Immigration as Domestic Policy

Immigration has long been seen solely as a domestic public policy issue. Accordingly, most of the existing literature on the determinants of immigration and border policy focuses exclusively on domestic factors. Such approaches generally identify the potential domestic “winners” and “losers” regarding changes in immigration levels and model politics as a “bottom-up” process that ends with dominant interests reflected in policy development (Gimpel and Edwards 1999; Kessler 1999; Money 1999). The state is largely epiphenomenal to political processes. Marxist variants argue that immigration policies consistently favor business interests because of their privileged access to the capitalist state, noting that use of foreign labor can be used as a mechanism to keep wages low and confound union action by dividing the working class (Castells 1975; Castles and Kosack 1973). Others argue that the dominance of business interests is the product of collective action dynamics and Olsonian interest groups (Freeman 1995). Specifically, because the economic benefits of migration are concentrated (benefiting employers) while the costs of migration are diffuse (general public), employers have a greater incentive to mobilize politically than those who bear its costs. Moreover, because employers face fewer collective action problems, they can more easily mobilize and generate interest-group pressure on policy makers and create a clientist relationship with the state.

If the state were truly beholden to the interests of domestic employers, we would expect policy to display three consistent characteristics. First, because of the advantages of foreign labor—including controlling domestic wages, elasticity, willingness to perform jobs that natives are reluctant to accept, and favorable work ethic—one would expect a continual process of liberalization in policies concerning labor mobility. This has clearly not been the case in any advanced industrial state. In fact, policies over the past 30 years have been overtly hostile to migrants and have stressed a strong political will to “regain control” of the national borders (Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield 1994). Second, policy would not display racial or ethnocultural preferences in the allocation of immigrant visas or temporary work permits. From a strictly economic standpoint, “a worker is a worker,” regardless of their skin color or ethnocultural background. Thus, we would expect preferences to be based solely on economic need and the skill-set a given migrant possesses. Instead, migration and border policies in most advanced industrial countries have displayed an acute sensitivity to the racial, ethnic, and cultural composition of flows. Finally, we should expect relative openness and closure to conform to the business cycle. However, this has not consistently been the case in many immigrant-receiving countries, especially in the post-1945 era (Hollifield and Zuk 1998; Potts 1990).

Migration is an increasingly global phenomenon with economic, social, and foreign policy implications (Rudolph n.d.). Though an internationally oriented approach would seem ideally suited to addressing issues of policy development, migration has until very recently been largely ignored by the mainstream international relations theory discourse (cf. Andreas 2000; Hollifield 1992; Koslowski 2000; Meyers 2003; Rudolph n.d.; 2003b; Rosenblum 2002). As will be shown, international relations theory provides useful tools that promote theory building capable of addressing factors at several levels of analysis and does not preclude an active role for the state as political agent. I begin with international relations theory's most basic question: What interests lie at the core of state behavior?

Three Dimensions of Security

While contemporary international relations scholars have generally privileged military security as the primary raison d'etat (“high politics”), it is important to recognize that security has both external (geopolitical) and internal orientations. Taken in this context, the “national interest” of states can be defined largely along three dimensions: (1) geopolitical security, (2) the production and accumulation of material wealth, and (3) social stability and cohesion. Grand strategy can then be defined as the mix of policies that provide aggregate maximization along these three facets of security. Focusing on the politics of immigration and border policies is particularly useful in explicating shifts in grand strategy since migration processes affect all three domains.

Of the three domains, internal security has received the least attention by scholars. Ole Wæver (1993, 23) offers the concept of “societal security” to capture the social–internal dimension of security that he defines in terms of “the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom.” Whereas change is integral to economic rationalization (increasing productivity, expanding markets, etc.), national identity is often based on a myth of primordial origins that prove enduring over time. Change is thus inherently threatening. Precisely defining “societal security” is inherently problematic, for, as the extensive literature on nationalism makes clear, social identities are often highly complex, continually evolving, and often politically contested (A. Smith 1991; R. Smith 1997). Societal security is often presented in solely ethnocultural terms and is measured by public reactions to demographic changes that significantly alter a polity as an “ethnic community” (A. Smith 1986; Wæver et al. 1993). However, few of the world's states are ethnically homogeneous and most of today's advanced industrial states are based at least in part on including liberal ideology as a prominent component of the national identity. A more accurate use of “societal security” must acknowledge and account for the political effects such “multiple traditions” have on political discourse and policy outcomes (R. Smith 1997).

By introducing large numbers of people of diverse ethnocultural and ideological backgrounds to a host-society, the globalization of migration represents a potentially significant threat to notions of stable national identities, culture, and ways of life—regardless of whether ethnocultural or ideological criteria are emphasized. Societal security is both a useful and a necessary concept in order to understand the ideational interests that can strongly influence state grand strategy, especially when geopolitical threats are low. However, operationalizing such variables presents considerable obstacles to social-scientific analysis. I draw on four primary sources to operationalize threat perception in the area of societal security, including public opinion polls, public and policy maker discourse analysis, symbolic voting practices (e.g., voter initiatives, support for right-wing parties, etc.), and deconstruction of the policies themselves. Immigration and border policy is much more nuanced than terms such as “open” and “closed” can capture. While both increased border surveillance and reduction of immigrant visas can be classified as “restrictive,” paying attention to where such restriction is placed can tell us important information regarding ulterior motives, as is often the case with issues of race and culture in so-called multicultural democracies. Admittedly, some of the indices used here to determine societal insecurities have weaknesses. While numerous public opinion polls have been taken in all case nations surveyed here, systematic and consistently worded polls of opinion across the time period examined here simply do not exist. Moreover, racialized discourse is often reflected publicly only by the extremist minority, though such ideas may strike a chord among the mainstream who either are unwilling to be publicly associated with such groups or are experiencing cognitive dissonance with these notions and their more liberal sense of social identity. Finally, while right-wing political parties may present largely single-issue platforms (such as anti-immigration), mainstream voters may not mobilize on single issues. As such, using voting patterns for such parties as a proxy for societal insecurities may present a more limited indicator of public sentiments than are actually present in a given polity. However, even though no single proxy for measuring “societal insecurity” exists, careful analysis of these variables in aggregate provides the most tangible means of understanding the political processes involved where societal security interests are at stake.

What, then, drives state behavior? Stephen Walt (1987) suggested that state behavior regarding alliance formation is driven largely by the perception of threat(s). I argue that threat perception lies at the core not only of alliance behavior, but of other elements of state grand strategy, including migration and border policies. Prior to 9/11, we could expect the presence of acute external (geopolitical) threats to result in a grand strategy heavily favoring military and material dimensions. Economic production is necessary for military production as well as to reduce the risk of domestic unrest and political subversion, while military protection is a prerequisite for a functioning industrial base and stable economy. A general preference for policies of openness to correspond with material and military interests is also aided by reduced demands for closure resulting from societal insecurities. Wartime nationalism produces a “rally-round-the-flag” effect that bolsters social cohesion by mitigating internal differences in the presence of external enemies (groups associated with external enemies notably excluded). However, when external threats decline, such rally effects no longer exist and domestic sensitivities to societal differences often become more acute, and we could expect grand strategy to reflect such changes in the security environment.

