As a researcher writing about soft power, often using Taiwan as a case study, this was an edifying book to review. In just seven excellent chapters based on a careful review of the literature and theoretical frameworks and drawing on data obtained through rigorous quantitative and qualitative methods, Chen Jie and the team of international scholars he has assembled examine how Taiwan’s democratization has influenced political and public opinion in China. The subtitle of the book is important: Inspiration and Support. This is certainly not a call to arms; the authors are not offering an uncompromising diatribe against the PRC and shining their spotlight on Taiwan as the template China could/should/will follow. Rather, they highlight how Taiwan’s social and political systems have influenced the way mainland Chinese have thought about both democracy and Taiwan, and how Taiwan has supported possible changemakers in both the PRC and Hong Kong. This is indicated in Chen Jie’s opening chapter, in which he discusses Taiwan “as a helper as well as inspirer for democracy in China.” While there are many passages in the chapter this reviewer underlined for future reference – recalling the decline of events on Hong Kong to remember the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989, Chen noted that “The mission to counter a collective amnesia imposed by Beijing has now fallen on Taiwan’s shoulders” (p. 3) – the most compelling part of the chapter examines how mainland scholars have researched and written about Taiwan’s political transformation. Far from avoiding the subject for political reasons, the volume of (rigorous and credible) research on Taiwan in China’s think tanks and in universities which finds its way into government circles is astonishing. This leads Chen to introduce “democracy diplomacy” (p. 15) which this reviewer would suggest helps communicate Taiwan’s significant soft power capacity and which also forms the basis for the six chapters that follow.

Chen Jie also provides a somewhat critical discussion of Taiwan’s support for democratic movements in China and Hong Kong during Tsai Ing-wen’s presidency. His conclusions are persuasive given the evidence he marshals but will be disappointing for Tsai’s legion of supporters who view her and the party she led as beacons of democracy: “Overall,” he writes, “the track record of the Tsai administration is as lacklustre as it is contradictory” (p. 51). Chen continues that “her administration hasn’t upped the game of democracy support targeting China despite new and compelling circumstances to do so for both money and love” (p. 51).

The next three chapters take a case study approach. Joseph Yu-shek Cheng writes about Taiwan’s support for the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong; Frédéric Krumbein on how Taiwan’s record on LGBTQ rights and same-sex marriage have found audiences in China; and Chia-chou Wang about the effect on Chinese students of studying in Taiwan. These are all examples of Taiwan’s soft power and its communication. On LGBTQ and same-sex marriage, for example, the situation was not resolved without considerable opposition, and there are many in Taiwan who continue to criticize the extension of such rights to the LGBTQ community. However, the important factor – and perhaps Krumbein could have drawn this out a little more explicitly in his chapter – is that this difference of opinion shows the democratic landscape is often very messy, and that rows on policies and the right to protest and challenge them are significant and powerful signals about the efficacy of the liberal-democratic system: that disagreement is expected and tolerated is a measure of soft power.

Chia-chou Wang’s chapter on Chinese students in Taiwan is equally fascinating. This reviewer has long been an advocate of cross-Strait exchange. From a public diplomacy perspective, the more Taiwan can showcase its democracy to visitors from the other side, the better. Wang has given me cause to rethink this by presenting his argument using data drawn from quantitative methodology. Wang measures changes in the evaluation of political performance external political efficacy and institutional trust, and he concludes that while short term trips to Taiwan may help change visitors’ opinions, longer term stays could “worsen their impressions of Taiwan and elevate their patriotic sentiments” (p. 132). This is worth considering in any public diplomacy strategy that includes opening Taiwan’s education to mainland Chinese students.

Before Chen’s brief concluding chapter, Yeau-tarn Lee rounds off the book with a discussion of “Lessons from Taiwan’s experience to promote China’s peaceful democratic transition.” Using Samuel Huntington’s work as a scaffold (especially his analysis of the Third Wave of democratization), Lee then asks the fundamental questions: Why Taiwan? And Why not China? He seeks his answers through examination of economic, social, cultural and political differences, including, crucially, leadership decisions and the external environment: Lee considers how Trump 1.0 and the Biden administrations affected cross-Strait relations, though of course the book was published before Trump 2.0 set the world alight with tariffs, a trade war with China, and (for Taiwan) an alarming approach to Russia’s war with Ukraine and how it may end.

Taiwan and the Cause of Democratization in China is an excellent book. Its arguments are often provocative and sometimes challenge accepted wisdom – as the best academic literature should – but this is a major contribution precisely because the contributors ground their ideas in evidence rather than polemic. This is a book that I shall certainly use and reference repeatedly in my own work on soft power and I recommend it without reservation.