This book is an extended version of Dr Orakhelashvili's PhD dissertation. The concept of peremptory norms in international law is one of the most complicated and obscure issues of international law. Certain aspects of this issue have been analysed and explored extensively in the work of the International Law Commission on the codification of the law of treaties, as well as in many publications; tackling this subject-matter is, therefore, a daunting task.

Orakhelsahvili has adopted a very broad approach to the subject of peremptory norms, which he analyses in its entirety. This sets it apart from some of the classic publications on the subject, which either focused on only one aspect of jus cogens (such as its working in the law of treaties) or limited themselves to the theory of peremptory norms, leaving aside the effect of such norms in terms of the meanings of substantive rights and obligations.

Orakhelashvili analyses an enormous quantity of literature on this subject and makes an impressive survey of available practice. The book is structured in five parts: Parts One and Two deal with the general aspects of jus cogens, ie the concept and identification of peremptory norms (Part One) and the effect of peremptory norms in general international law. Parts Three, Four and Five deal with particular aspects of these norms by examining peremptory norms and the powers of international organizations (Part Three); peremptory norms and the powers of international tribunals (Part Four); and finally the effect of peremptory norms in national legal systems (Part Five). The aim of this study, in the words of the author, is:

Part One examines fairly well-known aspects of peremptory norms, such as the issues regarding the relation between these norms and the concept of public order, as well the issue of the identification of these norms. The author analyses the new problem of attributing peremptory character to certain norms of environmental law, such as prohibiting large-scale pollution of the human environment. This statement is not evidenced, however, by the practice of States; and in the view of the present reviewer such characterization is premature. Orakhelashvili is a staunch proponent of the extensive approach to the catalogue of peremptory norms and suggests that each norm should be assessed on its merits ‘in the light of criteria of identification, to clarify whether it qualifies as a peremptory norm’ (p 66).

The chapter on the law of treaties and jus cogens focuses on Article 53 (and related provisions) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which is possibly the most extensively researched aspect of peremptory norms. The author provides a sustained analysis of the nature of jus cogens in relation to the law of treaties as well as the nature and working of conventional transactions, such as reservations to treaties from the viewpoint of peremptory norms. Especially interesting is the author's analysis regarding the impact of jus cogens on the law of treaty termination (pp 200–3), in particular of Article 60 (5) of the 1969 VCLT. Orakhelashvili examines the character of certain integral obligations (the category introduced by Fitzmaurice during the codification of the Law of Treaties) contained in humanitarian law treaties in relation to Article 60 (5) and concludes that

In view of the present author, however, the question arises whether all integral obligations, linked by Fitzmaurice to non-reciprocity, can be termed jus cogens (p 203). This would go too far. Moreover, account needs to be taken of the fact that humanitarian law treaties include only partly non-reciprocal obligations.

This problem has been also discussed within the International Law Commission's work on the general issue of reservations to treaties. Professor Alain Pellet, the Special Rapporteur on reservations, raised the problem of reservations to so-called ‘normative’ treaties, which include, for example, the International Labour Organization conventions, treaties on the law of armed conflict and human rights treaties (the category which was the subject of analysis by the author of this study). However, as Pellet observed, a treaty was rarely entirely normative or entirely synallagmatic (reciprocal). In most cases, including human rights, a treaty includes both contractual clauses recognizing reciprocal rights and obligations and ‘normative’ clauses. What we call a normative treaty is a treaty in which the provisions of a normative character predominate.

The presentation of the issue of reservations would benefit from a study of the more recent publications on this subject, which are not in fact referred to and cited.Footnote ¹ The author appears to be relying mainly on the classic article by D Bowett, written in 1975.Footnote ²

The theme of reciprocity of obligations (or lack thereof) and the position of third parties, as for example in the case of remedies for breach of norms jus cogens, is the general theme of the book. The author is a great supporter of third party countermeasures in cases of breaches of the norm of jus cogens, correctly observing that ‘limiting the standing to take countermeasures to bilateral contexts is effectively to leave many breaches without redress.’ (p 272).Footnote ³

In Parts Three to Five of the book, the author presents an original and extremely valuable insight into the working of jus cogens within the framework of international organizations, international tribunals and national legal systems, which is supported by extensive research. The author is a supporter of the theory of ‘full-fledged limitation on the action by the Security Council’; and he further observes that such a ‘limitation shall have necessary consequences in terms of validity and interpretation of relevant measures: if one accepts the principle, one must accept its consequences’ (p 484). Orakhelashvili acknowledges, however, that such a broad interpretation of the working of jus cogens within the structure of the Security Council has not as yet gained full acceptance. Equally interesting is the part on peremptory norms and international judicial jurisdiction, in which he examines such controversial issues as the consent to jurisdiction (and the related principle of non ultra petita) and its relation to obligations erga omnes and actio popularis, as well as norms jus cogens and standing to bring claims. He supports the view that, due to the special character of obligations erga omnes,Footnote ⁴ the

This is a very far-reaching postulate. As to the interaction of the norms of jus cogens with national legal orders, the author is of the view that they are very well suited to ‘receive’ international law standards into national legal systems (p 575).

In conclusion, this book is an excellent and lasting contribution to the study of international law. The author admirably deals with this difficult subject-matter and presents a complete (if somewhat idealistic) analysis of the norms of jus cogens, based on meticulous research.