Mira Sucharov's The International Self is written primarily for an audience of political scientists or international-relations scholars. As a historian, my comments here may, therefore, not address the major theoretical and disciplinary concerns of Sucharov or her intended readers as these are outside the purview of my expertise. Nevertheless, the following review critiques the book from a historian's perspective with the hope that such an analysis will raise equally relevant intellectual concerns for all scholars of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. To be sure, a review by a political scientist of the Middle East or international relations theorist would yield a different set of comments.
In her book, and in a related 2005 article in Armed Forces and Society, Sucharov tries to insert a consideration of ethical identity into an analysis of diplomatic decisionmaking. In particular, she applies a new theoretical approach to analyze shifts in Israeli diplomatic policy with regard to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Sucharov takes the ideas of psychoanalysis and construction of individual identity and applies them to the state. She correctly considers the adaptations in context and the theory that such an exercise would require. The author looks at state identity and narrative as well as counternarrative to explain breaks in military patterns, public reception of those breaks, and consequent shifts in Israeli diplomacy.
The author dates a major change in such policy to the Lebanon war and the first intifada, which eventually led to a decision by the Israeli government, she argues, to engage in the Oslo negotiations, because those two events created a “cognitive dissonance” among the Israeli public. Sucharov writes, “The war in Lebanon and the Intifada were both instances of military episodes that, to broad swaths of the Israeli population, contradicted their state's role identity. It was this break with Israeli's security ethic and hence its self-image in the realm of security policy that led Israel to seek peace with the PLO” (p. 76). She argues that during and after these events, the “psychic tension that Israelis experienced between their state's aggressive actions and its defensive-warrior role identity” was so intolerable for most Israelis that it provided a major justification to engage with the Palestinian Liberation Organization in peacemaking during Oslo (p. 90). The term defensive warrior refers to a Sucharov's typology of state role identities where, in this case, the primary Israeli role identity supports a defensive ethic but is accompanied by an active policy of military operations.
Sucharov's attempt at introducing a new way to analyze the conflict is a courageous and definitely innovative one, especially in light of the vast literature on the subject that has explored the conflict from what seems to be every detailed angle possible. Sucharov's discussion of the Israeli principle of “wars of no choice” is particularly pertinent in light of the recent American rhetoric of “no choice” with regard to its war against Iraq.
The major problem with Sucharov's analysis, in my opinion, is that she creates her own terms and then takes them as self-evident and nonproblematic throughout the book. As such, her model seems to be deterministic, rather than tested. As stated, she argues that the Lebanon war was the turning point in Israeli role identity without providing any in-depth historical investigation (other than a critical public response) that shows how and why events leading up to the Lebanon war and the war itself (rather than the 1967 war, Resolution 242, or other instances) make it the prime candidate for such a diplomatic shift. Her historical examination tends to be a summary of events rather than a detailed analysis of how those events connect to her argument(s). Similarly, Sucharov uses a typology of state role identities (p. 33) based on military concerns that is taken as true, with little proof offered as to the schematic's validity from historical examples. The discussion of her schematic, although interesting and innovative, focuses primarily upon its logic, rather than its validity. Could there be another schematic that could equally apply or even fit better? The author does not pose this question.
Although state role identities are defined as diplomatic–military identities, the author bases identity construction on what she refers to as strategic culture, which, in turn, she bases upon cultural artifacts like school curricula and national rituals and myths. Those cultural artifacts and historical quotes presented move from the Yishuv period (pre-state) to the 1970s or 1980s, without accounting for significant differences in the relative power status of the Zionists in the Mandate period versus a post-1967 state period. True, as Zerubavel so aptly shows in Recovered Roots, such rituals contributed to the construction and expression of Zionist nationalism, but it seems problematic to jump from a claim about roots to using the same examples to explain a state's military decisionmaking in a later stage of maturity and contemporary strategic culture(s). It seems to me that these cultural artifacts reflect more than they form the starting point of a military ethos. In addition, the contemporary reappropriation of Zionist myths (i.e., Masada, Tel Hai) does not necessarily translate into or effect concrete political steps.
Although Sucharov rightly acknowledges that identities are formed not only as a function of internal debates but also as a result of views of a state by external parties, she does not sufficiently consider Palestinian sources, comments, or narratives on Israeli military or diplomatic actions. Her primary-source materials come mainly from interviews and Ministry of Education files. I would be interested in learning more about how Palestinian narratives and construction of identity or existential concerns influence and shape Israeli state identity, as she defines it. Materials from diplomatic, military, and economic sources or correspondence between governmental officials would have strengthened her argument.
Indeed, Sucharov's analysis of Israel's military patterns and diplomatic shifts is quite conceptual and theoretical, a definite focus of her field. For instance, Sucharov posits the concepts of “purity of arms” and wars of “no-choice” as foundational ideas in Israeli role identity. However, although these concepts are taught to Israeli soldiers, this does not necessarily mean that they are internalized fully, as she claims (p. 87); are practiced in every military instance; or are even overriding considerations in the war room at all times. To prove her claim, she needs to present archival evidence of officers having used explicitly these principles to determine their decisions, even when circumstances would predict an opposite response. My reading thirsted for a more thorough exploration of the state's vital strategic, economic, and political interests, the materiality of the conflict. As most historians view this conflict, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is a conflict over land and the dynamics surrounding land. Existential/identity concerns may be important to consider but should be analyzed as part of a larger picture, rather than as a determining factor.