Given this framework, several hypotheses can be forwarded regarding migration and border policy development based on elements that generate threat:

• Threat Hypothesis—As external threats increase, migration policy will be more open, both in terms of volume and type, because trading states will seek to maximize economic gains available through labor mobility. It should also correspond with foreign policy interests.
• Rally Hypothesis—High degrees of external threat result in more open migration policies with a low emphasis on ethno-cultural criteria, but when migrant flows are associated with a military adversary, increased closure directed at such groups will result (Adversary Corollary).
• Societal Proximity Hypothesis—Ethno-cultural proximity results in lower degrees of societal threat (i.e. more toleration). Ethno-cultural distance is positively correlated with societal threat and more restrictive policy.
• Concentration Hypothesis—Geographic and temporal concentration of migrants (entry routes and/or settlement patterns) increases the visibility of migration flows and increases societal insecurity. This should result in more closed policy.
• Assimilation Hypothesis—Ability and willingness of migrants to assimilate into the dominant culture decreases societal insecurity and increases openness.
• Legacy Hypothesis—Policy legacies with unintended consequences are associated with societal insecurities because they establish patterns of migration (“chain migration”) that make it more difficult for states to control flows and creates perceptions of a loss of control. This should result in more closed policy.
• Liberal State Hypothesis—Socio-political liberalism embedded in social and legal institutions limit restrictive state responses to ethno-cultural aspects of societal in security. This limits the degree of closure given societal pressures for such policies.
• 9/11 Hypothesis—Newly established links between migration and military threat will swing grand strategy sharply toward closure.

To test these hypotheses, I examine immigration and border policies in four advanced industrial states in the context of threat environments since 1945. Because the hypothesized model is based on the economic and political interests of advanced industrial trading states and the political implications of immigration flows, all fit this classification, including the United States, Germany, France, and Great Britain. While developing states also have strong interests at stake in processes of global migration—particularly the use of emigration as an unemployment “safety valve” and the use of migrant remittances as sources of much needed foreign exchange—the security agenda of these states is sufficiently different to require separate in-depth analysis. The four cases examined here represent excellent “critical cases” for theory development not only because of common economic and geopolitical interests, but also because “societal security” is socially contested and is based on competing visions of national identity. Heterogeneous, liberal, multicultural societies represent the most difficult tests of models incorporating societal security as an explanatory variable.

More difficult than case selection may be the question of analytical focus. The complexity of global migration suggests that analysis focus not solely on structural, domestic, or individual levels alone but, rather, on the inter relationships between forces at various levels using a multilevel approach. International and internal warfare are structural factors that shape global migration flows, as are the economic disparities that exist between developing and developed states. These patterns largely determine the ethnocultural proximity of migrant inflows, the temporal and spatial density of these flows, and their magnitude. We must also recognize that individual migrants are active players whose decisions also have significant effects on social and political processes. Migrants' decisions regarding entry channel, settlement patterns, and willingness to assimilate into host cultures may either exacerbate or mitigate societal insecurities in receiving countries (Heisler 1998). Sociologists have documented migrant preferences to follow routes traveled by prior migrants (“chain migration”), causing entry and settlement patterns to be geographically concentrated rather than diffuse, and hence, more visible as well as more challenging for states to control (Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield 1994; Massey and Garcia Espana 1987; Massey et al. 1998).

Although both structural changes and aggregate individual decisions set in motion patterns that drive political processes, closer scrutiny reveals a central role of the state not only in shaping forces at other levels, but also as an agent in its own right. Migration processes initiated by structural forces are often the result of the foreign and economic policies of the state (or group of states), and policies initiated by the state can alter a given decision calculus among individual migrants that has similarly powerful effects. Policy legacies—such as labor recruitment programs—establish initial links in migration chains that are difficult to alter when political interests change. Moreover, state policies regarding one channel of migration can have direct effects on flows through other channels. Given continuing economic disparities, reducing legal visa quota limits simply shifts migration pressures to other channels, including clandestine entry or through exploitation of refugee or asylum policies. Such shifts in patterns initiated by state policies have greatly contributed to contemporary anxieties regarding migration more generally. In addition to affecting structural patterns and individual migrant decisions, the state plays a key role in framing issues and providing information. It is also often instrumental when it acts to preempt political demands from the general public—the most powerful, though often latent, interest group. Policy makers have often shaped policy in anticipation of rising societal threats, reflecting their own respect for the potential political volatility migration represents. In such instances, the state functions as the sole political determinant of policy.

What patterns should be present if the hypotheses proposed here are valid? High degrees of geopolitical threat stemming from early Cold War instability, belligerence, and mistrust should skew grand strategy toward the military and material poles and generally toward more open policies; openness stems from the combination of a desire for higher aggregate economic returns as well as the societal rally effect. As such threats decline with the emergence of détente and later the end of the Cold War, societal dimensions of security should become increasingly more salient and policies should move toward increasing degrees of closure. This shift toward closure should become even more pronounced after 9/11, as military interests increasingly converge with societal rather than material interests.

Security in PostWar Europe

External threat in Europe was significant in two respects. Geographic proximity and apparently expansionist intent of the Soviet Union, coupled with the devastating effects of the war on Western Europe, made the possibility of Soviet military invasion a credible threat to the security of continental Europe. Moreover, the bleak domestic economic situation in Europe, especially during the severe winter of 1946, made the possibility of domestic unrest and Communist insurgency all too likely. European security was initially based on two associated strategies: (1) integration for economic development and collective security and (2) management of trade and factor mobility to maximize economic gains and speed the pace of postwar reconstruction. Population management emerged as a key element of grand strategy because of the high level of war casualties and a drop in Western European birthrates from 35 per 1,000 in 1910 (3.5%) to 15 per 1,000 (1.5%) during WWII.

Geopolitical threats were acutely felt in Germany, whose infrastructure was obliterated during the war, suffered significant casualties (9.1% of the total prewar population) and was an occupied nation at that time. A widespread belief among Western policy makers that economic weakness would induce Communist insurgency (and/or a possible Soviet invasion) soon led to Marshall Plan aid (Larson 1985). Germany's use of foreign labor soon became a primary factor in Germany's tremendous post-war economic growth as foreign aid facilitated a rapid reconstruction of the country's infrastructure (Hollifield 1992; Kindleberger 1967). Initially, no government-sponsored recruitment was necessary to secure needed labor. From 1945 to 1950, West Germany received 8.3 million refugees, expellees, and displaced persons from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and they soon constituted one-sixth of the population in West Germany (Martin 1994, 198). Although this large influx of migrants represented a potentially significant threat to societal security, the fact that most were ethnic Germans (Volksdeutsche) reduced potential frictions (consistent with the Societal Proximity Hypothesis). In fact, the presence of the Vertriebene actually served to strengthen German national identity. Maintaining strong blood ties with ethnic Germans kept the notions of the German Volk and the Kulturnation intact, even as the country was partitioned into occupation zones and, later, into separate political entities (Brubaker 1992).

Because the skill levels of these initial migrant inflows were generally high, economists described them as one of the finest sources of additional labor in all of Europe (Kindleberger 1967, 31; Ulrich, 1994). From 1950 to 1960, West German economic productivity rose by an average of 6.7% annually, while unemployment in key industrial areas such as Baden-Württemberg and North Rhein-Westphalia remained very low (2.2% and 2.9%, respectively) (Korte 1985, 30). However, as Vertriebene migration from the East slowed over time and the need for labor increased as the postwar economy surged, Germany established a program of worker recruitment through a series of bilateral agreements. Initially, these agreements were established with other European states, including Italy (1955), Spain, and Greece (1960). Encouraged by the success of these programs and the positive effect worker recruitment was having on economic development, policy makers gained confidence that labor inflows could be managed effectively to maximize economic development. As the available supply of European labor declined, Gastarbeiter recruitment programs were extended toward more ethnoculturally distant sending countries, including Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), and Tunisia (1965). A temporary suspension of labor importation in response to the 1966–67 recession resulted in a 25% decline in the number of foreign workers in Germany. The responsiveness of flows to this change in policy supported attitudes that the Gastarbeiter were truly temporary migrants, not permanent immigrants (Brubaker 1992). These beliefs, coupled with the rapid growth of the West German economy during the 1960s, ensured that the economic primacy of Germany's immigration and labor recruitment policies were never questioned.

