In its judgment on preliminary objections in the case of Chirinos Salamanca and Others v. Venezuela,Footnote 1 the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR; Court) relied on a controversial re-accession to the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) to assert jurisdiction over Venezuela. The Venezuelan government had withdrawn from the ACHR in 2012, but “Interim” President Juan Guaidó Márquez re-ratified the convention in 2019 with “retroactive effects.” At the time, the Guaidó government did not exercise effective control in Venezuela, and its legitimacy was strongly contested. By recognizing the validity of the Guaidó government’s re-accession, the Court intervened in one of the most intensively debated political-legal issues of the past decade. However, it avoided addressing the highly contentious question regarding the conditions a governmental entity must meet to represent a state under international law. This was a missed opportunity. Nevertheless, the Court’s human rights-based interpretation of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) is in line with its prior jurisprudence.
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The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights submitted this case to the Court in 2022. On the merits, it concerns twelve police officers who were charged with the murder of a journalist, incarcerated, and allegedly tortured in the infamous “Helicoide” prison in Caracas between 2016 and 2018 (para. 1). The Venezuelan government raised ratione voluntatis and ratione temporis preliminary objections to the Court’s jurisdiction (para. 7). Venezuela had joined the ACHR as a founding member in 1978 but withdrew from the Convention in 2012 under President Hugo Chávez Frías.Footnote 2 The Venezuelan government thus argued that the Court retained no jurisdiction over Venezuela after the end of the withdrawal period in September of 2013. Although the withdrawal’s validity was challenged by the representatives of the alleged victims and an amicus curiae brief, who argued that the withdrawal violated Venezuelan constitutional law and could not produce international effects,Footnote 3 the Court did not engage with this challenge and instead focused its analysis on the legal effects of the 2019 re-accession (paras. 12, 56). It, therefore, had to answer two questions: (1) whether the re-accession through “Interim” President Guaidó was valid under international law; and (2) whether the re-accession retroactively renewed Venezuela’s membership in the ACHR for the 2016–2018 period.
The 2019 re-accession was set against the backdrop of an internal Venezuelan power struggle. After winning snap-elections in May 2018 that were boycotted by the main opposition parties,Footnote 4 President Nicolás Maduro Moros asserted his aspiration to govern Venezuela for another six-year period starting in January of 2019 (para. 39). The Venezuelan National Assembly disputed the democratic character of the 2018 elections. It argued that because the 2018 elections had not produced a democratically elected president, the Venezuelan presidency would be vacant in January 2019. Invoking Articles 233 and 333 of the Venezuelan constitution, the National Assembly declared that President of the National Assembly, Juan Guaidó, would assume the “Interim” Presidency (Presidente “Encargado” de Venezuela) tasked with organizing a new round of elections (id.). Guaidó was recognized in this capacity by sixty states, including the majority of Latin American states, and the Organization of American States (OAS), though the different states and international organizations assigned varying legal effects to their respective recognition.Footnote 5 Over the course of several months, President Guaidó led an institutional struggle and a protest movement against the Maduro government and acted as the Venezuelan head of state in relation to other states and international organizations. However, the Guaidó government never gained effective control over Venezuela, and Juan Guaidó has lived in exile since 2023.
The question whether “Interim” President Juan Guaidó represented Venezuela as a matter of international law has sprung up in multiple national courts and international tribunals.Footnote 6 Two arbitral panels under the framework of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, for example, rejected representatives of the Guaidó government because it lacked effective control over Venezuela’s territory and people.Footnote 7
In contrast, the IACtHR held that the Guaidó government represented Venezuela and that its re-accession to the ACHR was valid. In May 2019, the Venezuelan National Assembly adopted legislation for Venezuela to re-enter the ACHR. The legislation specified that Venezuela would rejoin the Convention with retroactive effects from September 10, 2013 onward—the date when the 2012 withdrawal entered into force (para. 43). Acting as “interim” president, Guaidó signed the ratification instrument on July 1, 2019 and deposited it on July 31, 2019 with the secretary general of the OAS (para. 44).
According to the Court, this re-ratification through “Interim” President Guaidó was valid and produced retroactive effects (para. 56). The Court’s central holding reads:
Accordingly, and pursuant to positive international law [VCLT Art. 7(2)(a)], the “Interim” President, appointed by the Venezuelan National Assembly, was empowered to sign treaties with the States that accepted him—including multilateral treaties—especially in spheres in which he had been recognized, his representatives had been granted credentials, and the depositary of the treaty was an international organization to which he was accredited, as is the case of the OAS.Footnote 8
The Court’s principal argument is strikingly simple: Because Juan Guaidó was “interim” president and VCLT Article 7(2)(a) stipulates that heads of state represent a state for the conclusion of a treaty, Guaidó was able to conclude treaties on behalf of Venezuela.Footnote 9 This principal argument is supported by two further arguments. First, the Court held that the applicable rules on treaty accession must be interpreted in light of the principles of the Inter-American Human Rights system, including the notions of collective guarantee and the pro persona principle (para. 50). The pro persona principle proscribes an interpretation of the ACHR that extends its protections to the largest and most effective extent (para. 53). Applying this principle, the Court argued that it can give “preference to” (priveligiar) an interpretation of the relevant norms that increases the ACHR’s applicability (id.). Second, the Court highlighted that the OAS, as the relevant regional organization, had recognized the “Interim” Presidency as the Venezuelan state’s international representation through decisions of its Permanent Council (April 10, 2019) and General Assembly (June 28, 2019) (paras. 41–42). This regional practice thus supported the Court’s assessment that Guaidó could represent Venezuela as “interim” president.
