic…[and that this] becomes clear in his use of so-called “prepositional metaphysics”, in which – in line with Stoic theology and physics – God is seen as the one “from whom” “through whom” and “into whom” all things develop’.Footnote 3 In this essay, I will demonstrate that van Kooten has misconstrued the relevant data and also failed to appreciate the ways in which, whatever metaphysical work these prepositions are doing in Paul’s metaphysics, theology, Christology, etc., they are not doing precisely the same work as they seem to be doing in the metaphysical traditions from which they ultimately derive.Footnote 4 And this is why we must carefully heed the warning of Boys-Stones with which we began.
In any case, let us start with what van Kooten gets right. The combined ascription of ‘from whom/him’ and ‘to whom/him’ to the same (active) cause in 1 Corinthians 8.6 and Romans 11.36 (cf, Col. 1.15–16) resonates with the monism of the Stoic tradition.
The closest parallel to this particular Pauline formulation comes from the famous Stoic philosopher-emperor, Marcus Aurelius:
The manner of expressing metaphysical causation by way of prepositional shorthand goes back particularly to Plato and Aristotle, the latter of which had postulated four causes (the material [τὸ ἐξ οὗ], the formal [τὸ εἶδος ἢ τὸ παράδειγμα], the efficient [ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς ἡ πρώτη ἢ τῆς ἠρεμήσεως] and the final [τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα]),Footnote 5 in addition to which Plato had famously postulated a fifth: the paradigmatic ideal (τὸ πρός ὅ) with reference to which something is made. This idiom was also well known in Paul’s day, as can be seen by its use in Alcinous’ Handbook of Platonism, Seneca’s Epistles, Philo’s writings and, of course, in Paul himself (esp. 1 Cor. 8.6; and Rom. 11.36; cf. Col. 1.15–17/cf. John 1.3, 10; and Heb. 1.2).
If the world is not such as it is by accident, it has not only been generated from something (ἔκ τινος), but also by something (or someone) (ὑπό τινος), and not only this, but also with reference to something (πρός τι). But what could that with reference to which it is generate be other than form (ἰδέα)? So forms (αἱ ἰδέαι) exist.Footnote 6
Accordingly, there must be, in the case of each thing, that ‘from which’ it is made (unde fiat aliquid), and, next, an agent ‘by which’ it is made (deinde a quo fiat). The former is its material, the latter its cause [the Stoic position].Footnote 7
Accordingly, there are five causes, as Plato says: that ‘from which’ (id ex quo), that ‘by which’ (id a quo), that ‘in which’ (id in quo), that ‘toward which’ (id ad quod), and that ‘for which’ (id propter quod) [the Platonic position].Footnote 8
For to bring anything into being needs all these conjointly, the ‘by which’ (τὸ ὑφʼ οὗ), the ‘from which’ (τὸ ἐξ οὗ), the ‘through which’ (τὸ διʼ οὗ), and the ‘for which’ (τὸ διʼ ὅ).Footnote 9
The point I want to make here is that in none of these cases does the ‘from which’ formulation denote the active cause but always the passive material cause. Thus, although it is true that in Stoicism the active divine cause is material, the ‘from which’ formulation does not seem to have been a way of referring to this active cause.
But what of the two closest parallels van Kooten highlights in this connection? Pseudo-Aristotle, On the Cosmos 397b14–15: ‘All things are from God (ὡς ἐκ θεοῦ πάντα) and are for our sake held together by God (καὶ διὰ θεοῦ ἡμῖν συνέστηκεν).’Footnote 10
Before we jump to the conclusion that the ‘from God’ formulation of Pseudo-Aristotle, On the Cosmos 397b14–15 necessarily indicates that the active divine cause is also material (à la Stoic materialism) – as one might suspect on the basis of the use of ‘from which’ language in Alcinous, Seneca, and Philo (above) – we should remember that in these traditions the ‘from which’ language never denotes the active divine cause, and we should also note Pseudo-Aristotle’s strong Middle Platonic emphasis on the transcendence of the first principle (On the Cosmos 400b):
In a word then, as the helmsman in his ship, as the charioteer in his chariot, as the leader in a chorus, as the lawgiver in a city, as the commander in a military camp, so is God in the cosmos, except that their command is wearisome and fraught with many movements and cares, while God rules without pain and toil, free from all bodily weakness: for he is established in the immovable, and moves and directs all things as and where he wishes, among the varieties of form and nature (τῷ δὲ ἄλυπον ἄπονόν τε καὶ πάσης κεχωρισμένος σωματικῆς ἀσθενείας· ἐν ἀκινήτῳ γὰρ ἱδρυμένος πάντα κινεῖ καὶ περιάγει).Footnote 11
That the active divine principle is ‘free from all bodily weakness’ and ‘established in the immovable’ strongly suggests that it is also incorporeal and thus immaterial (à la Middle Platonism).