In France, the postwar emphasis on population management was perhaps most conspicuous, stemming from some 600,000 war casualties and an interwar fertility rate that was below replacement level (less than two). Population was widely considered the number one problem facing economic reconstruction and growth, and it was also associated with military preparedness, signaling a predominant “populate or perish” attitude (Tapinos 1975, 16). Even though fertility rates in the immediate postwar period increased remarkably, from under two in 1945 to nearly three by 1950, rapid economic recovery required viable labor immediately. Thus, the first five-year plan adopted by the newly created Conseil Général du Plan made management of migration a key element of postwar French grand strategy. To manage labor recruitment, the Office National d'Immigration (ONI) was established on 2 November 1945 and opened offices in Italy in 1945, followed by a bilateral labor recruitment agreement in 1947. French elites were confident that all immigrants could be assimilated into French society regardless of their origins (Brubaker 1992), although the ease of integration was facilitated by the fact that initial flows were dominated by other Europeans (consistent with the Societal Proximity Hypothesis). In 1946, 27, 831 of the 30, 171 foreign workers who entered France came from Italy (Freeman 1979, 79). Moreover, though colonial legacies resulted in a rising Algerian population in France, immigrants from the Maghreb accounted for only 12.9% of France's foreign population by 1954, while Italians, Spaniards, and Portuguese accounted for 46.25% (Hargreaves 1995, 11; INSEE 1985, 20; Silverman 1992, 41).

The rapid economic growth in France during the 1950s not only generated increased demand for foreign labor but also created incentives for employers to circumvent the bureaucratic apparatus set up by the ONI. Employers soon began to engage in direct labor recruitment with workers abroad, who were then later “regularized” by government officials, creating a laissez-faire approach to migration control (Freeman 1979). While early CGP plans promoted governmental control over migration to meet the nation's labor demands, attitudes among policy makers seemed comfortable with allowing the free market to regulate supply and demand. During these early stages of labor recruitment, economic gains from migration were substantial, and few sociopolitical tensions were associated with these initial inflows. From 1955 to 1973, the total inflow of foreigners rose from 58,952 to 347, 160, and much of this labor was utilized in key economic sectors including mining, manufacturing, construction, and services (Hollifield 1992; Kindleberger 1967). As competition for foreign workers increased with other European states (especially Germany), bilateral recruitment agreements were directed farther from the French Metropole. Agreements with Morocco and Tunisia were reached in 1963, while immigration from Algeria increased after the Evian agreement of 1962 that established independence for the former colony.

In Britain, government forecasts estimated a labor shortage of some 600,000 to 1.3 million workers. Coupled with a balance of payments deficit, declining monetary reserves, and a large debt, Britain's economic situation was indeed dire. Initial efforts to supplement the labor supply were manifest in policies that enabled 335,000 European POWs to be employed in Britian in 1945, and another 180,000 migrants to enter in 1947 through the Polish Resettlement Act and the European Volunteer Workers Program (Holmes 1988, 210–214). However, in contrast to its continental neighbors, Britain's postwar policies regarding economic development (including labor requirements) were based on its prewar imperial grand strategy (Heinlein 2002; Kennedy 1989). Britain's focus on the Commonwealth as the source of material power was based as much on the defense of the declining Pax Britannica and the nation's status as an elite world power, as it was on concerns regarding the emerging Soviet threat. Trade opportunities and acquisition of raw materials within the sterling area provided a financial buffer against Britain's accumulated wartime debt and the financial requirements needed to rebuild its war-torn infrastructure. Canada accounted for over 40% of Britain's exports, while Australia and New Zealand provided dollar-free sources of meat, wheat, timber, and dairy products (Paul 1997, 1). Although Britain's “dollar shortage” stemmed in large part from its balance of payments deficit outside the sterling area, it maintained a significant current account balance within the Commonwealth from 1950 to 1954. Moreover, London's role as central banker within the sterling area generated reserves used to finance a significant portion of Britain's balance of payments deficit in the early postwar period (Krozewski 2001). Given the economic incentives, maintaining an imperial basis to grand strategy made perfect sense.

When the Canadian Citizenship Act threatened Commonwealth cohesion in 1945, Britain responded by establishing the British Nationality Act of 1948. The Act provided nearly identical rights for individuals that fell within either of its two major categories—Citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies (CUKC) and Citizens of Independent Commonwealth Countries (CICC)—including the right of free movement (Hansen 2000; Money 1999). The British Nationality Act established a citizenship regime that allowed Commonwealth states to define their own citizenship, but ensured that such definitions could not take place without reference to the United Kingdom. Richard Weight suggests that “by legally codifying the concept of a far-flung British family, the Act was in a sense the high point of British imperialism” (Weight 2002, 137). Although the Act did not include provisions for labor importation, the establishment of a free movement regime allowed for market forces to drive migration patterns consistent with Britain's labor needs and shifts in the business cycle. More importantly, its symbolic purpose in establishing a sense of equality among Commonwealth members was crucial to Britain's economic interests by reinforcing ties with its key sources of exports, dollar-free imports, and capital accumulation.

External and Internal Security in the United States

As the only state capable of keeping potential Soviet expansionism in check, postwar American policy was understandably focused on boosting material production and increasing military defense. In terms of trading state grand strategy, the empirical evidence generally confirms the Threat Hypothesis—with some important caveats. Though the societal rally effect bolstered national cohesion against the Soviet bloc, ethnonationalist insecurities were also mitigated by the existing immigration regime in place since 1924. Moreover, in the American case, the binary external–internal security dynamic was more complex than initially theorized herein. Ideological elements dominated political discourse, while ethnocultural aspects of societal security were deemphasized. This was largely a function of how the Cold War was initially framed by the Truman administration.

The Truman Doctrine, outlined in a speech to the U.S. Congress on March 12, 1947, defined the postwar international order as a struggle between two worlds, two identities, and two opposing ways of life. This defining moment of the early Cold War period not only shaped conceptions of political order but, indirectly, shaped conceptions regarding migration (Rosenblum 2002). Because anti-Communist paranoia created internal insecurities based on political ideology rather than race or culture, the Cold War provided a lens through which migrants were increasingly perceived in a more positive light—a perspective actively cultivated by the American executive. Postwar migrants—in the form of refugees fleeing Communist countries—became a symbolic element of the Truman Doctrine. Their trials and tribulations not only supported the American conception of the Soviet sphere as oppressive, but, by allowing them to enter the country, the United States was able to affirm its self-conception as a defender of liberty and personal freedom. In addition, because many of those fleeing Communist countries were highly skilled, their migration represented a net loss to the Soviet economy and military complex and a gain for the American pursuit of material power.

The Displaced Persons Act (1948) established entry provisions for 205,000 refugees fleeing persecution in the communist bloc. In 1950, this level was increased to 415,744, and later the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 provided nonquota visas for an additional 214,000 people. Confirming the link to U.S. foreign policy, a 1953 NSC memorandum suggested that the Act served to “encourage the defection of all USSR nations and key personnel from the satellite countries” in order to “inflict a psychological blow on communism” (Zolberg 1995, 123–24). Refugee waves following the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 and the Communist revolution in Cuba in 1959 were admitted to the United States via the Attorney General's “parole” powers codified in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. The impact of this positive image of migration created by Cold War foreign policy can be reflected in the rapid reduction of nativist sentiment in American public opinion. In 1947, 72% of poll respondents did not support the admission of 100,000 new refugees; however, by 1953, 47% replied that they supported of the admission of 240,000 displaced persons (Fetzer 2000, 40).

