There are now fifty signatories to the Antarctic Treaty, of whom 28 are Consultative Parties forming the governance group for the continent. With the present state membership representing over 66% of the global population it would be difficult to claim that the majority of the world is not already concerned with the Antarctic, although there are those who consider all states equal regardless of population, which is why China and Luxembourg both have the same vote at the United Nations. On these latter grounds only a quarter of the world’s countries are members of the Treaty so it can easily be portrayed as unrepresentative. There are other states who are apparently considering joining the Treaty - such as Denmark and Kazakhstan - and amongst the existing Contracting Parties there are several, such as Malaysia, which clearly wish to become Consultative Parties. The Treaty is thus in a state of flux and development, which is why this volume is both timely and useful.
The book does not, however, look at the complete picture but concentrates mainly on a small number of countries that the editor sees as especially important in the present political scene. Of these, four are from the Middle and Far East - China, South Korea, Malaysia and India - which Brady considers as rising players, whilst the other four are a strange selection, the USA, Russia (and its now independent parts), New Zealand and France, which she justifies as representing the post-Cold War challenges and the claimant states. Given the major increase in Australian spending and activity I wondered if that would not have been a better choice than New Zealand, whilst the lack of any of the more recent members - such as Germany - seems surprising. The final three chapters deal with what she calls “burning issues” - scientific achievements, tourism and bioprospecting-which she thinks have the potential to destabilize the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). In a statement in the editor’s introduction she says “… the challenge of how to enhance the involvement of approximately 147 sovereign states in the world that are not signatories to the Antarctic Treaty, yet have the right to benefit from what can be gained from Antarctica” suggests that she has greater sympathy with those states who do not participate than those (representing more than 66% of the global population) that have invested in Antarctica.
Marcus Haward opens the volume with a general commentary on the ATS from the point of view of political challenges. His conclusion that it has been highly successful is certainly one shared by many observers although he observes it has been slow to interact with other relevant international instruments. Anne-Marie Brady’s interesting short history of Chinese involvement in the ATS highlights the way in which the global change in China’s assertion of its new found wealth and importance has been reflected in its Antarctic investment for new infrastructure. She makes a particular point about Chinese dissatisfaction with the existing governance regime which marginalizes China, but no more than it does countries like South Korea or Germany. I would agree that for the first two decades China has had little impact largely because it originally spent little and contributed little in either science or diplomacy. That has now changed significantly. Interestingly she suggests that the major point of difference is in resource usage where China’s general foreign policy of acquiring resources everywhere is driving a debate that China should map Antarctica for mineral resources to ensure it gets its share. Meanwhile other Chinese writers have been alleging that environmental protection is simply a Western tool to make life difficult for the newer states and consolidate the present management system.
Sanjay Chaturvedi questions why, after three decades of Antarctic work, India still has no coherent Antarctic policy. His linking of Antarctic policy with changes in more general Indian foreign policy suggests that it has become more pragmatic and less idealistic than it was a few decades ago. No longer is it seen to represent the developing countries and yet it has failed to make any important impact in either the scientific or political spheres of Antarctica despite increasing budgets. A more organized and focussed approach seems to have been taken by the Republic of Korea where the ATCM activities were part of a deliberate attempt to assert its growing global importance, although Brady and Seungryeol in Chapter 4 criticize the lack of a single central facility for polar affairs. With its new icebreaker and second Antarctic station, as well as the organization of the Asian Forum for Polar Sciences, Korea shows a determination to use all the options to leverage its role upwards. The authors observe that a core justification for its research has been and will be the opportunity to extract mineral resources as soon as it proves possible. In the meantime an emphasis on cold adapted biology is seen as economically useful.
The chapter on Malaysia highlights just how the leadership role for the Third World at the United Nations has been abandoned for a more pragmatic role as a potential Consultative Party. Malaysia set a record in ambivalence towards signing the Treaty, spending a remarkable period as an observer at the ATCM whilst its scientists were hosted by other Parties. Its original intransigent role beginning in 1982 was engineered by the then Prime Minister Mahathir who used it to criticize all of the ATCM activities as “exclusive” and suggest that the UN should take over responsibility for resource management. In the long term, this was an untenable foreign policy and Hamzah describes very well how Malaysia took quite a while to find an acceptable exit strategy which would not cause it to lose too much credibility. Whilst it has made plenty of statements, including one suggesting it will establish the first Islamic station, the rhetoric has yet to be matched by serious investment in the science and more convincing evidence of legal and political commitment.
The author of the chapter on the USA, Chris Joyner, sadly died before publication but his chapter lays out the key tenets of US policy which date back to 1958. It serves US interests best to maintain the Treaty as it is and that remains its long-term objective. Whilst he notes that climate change is a growing problem he fails to record how the Treaty struggled with this whilst George W. Bush was president and insisted that it should not be discussed. Equally he refers to the fact that the USA is not a signatory to either the Law of the Sea and the Convention on Biodiversity but fails to explain just what a problem this is when all the other countries are signatories and want to progress.
In discussing Russia, Irina Gan also includes the former Soviet states with polar pretensions. Whilst Russian activities only just survived the breakup of the Soviet Union there is evidence of recent funding increases to allow an improvement in the quality of science, which not long ago was judged to be poor in many fields. Belarus has been using Russian expeditions to train its scientists, whilst Ukraine took over an old British station and developed its own capacities. Apparently Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan also cherish Antarctic ambitions but are a long way from realising any of them. Brady’s account of New Zealand interests is more detailed and nuanced than Gan’s and demonstrates just how far Antarctic policies have penetrated into New Zealand governance and its society. The present system, with its support from the USA, provides almost the ideal cost/benefit for New Zealand and has made it perhaps the most cost effective of all Antarctic counties in cash spend terms. Sulikowski provides a potted history of French involvement in and around the continent, asserting that France has made major contributions to the ATCM and to international science on the continent. She makes some interesting guesses as to why France refused to ratify CRAMRA and describes the joint station with Italy at Dome C but says little about the difficulties of managing it nor anything about how having TAAF in Reunion and IPEV in Brest is a sensible scheme for co-ordinating French activities.
The final three chapters cover some well-worn ground. Elzinga writing about research covers his contention again that research stations are proxies for colonization and that science is diplomacy by another name! His account of why Sweden was not amongst the original Treaty Parties is interesting and I had not made the connection before between the Swedish view that the United Nations was the right forum for international management rather than a new treaty. The question of station sharing is also examined in some detail as is the need to maintain relevant programmes in one location over long periods. Verbitsky outlines the history of tourism in the Antarctic and puts the case for a tourism convention, something the Parties have refused to consider, whilst also suggesting that decision-making for some activities could be delegated to SCAR, a responsibility that SCAR is never likely to embrace. Finally, Jabour looks again at biological prospecting, and concludes that it has no more need of special regulation than fisheries in the Southern Ocean. Rewards go to those who invest and she sees little prospect of that changing to a more equitable system or that the developing countries will ever get a share of the rights. Why would the Parties undermine their own industries, which have now registered almost 100 patents on krill alone, in order to give rights to countries not even active on or around the continent? Life and politics are not like that!
An interesting volume with much that is new or so disseminated that few will have seen it. A useful research tool and reference for several key Antarctic countries.