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The IACtHR’s reasoning sidesteps the elephant in the room. It asserts that Juan Guaidó was Venezuela’s head of state but does not detail why he qualified as such. However, the Court’s human rights-based interpretation of the VCLT is consistent with its prior case law. Moreover, this methodology was preferable to the other methodological option, which would have entailed comprehensive deference to the OAS’s political organs to determine a member state’s head of state.
What makes a head of state a head of state? At the Vienna Conference ahead of the VCLT’s adoption, multiple proposals to make a state’s consent to a treaty more dependent on national and particularly constitutional rules were struck down.Footnote 10 Accordingly, the VCLT fails to provide guidance on which entity qualifies as a head of state and bars inquiries to this end into the national legal systems of the states.Footnote 11 This ambivalence recognizes that other states or international tribunals do not and should not have the authority to definitively interpret the internal norms of a different state. The same holds true for the IACtHR. It is not an apex court and therefore cannot interpret national laws authoritatively, e.g., the Venezuelan constitutional provisions on presidential ascent or succession. The Court did cite Article 233 of the Venezuelan Constitution, but this reference is more narrative than analytical, and the judgment does not purport to assert the “interim” president’s international authority from this constitutional provision (paras. 39–40).
The VCLT thus contains a lacuna. It employs the term of head of state, but neither provides a definition nor the method to determine a head of state. Likewise, the ACHR provision on treaty accession (Art. 74) does not provide guidance for determining the validity of such accession. Therefore, the term “head of state” requires interpretation.
The predominant form of determining a government under international law is to inquire into an entity’s effective control over the territory and population of a state.Footnote 12 The effectivity criterion has been challenged throughout history by a legitimacy criterion which posits that a government can only represent a state if it is the legitimate entity governing the state.Footnote 13 In more recent iterations, this has been conflated with democratic legitimacy, i.e., that a government must democratically represent its population in order to represent the state internationally.Footnote 14 The effectiveness versus legitimacy debate has been the central issue concerning the validity of the Guaidó government’s international endeavors and its recognition by sixty states. Nonetheless, the Court sidestepped this debate and neither assessed the (obviously lacking) effectiveness nor the disputed legitimacyFootnote 15 of the Guaidó government.
Instead, the Court interpreted the term “head of state” through the pro persona principle.Footnote 16 Applying VCLT Article 7(2)(a) to the case at hand allowed for two possible results: On the one hand, Nicolás Maduro could qualify as the Venezuelan head of state, which would imply that the Guaidó government’s actions were without effect. On the other hand, “Interim” President Guaidó could qualify as head of state, which would render the re-accession valid. Operating in this lacuna, the pro persona principle allows the Court to favor interpretations that extend the reach of ACHR provisions and its jurisdiction to the fullest extent. Considering that the ACHR’s application would be maximized if the 2019 re-accession were valid, the Court accepted that Juan Guaidó was Venezuela’s head of state and therefore authorized to accede to a treaty on behalf of Venezuela. After establishing the validity of the re-accession, the Court had no trouble in accepting its retroactive effects for the period between 2013 and 2019 (paras. 55–56).Footnote 17
Unsurprisingly, this human rights-based interpretation of VCLT norms received strong criticism.Footnote 18 Critics believe that the pro persona principle was specifically developed for the interpretation of the ACHR and should not guide the interpretation of treaties of general international law.