Foreign policy considerations had strong effects on other aspects of migration and border policies as well. While the national origins quota system helped to keep ethnocultural insecurities in check, racially discriminatory policies strained political ties with key allies. Because of this, Congress repealed the Chinese Exclusion Acts in 1943 to improve ties with China, a U.S. ally in the war against Japan. In 1946, Congress established quotas for Asian allied nations, including India and the Philippines. This was followed by the McCarran–Walter Act (1952), which attempted to deflect criticism of America's national origins quota system by including an official prohibition against utilizing racial bases for admissions decisions. Truman felt that the 1952 Act did not go far enough to establish equality and vetoed the legislation in order to maintain a positive U.S. standing with Asian allies;¹

U.S. policy makers placed a high emphasis on America's relationship with Mexico in terms of the economic dimensions of early Cold War grand strategy (Rosenblum 2002). On March 10, 1947, the Bracero program of Mexican contract labor begun during WWII was renewed. Mexican contract labor during the war not only provided needed manpower in agriculture, but also enabled domestic workers to shift into industrial production jobs. As domestic labor shifted toward higher-paying industrial production jobs, opportunities in agriculture became less appealing to native workers in terms of relative wages, working conditions, and social status. Due to high demand, workers admitted to the United States through the Bracero program increased rapidly from 1947 to 1959, reaching a peak of nearly 450,000 in 1956. In general, the program was not politically contentious and did not generate societal insecurities until an increasing number of Mexican migrants began to circumvent bureaucratic procedures. From 1946 to 1954, apprehensions of illegal immigrants increased from 99,591 to 1,089,583, trends characterized in the U.S. media as being tantamount to a foreign invasion. Consequently, negative perceptions of migration countered positive conceptions generated by the dynamics of the Cold War. In response to public outcry over increasing levels of illegal immigration in 1954, the Eisenhower Administration decided that a pure laissez-faire approach was politically unstable, even in a Cold War environment, and established a crackdown at the border dubbed “Operation Wetback” (Reimers 1985). The INS apprehended over one million illegal aliens in 1954, projecting a strong image of a government that had not lost control of the nation's borders. The empirical evidence suggests that reduced societal insecurities evident during periods of high external threat required a sense of public confidence in government regulation of migration flows, implying an important caveat to the Threat Hypothesis and the Rally Hypothesis. This dynamic has remained a dominant underlying theme in U.S. immigration policy ever since.

To summarize, external threat and the need for material production moved the security equilibrium sharply toward the economic pole in both the United States and Europe during the early Cold War period. Policy developments that increased migration levels without generating strong nativist public sentiment generally support the Threat Hypothesis, though the specific approaches taken varied somewhat due to intervening variables that are case specific. Governments either facilitated trade and factor flows directly, or did so indirectly by adopting a laissez-faire approach. While Britain and the United States displayed more sensitivity to ethnocultural threats presented by migration than Germany or France, all adopted a remarkably open trading state approach to trade and factor mobility. Many of these policies, however, would prove to have unintended consequences that contributed to societal insecurities later on.

Societal Insecurity in Europe

In France, laissez-faire recruitment of foreign labor led to a gradual transformation of migration inflows. From 1946 to 1955, Italians accounted for 66.8% of migrant inflows, but by 1973 they accounted for only 4.6% (Hollifield 1994, 153). In contrast, by 1975 over 30% of France's foreign population came from the Maghreb (INSEE, 1992). Moreover, uneven geographic distribution of these new immigrants served to increase their visibility and raise awareness of societal changes among the general public (consistent with the Societal Proximity and Concentration Hypotheses). In contrast with prior inflows, migrants entering France in the 1960s were concentrating in the industrial Paris and Lyon regions where industries that utilized foreign labor were concentrated (Money 1999, 120–23; see also Hollifield 1992; Ogden 1989, and White 1995). The lack of suitable housing and the emergence of ethnic enclaves created a rise of urban ghettos and shantytowns (bidonvilles) in many of these industrial centers. Where immigrants were previously associated with economic growth during the Trente Glorieuses, they increasingly became associated with urban plight and ethnic segregation.

A rise in family-oriented migration (rather than single males) also served to increase the visibility of changing migration patterns. In addition to representing a more permanent rather than temporary or cyclical flow, family migration from North Africa led to deeper penetration of the housing market, a larger presence of foreign children in school, and increased opportunities for interaction with mainstream French society. All of these factors served to increase visibility of the foreign population (Hargreaves 1995). In addition, the fact that Maghribi migrants were largely Muslim also served to generate societal fears due to a perception of cultural distance and growing doubts regarding their ability and willingness to assimilate (Oriol 1992; Roy 1994). In 1968, domestic political and social unrest prompted a reevaluation of migration policies by the French government. Reports commissioned by the government suggested that even though migration offered considerable economic gains, it threatened social cohesion. These reports argued that while French society was based on liberal principles founded during the revolution, it had a “threshold of tolerance” (seuil de tolérance) for assimilating immigrants, and neglecting this dynamic could have significant negative sociopolitical effects. It must be noted, however, that this seuil de tolérance applied primarily to Maghribi migration, not European migration (Silverman 1992, 75–76).

Responding to societal insecurities, the Franco–Algerian Accords of 1968 were signed to limit migration from North Africa (Hollifield 1992, 68–69). In addition, new sanctions were implemented against employers of illegal aliens to deter would-be migrants. On 3 July 1974 recruitment of foreign workers was temporarily halted, and options for reducing the country's non-European foreign-born population were considered. Consistent with the Liberal State Hypothesis, forced deportations were not a viable policy option. Instead, France offered financial incentives (10,000 francs) to foreign workers to voluntarily return to their home country in 1977. Unfortunately for policy makers, the program met with limited success as the number of participants was relatively low (80,000) and was dominated by Spaniards and Portuguese rather than Maghribi, for whom it was primarily intended (Weil 1991). An unintended consequence of France's new restrictionism was that as official recruitment channels closed, migration flows increasingly shifted toward clandestine immigration and asylum/refugee channels. Future responses to societal insecurities increasingly focused on perceived exploitation of this entry channel.

As in France, the sociopolitical problems associated with the Gastarbeiter program became increasingly evident in Germany in the late 1960s. In the period from 1968 to 1972, the foreign work force in Germany rose from one million to 2.6 million, which amounted to an increase from 5% to 12% of the total German work force (Martin 1994, 201). More important was the change in sources of migration, as Turkish migration increased from 2,500 in 1960 to 605,000 in 1973 (Bade 1983, 70). In addition, it soon became apparent that the “temporary” guest workers were increasingly less interested in returning to their home countries and were becoming a permanent part of German society. From 1963 to 1967, the percentage of foreign workers who had been in Germany for over three years increased from 22% to 45%. More permanent and family-oriented migration led to changes in preferred housing among immigrants. Although the communal housing offered by the German government was initially appealing to guest workers (largely single males), by the end of the 1970s more than 80% of the foreign workers chose to live in individual apartments and rooms secured on the open market (Heckmann 1985, 73). Similar to the French case, this change brought the resident foreign population into closer contact with German society, increasing social visibility. The Gastarbeiter program was halted in November 1973, coinciding with the OPEC embargo. However, Ulrich Herbert (1990, 324–25) suggests that “the oil embargo had been little more than a supplementary factor; it had provided a useful occasion to check the influx of foreign workers and reduce their numbers—without any great resistance from the worker-exporting countries and without wearying public discussion on the social consequences of this measure.”

