Special judicial solicitude for free speech has two distinctive roots. The first is the belief that expression rights are more valuable than other rights. “Freedom of thought, and speech,” Justice Benjamin Cardozo maintained, was necessary to secure “the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom.” The second is the belief that government is less competent when regulating speech than when regulating other human behaviors. As John Hart Ely pointed out, elected officials may not determine fairly when criticisms of their actions threaten grave social harms. The preface to Professor Melvin I. Urofsky's Money and Free Speech: Campaign Finance Reform and the Courts feints at the first justification for judicial protection, reminding readers that “the cure for bad speech [is] not its restriction, but more speech.” The detailed history of campaign finance reform that follows teaches that the cure for campaign finance abuse is unlikely to be campaign finance reform.
Money and Free Speech is best read as a very accessible, scholarly history of how elected officials and courts have responded to perceptions that money is corrupting politics. Urofsky accurately documents the history of campaign finance reform, explains the abuses responsible for the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1974 and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002 (better known as the McCain-Feingold Act), details the Supreme Court decisions on the constitutionality of those measures, mostly notably McConnell versus FEC, and discusses the ways in which legislative and judicial action has influenced the electoral process in the United States. The history and analysis are remarkably balanced. Persons who receive a copy of Money with the preface and final page removed are unlikely to guess that Professor Urofsky believes most campaign finance reform measures violate the First Amendment. The central constitutional claims of both sides are fairly presented. Professor Urofsky minimizes neither the baneful influence wealth has on American politics nor issues repeated jeremiads against reformers. The measured tones in which these hotly disputed issues are discussed make Money a first-rate introduction for students and professors interested in the political and jurisprudential issues raised by efforts to prevent wealth from overly dictating election results.
For more than a century, Urofsky convincingly explains, hopes for meaningful campaign finance reform have consistently been dashed by politics rather than courts. Campaign finance reform proposals more frequently provide opportunities for elected officials to take popular positions than pass legislation. Money notes, for example, how the Senate and House once passed nearly identical bills and then recessed before resolving minor difficulties. Many proposed bills aim at partisan advantage. Republicans consistently seek to restrict union spending in politics. Democrats call for limits on corporate contributions. Restrictions that pass are enforced by officials with little interest in effective campaign regulation. Staffed by partisan Democrats and Republicans, the Federal Election Commission pursues few complaints and almost never acts in a timely or aggressive fashion. Most important, regulations rarely accomplish much as politicians find more creative ways of spending and raising money. The FECA of 1974 failed to anticipate the rise of PACs. The BCRA of 2002 failed to anticipate the rise of 527s such as Move-On and the Swift Boat Veterans. As a result, Urofsky concludes, the “BCRA did not appear to have affected the fund-raising abilities of either party” (236). Senate Mitch McConnell observed, “Soft money is not gone, it has just changed its address” (231).
Urofsky does at times get bogged down in the intricate details of campaign finance law. The problem, however, lies as much with the subject matter as the author. Just as the best concert pianists must make tragic choices between the notes written in the score when playing Tchaikovsky's impossibly difficult 3rd Piano Concerto, so commentary on McConnell and the “incomprehensible” (179) opinions written in that case must inevitably choose between dramatic oversimplification and losing the reader in details. Lawyers and political scientists tend to choose the first. Urofsky, a historian, chooses the second. More than a few heads will spin trying to sort out all the analysis in Money of all the different judicial opinions on all the different issues and provisions in the BCRA. Still, Money does about as well as expected explaining a 500- page decision with no clear majority opinion regarding the constitutionality of approximately twenty-five provisions. Urofsky also helps readers considerably when noting that those who believe most campaign finance reform measures pass constitutional muster pay great attention to the evils of the present campaign financing system while underplaying certain traditional First Amendment claims. Furthermore, those who believe most campaign reform measures do not pass constitutional muster pay great attention to traditional First Amendment claims while downplaying the corrupting influence of money on the present electoral system.
The moral of Money and Free Speech is that campaign finance reform is better understood as symbolic politics than as either an assault on traditional First Amendment values or an effort to level the electoral playing field. The work provides hardly any examples of measures that in practice significantly restricted free speech or promoted greater political equality. The best that can be said for the BCRA is that “the donor base” of both parties “has been expanded,” though the most affluent Americans and corporations continue to find ways to exercise disproportionate influence on the political process. Litigants consistently complain that their core First Amendment rights will vanish should the justices sustain various measures, but opponents of reforms have historically found ways of engaging in analogous expression after their judicial defeats. The most that regulations accomplish is “shifting political speech from one actor to another” (248). Urofsky is right to note that this “is surely not what the framers of the First Amendment intended” (248), but justices who sustain legislation that has so little practical impact can hardly be accused of “[turning their] back on [the] First Amendment” (250). Money more accurately concludes that the justices may rule differently when, instead of issuing convoluted opinions on legislative placebos, they adjudicate “a case involving a real governmental restriction on political speech” (250).
