[Prestige] is, however, far from being a mere bobble of vanity; for the nation that possesses great prestige is thereby enabled to have its way, and to bring things to pass which it could never hope to achieve by its own forces. Prestige draws material benefits mysteriously in its train. Political wisdom will never despise it.Footnote 1
Introduction
The US-led interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan following the terrorist attacks on 9/11 were not only tremendously costly to the United States, but also to the many smaller (mostly) European troop-contributing countries. In terms of blood and treasure, the nations that signed up for the Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF-I) and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan paid a remarkably high price for being part of the US-led coalitions.Footnote 2 Moreover, few – if any – European governments earned much domestic applause for their willingness to come to the aid of their American ally. In the vast majority of the European troop-contributing nations, governments faced strong public opposition due to their participation in what was generally perceived to be unsuccessful military endeavours, and in at least one instance – the Netherlands – the decision to contribute brought down the government.Footnote 3 At the same time, it was less than clear that the Europeans had a national interest in stabilising Iraq and Afghanistan that was strong enough to justify the high economic, military, and political costs involved. In fact, to many of the small state coalition members it arguably made little difference security-wise whether the missions succeeded or not. Neither the Iraqi nor the Taliban regime posed a direct threat to the majority of the countries engaged in the coalitions.
This logic also applies to the expeditionary operations launched by the United States and NATO outside the NATO area in the 1990s. Why did many small European nations with little prospect of making a substantial difference on the ground put their armed forces into harm’s way in these operations? At first glance, these out-of-area operations posed very strong incentives not to participate. So what convinced small states all over Europe to deploy a significant number of forces to the Balkans, the Middle East, and Central Asia? Why did so many European decision-makers accept the human, economic, and political costs associated with being a member of US-led coalitions?
In this article we argue that an important and overlooked reason why smaller states deploy forces alongside the United States and contribute to risky military operations with little direct bearing on their own national security is that they seek to enhance their standing and prestige in Washington. Most of the time the contributing small states do so not because they perceive of prestige as an end in itself, but because they consider prestige and status means to an end. Increasing prestige is understood to serve the national interest. According to this interpretation, prestige and status is a category of social capital. Once obtained, status and prestige can be converted into influence, agenda-setting power, access, or even material benefits. Not unlike a bank account, small states can take actions that will increase their ‘prestige capital’, and they can sometimes draw on that capital to further their national interest.
Even so, we fully recognise that states become coalition contributors for multiple reasons – and that their reasons might oscillate over time. To name but some of the motives that presumably influence national policymakers when deciding to contribute to NATO and US-led expeditionary operations: the threat of international terrorism; a desire to keep the transatlantic bonds and NATO strong; human rights and nation-building; bilateral American security pledges; ‘democracy export’; becoming a member of NATO; the fear of being marginalised and chastened as a free-rider; and aspirations to uphold a liberal international order. Our purpose is not to weigh the relative importance of these motivations against the proposed prestige-seeking driver. More modest, our aim is to: (1) demonstrate that prestige-seeking played an important, but hitherto overlooked role in the Europeans’ somewhat surprising willingness to contribute forces to US-led operations; and (2) to determine how small states use their military contributions to enhance their prestige and status in Washington. We conclude that in both Denmark and Norway prestige-seeking was an important explanatory factor driving the decisions to contribute to (mostly) US-led interventions after the end of the Cold War.
The article’s contribution to the growing literature on prestige and status is twofold: First, we aim to bring small states into the study of prestige and status in international politics. Following Jonathan Renshon, we find that ‘most previous research on status, … has excluded smaller states’.Footnote 4 By ‘bringing small states in’ we reduce the great power bias from which the existing research on prestige currently suffers and suggest that the traditional understanding of what makes for prestige in international politics is too narrow. Second – and intimately linked to the article’s first theoretical objective – we suggest that the traditional understanding of what makes for prestige in international politics is too narrow. Some of the literature’s most influential definitions of prestige simply exclude the possibility that small states can use prestige as a means of power and influence. For instance, Robert Gilpin argues that ‘the hierarchy of prestige in an international system rests on economic and military power’. Moreover, according to Gilpin, ‘prestige functions to ensure that the lesser states in the system will obey the commands of the dominant state or states’Footnote 5 – that is, small states will always be at the ‘receiving end’ of prestige. We concur that (perceptions of) material power is an important source of prestige, but hold that also materially weak states can acquire prestige as an instrument of influence vis-à-vis a stronger power. That, however, requires a broader and more flexible understanding of prestige in international politics, an understanding than includes the prospect of gaining prestige via deeds rather than material power.
The article has three main parts. It begins by briefly outlining the different theoretical explanations for why states contribute to coalitions and alliances engaged in out-of-area operations. Our point of departure is the costly interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the article’s second part we offer an alternative, Realist-inspired explanation for why states become coalition members. We take our cue from Classical Realism and argue that small states are also concerned about their prestige and status. They perceive of military contributions to US-led coalitions as a means of obtaining prestige and good standing in Washington that they can convert into access, influence, or various forms of US support. In the third and final section we validate this hypothesis by examining the Danish and Norwegian contributions to US-led military operations after the end of the Cold War.