As was the case in France, closure of recruitment channels simply redirected flows. Due to its extremely liberal asylum policies, codified in Article 16 of the basic law, Germany received a disproportionate percentage of Western Europe's refugee applicants (Joppke 1999). It makes sense that migrants that were no longer able to gain entry through labor recruitment programs would seek to exploit these policies. In the year following the recruitment stoppage, new asylum claims almost doubled, from 5,595 to 9,424, and the number of applications increased annually, reaching a level of 100,000 by 1980 (Joppke 1997, 277). Although public demand to amend Article 16 was vociferous, doing so was considered contrary to Germany's desire to emphasize its postwar liberalism and to distance itself from its totalitarian past. Thus, initial responses centered only on administrative and procedural changes, including provisions articulated in the 1982 Asylum Procedures Law that sought to “fast-track” dismissal of “patently unfounded” claims. In addition, the government sought to reduce the size of the foreign population by promoting voluntary repatriation. At that time, the foreign population in Germany had reached a peak of 4.7 million. Under a new program begun in 1982, financial assistance (DM10,500) was offered to former guest workers that were willing to voluntarily return to their homeland. However, as with France's attempt at similar policies, the program had little effect on the size and composition of the foreign population.

Britain's response to societal insecurity is slightly different from that of France or Germany. Britain's free movement regime did not initially generate significant migration from NCW countries; however, over time flows from these sources increased dramatically. During the first months of 1958, immigration from India and Pakistan rose sharply, and in February, the number of new arrivals from these sources was equivalent to 30% of the total flow in 1957 (Spencer 1997, 91). From 1959 to 1961, immigration from the West Indies surged from 16,400 to 66,300 (Patterson 1969, 3). Even though they were still relatively insignificant levels in relation to the total population in Britain, they generated considerable perceptions of threat among Britons. However, it appears that societal insecurities were based more on fears of the size of future flows (if trends continued unabated) rather than on the size of current flows. These fears became especially acute during the race riots in 1958, which increased perceptions among policy makers that changing ethnic demographics had volatile political consequences. Attitudes among the general public mirrored these concerns. A Gallup poll conducted in June 1961 found that 67% of the public favored immigration restrictions (Patterson 1969, 18).

In the wake of rising New Commonwealth migration, the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act subordinated entry of all Commonwealth citizens and CUKCs whose passports were issued outside the United Kingdom to immigration and labor market controls consisting of a three-tiered voucher system. When it became apparent that Indians and Pakistanis were disproportionately applying for all three categories of vouchers in 1963, the government stipulated that no Commonwealth country could receive more than 25% of the available “C” vouchers (non-skills-based). In August 1965, a Labor Government White Paper tightened the 1962 controls by establishing a ceiling on New Commonwealth immigration to 8,500 per annum and abolishing the “C” voucher category altogether (Layton-Henry 1994, 284).

Subsequent amendments to the Commonwealth Immigrants Act in 1968 stipulated that only patrial CUKCs remained free from immigration controls while others were regulated via an entry-voucher system, with initial levels set at 1,500 heads of household. Restrictions on Commonwealth immigration were also strengthened with the passage of the 1971 Immigration Act, which removed most remaining migration privileges accorded to Commonwealth Citizens. The provisions of the 1971 Act actually served to increase the number of people entitled to enter the United Kingdom without restriction, although these were composed primarily of people of European extraction who, it was believed, posed a lower degree of societal threat. In this sense, the 1971 Act marks a significant shift in British grand strategy, from one predicated on imperial legacy to one increasingly predicated on ties with its European neighbors.

The passage of the British Nationality Act of 1981 was a milestone in the British shift toward a societal reactionist posture. Through the Act, the status of “British subject,” which had long been synonymous with “Commonwealth citizen,” was for the most part abolished (Hansen 2000, 214). The 1981 Act abolished the Anglo-Saxon tradition of jus soli, where membership is primarily a function of place, and replaced it with a citizenship regime based on the principle of jus sanguinis, where membership is a function of descent (Goulbourne 1998, 54; see also Brubaker 1992). The Act also sought to shore up loopholes in migration and border policy. It established the “primary purpose” rule that prohibited the entry of fiancées or spouses of British women citizens unless they could prove that the primary purpose of the marriage was not to garner settlement rights in the United Kingdom. A few years later, the Tamil crisis of 1985 raised British sensitivities to the possible exploitation of refugee and asylum policy by economic migrants, and Home Office officials used their deportation powers with extreme prejudice (Joppke 1997). As the number of asylum applicants increased, societal calls for closure increased as well.

The empirical evidence from Europe supports many of the hypotheses presented here. A changing geopolitical environment, increasingly diverse flow of migration, settlement patterns, and integration problems all served to increase societal insecurities and push policies toward closure. Yet the evidence also supports ideational and institutional constraints on policies supporting ethnonationalist impulses. The Liberal State Hypothesis is supported by the fact that draconian deportation measures were generally eschewed in favor of financial incentives for voluntary repatriation, and though augmented, refugee and asylum regimes were still functioning to provide protection for bona fide applicants.

Societal Insecurity in the United States

The Rally and Threat Hypotheses predict that a reduction geopolitical threat and concomitant reduction in focus on opposition to the USSR as a major component of U.S. national identity would result in more closed policies as societal insecurities become more pronounced. Furthermore, hypotheses based on demographic indicators should also be positively correlated with increased levels of societal insecurities. The undesired effects of prior policies compounded societal insecurities, suggesting support for the Legacy Hypothesis. However, in the United States the timing of policy changes in response to growing societal insecurities is less parsimonious than in the European cases, reflecting perhaps a cognitive dissonance between such restrictionist impulses so soon after a major policy shift symbolic of U.S. liberalism (the 1965 amendments).

In addition to a changing geopolitical environment, two policy legacies had a significant impact on the generation of societal insecurities and, later, on changes in policy. The 1965 changes in U.S. immigration law shifted visa preferences from those based on national origins to those predominantly based on family reunification. Policy makers skeptical of the potential sociocultural changes of such a change in policy were assuaged by the notion that a system based on familial ties would replicate the existing demographic characteristic of the nation. In practice, however, the 1965 changes resulted in pronounced increases in Mexican, other Latin American, and Asian immigration flows. Over time these changes significantly affected the ethnic composition of the country as a whole. From 1960 to 1990, the percentage of the population that was non-Hispanic white decreased from 85.1% to 75.2%, while the percentage of Hispanics and Asians increased from 3.5% to 9% and from 0.6% to 2.9%, respectively (Bean, Cushing, and Haynes 1997, 126). Consistent with the Societal Proximity Hypothesis, public opinion reflected a growing sense of societal insecurity associated with such changes (Fetzer 2000). Roper Center and Gallup polls show that the percentage of Americans who favored decreasing existing levels of immigration increased from 33% in 1965 to 42% by 1977. By 1993, this percentage increased to 65% (Shanks 2001, 234).

The second policy legacy that affected attitudes and later policy development involved the Bracero program. As mentioned above, the increase in illegal immigration associated with the Bracero program had a significant impact on attitudes about migrants—particularly Mexican migration. Even after the labor importation program was abolished, notions of Mexican migrants as lawbreakers had lingering residuals in the American public consciousness even though they offered economic benefits to the country. Moreover, the program established migration linkages that resulted in chain migration that persisted long after it was discontinued (Massey and Espana 1987; Massey et al. 1998). Effects of such chain migration are manifest both in legal and clandestine channels of entry. In terms of the naturalization channel, past migration (and jus soli citizenship rights afforded to children of immigrants) provided familial ties that gave family members preference under the post-1965 immigration regime. In terms of clandestine flows, past migration created social linkages that facilitated illegal immigration through the availability and use of social capital. The result is that from 1965 to 1975, apprehensions of illegal aliens increased by roughly 400%.

