Marcus Mietzner's Democratic Deconsolidation in Southeast Asia is a welcome comparative analysis of three Southeast Asian countries: Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. The study examines the patterns of democratic peaks, democratic deconsolidation, and Southeast Asia's patterns in a global democratic recession context. The study frames itself in works by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan on the notion of democratic consolidation, Wolfgang Merkel on consolidation stages, and Larry Diamond on the notion of consolidation as a process.Footnote 1 It takes as its point of departure Merkel's four stages: the setting up of constitutional organs and political institutions, including the electoral system and the catalog of civil rights; the consolidation of the party system and interest groups; behavioral change among veto actors (i.e., actors previously dominant in the political system such as the military or the monarchy in the case of Southeast Asia); and democratic values among civil society and the broader population (pp. 6–10). The study ably makes use of global assessment tools such as the Democracy Index, Freedom House's Freedom in the World Index, and V-Dem's Deliberative Democracy Index to support its arguments. Overall, Democratic Deconsolidation in Southeast Asia is theoretically refreshing and empirically grounded in both qualitative and quantitative sources.
The study singles out for consideration Indonesia between 2004 and 2008, the Philippines between 1987 and 1990, and Thailand between 1998 and 2002. It argues that these three polities followed a comparable sequence of consolidation, meeting the stages outlined by Merkel. They progressed in constitutional, electoral, and institutional reform and had at least nominal protections of civil rights. Although each experienced difficulties in setting up stable party systems, they saw interest groups blossom. All witnessed a proliferation of democratic values in society, and all succeeded in sidelining traditional political forces with veto powers such as the military and monarchy. The study concludes that the driving factors of democratic transition are cross-constituency agreement between key civilian forces, holding at least one democratic election after the first election immediately following or initiating the regime change, effective management or ending of major communal violence, and temporary or long-term marginalization or appeasement of potential veto powers. All these conditions gave rise to the respective peak periods.
The study argues that the three Southeast Asian states share common patterns of deconsolidation driven by structural challenges. Key features signifying democratic erosion are challenges to the constitutional and electoral order developed during highpoints of consolidation; a dramatic erosion of civil rights protections; the emergence of new populist leaders; a proliferation of illiberal values among the population; and a persistence of old veto players. Indonesia recorded a moderate but noticeable regression from its peak period, while the Philippines went through a serious process of deconsolidation under President Rodrigo Duterte. Thailand suffered the most, regressing to a military-steered electoral autocracy. Three clusters of factors contribute to deconsolidation. The first is long-term structural democratic deficiency, including persistent clientelist structures, the politicization of security forces, and autocratic enclaves. The second is the rise of wealth inequality and its politicization by populist politicians. The third cluster centers around the ambivalence of a middle class that favors nondemocratic alternatives to secure material and social status.
Finally, when comparing Southeast Asian deconsolidation in a global context, the study observes that the Southeast Asian experience, its drivers and actors, fits the global trend of democratic deconsolidation. Southeast Asian democratic crises followed the timeline of the global democratic recession that began in 2006. Overall, democratic deconsolidation in Southeast Asia coincides with the global trend of democratic regression.
While Democratic Deconsolidation in Southeast Asia is undoubtedly a valuable account of the democratic peak and decline in Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines, there remain empirical and conceptual gaps to be addressed. One is the absence of any notion of accountability as a factor that drives democratic consolidation and hampers deconsolidation. While the theoretical framework reflects the need to institutionalize the basic principles of democracy, such as participation and contestation through elections and party mechanisms, it does not provide for how these institutions can promote accountability or how accountability supports democratic consolidation. The question of accountability institution building is critical to democratic consolidation given that in the three countries under study, elections, more often than not, reflect a high degree of political clientelism.
A second gap centers on the scale of democratic consolidation. While the theoretical framework outlines four stages, it does not differentiate levels of democratic development. In the case of Southeast Asia, levels may be differentiated based on the extent to which democratizing polities consolidate competitive elections or inclusive elections with high integrity and whether they institutionalize civil liberties and promote the rule of law. It is apparent that the three Southeast Asian countries under study have developed competitive elections but have not consistently reached the level of inclusive elections with high integrity. The extent to which the three polities have institutionalized civil liberties and adhered to the rule of law remains to be analyzed.
An additional gap is the absence of a comprehensive notion of democratic institution building. The democratic principles enshrined in a constitution have to be translated into concrete institutional reform efforts that address long- and short-term as well as emerging institutional challenges. In the case of Southeast Asia, relevant specific efforts are, for example, the reform of public administration, civil service and the judiciary, or the development of institutions supportive of civil liberties and the application of the rule of law. Linking democratic consolidation with institutional reform is critical given that in the three countries under study, veto powers, civil servants, politicians, and businesses are well connected and that the bureaucracy, the judicial system, and the rule of law often act in the interest of these coalitions.
The three additional conceptual and empirical considerations will enable scholars of Southeast Asian studies and democracy builders to be more comprehensive when analyzing and designing democratic consolidation and when enacting measures to prevent the deconsolidation process.