Existing explanations for allied military contributions to US-led coalitions
Over the last decade scholars have provided a variety of explanations for the making of US-led coalitions. Very few, however, have considered the desire for prestige a means to obtain other benefits centre stage.Footnote 6
Realist scholars have not regarded prestige as an important explanatory factor. In our review of the literature we were able to identify only one distinct Realist explanation emphasising prestige-seeking as a motive for supporting the United States militarily – and even then the ‘good reputation motive’ played a minor role in the explanatory model.Footnote 7 Realists have emphasised three motives for deploying with the United States: a desire for credible security guarantees, keeping the Americans engaged in Europe, and the fear of international terrorism. Several Realist scholars have pointed to the fact that most of the European allies closest to Russia chose to assist the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan because they sought more credible security guarantees from Washington.Footnote 8 Other Realists have emphasised a strong (and broader) European interest in keeping the United States engaged in Europe to avoid a future ‘re-nationalisation’ of European security and the best way to ensure some kind of influence on American policies.Footnote 9 Finally, Realists have argued that European fear of international terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction stemming from Iraq and Afghanistan has provided incentives to join the United States in the ‘War on Terror’.Footnote 10
Liberal scholars have tended to focus on the importance of institutions and a desire to uphold and export liberal values in order to support the existing liberal world order. For instance, Sarah Kreps argues that participating ‘under the banner of NATO is as close to an ideal type iterated game as there is in security cooperation’.Footnote 11 Following Robert Keohane, she suggests that actors that do not contribute will be precluded from enjoying the fruits of future cooperation.Footnote 12 In other words, in Afghanistan it was NATO – the institution – that provided the incentives for NATO-Europe to contribute forces to an unpopular war. Other liberals have argued that European nations went to war in Iraq to promote international law and human rights.Footnote 13 According to this perspective, policymakers in Western capitals were primarily motivated by a desire to expand the sphere of liberal values, underpin the credibility of the UN, and facilitate the spread of democracy.Footnote 14
In line with their preferred focus on ideas and identities, social constructivists have emphasised securitisation processes and strategic culture when analysing contributions to the US-led operations.Footnote 15 Observed through the securitisation theory lens, political actors and experts successfully constructed terrorists and insurgents in Afghanistan, as well as Saddam Hussein’s presumed weapons of mass destruction, as threats to national security and, accordingly, rationalised the use of ‘extraordinary measures’.Footnote 16 Studies of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan employing the concept of strategic culture have mainly focused on how the wars were fought, while the decision to deploy in the first place has been less scrutinised from this perspective.Footnote 17
While all these theoretical approaches add bits and pieces to our understanding of why the United States succeeded in persuading friends and allies to make military contributions, we argue that something important is missing: the desire for prestige and standing. Although some of the involved actors might have craved prestige as an end in and of itself, we argue that more often the prestige and status believed to be flowing from contributing to US-led coalitions is seen as a means to other ends.Footnote 18
Small state prestige-seeking in coalition war
The gist of this article’s theoretical argument is that smaller states also contribute to coalition warfare because they believe that status and prestige can be acquired by being a ‘good ally’. Accordingly, we propose that prestige in international politics is more than just the ‘shadow of power’. There are other dimensions to the sources of prestige than simply economic and military power, as suggested by Robert Gilpin. Of course, material power is not irrelevant to the status and prestige of states in international politics, but a reputation for being a staunch ally or an ‘ally punching above its weight’ also has the potential to improve a state’s prestige in the eyes of the great power receiving the support. As such, prestige and status flow from both ‘the reputation for power, and military power in particular’Footnote 19 and from supportive military actions by smaller states.Footnote 20
How, then, should we understand the different aspects of prestige?Footnote 21 Like Steve Wood, we consider prestige to be a concept belonging to a larger ‘conceptual family that includes honour, status, reputation, respect, glory, credibility, pride and legitimacy’.Footnote 22 Although these terms are often used interchangeably, they do not hold the exact same meaning.Footnote 23 Lana Wylie makes a distinction between reputation and prestige, as the former ‘can be both positive or negative, whereas prestige always grow out of a positive reputation’.Footnote 24 We subscribe to this distinction, which implies that a good reputation is very similar to prestige. In addition, we agree with – among others – Jonathan Mercer and Jonathan Renshon that prestige is a relational and perceptual concept, as prestige and a good reputation in international politics depend on what others think of the state.Footnote 25 Finally, some scholars have made a conceptual distinction between status and prestige, while others have used the two concepts interchangeably.Footnote 26 We find the distinctions between status and prestige to be so subtle that we will use both concepts to describe the same phenomenon.Footnote 27
In essence, the possible influence or power flowing from a good reputation and prestige is based on social recognition and intersubjective appraisals bestowed on an individual, institution or state by other actors. Prestige and status in international politics are thus gained when states receive respect, admiration, or esteem from the peoples or representatives (policymakers, diplomats, high-standing officers, etc.) of other states or institutions in the system.Footnote 28 As noted by Hans J. Morgenthau:
Actually, the policy of prestige, however exaggerated and absurd its uses may have been at times, is as intrinsic an element of the relations between nations as the desire for prestige is of the relations between individuals … In both spheres, the desire for social recognition is a potent dynamic force determining social relations and creating social institutions … Thus, in the struggle for existence and power … what other thinks about us is as important as what we actually are. The image in the mirror of our fellows’ minds (that is, our prestige), rather than the original, of which the image in the mirror may be but the distorted reflection, determines what we are as members of society.Footnote 29
In the scholarly literature on status and prestige it is often highlighted that an important aspect of prestige is that it ‘elicits voluntary deference’.Footnote 30 In the words of Renshon, ‘States seek status commensurate with their abilities because it is a valuable resource for coordinating expectations of dominance and deference in strategic interactions.’Footnote 31 We agree that ‘dominance’ and ‘deference’ are significant aspects of prestige. However, that is not the whole story about how prestige is translated into influence and power. Great powers are highly unlikely to behave in deferential ways towards smaller states that have won prestige by contributing significantly to coalition warfare. That does not mean, though, that prestigious small powers cannot make use of their good reputation as a source of influence. We argue that the prestige of small powers can still buy them influence, as their greater brother-in-arms will be more inclined to accommodate their wishes and listen to their points of view. Obviously not because great powers are awestruck by their smaller allies’ ‘shadow of power’, but rather because the prestige and status of being a ‘good ally’ obtained by the small ally will sometimes translate into a sense of obligation and gratitude towards an important partner. In a way, our broader understanding of how small states can convert prestige into influence turns the traditional understanding of how prestige and deference relate on its head. Gaining prestige does not help the smaller states achieve deference from their larger allies. Rather, small states achieve prestige by acting deferentially towards their greater allies (and contributing forces to US-led coalitions).Footnote 32
The scholarly literature on prestige, status, and reputation in international affairs is divided into two schools of thought holding different views on states’ motives for seeking prestige. One school of thought maintains that states desire prestige for its own sake, that is, prestige for the sake of identity or as an end in itself; the other school of thought holds that states first and foremost acquire prestige as a means to an end.Footnote 33 The first general perspective on prestige has deep roots in the study of international politics. Already, Thucydides claimed that honour was one of three principal motives driving the Peloponnesian War (the other two being security and self-interest). Several Realist thinkers, such as Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, and Aron, have subsequently subscribed – with minor semantic variations – to the same three-pronged understanding of what fuels the behaviour of states. To all of them, the lust for glory, pride, reputation, status, and prestige was a fundamental driver of international relations.Footnote 34
Later on Social Constructivists and scholars working from within the field of international sociology picked up on the idea that states seek prestige as an end in itself.Footnote 35 Like Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, and Aron, these scholars perceive of prestige not as an instrument of power or a means to make other political entities voluntarily defer to the state’s wishes or suggestions. Rather, prestige is seen as a ‘final goal’ sought simply because states (and statesmen) prefer to have international status and standing; that is, states seek the intersubjective and social recognition inherent in prestige for its own sake. According to this non-instrumental – or intrinsic – perspective, states might even engage in ‘financially costly or otherwise potentially risky international behaviour’ to obtain a good reputation and prestige.Footnote 36 Lilach Gilady identifies several examples of such state behaviour that she pointedly terms ‘conspicuous waste’.Footnote 37 Seeking to build a distinct identity, states and diplomats thus pursue policies in order to be seen as prestigious actors doing the right thing.