Beginning with its first comprehensive migration regime established in 1924, U.S. policy hinged on a notion of government control (Torpey 2000). The changing characteristics of migration flows in the 1960s and 1970s suggested that structural rather than governmental factors were driving migration dynamics. As such, discourse in the 1970s and 1980s revolved around notions of “regaining control” of our “neglected borders.” Faced with growing numbers of migrants from non-European sources, initial efforts to respond to societal insecurities came in the form of revised Western Hemisphere limits on immigrant visas, as stipulated in the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1976. The Act implemented per country limits of 20,000—a change which most significantly affected Mexico, which had previously only been subject to the hemispheric limit of 120,000. This was just the beginning of a more comprehensive reassessment of policy. In 1978, the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy recommended a comprehensive control policy aimed at both the border and the interior. The commission recommended (1) sanctions against employers that hire illegal immigrants, (2) the development of a secure identification system, (3) enhanced border enforcement, and (4) amnesty for illegal aliens currently residing in the country. Most of these recommendations comprise the basis of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) passed in 1986. Declaring amnesty for existing illegal immigrants was intended to provide a “clean slate” for the increased control provisions articulated in IRCA, especially border control. From 1986 to 1990, the budget allocated for the Border Patrol increased from $154 million to $262.6 million, which constituted the largest portion of the INS's budget for enforcement activities (Rolph 1992, 45).

The public discourse and politics leading up to IRCA suggest that the rise of identity as a security object created strong pressure for closure in the United States. Increases in non-European migration and a concomitant rise in illegal immigration, especially from Mexico, were greeted with alarm and calls for firm measures to halt such migration. Policies enacted in response to such threats included both external (border) and internal (sanctions) measures, even though IRCA's employer sanctions provisions were vehemently opposed by business interests who saw this as a negative externality on business processes. In both the United States and Europe, the strong negative reaction to new migration trends resulted in calls for closure and made policy makers aware that U.S. grand strategy could not be based on pure trading state openness. Societal security was an increasingly volatile issue that would have to be seriously taken into account.

As in the European cases, although the evidence supports hypotheses pertaining to rising societal insecurities and resultant policy closure, government response to identity-centered issues was not unidirectional. If government was completely responsive to ethnocultural restrictionist impulses, the most direct approach would have been to significantly scale-back quota levels and repeal the 1965 family-based immigration regime. Because of its symbolic importance to the liberal facet of America's multiple-traditions of national identity, such measures were not politically viable options. As such, it would seem that the evidence supports the Liberal State Hypothesis as a constraint on policy options.

Fortress Europe and Third Country Nationals

Societal insecurities inflamed political discourse in Europe as the Cold War ended. A 1998 poll conducted in France found that 75% of the population believed that French national identity was in jeopardy if measures were not taken to limit the size and inflow of the foreign population (Hargreaves 1995, 151). This sentiment increased nearly 10% from results taken in a similar poll in 1985. In Britain, polls revealed increasing public concerns regarding migration and, in 1999, reached their highest levels in two decades (Migration News, May 2000). In Germany, public opinion polls taken in 1992 showed that 75% of Germans supported drastic action to control the wave of migration flowing through its asylum channel (Joppke 1999, 92). In addition, support for the antiimmigrant Republikaner party increased sharply during the early 1990s, while other radical expressions of societal unrest were manifest in violent attacks against foreigners in the cities of Hoyerswerda, Rostock, Mölln, and Solingen.

Analysis of European policy suggests the “problem” of migration rests with the movement of “third country nationals” (TCNs), not necessarily with migration per se (cf. Newland and Papademetriou, 1998; Papademetriou 1996). EU cooperation has been engaged not only to facilitate migration internally, but also to help stem TCN migration from outside of what many have characterized as the “fortress Europe.” This includes information sharing, linkage politics, border enforcement, and policy harmonization concerning asylum and refugee policies (Koslowski 2000). Linkage politics, including linking foreign aid and entry into the EU in exchange for cooperation in controlling TCN migration into the EU, has emerged as a common approach. Given its large land borders to the East, these methods have been used vigorously by the Germans. In 1993, Germany linked the continuation of visa-free travel for Poles entering Germany with their acceptance of a readmission agreement. By accepting, the Polish government was committed to “reaccepting” all undocumented TCNs attempting entry into Germany across the German–Polish border. Germany also offered to provide $80 million of direct financial assistance as an additional incentive and to offset costs during the first two years of the implementation of the agreement. In 1997, Germany provided another $66 million of aid to Poland in order to help secure the border and stop clandestine entry of TCNs. For Poland and the Czech Republic, as well as other countries seeking entry in the union, EU policy makers made it clear that the acceptance of EU border policy is a requirement for accession (Andreas 1999), most of which has already been negotiated and confirmed by candidate countries.

When labor recruitment programs were halted in the early 1970s, applications for asylum from TCNs increased dramatically. Although Western states supported the establishment of a liberal refugee regime in the wake of World War II, perceptions that economic migrants were increasingly exploiting liberal policies rose sharply during the 1980s and into the 1990s. This connection between illegal immigrants (generally TCNs) and the exploitation of asylum procedures was supported by new evidence in Britain. In 1995 it was found that two-thirds of the illegal aliens detected by authorities applied for asylum to prevent deportation. Because the asylum/refugee channel was specifically associated with TCN migration, closure and control mechanisms during the 1990s were focused on this mode of entry. The Dublin Convention (1990) established a mechanism for policy harmonization among EU states and sought to close policy loopholes being exploited by TCNs. It has been argued that acceptance of the Dublin Convention “was one of the key preconditions agreed upon by the EU member states in order to proceed with consolidating the single European market and eliminating border controls within the EU” (Newland and Papademetriou 1998, 643). The Convention stipulates that asylum applicants must generally submit their claim in the first EU country they enter, who is then responsible for deciding their case. This ensures that asylum decisions are made once—and only once—since the decision of the first EU nation will be considered binding in all other EU member states, and eliminates the practice of “asylum shopping” among potential applicants (Koslowski 2000).

New policies were established in Germany, France, and the United Kingdom that provided the means to fast-track asylum procedures and granted the state considerable discretion in dismissing “patently unfounded” claims. Moreover, the concept of the “safe third country” emerged as another means of reducing asylum claims from TCNs. The third country option, adopted domestically by most European states, automatically dismisses claims if applicants arrive from other European nations or transit countries that prima facie do not produce refugees. These lists of “safe countries” were established in consultation with the UNHCR and may vary—albeit generally slightly—between member EU states. The combination of control measures has served to significantly reduce the number of asylum applications filed in the EU during the 1990s. In Germany, these various provisions and procedures resulted in a 70% decline in asylum applications from 1992 to 1995, while in France, applications from 1990 to 1996 declined over 30%. In the United Kingdom, the percentage of asylum applicants granted acceptance declined from 85.9% in 1990 to 23.8% in 1997 (Newland and Papademetriou 1998, 645; Joppke 1999, 94).

The empirical evidence suggests that European states have sought to quell nativist impulses by focusing policy on exclusively on restricting the movement of TCNs—those whose societal proximity is considered more remote than those of other Europeans—while maintaining a commitment to internal openness within the EU. The key to “finessing” the tension between societal and material interests seems to rest on the construction of an image of border integrity on the regional level and closing perceived loopholes that TCNs may exploit to circumvent immigration controls.

The Gatekeeper Approach in the United States

As in Europe, public concerns regarding immigration continued to increase in the United States in the 1990s, consistent with the Threat Hypothesis. Polls taken in 1993 showed that 65% of American favored decreased levels of immigration, up from 42% in 1977 (Shanks 2001, 234). Moreover, highly publicized images of migrant border dashes through the San Ysidro border checkpoint fueled passionate anti-immigrant rhetoric. In 1994, voters in California overwhelmingly passed Proposition 187, an anti-illegal immigration bill riding the crest of societal insecurities. Organizers and proponents often suggested that the bill was intended to “send a message” to policy makers, even though the law was almost immediately struck down in the courts (Andreas 2000). In the 1990s, government responses to societal insecurities were focused on adjusting for the unintended effects of the 1965 amendments to the INA with regard to European migration and crafting an image of security along the U.S.–Mexico border. In response to economic interests, legal immigration quota levels remained steady and special provisions were made to recruit highly skilled labor.

The Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT) resulted in a 40% increase in overall legal admissions into the United States; however, its provisions were shaped to alter the qualitative characteristics of immigrant inflows by stressing economic criteria and augmenting ethnocultural characteristics of inflows. IMMACT increased the number of employment-based visas from 54,000 to 140,000 and established the H-1B visa program for highly skilled workers. IMMACT also established an allocation for “diversity immigration” visas (DV-1), intended to “correct” for the adverse effects of the 1965 amendments. Beginning in October 1994, IMMACT provided 55,000 immigrant visas to be distributed among nationals or nations that had sent fewer than 55,000 legal immigrants to the United States over the previous five years—a move clearly intended to “balance” the dramatic rise in the proportion of Latin American and Asian immigration. In the first apportionment of such visas, nearly 50% (24,550) were allocated to European nations.

Similar to the approach taken in Europe, openness regarding entry levels has been politically “purchased” through highly symbolic closure policies (Andreas 1999). In the United States, these were manifest in border enforcement policies directed at migration from Mexico and Latin America. In the early 1990s, the INS initiated a series of border enforcement programs along the U.S.–Mexico border, beginning in El Paso (1993) and, later, in San Diego (1994), Nogales (1995), and East Texas (Operation Rio Grande, 1997). Given the highly visible flows crossing along the San Diego–Tijuana region, “Operation Gatekeeper” became the symbolic flagship for the new strategy. Operation Gatekeeper, begun in October 1994, employed a highly visible, multilayered approach to sealing this porous border region. In 1996, additional funding for such border enforcement measures was secured as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA), which also called for 1,000 additional Border Patrol agents to be hired annually. From 1993 to 1997, the annual budget for the INS increased from $1.5 billion to $4.2 billion, while the annual budget for the Border Patrol increased from $354 million to $877 million. Some scholars have suggested that these methods are a failure, since they have failed to stem the flow of illegal immigrants entering from Mexico (Cornelius 1998b, 392). Indeed, examining apprehensions statistics at the sector level reveals that while apprehensions in the San Diego sector decreased, apprehensions increased in zones East of San Diego. In aggregate, Border Patrol apprehensions actually increased between 1992 and 1998, from 1,199,560 to 1,555,776 (INS 1998, 209–10).

The border enforcement strategy that has emerged during the 1990s focused on curbing flows in high-traffic zones such as San Ysidro and dispersing them geographically. While this may not reduce the overall volume, it has significantly reduced the visibility of border transgressions and, thus, an element significant to societal threat perception (consistent with the Concentration Hypothesis). Most of the rhetoric concerning illegal migration has focused on Mexico and Latin America, though most estimates suggest that about 40–50% of the illegal immigrant population in the United States consists of “out-of-status” migrants—those who enter legally, then overstay the terms of their visa. The Gatekeeper approach is very successful in two ways: (1) It is a highly visible government response that projects a symbolic image of control (Andreas 1999), and (2) it makes reduces the visibility of migration flows by reducing concentration, in both time and space. In an important sense, by making flows “disappear,” Gatekeeper serves to make border crossers as politically unproblematic as those who over stay the terms of their visa. Thus, reducing societal insecurities in the 1990s was essentially based on the principle of “out of sight, out of mind.” While politically successful during the 1990s, this notion would be challenged after 9/11.

“Securitizing” Migration

Public attitudes and government policies on both sides of the Atlantic responded quickly to the post-9/11 security environment. According to a Fox News poll taken in November 2001, 65% of Americans supported stopping all immigration into the country—a clear indication of just how acute perceptions of threat had become and the clear linkage made between security and immigration control among the general public after 9/11. The actions of policy makers reflect similar convictions: Prior to 9/11, Mexico was touted as America's primary ally, yet soon after 9/11 previous suggestions for continued bilateral negotiations regarding amnesty for undocumented workers and a new temporary worker program were tabled indefinitely, much to the dismay of Mexican president Vicente Fox.

Consistent with the 9/11 Hypothesis, the first significant policy developments of the post-9/11 period were restrictionist, including the USA Patriot Act (October 2001) and the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act (EBSVERA) (May 2002). The USA Patriot Act called for fortifying the country's northern border, increased law enforcement powers for surveillance and detention when dealing with suspected terrorists, and increased the grounds for inadmissibility for entry to those involved with terrorist organizations by expanding the legal definition of “terrorist activities.” Likewise, EBSVERA stipulated an increase of 3,000 immigration inspectors and investigators, called for increased scrutiny of visa applications originating in countries suspected of supporting terrorism, and required U.S. universities to better account for foreign students attending their institution. In addition to border security, internal control measures were also initiated in the name of homeland defense. In 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft initiated a program requiring male foreign visitors from “politically sensitive”—largely Muslim—countries to register with the INS. In addition, information technology, such as the National Automated Immigration Lookout System (NAILS), increasingly has been utilized to properly identify visa applicants, match names with international databases of known or suspected terrorists and/or terrorist supporters, and track the movement of foreigners working or studying in the country (Koslowski 2002).

Initial responses in Germany, Great Britain, and France would also seem to support the 9/11 Hypothesis. Spanish Foreign Minister Josep Pique articulated the post-9/11 sentiment that, “the fight against illegal immigration is also the reinforcement of the fight against terrorism” (Migration News, Nov. 2001). Prior to 9/11, the EU Commission was recommending liberalization of immigration policies among member nations, continuing the trends evident during the late 1990s. After September 11, most member nations immediately suspended such plans, and it appeared that the new focus of grand strategy would come in the form of new antiterrorism legislation with special focus on controlling illegal immigration. Following 9/11, the governments of Britain, France, and Germany granted additional authority to police and intelligence agencies to monitor and detain suspected terrorists and their associates. In addition, the new security environment prompted government action to better control migration. In Britain, the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Bill (November 8, 2002) increased existing carrier and employers sanctions laws by increasing incarceration periods for those convicted of organizing the smuggling of illegal immigrants into Britain. In addition, the law restricts the appeals period for those seeking asylum and permits the government to detain asylum seekers for up to six months and also prohibits nationals of EU countries (and accession countries) from applying for asylum in the United Kingdom. The British government has also sought cooperation from the French government in increasing security at the Channel Tunnel and has added extra police and video surveillance cameras to this vital crossing route.

More significant, perhaps, was Britain's success in garnering French acceptance to close the Sangatte Red Cross Center, a suspected staging point for illegal immigrants and asylum seekers, in December 2002. British Home Secretary David Blunkett optimistically declared, “This agreement not only closes Sangatte… [but] it will also shut off the routes used by illegal immigrants to get to the UK from France. It effectively pushes our border controls across the channel to the French coast, where stronger controls and tighter security will mean we can prevent illegal immigrants from getting to the UK in the first place” (M2 Presswire, December 2, 2002). Increased French police deployment in the area resulted in the apprehension of hundreds of illegal aliens, including some 250 migrant smugglers. Cooperative security efforts related to immigration and border control have also increased in Germany, where authorities have been working with representatives of other EU countries to increase cooperation and coordination of border policing.

Societal and Material Aspects of Policy

Although the establishment of these new security policies would seem to support the 9/11 Hypothesis, the empirical evidence suggests that military security interests do not wholly dominate migration policy as one might predict. Societal security remains salient, and economic interests continue to serve as a powerful counterweight to the political interests that push for closure, though they may have declined in relative importance after 9/11. As has long been the case, the state continues to seek a grand strategy that best maximizes security's three dimensions in aggregate, a process that has become increasingly difficult since 9/11.