However, the expansion of the IACtHR’s jurisdiction through a human rights-based interpretation of relevant VCLT norms is well established in its jurisprudence. In its 2024 decision in Vega González and Others v Chile, the Court asserted its jurisdiction over alleged human rights violations that had occurred before Chile’s accession to the ACHR in 1990.Footnote 19 In accordance with the principle of non-retroactivity of treaties enshrined in VCLT Article 28, a treaty will not be applicable to occurrences prior to a state party’s accession, unless expressly stated in the treaty. Human rights violations before 1990 in Chile (i.e., during the Pinochet dictatorship) are therefore in principle outside of the Court’s jurisdiction.Footnote 20 However, Vega González concerned forced disappearances in the 1970s that had not been sufficiently remedied by Chilean authorities. According to the Court’s jurisprudence, such human rights violations persist and do not end until the disappearances are sufficiently remedied.Footnote 21 The Court therefore employed the pro persona principle to interpret VCLT Article 28 in a manner which allows for its jurisdiction on the matter, including assessments into the disappearances during the 1970s. The Court has developed similar jurisprudence relating to forced disappearances in Mexico and Bolivia.Footnote 22
Similarly, Advisory Opinion 26 of 2020 interpreted VCLT Articles 54 and 56 in light of the pro persona principle to limit the possibility of withdrawal from human rights treaties.Footnote 23 Most provisions on treaty withdrawal do not significantly restrict a state’s ability to withdraw, containing merely a notification requirement and transition period.Footnote 24 In its advisory opinion, the Court held that this general framework is inadequate for human rights treaties. Drawing on the pro persona principle, it developed a set of conditions that should guide a state’s treaty withdrawal, which significantly exceed the formal requirements of VCLT Articles 54 and 56 and ACHR Article 78.Footnote 25
Interpreting the VCLT’s provision relating to the accession, scope, and withdrawal of the ACHR through the pro persona principle is thus a well-established practice and hence did not come as a surprise.Footnote 26
Moreover, centering its argument on a human-rights based interpretation of the VCLT was preferable to the other methodological option to ascertain jurisdiction without assessing why Guaidó qualified as president. Representatives of the alleged victims argued that the Court should defer to the relevant OAS organs on the re-accession’s validity.Footnote 27 The OAS secretary general is the depositary of the ACHR. The secretary general accepted the re-accession’s validity because the OAS General Assembly and Permanent Council recognized the Guaidó government as the Venezuelan representation before the OAS (para. 48). Moreover, none of the OAS member states objected to the re-ratification after the OAS secretary general circulated the pertinent documentation (para. 45). The representatives argued that the Court should follow a “systemic approach” by aligning itself with the decisions of the OAS organs.Footnote 28 For guidance, they referred to a decision by Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court, which accepted Palestine as a “State” in terms of Rome Statute Article 125 because the United Nations General Assembly had previously recognized Palestine as a “non-member State.”Footnote 29 Similarly, the Court could have deferred to the OAS bodies on the re-accessions validity.
Fortunately, the IACtHR did not follow this approach. In its central holding, the Court asserted that the “interim” president was empowered (habilitado) to enter into treaties with other states “especially” (especialmente) in frameworks in which his presidency was recognized. The term “especially” signals that the recognition through a regional organization illustrates a government’s capacity to conclude treaties on behalf of a state, but that the recognition by the organization is not a sufficient condition for a government’s treaty making-authority.Footnote 30 In the logic of the Court, the government’s authority to accede to treaties precedes its recognition by other governments or international organizations.
This is in line with traditional views on recognition of governments, i.e., that the recognition by a foreign state will not determine which entity within another state qualifies as a government (declaratory theory of governmental recognition).Footnote 31 Moreover, the OAS organs do not have the express authority from the OAS Charter to determine which entity in a state qualifies as its government. The determination of a government under international law is a legal question. The Court therefore rightfully retained its authority to decide this legal question autonomously without deferring to political organs.
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It is regrettable that the Court sidestepped the question of how to determine a head of state under international law. Using the pro persona principle to favor an interpretation of VCLT Article 7(2)(a) that expands its temporal jurisdiction is consistent with the Court’s prior jurisprudence. However, this cannot replace an engagement with the question why “Interim” President Guaidó was able to represent Venezuela despite lacking effective control.
This is particularly concerning considering the judgment’s far-reaching implications.
The Court significantly expands the legal framework for treaty accession, infusing the formal understanding of the VCLT with a human rights-based reading. This methodological approach stands in contrast to that of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).Footnote 32 The ECtHR regularly defers to general international law when there is a conflict with the European Convention on Human RightsFootnote 33 and does not interpret general international law in light of the particularities of human rights treaties.Footnote 34
Further, jurisdictional questions and matters relating to accession and withdrawal to a treaty touch closely upon questions of state consent. The IACtHR has effectively told Venezuela that its withdrawal in 2012 is now irrelevant. Moreover, it implicitly asserted that Venezuela will not be able to withdraw in the short- and mid-term (paras. 66–67). Drawing on its findings in Advisory Opinion 26 of 2020, the Court detailed that Venezuela’s ongoing incompliance with its obligations under the ACHR constitute a barrier against withdrawal from the Convention. This significantly limits Venezuela’s sovereignty.
Finally, stepping around the elephant in the room leaves the legal framework for the determination of governments in the Americas in an uncertain state. This is likely the most consequential effect, as demonstrated by the illegal use of force by the United States against Venezuela on January 3, 2026.Footnote 35 One of the U.S. government’s arguments focused on the illegitimacy of President Maduro and the public refutation that he qualified as Venezuela’s president.Footnote 36 Moreover, the Maduro government’s disputed status under international law was likely one of the reasons for the restricted condemnations of the United States’ unlawful use of force.Footnote 37 The episode demonstrates how uncertainty in this field of international law can be exploited by actors operating in bad faith. The Court missed an opportunity to detail the international law for determining governmental entities.