In this article we subscribe to the second school of thought. We acknowledge that states sometimes seek prestige and standing as a final goal, but – in the words of Hans Morgenthau – we maintain that prestige is an ‘indispensable element of a rational foreign policy’.Footnote 38 This is because, as pointed out by Harold Nicolson, policymakers and diplomats understand prestige as ‘power based on reputation’ (and not only as a ‘reputation for power’, as suggested by Gilpin).Footnote 39 States often adopt certain ‘prestige-augmenting policies’ because they believe that a good standing or reputation will increase their potential influence and access to those nations that bestow social recognition upon them. Sometimes the policies undertaken to build a good reputation are entirely unrelated to the policy areas where the state wishes to capitalise on the enhanced prestige. In this perspective, prestige is a means to a higher end. Statesmen and diplomats thus engage in prestige-seeking for strategic reasons. Again, we subscribe to the analysis of Morgenthau: ‘The prestige of a nation is very much like the credit of a bank. A bank with large, proven resources and a record of successes can afford what a small and frequently unsuccessful competitor cannot.’Footnote 40
We expect small or third-tier states to be particularly attracted to prestige-seeking strategies and coalition contributions, because they typically lack the material resources to make a difference on the international scene, and because they generally depend upon others for their security.Footnote 41 Small states do not contribute to coalitions in order to influence great power policy or to win. Instead, their primary objective is to be seen and recognised in the hope of generating goodwill and ‘credit in the bank’ that can be translated into something that they want at a later point in time: security, access to great power decision-makers, economic, or other forms of support. It is our thesis that small allies provide military contributions to US-led operations in the hope of establishing prestige and a sense of obligation in Washington that will make American decision-makers more inclined to meet requests for access, assistance, or influence.
The purpose of the empirical analysis in the next two sections is to determine whether prestige-seeking was an important factor driving Danish and Norwegian contributions to recent US-led military operations. We look for three types of evidence in order to validate our small state prestige hypothesis:
1) Statements by key policymakers and senior officials indicating that Danish and Norwegian decisions to contribute to US-led interventions were motivated, partly at least, by a desire to gain prestige and visibility in Washington.
2) A greater concern with visibility, social capital and prestige than with military effect when designing and offering military contributions.
3) A definition of success focusing more on American praise, access to US decision-makers and influence on other issue areas than military success.
Denmark: Fighting for prestige, access, and Influence
Determining the role played by prestige-seeking in specific Danish force contributions is not as straightforward as it may seem. To be legitimate in a Danish context, a decision to go to war has to be couched primarily in idealistic and legal terms. Interest-based arguments beyond self-defence are generally frowned upon, and many critics of Denmark’s involvement in out-of-area military operations reject the argument that prestige-seeking in Washington constitutes a legitimate casus belli.Footnote 42 This gives Danish decision-makers an incentive to downplay the role played by these motivations in parliamentary bills and other official documents seeking to mobilise political and popular support for making military contributions in support of the United States. Yet, we do expect interest and prestige-seeking motives to surface from time to time in public statements and memoirs, and indicators 2 and 3 are designed to capture these motivations indirectly in order to address this methodological challenge.
Do Danish decision-makers and officials highlight prestige-seeking as a policy-driver?
Reputation is for a leader of a kingdom what credit is for a merchant and his business.