In contrast to the 1990s, where “out of sight, out of mind” seemed to rule the day, it is the very invisibility of the undocumented or out-of-status migrant population that generates vulnerability in terms of potential terrorist activity. Given the security environment in the United States, one might expect a more expansive effort to document the 8–11 million undocumented aliens currently living in the country and to more accurately regulate the movement of temporary workers. In 2000, immigrant advocacy groups vigorously lobbied Congress to pass the Latino and Immigrant Responsibility Act, which would have established an extended amnesty program for undocumented workers. However, consistent with the strategy employed during the 1990s, societal security interests held the day, and policy makers were only willing to pass an extension of the H1-B program for highly skilled workers (American Competitiveness in the 21st Century Act). Renewing amnesty legislation would make perfect sense post-9/11, since it would provide a means to identify the millions of “invisible” migrants living in the country, yet such legislation has generated no serious political momentum. If increasing the ability to detect and track foreigners is a security imperative in the post-9/11 environment (consistent with the 9/11 Hypothesis), we might also expect new efforts to establish a stricter regime to control the movement of foreign workers, perhaps in the form of a new guest worker program. However, the lessons of Germany's postwar Gastarbeiter program (which resulted in unwanted permanent rather than temporary migration) continue to guide government attitudes regarding such proposals, consistent with societal security interests. In contrast, if reluctance to engage largely economic migration from Mexico reflects American ethnonationalism, the liberal aspect of its national identity has confounded government efforts at increasing internal monitoring and controls of foreign immigrants. A policy to establish a national ID card utilizing biometric data has received little public support and has been largely ignored by policy makers, even though experts argue that it would be necessary to establish the kind of monitoring necessary to maximize internal security and thwart terrorist-aliens (consistent with the Liberal State Hypothesis).

As in the United States, Europe's post-9/11 grand strategy does not appear myopic, but again reflects an active state balancing various facets of the national interest. Given the connection between terrorist cells operating in the country and the events of September 11, it is not surprising that some of the most significant policy changes have taken place in Germany. What is surprising is that the new immigration laws signed into law in April 2002 deal less with issues of military security than with the continuing trend of balancing societal security demands with macroeconomic interests. Although the German Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe declared the new laws unconstitutional in December 2002, examining the form and politics associated with the process again illustrates how policy makers construe the national interest. In terms of macroeconomic interests, two factors continue to push Germany toward liberalization rather than closure. First, low fertility rates (1.39 in 2002) may require that Germany initiate and maintain relatively large levels of immigration over the next 20 years in order to keep the social security system solvent. Second, economists have steadily argued that macroeconomic growth is dependent on immediate increases in the availability of highly skilled labor. To address economic need, the laws established provisions though which foreign entrepreneurs could obtain a temporary residence permit, provided that they could supply an initial investment of one million Euros and that their business would create at least 10 jobs. Unlimited residence permits would be available for highly skilled applicants whose services were considered essential to economic growth. Interior Ministry estimates anticipated these laws would initially admit about 5,000 highly skilled workers and 500 entrepreneurs, though no specific quota levels were included in the legislation. The new laws also allowed foreign students who studied at Germany universities to remain in the country and work, providing yet another source of highly-educated and skilled labor.

In addition to economic interests, societal security interests also figured prominently in the 2002 legislation, both ethnic-nationalist and civic-nationalist in orientation. For those who have maintained that postwar German identity must break with its ethnonationalist past and embrace liberal ideology, these new laws—Germany's first immigration regime—represented the manifestation of such ideals. Interior Minister Otto Schily announced, “With this law Germany shows itself to be an open country” (Migration News, April 2002). However, the legislation also reflected an interest in mollifying ethnonationalist societal insecurities initiated by the immigration of Third Country Nationals and the presence of a large, unnaturalized foreign population living in Germany, many for over a quarter century. The new laws contained provisions to promote the integration of existing foreigners by requiring them to take courses on the German language, its social institutions, and its governance/legal structure. Failure to attend such courses could result in being denied an unlimited residence status. While accepting the presence of the existing foreign population can be interpreted as a remarkable transformation toward openness for a country reluctant to accept its position as a “country of immigration,” the inclusion of integration requirements provides some measure of symbolic weight for conservatives in defense of the German Leitkultur. The heated debate regarding a new immigration regime reveals how two visions of German nationhood seek to defend themselves from perceptions of societal threat and will certainly figure prominently in the coming policy discourse.

In France, societal security has remained at the center of political discourse even amid rising concerns about global terrorism. Indeed, 9/11 may have inflamed the debate, given that the Al Queda terrorists were from Muslim countries—the source of much of France's ethnonationalist societal insecurities. The unprecedented support garnered by Jean-Marie Le Pen in the April 2002 elections is evidence of a continued sense of ethnocultural societal threat. Such sentiments appeared especially strong in areas with high concentrations of immigrants where Le Pen's National Front party received many of its votes. Yet, the rise of France's ethnonationalist underbelly has also mobilized its republican liberal component. In October 2002, a rally of some 5,000 people marched through the streets of Paris demanding residency permits for undocumented foreigners living in France. Consistent with the approach taken during the late 1980s and 1990s, President Jacques Chirac has proposed integration contracts that would provide migrants with French language instruction and job training in order to bolster their integration into French society and reduce societal tensions.

Likewise, Britain's post-9/11 grand strategy also reflects responsiveness to societal and material interests, not simply to military security and counter-terrorism. In January 2002, Britain began a program to recruit highly skilled migrants into the country. Applicants who possess an advanced degree, have at least three years of work experience, and can verify that they have earned at least £40,000 a year are eligible to enter the country without a prior job offer as required under the normal work permit system. In terms of societal insecurities and migration, the new British law is consistent with the approach taken by its continental neighbors. The Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Bill stresses the social integration of new immigrants by requiring citizenship applicants to take English language classes and to demonstrate a thorough knowledge of British society. As in the case with France and Germany, new laws reflect a modest tightening of control policies in response to new military threats associated with migration, yet are not dominated by them, suggesting a limited affirmation of the 9/11 Hypothesis.

Clearly, post-9/11 security measures related to migration at least partially support the 9/11 Hypothesis. However, it is important to recognize that grand strategy is not dominated by policy myopia. The evidence also supports the Adversary Corollary of the Rally Hypothesis, in that the identification of a particular ethnic group with the source of external threat has focused policy closure on migrants from those sources. The widespread association of Muslim's with the escalation of global terrorism has sharpened perceptions of threat, especially in Europe, where Muslims have long been associated with societal insecurity. Conversely, the evidence also suggests considerable support for the Liberal State Hypothesis. Each of the cases examined here represent national models that have both ethnic- and civic-nationalist impulses. Restrictionism in the post-9/11 environment has been tempered by a combination of a reluctance to appear overtly authoritarian (and/or racist) and the institutionalization of liberal ideals in existing policy and legal precedent. Germany's apprehension at heavy-handed responses to counter-terrorism and border policies in light of its desire to distance itself from its authoritarian past is a good example. The reluctance of American policy makers to seriously discuss new laws requiring the creation of a national ID card is another good example. Finally, the post-9/11 security environment has not radically altered existing preferences for dealing with societal insecurities developed during the 1990s. There is little to suggest that the Societal Proximity Hypothesis (and those related to it) has lost salience, though its relative influence may have declined somewhat since 9/11. What we see in the post-9/11 world in similar to that which preceded it—an active state seeking to balance interests and craft an optimal grand strategy given a fluctuating security environment.