This book addresses the long-running question of whether there is some kind of inherent or necessary clash between the world of Islam and the West through a thorough and detailed analysis of demographic developments in the two culture zones. Its conclusion is clear: “The ‘clash of civilizations’ will not take place. Consideration of profound social and historical indicators points rather to the idea of a ‘meeting of civilizations”’ (p. xi).
The basis of this conclusion is the investigation of birth rates and fertility trends (over the past half century or so) in fifty-one Muslim-majority nations: twenty-three Arab, five in the “Greater non-Arab Middle East” (which rather confusingly for British-based scholars includes Pakistan and Bangladesh as well as Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan), nine ex-Communist countries (six in Asia and three in Europe), four in Southeast Asia (including the Maldives), and ten in Sub-Saharan western Africa. The range of birth rates across different countries is huge—varying in 2005 from 7.55 in Niger, 7.09 in Guinea Bissau, 6.8 in Afghanistan, and 6.2 in Yemen to 1.2 in Bosnia, 1.69 in Lebanon, 1.7 in Azerbaijan, and 2.0 in Iran. The change over the course of recent decades is also sharp, dropping from 8.45 in 1976 to 3.61 in 2005 in Saudi Arabia, from 8.36 in 1962 to 2.57 in 2005 in Algeria, from 6.9 in 1953 to 2.35 in 2005 in Turkey, and from 6.94 in 1958 to 3.07 in 2005 in Malaysia, to cite a few examples. It is on the basis of such figures that the authors conclude that these trends in Muslim-majority nations follow a similar pattern as that which has unfolded in Western countries over the past several centuries. In other words, the world of Islam is not inherently distinctive, and there is therefore no essential clash between it and the West. This short book is a constructive contribution—alongside another published by Columbia University Press, Richard Bulliet's The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization—to the ongoing debate about the relationship between the world of Islam and the West.
In light of some of the lurid prognostications which have been circulating on the internet, as well as in printed volumes such as Christopher Caldwell's Reflections on the Revolution in Europe: Immigration, Islam and the West (New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2009), the insights presented here—along with such other publications as the Pew Research Centre's The Future of the Global Muslim Population: Projections for 2010–2030 (Washington D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2011)—make an important point. Birth rates in many Muslim-majority societies are indeed higher than in many Western countries, but they are not static and the authors suggest a significant convergence is in the making.
Youssef Courbage is a highly experienced demographer, well known among students of the Middle East for his work (jointly authored with Philippe Fargues) on Jews and Christians under Islam (New York: I. B. Tauris, 1998), with its very interesting conclusion that the proportion of Jews and Christians in the Middle East during the Ottoman period went up significantly. It is a good combination, as the other significant theme of the book is the role played by religion in bringing about either high or low birth rates. Here too their conclusion is clear: “emphasis on Islam as a causative factor is primarily a symptom of intellectual myopia. Literacy, patrilinealism, reactions of minority groups, and oil wealth all reduce the idea of Muslim demographic specificity to the level of a residual variable” (p. 120).
There is thus no shortage in the book of data and statistics from across the wider Islamic world, but they are always helpfully contextualized, for example, in the observation that fertility rates in Iran and Tunisia are now the same as in France (p. xii). Regional variations are also stressed, together with such important factors as female literacy, pre-Islamic social patterns, the wider political scene, and, last but by no means least, economic issues such as poverty. Different perspectives within the Islamic tradition are also important, especially between Sunni and Shiʿi views, with the interesting observation made on page 31 that Ryad al-Solh, the (Sunni) first prime minister of Lebanon, converted to Shiʿism because he had no sons and wished to be able to transfer his property to his daughters. Religious factors do make some difference but they are not necessarily the primary factor in these questions. Generally speaking, the authors suggest secularization is conducive to a decline in fertility since religion is commonly natalist. Freedom of choice in sexual and family matters has consequences in both the demographic and the political arenas, again potentially leading to convergence rather than conflict.
Overall, the book provides a healthy grounding in empirical reality to a debate that is too often focused exclusively on the realm of ideas. It may be that the authors overstate their case somewhat at one or two points, but the fundamental thesis is well argued.