Count Johann Hartwig Ernst von Bernstorff, head of the Danish diplomatic corps (1751–70).Footnote 43
In his memoirs, Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs Uffe Ellemann-Jensen (Liberal Party, 1982–93) argued with reference to the above-mentioned quote that reputation and prestige are critical assets for Danish foreign policy.Footnote 44 In Ellemann-Jensen’s view, Denmark depended on international prestige and goodwill, particularly in Washington, in order to make a difference on the international scene. He explicitly said in his memoirs that his successful efforts to mobilise political support for the dispatch of a corvette to the Persian Gulf in 1990 and for Danish participation in the UN force that was deployed in Iraq after the end of the Gulf War in 1991 were driven by his desire to repair Denmark’s standing in Washington, which had been tarnished by its opposition to NATO’s decision to deploy intermediate range nuclear missiles in Europe in the 1980s.Footnote 45 He used the quote again in a blog in 2013, arguing that the Danish contributions to the US-led operations in Afghanistan had been successful because they had enhanced Denmark’s ‘prestige in London and Washington’.Footnote 46
Former Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen (Liberal Party, 2001–9) shared this perspective. His view of foreign policy was shaped by his close cooperation with Ellemann-Jensen for 13 years as his vice chairman of the Liberal Party.Footnote 47 Fogh Rasmussen made it clear before taking office in 2001 that he favoured ‘active participation in international military operations in order to give Denmark a stronger position on the international scene than its size warranted’.Footnote 48 Fogh Rasmussen personally pushed through the decision to support the United States in Afghanistan with F-16s and Special Forces in Afghanistan in 2001 against the wishes of the main opposition parties, which would have preferred a ‘softer’ contribution. He was also the principal architect behind the controversial decision to support the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. He made this decision ignoring protests from his own party, his Minister for Foreign Affairs Per Stig Møller (Conservative Party, 2001–10) and the main opposition parties, pushing the decision through parliament with a slight 11-vote majority.Footnote 49 He subsequently reiterated his desire for international ‘visibility’ when defending his decision to participate in the Iraq War on a number of occasions.Footnote 50
Public statements also indicate that prestige-seeking played a prominent role in driving the military contributions made by the government headed by Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen (Liberal Party, 2009–11, 2015–). Løkke Rasmussen explained his swift support for the US-led coalition launching military operations against Libya in 2011 on the grounds that he wanted Denmark ‘out in front’ with the ‘right states’ (that is, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States).Footnote 51 Being part of the first wave of attack appears to have been an overriding priority for the prime minister. The prime minister’s office reportedly put heavy pressure on the Danish chief of defence to hand over operational command to the US coalition commander even before the command arrangements and rules of engagement had been agreed upon – a request the latter flatly refused.Footnote 52
Interviews and correspondence with senior officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark confirm that prestige-seeking has been one of the drivers behind Denmark’s military contributions to US-led operations since 9/11. An experienced Danish senior diplomat put it this way: ‘I believe that it is entirely OK and a commonplace interest-based policy for a small country to also consider … where and how our most important ally wants our support and assistance. I believe that practically all nations consider when and how much credit it will create in Washington.’Footnote 53 By the same token, another senior official emphasised that a good standing is an important vehicle for security, access, and influence: ‘Although a desire for prestige and standing was not the principal motive for participating in Iraq and Afghanistan, it played a role. Other nations listen to the allies that deliver – to the allies with standing. Those allies are in another category. And remember: standing and reputation provides you with access. And for a small state access is the key to information and influence’.Footnote 54
Are Danish force contributions designed to generate visibility and social capital?
Denmark’s military contributions tell the story of a strong desire for visibility in Washington and NATO. The already mentioned desire to be ‘out in front’ appeared again in a Ministry of Defence factsheet on a major increase in Denmark’s contribution to the US-led campaign against the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in April 2016. This factsheet also highlighted that the increase made Denmark ‘one of the largest force contributors’ (measured per capita) in the fight against ISIS. It was also clear whom Denmark was seeking to impress, as it explicitly stated that the contribution was made in direct response to requests from the United States and France.Footnote 55
The ambition to be among the largest contributors per capita to military operations is a constant in Danish foreign policy, originating from the Cold War when Danish decision-makers realised that the position as a top per capita contributor to UN peacekeeping operations provided an effective way of generating international prestige and goodwill.Footnote 56 Denmark maintained this position in the UN and NATO operations in the Balkans in the 1990s, in the Iraq operation in 2003–7 and in NATO’s Afghanistan operation (2006–14), and it is highlighted time and again in official statements and documents.
Yet Danish policymakers have done more than play the leading-contributor-per-capita numbers game in order to generate prestige. They have also sought to do so by making a qualitative ‘difference’ with their contributions. Not in the sense of making a decisive difference to the outcome of a campaign; Danish decision-makers rarely mention victory or winning in their statements; they are well aware that Danish force contributions are generally too small for that.Footnote 57 Instead, they stress their desire to make a difference to their key alliance partners.
Danish decision-makers have thus made combat contributions without caveats their trademark and volunteered for dangerous tasks that few other nations were willing to undertake. Denmark was one of only five US allies contributing to the attack on Iraq in 2003; one of only six NATO members deploying combat troops to Southern Afghanistan in 2006; one of only eight NATO members dropping bombs over Libya in 2011; the only nation together with France supporting the US threat of air strikes against the Syrian regime in 2013; one of only six NATO members dropping bombs over Iraq in 2014–15 and over Iraq/Syria in 2016;Footnote 58 and one of a handful of NATO members allowing their Special Forces to operate inside Syria in 2017.Footnote 59 The desire for visibility and prestige is also indicated by the fact that Danish F-16s dropped 11 per cent (821 bombs) of the NATO bomb total during ‘Operation Unified Protector’, and that they were second only to the United States dropping 102 bombs in the initial US-led ‘Operation Odyssey Dawn’. In 2014–15, Danish F-16s dropped more bombs (503) than the British and French planes operating over Iraq.Footnote 60
Do Danish metrics of success privilege praise, access, and influence?
It is intensely debated in Denmark whether Denmark’s military support for the United States in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Iraq/Syria has paid off or not.Footnote 61 This is not the issue here, however. We are seeking to determine whether Danish decision-makers measure success in a way that signals interest in generating prestige and goodwill in NATO, London, Paris, and Washington.