Moreover, when we consider the wider context of Marcus Aurelius’ statement in Meditations 4.23, we see that neither in this text is the ‘from you/God’ language designed to signal the materiality of the active divine cause. In other words, though Stoics – and Marcus Aurelius no less – took the materiality of the active divine principle for granted, the prepositional formulations of ‘from you/whom/which/God’ and ‘to you/whom/which/God’ do not seem designed to make that point.
All that is in tune with thee, O Universe, is in tune with me! Nothing that is in due time for thee is too early or too late for me! All that thy seasons bring, O Nature, is fruit for me! All things come from thee, subsist in thee, go back to thee (ἐκ σοῦ πάντα, ἐν σοὶ πάντα, εἰς σὲ πάντα).Footnote 12
Rather, the force of the final formulation is to emphasise the monistic unity of the Stoic view of the cyclical nature of reality/time. And this, indeed, is how Philo understands it. As a part of his allegorical interpretation of the meaning of the sacrificial division of animals’ limbs, Philo writes:
The division of the animal into its limbs indicates either that all things are one or that they come from and return to one, an alternation which is called by some Fullness and Want, by others a General Conflagration and Reconstruction (ὅτι ἐξ ἑνός τε καὶ εἰς ἕν, ὅπερ οἱ μὲν κόρον καὶ χρησμοσύνην ἐκάλεσαν, οἱ δ᾿ ἐκπύρωσιν καὶ διακόσμησιν), the Conflagration being the state when the supremacy of heat has prevailed over the rest, the Reconstruction when the four elements, by concession to each other, obtain equilibrium.Footnote 13
In other words, Philo is aware of the ‘from whom/which’ and ‘back to whom/which’ idiom as a way of referring to the monistic unity of the cyclical nature of Stoic physics (i.e. ‘Conflagration’– ‘Reconstruction’ – ‘Conflagration’ – ‘Reconstruction’ ad infinitum).
Beyond this, one should also note a crucial and too little appreciated distinction between the famous statement of Marcus Aurelius above and the similar but different formulations of Paul in Romans 11.36 and 1 Corinthians 8.6. Paul speaks of the divine causal agent(s) ‘from’, ‘through’, and ‘to’ whom, whereas Marcus Aurelius, in good Stoic-pantheistic fashion, speaks of the single divine causal agent ‘from’, ‘in’, and ‘to’ whom. ‘In you/whom/God’ is appropriate to Stoic pantheism, whereas the Middle Platonic intermediary language of ‘through whom’ derives from the metaphysical insistence upon the distinction between the first causal principle and created reality, something that is out of place in Stoic monism. But van Kooten misses the point first by unwittingly mistranslating a metaphysical statement that Diogenes Laertius attributes to Zeno and then by equating this misinterpretation with the Middle Platonic formulation of Philo:
According to the Stoic view, God or Zeus (Δία) is the cause ‘through which’ [sic] (δι’ ὅν) all things have been generated by pervading ‘through all things’ (διὰ πάντων)…
‘For they call him Zeus (Δία) as the cause (δι’ ὃν) through which [sic] all things are (Δία μὲν γάρ φασι δι’ ὃν τὰ πάντα)’ (SVF 2,1021 apud Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers 7,147 = LS 54A; transl. LS, with minor changes). We also find this view expressed in Philo, according to whom ‘the Logos’ is that ‘through which (δι’ οὗ) the whole cosmos was created (λόγος […], δι’ οὗ σύμπας ὁ κόσμος ἐδημιουργεῖτο)’ (Philo, On the Special Laws 1,81).Footnote 14
As one can see, Diogenes Laertius reports Zeno as having spoken of the causal agent ‘because of which’ (δι’ ὃν/final cause) are all things and not, as in Philo’s Middle Platonic intermediary formulation, the causal agent ‘through which’ (δι’ οὗ) are all things.Footnote 15
Let us, then, finally come to Paul. What are we to make of 1 Corinthians 8.6 and Romans 11.36?
