A.'s new book is part of the OUP series Ancient Warfare and Civilization (edited by A. and R. Waterfield). It inevitably invites comparison with Syme's The Roman Revolution [1939]. Syme in many ways remains the elephant in the room, and one must question whether the period is best considered one of revolution. Whatever the case, A.'s book is a useful addition to the introductory books focusing on the transition from Republic to Principate. The preface emphasises cataclysmic violence and trauma, suggesting that scholars underestimate the violent transition from Republic to Empire. This is a valid contribution, even if Lintott's standard work, which takes the view that Rome was inherently violent, is curiously absent from the bibliography (Violence in Republican Rome [2nd ed. 1999]). A. has set out to write an essentially narrative history of the period after the death of Caesar, with focus on political developments and warfare, something that is unfortunately rather unusual in recent scholarship.
Chapter 1 focuses on the well-trodden issue of an alleged Augustan paradox: the chapter rather uncritically accepts the so-called restoration of the Republic (pp. 4, 236, Chapter 14); the alternative version(s) is never mentioned. A. suggests that Augustus muddled through the transformation (p. 2), making decisions according to political circumstances. However, for this reviewer at least, a more probable scenario proposes that the triumviral assignment became the model for Augustus’ retaining of the powers required to carry out the tasks and assignments presented to him by the SPQR. Augustus (wisely) and his contemporaries never defined the Principate, but this hardly equates to muddling through. A. also suggests a new paradigm for understanding Roman politics: networks. This is to be highly commended, but a more thorough exposition of such networks is perhaps needed in order to establish its value for the Late Republic (pp. 10–13, etc.). The use of modern theoretical approaches is to be applauded – of course we can use modern categories to analyse ancient history – one might, however, be concerned that there is not enough payoff.
Chapter 2 centres on the death of Julius Caesar, which according to A. is the main turning point during the Late Republic. Chapter 3 offers a narrative of the period 133 to 44 b.c.e. A. rightly emphasises that Roman politics was personal (p. 42). Chapter 4 continues unfolding the crisis. A. talks of an accidental war in 49 b.c.e. (pp. 66–71). Conceivably, but the civil war broke out in 49 b.c.e. not because Caesar did not want to be leave Gaul but over the terms on which he would return to Rome. There was consequently an inherent problem in the system and Rome may accordingly even be described as a failed state. Rome as a sovereign state did not monopolise violence.
Chapter 5 turns to the battle of Mutina, supposedly the last battle of the Republic (p. 74). A. focuses on two clear-cut sides in the conflict – Caesarian and republican – thus ignoring the absurd political situation: Caesar's assassins and Caesar's heir were on the same side, this time opposing Antonius, with Caesar's veterans fighting on opposing sides. Alliance formation seeks to maximise wartime returns. Antonius and Young Caesar were counterbalancing one another. To suggest that Mutina was a republican victory by any standards thus seems problematic (pp. 93–8, cf. 73) and decreeing a civil war triumph to Decimus Brutus reveals the extreme nature of the situation. The silent combat at Mutina (pp. 93–8; App. B Civ. 3.68) revealingly emphasises the differences between fighting a civil war and a war against a foreign enemy. Chapter 6 turns to the honours after Mutina; curiously the civil war triumph is not mentioned. Next Young Caesar's march on Rome is described and A. is undoubtedly right in suggesting that he was crucial to the balance of power (p. 112, cf. p. 120 on warring groups).
Chapter 7 sees the beginning of the revolution. A. observes that aims other than ‘constituting the res publica’ did not make it into the title of the triumvirate (pp. 127–34), but it is unclear how this would have been possible. This seems rather a trivial point, especially since he then goes on to exploit Appian's proscription edict (p. 131). Of course the law will have said more about the office than was spelt out in its title (avenging Caesar and ending the civil war). The office's powers were not specified in the title either. Chapter 8 turns to the proscriptions. A. emphasises that people joined the violence as a means of self-preservation (p. 137, cf. p. 53). In Chapter 9 the focus is on Philippi. A. rightly underlines that there could never be a negotiated settlement (p. 149). Chapter 10 concentrates mainly on Perusia and the peace at Brundisium (p. 189: last act of the overthrow of the Republic). Chapter 11 explores the war against Sextus Pompeius. The honours given to Young Caesar after his victory are mentioned (p. 182), but surprisingly the inscription on the rostral monument is left unmentioned (App. B Civ. 5.130: Young Caesar ended the civil war – begun by his enemies – and not for the last time).
Chapter 12 focuses on Antonius and Cleopatra and culminates with the battle of Actium followed by their death in Alexandria. A. rightly dismisses Dio Cassius’ fanciful story of the decision to withdraw to fight another day (50.14.4–15.3). He also rejects the notion that Cleopatra took fright and fled. But as the queen of Egypt she may have thought this was best for her country, whereas Antonius clearly wanted to fight. A. concludes that Cleopatra took flight and Antonius followed, but the majority of the fleet was unable to follow. This may be so, but we should not forget that this way they lost both the battle and the war, as the surrender of Antonius' army was then inevitable. The chapter suggests, contrary to the ancient evidence, that Actium was not a turning point of the period.
Chapter 13, ‘The Invention of Augustus’, surprisingly claims that Actium was not a triumph, only a procession, as a commander could traditionally not expect to triumph after a victory in a civil war (p. 226). This technicality (as he calls it) is, however, allegedly soon forgotten. But are we to believe that Augustus later claimed a triumph, even though he was never granted one, or at least never celebrated one? Res Gestae 4 clearly mentions three triumphs and two ovations (if not for Actium, then for what?). A. refers to the Fasti Barberiniani, which do not mention Actium, but surely this is just a stone cutter's mistake (M. Beard, The Roman Triumph [2007], pp. 303–5). In fact the case of Mutina – as mentioned above – shows that civil war triumphs were not impossible (cf. joint ovation of Antonius and Octavian in 40 b.c.e.). The chapter ends with the ‘Republic Revived 28–27 b.c.e.’ (pp. 230–6). Chapter 14 focuses on the so-called paradoxical world of ‘The Augustan Republic’ (pp. 246–7, also including the crisis of 23 b.c.e.). Whatever the case, A. is right that the powers of Augustus stemmed from military power (p. 240). Chapter 15 focuses on anarchy and discontent (pp. 268–71), but the idea that the regime allowed no opposition seems an overstatement (p. 312). Monarchy succeeded because the Romans had had enough of civil war. Chapter 16 offers examples of patrimonial networks, focusing on ‘The Cultural Revolution’. A. again discusses the term revolution and suggests that Augustus did not want to change the world (p. 283). Chapter 17 focuses on the imperial mission, i.e. conquest, Chapter 18 on the death of Augustus. The book's concluding section, ‘Rome's Revolution’, finally offers a definition of revolution: after five centuries of republicanism Augustus changed the world, which equates to revolution. This was not, however, a constitutional revolution (p. 335). A. adds that looking at the achievements of Augustus we need to count the corpses (p. 336). Syme certainly would have agreed.
A. is to be commended for a readable book that will hopefully re-establish interest amongst the wider public, especially with its focus on politics and warfare, but there are quibbles: even if a focus on the ancient evidence is always to be applauded, the bibliography is extremely selective. And even if the concept of revolution is accepted, the Late Republic, not just the last phase (as page 2), must constitute a revolution. Crucially, the different factions fought for supremacy of the state, not in order to dissolve it.