This is certainly the case. Praise from US presidents and other key decision-makers features prominently in official statements and decision-maker memoirs. Minister for Foreign Affairs Ellemann-Jensen and Minister of Defence Søren Gade (Liberal Party, 2004–10) both argued that the Danish contribution to Afghanistan was successful because it ‘fostered respect’ and was noticed by NATO’s big powers;Footnote 62 the F-16 contribution to Libya was a success according to the Danish force commander because the US commander of ‘Operation Unified Protector’ in Libya nicknamed the Danish pilots the ‘rock stars of the campaign’; the Libya contribution was a success in the eyes of Danish Minister of Defence Gitte Lillelund Bech (Liberal Party, 2010–11), because it was praised by the US Secretary of Defence and the US Ambassador to NATO;Footnote 63 it was seen as a sign of success by Prime Ministers Løkke Rasmussen and Thorning-Schmidt that President Barack Obama in 2011 and 2012 respectively told them that he appreciated Denmark’s contributions to Afghanistan and Libya;Footnote 64 and Minister for Foreign Affairs Kristian Jensen (Liberal Party, 2015–) hailed the increased contribution to ‘Operation Inherent Resolve’ in 2016 as a success because US Secretary of State John Kerry had praised it in a bilateral meeting.Footnote 65
Second, Danish decision-makers and officials have pointed out time and again that Denmark’s military contributions have significantly improved Denmark’s standing in NATO and Washington. This view is expressed by all Danish ministers for foreign affairs and ministers of defence who have served since 1989, by senior officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Danish ambassadors to NATO and the United States, and Danish NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen (2009–14).Footnote 66 Fogh Rasmussen thus argued that Denmark’s many military contributions to NATO operations had earned it a reputation as an ‘elite ally’ in the alliance, in spite of the fact that Denmark spent considerably far less on defence than the 2 per cent of the GDP demanded by the alliance.Footnote 67
Third, Danish politicians and officials stress that Denmark’s military activism has given them far better access to US policymakers, all the way to the White House. This has been stressed in the interviews we have conducted with senior Danish diplomats for this article and in interviews given by other Danish diplomats elsewhere.Footnote 68 It is also stated in official documents. For instance, a 2006 report from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark on globalisation noted that Denmark enjoyed ‘easy access to American decision-makers’.Footnote 69 Similarly, the Danish Defence Command argued in its annual report in 2011 that the United States and the United Kingdom treated Denmark as a privileged partner that is granted easier access to high-level decision-makers, intelligence, courses, staff positions, and equipment than most other nations.Footnote 70
Fourth, Danish ministers and officials argue that Denmark’s high standing in NATO and easy access to US decision-makers translate into increased influence. Minister for Foreign Affairs Per Stig Møller argued in 2008 that support for the United States enhanced Denmark’s international influence on issues of strategic importance, because its reputation as a close ally made it easier to obtain US support for Danish initiatives on the international scene. He backed his argument by listing a number of successful Danish foreign policy initiatives that in his view would have failed without US support.Footnote 71 Minister of Defence Nick Hækkerup (2011–13) also found that Denmark carried greater weight in NATO debates because the other members knew that the Danish view was respected in Washington.Footnote 72
Minister for Foreign Affairs Martin Lidegaard (Social Liberal Party, 2014–15) is not so sure that access translates into influence, but he agrees that it is an advantage: ‘It is hard to measure political influence but when Denmark is one of the first 12 countries that are invited to discuss an operation against ISIS this provides an indication of our position … Our position gives us the opportunity to discuss the strategies and influence them. But there is no doubt that because we are good at contributing and because we are a close ally, we are listened to.’Footnote 73
Finally, the close link that Danish policymakers perceive between military contributions and prestige is also highlighted by the concern that reductions in Denmark’s military contributions typically trigger. A representative example was provided in 2015 when Denmark temporarily withdrew its F-16s from the ISIS campaign. Minister for Foreign Affairs Kristian Jensen felt the need to assure a journalist that the withdrawal would not harm Denmark’s prestige in the eyes of its allies because it was only temporary and because Denmark compensated by making another contribution to fill the gap.Footnote 74
In sum, the evidence is clear. Since 9/11, Danish ministers, regardless of their party affiliations, and senior diplomats have staunchly supported US-led operations and designed the Danish contributions in order to gain prestige. They have done so in the hope that such prestige could be translated into access and influence in NATO and in Washington. Moreover, they all argue that these efforts have been highly successful. The extent to which this is the case is a topic of heated debate in Denmark as influence is notoriously difficult to measure.Footnote 75 But no one would dispute the conclusion that Danish policymakers have been motivated partly by this ambition.
Norway: Seeking prestige, access, and influence through contributory warfare
Like their Danish counterparts, Norwegian political leaders and senior officials hardly ever talk about ‘prestige’ as a motive for deploying forces in US-led military operations. Most of the time the argument is that this is the right thing to do for humanitarian or security reasons,Footnote 76 or that participating in military operations abroad is necessary to preserve Norway’s security guarantee in NATO. Since Norway is a ‘frontline state’ bordering Russia, ensuring allied reinforcements in a crisis is a more important objective in Norway than in Denmark.Footnote 77 Security-based explanations therefore figure prominently among the reasons why Norway deploys troops abroad. As the Norwegian Minister of Defence Jørgen Kosmo (Labour Party, 1993–7) once put it, ‘it is expected both in the U.S. and in Europe that Norway makes effective contributions to collective defence and international peace operations. This is a requirement if other alliance members, especially the U.S., are to make forces available to defend our territory.’Footnote 78 However, Norwegian policy documents also stress the importance of contributing to international operations in order to be seen as a ‘credible’ and ‘constructive’ country. Norwegian decision-makers view it as important to be in ‘good standing’ with allies and partners.Footnote 79 This supports our thesis that prestige is a policy driver in its own right, inducing small states to provide military support to important great power allies in order to put ‘credit’ in the bank.
Do Norwegian decision-makers and officials highlight prestige-seeking as a policy driver?
The fact that Norway is willing to contribute [to the US invasion of Afghanistan] means that we can call on solidarity if we get in a difficult situation [in the future] … we put something in which it is good to have on our bank account.Footnote 80
Minister for Foreign Affairs Jan Petersen (Conservative Party, 2001–5)
After the Cold War participation in US-led and NATO-led military operations became a central way for Norway to gain access, influence, and build up prestige, which Norway hoped to be able to draw on when required. As the government argued in a report to the Norwegian Parliament in 1999, ‘the overall goal of Norway’s participation in international military operations is to demonstrate to our allies that we are willing to take responsibility and make a solidary effort’.Footnote 81 By actively participating with military forces in UN and NATO operations Norway sought to become ‘a serious partner who is taken into consideration and listened to’.Footnote 82
After 9/11 it became a key objective for Norway to ensure that its reputation as a good ally was preserved. This is clear from the comment by Minister for Foreign Affairs Jan Petersen regarding Norwegian participation in the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001–2, which is quoted above in the beginning of this section. This is also underscored by the findings of the government-appointed Afghanistan Commission tasked with evaluating Norway’s military and civilian involvement in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2014. Its report, published in June 2016, concluded that Norway’s chief objective in Afghanistan had been to visibly demonstrate that the country was a ‘good ally’ to the United States and other NATO countries.Footnote 83 The commission found that Norway had pursued a ‘contributory-warfare strategy’ (bidragskrigføring). There was no independent or long-term strategy behind its military contributions ‘apart from being a good ally’.Footnote 84 For Norway, in other words, it was far more important how its contributions were perceived in Washington, than if they actually made any noticeable differences ‘on the ground’ in Afghanistan.