We have already determined that there is no good reason to conclude on the basis of Paul’s use of ‘from whom/him’ language for the active divine cause, God the Father, that he intends hereby to express the latter’s corporeality/materiality. But nor does this of itself answer the question as to what Paul did or did not think about divine ontology (immaterial/material/underdetermined). It only rules out ‘from whom/him’ language as an obvious indication of his view. For Paul, ascribing ‘from whom/him’ and ‘to whom/him’ language to God the Father was, not unlike the Stoic formulations in Pseudo-Aristotle, On the Cosmos 397b14–15 and Marcus Aurelius, Meditations 4.23, a way of saying that all of reality and history, its origins and teleological ends, are ultimately dependent upon one divine causal agent.
But what are we to make, then, of the use of the Middle Platonic intermediary formulation ‘through whom/him’? In 1 Corinthians 8.6, this language refers to Jesus the Messiah, a fact that could be taken to indicate that, as in typical Middle Platonic hierarchical metaphysics, Paul regards Jesus the Messiah (the intermediary causal agent) as slightly ontologically inferior to God the Father (the first principle), Jesus’ intermediary activity serving precisely to safeguard God the Father from direct commerce with created reality. But Paul’s use of the intermediary formulation in Romans 11.36 to refer indiscriminately to ‘God’ suggests that this is unlikely to be the reason he has made use of it.
The best angle of vision on why Paul made theological and Christological use of this metaphysical idiom and in this way, I suggest, comes from appreciating two facts. (1) Cosmogonical activity was the clearest marker of divinity in Second Temple Judaism: only the one God (and/or his wisdom/word) creates the kosmos.Footnote 16 (2) Some early Christian traditions (John 1.1–18; 1 Cor. 8.6; Col. 1.15–20; and Heb. 1.1–6) wanted to include the pre-existent Jesus in their Jewish-monotheistic cosmogony, but not as an intermediate being (à la hierarchical Middle Platonism) whose primary function was to safeguard the transcendence of the first principle (God the Father). Point (2) ran the risk of collapsing the distinction – equally important to these same early Christian traditions – between the Father and the Son. Therefore, the intermediary formulation ‘through whom/him’ (John 1.3, 10; 1 Cor. 8.6; Col. 1.16–17; and Heb. 1.2) was chosen so as to make a distinction within this Jewish-monotheistic cosmogony, but not so as to express the slight ontological inferiority of the intermediary principle, and thereby to safeguard the transcendence of the originating principle. After all, again Paul can refer indiscriminately to ‘God’ as the one ‘through whom’ are all things (Rom. 11.36; cf. Heb. 1.2 with 2.10).
In conclusion, then, my contention is that van Kooten has misconstrued key pieces of data relating to the use and implications of this metaphysical idiom in the relevant philosophical traditions and in Paul. (1) There is no evidence to suggest that Paul’s use of ‘from whom/him’ language for God the Father necessarily signalled the materiality of the latter. (2) Van Kooten unwittingly mistranslated the ‘because of which’ (δι’ ὅν) formulation that Diogenes Laertius attributed to Zeno the Stoic (Lives of Eminent Philosophers 7.147), mistaking a formulation about the final cause for a formulation about the intermediary cause, and then he equated this misinterpretation with Philo’s properly Middle Platonic formulation in Spec. 1.81 (‘through which’/δι’ οὗ). (3) And, finally, van Kooten appropriated these misunderstandings in a reading of 1 Corinthians 8.6 and Romans 11.36 in particular and of Paul’s metaphysics in general.
Finally, I cite a statement of Michael Frede’s with a few comments.
It seems that Sulla’s conquest of Athens in 87 BC had a devastating effect on philosophy in Athens… The consequences of this are easy to see. The diffusion of philosophers and the emergence of a variety of centres of philosophical study encouraged a proliferation of philosophical positions, fostered separate and independent developments, and undermined the unity of the position of the school… This goes some way to explain the absence of clear contours in the history of the philosophy done in the period from 125 BC to 250 AD.Footnote 17
The point here is that when teasing out the metaphysical presuppositions and articulations of figures like (e.g.) Alcinous, Pseudo-Aristotle, Seneca, Philo and Paul – not least in Paul’s day, well over a century after Sulla’s conquest of Athens – we have to beware of the tempting genealogical fallacy. That is, we have to beware of assuming that the metaphysical function of a particular lexeme, formulation, trope, etc. is doing precisely the same work in a text from the first century ce as it was doing in the earlier school formulations of Plato, Aristotle, Zeno and/or Chrysippus. In other words, by paying careful attention to all of the evidence available to us, we have to try to let authors construct the metaphysic they seem to want to construct, rather than to take single lexemes, formulations or tropes as genealogical evidence that an entire metaphysical construct from one of the earlier schools should wholly govern our reading of a later author/text.
Competing interests
The author declares none.
