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Dual-use nano-neurotechnology

An assessment of the implications of trends in science and technology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 November 2018

Kathryn Nixdorff
Affiliation:
Darmstadt University of Technology
Tatiana Borisova
Affiliation:
Palladin Institute of Biochemistry, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine
Serhiy Komisarenko
Affiliation:
Palladin Institue of Biochemistry, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine
Malcolm Dando*
Affiliation:
University of Bradford
*
Correspondence: Malcolm Dando, Department of Peace Studies and International Development, University of Bradford, West Yorkshire, Bradford BD7 1DP, UK. Email: M.R.Dando@bradford.ac.uk

Abstract

The chemical and biological nonproliferation regime stands at a watershed moment, when failure seems a real possibility. After the unsuccessful outcome of the 2016 Eighth Review Conference, the future of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention is uncertain. As the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) approaches its Fourth Review Conference in 2018, it has almost completed removing the huge stocks of chemical weapons, but it now faces the difficult organizational task of moving its focus to preventing the reemergence of chemical weapons at a time when the international security situation appears to be increasingly more difficult and dangerous. In this article, we assess the current and near-term state (5–10 years) and impact of three related areas of science and technology that could be of dual-use concern: targeted delivery of agents to the central nervous system (CNS), particularly by means of nanotechnology; direct impact of nanomaterials on synaptic functions in the CNS; and neuronal circuits in the brain that might be targeted by those with hostile intent. We attempt to assess the implications of our findings, particularly for the consideration of the problem of state-level interest in so-called nonlethal incapacitating chemical agents for law enforcement at the CWC Review Conference in 2018, but also more generally for the longer-term future of the chemical and biological nonproliferation regime.

Information

Type
Article
Copyright
© Association for Politics and the Life Sciences 2018 
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Figure 1. Probable changes in nanoparticle safety and misuse potential.

Figure 1

Figure 2. The evolving threat. Timeline describing the three phases of the evolution of potential biological warfare agents and their impact on the biological weapons threat level. Source: Petro, Plasse and McNulty 2003, reference12, with permission of Mary Ann Liebert, Inc.