The importance attributed to prestige and credit in the Washington bank account is also highlighted by politicians who are critical of Norway’s pro-American policies. They often fail to understand why their political colleagues place so much emphasis on ‘what they think of us in Washington’. For example, Kristin Halvorsen, leader of the Socialist Left Party (SV) and Minister for Finance 2005–9, successfully opposed her coalition cabinet colleagues’ desire to deploy Norwegian forces to southern Afghanistan. According to Halvorsen, her coalition cabinet colleagues were mainly motivated by concerns about how Norway would be perceived in allied capitals. ‘[I] understood that it was important for the prime minister, foreign minister and minister of defence how Norway’s contribution’s to missions abroad were perceived in NATO’. However, Halvorsen nevertheless ‘just could not understand why Norway should be there for NATO and the United States no matter what they asked of us’. Halvorsen clearly thought it wrong to send Norwegian soldiers to war just in order to, as she saw it, get praise in Washington and NATO.Footnote 85
Halvorsen represents a minority opinion in the Norwegian political establishment. Most Norwegian leaders see it as self-evidently beneficial for Norway to ensure that Norway has a good reputation in allied capitals as well as access and influence with allied leaders. As the long-serving Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs Jonas Gahr Støre (Labour Party, 2005–12) put it, ‘the transatlantic ties are still vital for Norway’s security … we still need the support of our European and North American allies’. Norway has an unpredictable great power neighbour in Russia and lacks membership in the EU. These factors make ‘nurturing the relationship with the EU and U.S. … key priorities in [Norwegian] foreign policy’.Footnote 86
Are Norwegian force contributions designed to generate visibility and social capital?
Norway was noticeably slower than Denmark when it came to embracing ‘robust’ participation in expeditionary military operations after the Cold War. In the 1990 Gulf War the country provided only a field hospital and a logistical vessel to support the Danish corvette, and in the UN peacekeeping missions in the Balkans in the 1990s the Norwegian contributions were generally not comprised of combat formations, but for the most part restricted to medical and logistical units.Footnote 87 This practice, of only deploying support units, came under fire in the late 1990s. The main criticism was that it did not generate a sufficiently ‘visible profile’ with Norway’s allies.Footnote 88 This argument seems to have been decisive. In 1997 Norway changed tracks by deploying a mechanised infantry battalion as part of the NATO forces in Bosnia.Footnote 89 Thereafter, Norway regularly sought to contribute ‘visible’ combat forces to NATO-led and US-led operations.
In the run-up to NATO’s 1999 Kosovo War, Norway’s first participation in a war since 1945, the government decided that Norway should make a ‘significant and visible’ contribution.Footnote 90 However, this proved militarily challenging. It turned out that its F-16 aircrafts could not operate at night or attack ground targets, and its mechanised battalion took four months to arrive on the ground. Afterwards, this was considered highly unsatisfactory by the Norwegian government.Footnote 91 It was perceived as deeply embarrassing that the British Kosovo Force (KFOR) commander, Lieutenant General Michael Jackson, supposedly had asked sarcastically: ‘What took you so long, have you been walking?’ Norwegian politicians subsequently repeated this quote often in order to justify reforming the armed forces. The aim was to make them more flexible and capable of rapidly partaking in missions abroad.Footnote 92
During the invasion of Afghanistan, Norway sought to do better than in Kosovo. In 2003 Minister of Defence Kristin Krohn Devold (Conservative Party, 2001–5) told The New York Times that her objective was ‘to be relevant’. Her strategy was to ‘identify what you are good at, and concentrate on it. That way you can play with the big boys even if you are small’.Footnote 93
Norway sought to make a visible and effective contribution to US and allied efforts, both in and outside of ISAF. It sought out more demanding tasks, such as providing the quick reaction force (QRF) in Kabul (2003) and Northern Afghanistan (2006–8), since this was viewed by Devold as a ‘high-profile mission that will demonstrate … Norway’s ability and willingness to support the efforts of the alliance in Afghanistan’.Footnote 94 From 2005 the Norwegian effort was mainly in northern Afghanistan. When internal disagreements within the coalition government precluded participation in southern Afghanistan in 2006–7, the government sought to compensate by deploying Special Forces and intelligence personnel to Kabul. It deliberately chose to assume a larger part in securing the Afghan capital because ISAF preferred this to a greater contribution to northern Afghanistan.Footnote 95 Special Forces, the intelligence service and peace-mediation diplomacy were used actively and deliberately to provide ‘visible and highly-sought contributions’.Footnote 96 The same tactics were employed in 2003 when internal disagreements inside the coalition government prevented Norway from contributing to the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. On this occasion the government compensated the United States and the United Kingdom by deploying an engineer company to the British occupation zone in Iraq in 2004–5.Footnote 97
The 2011 Libyan War stands out as a high point for Norway in terms of providing high-visibility combat forces. Norwegian F-16 combat aircrafts dropped 8 per cent (588 bombs) of the total number of ordinances during NATO’s air campaign.Footnote 98 Prime Minister Stoltenberg was pleased that ‘few countries contributed as much as Norway’. For a few weeks Norwegian and Danish F-16 aircrafts flew ‘more than 30 per cent of the sorties’ for the alliance and undertook ‘some of the hardest tasks’.Footnote 99
In 2014, unlike Denmark, Norway declined to deploy combat aircrafts as part of the US-led anti-ISIS coalition. Prime Minster Erna Solberg (Conservative Party, 2013–) argued that ‘due to our border with Russia, Norway is in a different situation than countries such as Denmark, Holland and Belgium’.Footnote 100 The aircrafts were needed at home. However, shortly thereafter, in addition to its military trainers in Iraq, Norway agreed to be one of only a few countries to provide Special Forces to train Syrian rebel forces in Jordan to combat ISIS. The mission was domestically controversial in Norway, especially since the government even authorised its troops in Jordan to mentor the rebels inside Syria.Footnote 101 To compensate the United States for its lacking contribution to the anti-ISIS air campaign, which risked hurting Norwegian standing in Washington, the Norwegian government undertook a visible, but domestically controversial and potentially risky, military deployment.
