This book is an update on Thailand's continuing turmoil since the May 2014 coup, with articles covering politics, economy, military, judiciary, religion, media, and civil society and some revisiting the red-yellow conflict of 2006–14. The focus, however, is the monarchy. Of the fifteen essays, the monarchy is the sole subject of four, a major element in seven others, and peripheral in only four, while two kings stare at us from the cover. In Thailand, in the third decade of the twenty-first century, the monarchy is at the center of academic study and daily debate.

In the mid-twentieth century, Thailand's Chakri dynasty seemed to be slipping into the cosmetic mold of most of the world's surviving monarchies. That changed in the 1960s, when the United States saw the potential to build a conservative pillar in Southeast Asia during the Cold War. Over the following half century, King Bhumibol Adulyadej crafted a new model of moral kingship, which appealed to members of a new urban middle class that felt insecure about their Chinese origins, their wealth made too quickly, and their vulnerability to globalization.

King Bhumibol died in 2016 and was succeeded by his only son, Vajiralongkorn. Kevin Hewison sets this moment in the context of a “long succession” that began when Vajiralongkorn was designated as crown prince in 1972. It was already clear then that the prince was a contrast with his father. His education was troubled, his love life chaotic, and his enthusiasm for royal duties patently low. Yet the palace decided that sticking with male primogeniture was safer than any innovative alternative, which would have to be female. As a result, the palace has been managing the successive upheavals in the heir's life for almost half a century.

Since the turn of the millennium, as his father faded from the central role, the prince's behavior seemed more “extravagant, self-indulgent and idiosyncratic” (p. 125). The lèse-majesté law was increasingly used to suppress not just criticism of the monarchy but also news of his life. After the succession in 2016, the new king increased his personal control over the crown's wealth and lands, over a significant segment of the armed forces, over the Buddhist Sangha, and over the palace administration. As Hewison sums up, “the crown holds more formal power than at any time since 1932,” and this has placed “the monarchy again at the center of political conflict” (p. 133).

The military coup in 2016 was partly designed to enable the military to manage the succession. Paul Chambers shows that it was much more than another Thai coup-as-usual. The junta conducted a campaign of intimidation, used military courts for civilian cases, and introduced a barrage of new and repressive laws to silence dissent. It then proceeded to restructure the political system for the long term, diminishing the role of elected bodies and enhancing the power of military, civilian, and judicial officials. It also installed a new regime of surveillance and social control using electronic technology and vigilante organizations revived from the Cold War era.Footnote ¹ With these powers, the junta managed the transition through an election in 2019 to a nominally parliamentary regime with the coup leaders still in power—something earlier juntas had failed to manage.

Within the military, Chambers shows, the Wongthewan clique, which consists mainly of long-standing military families, has returned to dominance in close alliance with the new king. This combination has been able to control senior appointments across all the armed forces and the police. Chambers predicts that this royalist “praetorianism” will dominate Thailand for long to come.

David Streckfuss argues that the expansion of the monarchy and military has been accompanied by a severe shrinkage of public space. After the courts handed down very long sentences for lèse-majesté and other thought crimes, a regime of censorship and self-censorship prevailed. Streckfuss interviewed academics, writers, journalists, and creative artists. They related how they now self-censor and feel frustrated. One predicted that Thailand will “become a depressed society where people hate the powers that be so much, but they can't express themselves” (p. 331). Apichatpong Weerasethakul, Thailand's most internationally acclaimed film director, will not show his latest work in Thailand. Many academics and creative artists have gone into self-exile.

Tyrell Haberkorn's contribution to this book slides across the gap between committed academic research and activism. She suggests how, in the utopian future when democracy is restored and the members of the 2014 junta are deprived of their immunity, they could be prosecuted by reviving cases of torture, death in custody, and other infringements on human rights that the courts have rejected in the last few years. This is a form of optimism in dark times.

The book was caught up in this regime of repression. Ten of the fourteen authors live outside Thailand. The editor, Pavin Chachavalpongpun, is self-exiled to Japan, where he runs a website about the monarchy. As the book was about to go to production, NUS Press in Singapore walked away from it. The reason behind this action was not explained, but it is easy to imagine. Yale picked up the project. The book is unlikely to appear in any bookshop in Thailand. In a variation of self-censorship, booksellers fail to stock certain titles.

King Bhumibol crafted a new style of monarchy by updating the traditional theory in which the king becomes king because he is the best man available, the moral exemplar.Footnote ² In the latter part of his reign, he was hailed as a thammaracha, a king of righteousness. The passing of the throne to a very different man has forced all supporters of the monarchy to reorient or rationalize their attitude. The expansion of the king's power since the succession has increased the complexity. Besides, Vajiralongkorn has lived most of the time in Germany, and in 2020, he officially adopted a royal consort, reviving polygamy. His life and times are regularly covered in the Western tabloid press, and in a network of websites and YouTube channels hosted outside Thailand. Below the surface in Thailand there is turmoil, but in public space, all was quiet until August 2020, when a new wave of student activists punched through this thin surface. An activist lawyer, Arnon Nampha, told a crowd, “the monarchy already has power beyond what is allowed by the system. This is an issue that we need to talk about seriously”Footnote ³—sparking a new wave of student activism after a lull of almost half a century.

These events have left Thailand's politics more divided than ever. On one side, many in the urban middle class clearly value the monarchy as a pillar of conservatism and stability, with or without the moral underpinning accrued by King Bhumibol. This group is vociferous and self-righteous in trying to suppress any comment on the monarchy. They have the weight of established power behind them. On the other side, many in the younger generation see an opportunity not only to modernize the monarchy, but also to do away with the repressive apparatus, hierarchical structures, and backward-looking ideologies that surround the institution. They are reluctant to live with the status quo for the rest of their lives, and they have the passion and privilege of youth.

This book is a valuable update on what the editor calls Thailand's “crisis of legitimacy” (p. 5), especially the changing role of the monarchy and its multiple consequences.