Do Norwegian metrics of success privilege praise, access, and influence?
It was this type of mission that ensured that we received such tremendous recognition … I know that the Norwegian effort [in Libya 2011] made a strong impression among our allies.Footnote 102
Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg (Labour Party, 2005–13)
Norwegian leaders, and the armed forces themselves, regard it as a sign of success that the capabilities of the Norwegian Armed Forces are held in high esteem and are sought after by key allies. Indeed, for better or worse, this has become a major metric for success. As the Afghanistan Commission concluded, ‘the first and most important objective in the whole period [in Afghanistan 2001–14] has been the alliance dimension: to support the U.S. and contribute to NATO’s relevance. Norway has been a good ally and to a great extent achieved this goal.’Footnote 103
After Norway’s participation in the 2011 Libyan War, the armed forces presented the operation as a success mainly by arguing that ‘the armed forces have received a great deal of praise for the way in which the operation was conducted’.Footnote 104 Minister of Defence Espen Barth Eide (Labour Party, 2011–12) argued that the Libyan War was proof that the transformation of the Norwegian Armed Forces had been a success, since it enabled Norway to be in the ‘forefront’ of foreign interventions.
During [the 1999] operation Allied Force in Kosovo, Norway was not among those countries who stood in the forefront with our F-16 aircraft. Now we do just that. Yes, therefore our participation in the Libya War is a sign of successful restructuring … Feedback from NATO on Norway’s efforts have been exceptionally good. This makes me confident that what we have done, and continue to do, is correct.Footnote 105
Ivar Kristiansen (Conservative Party), a member of the parliamentary defence committee, stressed that when the committee visited the United States after the war, it experienced how Norway’s contribution was praised as ‘Best in Class’ and ‘Gold Star’. A ‘unanimous committee’ concluded ‘that this is feedback … that we all have reasons to be very proud of’.Footnote 106 Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg similarly stressed that the Libyan War was a success for Norway, in spite of its economic and domestic political costs, because he knew ‘that the Norwegian effort made a strong impression among our allies: in NATO, in Washington, in Paris and in London’.Footnote 107 After the war, for the first time in eight years, the Norwegian prime minister was invited to a bilateral meeting with the US President.Footnote 108 During this meeting President Obama heaped praise on Norway for its contribution to the campaign.Footnote 109
Norway’s contribution to the US-led anti-ISIS coalition was hampered by the country’s inability to deploy F-16 combat aircrafts. However, the deployment of Norwegian Special Forces to Jordan was greeted by US Secretary of Defence Ash Carter as ‘a welcome contribution from a stalwart ally’.Footnote 110 Norway also maintained its Special Forces presence in Kabul. Minister of Defence Ine Eriksen Søreide subsequently argued that Norway’s Special Forces were a key asset because they were ‘highly appreciated among our most important Allies in NATO’. As evidence, she pointed to the fact that ‘I regularly meet colleagues and military chiefs in NATO who strongly praise our Special Forces.’Footnote 111
Today, Norway assigns priority to those ‘strategic capabilities’ in its armed forces that are not only valuable for national defence, but which are also of great importance for generating goodwill and prestige with its major allies. These include Special Forces, new F-35 combat aircrafts, the intelligence service, and new maritime patrol aircrafts. These sophisticated, high-tech capabilities deliver a ‘considerable contribution to our allies and NATO’ and form a key part of the bilateral relationships with the US.Footnote 112 Such capabilities need not be primarily intended for deployment abroad to generate prestige. As a government-appointed expert commission on security and defence argued in 2015, ‘Norway has gained particular recognition [from the United States] for its contributions in the field of intelligence and surveillance in the High North.’Footnote 113 Some Norwegian experts and members of the political opposition have criticised the priority given to these ‘strategic capabilities’. Critics claim that their prioritisation comes at the expense of capabilities needed mainly for national defence, such as the Norwegian Army and Home Guard.Footnote 114 The high priority, which is nevertheless given to those capabilities regularly praised by Norway’s allies, especially by the United States, gives clear indication of the degree to which the opinions of key allies serve as a central metric for success.
Conclusion
The theoretical aim of this article was to bring small states into the study of prestige to offset the great power bias that this growing field of research currently suffers from. We took issue with the prevailing view that regards prestige as a function of material and especially military power. We argued that small states lacking material power may derive prestige and good standing by acting as loyal allies and heeding great power requests for military contributions. Taking our cue from Hans Morgenthau, we conceptualised small power prestige as a form of soft power that small powers may generate by providing military and other forms of support to great powers that they wish to influence or obtain protection or other forms of support from. We hypothesised that small states should be particularly attracted to this way of generating leverage vis-à-vis great power patrons because they lack the material and military power that forms the basis of great power prestige and status. We consequently expected prestige-seeking to be a major factor driving Danish and Norwegian military contributions to the US-led operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. To corroborate our hypothesis we looked for statements by key policymakers and officials indicating that Denmark and Norway had been motivated by a desire for increasing their prestige in Washington and NATO; we sought to determine whether force contributions had been designed to maximise visibility and prestige rather than military effect; and finally we examined whether the Danish and Norwegian definitions of success focused more on generating American praise and support than on operational success.
As is clear from Table 1, our two case studies leave little doubt that the desire for prestige among decision-makers in Washington and in NATO was a major driver in both countries.
Prestige-seeking in Danish and Norwegian military contributions to US-led operations.
Although prestige-seeking is not regarded as a legitimate casus belli in neither Denmark nor Norway, we found several statements from central decision-makers indicating that the desire for prestige was among the key factors driving decisions to provide military support for the United States and NATO in the post-Cold War era. Denmark and Norway designed their contributions to generate visibility in NATO and Washington, and decision-makers primarily measured success in terms of allied praise, access to US decision-makers and influence on US and NATO policy as well as US support in other issue areas. These metrics were far more important than the results of the actions taken by Danish and Norwegian forces on the ground.
Our finding that prestige-seeking constitutes a major policy driver for small states contemplating whether or not to meet a military request from a major ally is no trivial finding. It does make a difference that smaller US allies value prestige and standing in Washington as highly as our case studies suggest. This makes it easier for the United States to elicit military support from its allies than existing interest-based and rational choice studies of burden-sharing and collective action problems would lead us to expect. This not only helps to explain the puzzle highlighted in the beginning of this article: why smaller European states continued to support the US-led wars after the end of the Cold War in the face of public protests and at a high cost in blood and treasure. It also suggests that it will be easier to maintain the transatlantic bonds and the military cooperation between Europe and the United States that many now fear may be damaged beyond repair by the Trump presidency. The uncertainty caused by the Trump presidency will not remove the small state desire for influence, access and US support; it may well have the opposite effect, inducing them to work even harder to retain their prestige and standing in Washington.
Our findings do not refute the existing research on coalition-building and coalition management. Denmark and Norway were not just motivated by prestige-seeking. Policy drivers such as the threat posed by terrorism, concerns related to national security, a desire to promote human rights and democracy, and domestic party politics also influenced the decision-making processes. Divergent threat perceptions regarding Russia and differences in strategic culture explain why Denmark responded positively to US requests for military support for the attack on Iraq in 2003 and Norway said no; why Denmark supported the US threats of air strikes against Syria in August 2013 and Norway did not; and why Denmark sent F-16s to Iraq and Syria in 2014–16 and Norway did not.Footnote 115 These differences cannot be accounted for by prestige-seeking. It is clear from our case study that Norway gave priority to national defence following the Russian annexation of the Crimea in 2014, and that this was deemed more important than generating prestige by making military contributions to the US-led campaign against ISIS.Footnote 116 Similarly, the Norwegian refusals to participate in the attack on Iraq or to support air strikes against Syria, and the Norwegian decision to withdraw early from NATO’s Libya campaign, reflect that Oslo attributes greater importance to the United Nations and international law than Copenhagen. It also reflects greater domestic bipartisan support for the use of military force in general in Denmark than in Norway, which can be attributed to different strategic cultures.Footnote 117 The importance of prestige-seeking is thus conditioned by other factors than the existing literature on coalitional warfare would lead us to expect. Prestige-seeking should consequently only be regarded as one policy driver among others, and its relative importance must be determined empirically from case to case.
To break new ground, future Realist studies of international prestige-seeking would be well-advised to focus on two pertinent issues that are outside the scope of this article. First, our study raises the question of how small states manage the politics of adjusting their approach to prestige and thus gain the expected benefit: Both Denmark and Norway entered the wars of terror with established reputations (prestige) for soft power – in matters of development aid, UN diplomacy, and in Norway’s case especially, peace diplomacy. How did the change come about, and – more generally – how do small states decide on prestige-seeking? To what extent do great power responses to prestige-seeking affect the foreign policy choices of their smaller allies? And how do leaders argue the case of prestige? Second, future scholarship on prestige-seeking should zoom in on the ways in which great powers respond to small state prestige-seeking. This article has first and foremost examined how small state policymakers are motivated by prestige (as a means); a sensible next step would be to investigate the reactions of their greater allies. How do a good reputation and prestige translate into small power influence and benefits (if at all)? Do great powers act out of gratitude or self-interest (or both), when they react positively to prestige-seeking small states? Do larger allies categorise their troop-contributing smaller brother-in-arms according to status? And what difference does it make? These are but some of the questions that ought to be part of a future Realist research agenda dealing with prestige-seeking in international politics.
Biographical information
Peter Viggo Jakobsen (PhD) is Associate Professor at the Institute for Strategy, Royal Danish Defence College, and Professor (part-time) at the Center for War Studies, University of Southern Denmark. He is frequently used by the Danish and international media as a commentator on defence and security issues, gives many lectures on these issues, and has acted as an advisor and consultant for several governments and international organisations. He has written extensively on civil-military cooperation and the integrated approach, coercive diplomacy, Danish and Nordic foreign and security policy, NATO, peace and stabilisation operations, and use of military force.
Jens Ringsmose (PhD) is the Director of the Institute for Military Operations at the Royal Danish Defence College. He has published widely, including articles in Survival, International Politics, Contemporary Security Policy, European Security, Journal of Transatlantic Studies, Global Affairs and Cooperation and Conflict, on NATO burden-sharing, transatlantic cooperation, and Danish security and defence policy. He recently published two books: Strategic Narratives, Public Opinion and War: Winning Support for Foreign Military Missions (2015, eds) with Beatrice A. de Graaf and George Dimitriu, and Conflict in Cyber-Space: Theoretical, Strategic, Legal and Ethical Implications (2016, eds) with Karsten Friis.
Håkon Lunde Saxi (PhD) is a Senior Fellow with the Norwegian Defence University College (FHS), Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS). He received his PhD from the University of Oslo in Political Science in 2016. His research focuses on Norwegian, Nordic, British, and German security and defence policies, the Northern European security environment, and multinational defence cooperation. Saxi has previously published articles in Defence Studies, Journal of Strategic Studies, and Defense & Security Analysis. He is presently writing a book about the involvement of the Norwegian Armed Forces in UN and NATO-led operations in the Balkans between 1992 and 2005.
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to all the Danish and Norwegian officials and decision-makers who kindly offered their valuable insights and advice, thereby enabling us to write this article. Any mistakes or omissions are entirely our own. We would also like to thank Jonathan Mercer, James Sperling, and the anonymous reviewers for useful comments, which have improved the quality of the article significantly.
