Tara Povey's review of my book, The Politics of State Intervention: Gender Politics in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Press, 2013) in IJMES 46:4 misrepresents my comparative work on the gender politics of three Muslim-majority neighboring states whose territory invading Arab armies during the early Islamic period called “Khurasan.” The Safavid Empire encompassed modern-day Iran (known as “Persia” until 1935), Afghanistan, and the southwestern portion of present-day Pakistan. The Afsharid Empire, based out of Isfahan, also included this vast territory; its hegemonic ambitions led to military expeditions to wrest control of the entire Indian subcontinent to the east from the Turkic Mughals, which included the sacking of Delhi by Nadir Shah in 1739. Thus, these contemporary states have historical linkages with shared cultural, ethnic, linguistic, and religious characteristics across what some citizens (Kurds, Baluch, and Pashtuns, for example) perceive as artificial—albeit internationally recognized—borders.
Why begin with this historical framework? Because the first sentence in Povey's review emphasizes that this comparative work examines “three very different neighboring states.” Unfortunately, this incorrect premise sets the standard for the remainder of her review, which does not provide a balanced overview of my foundational theses.
Per the title of the book, this comparative work does focus on the primary mechanism of any contemporary sovereign state to regulate state–society relations: the enactment of a constitution and laws, and implementation measures leveraged to embed state policy, in order to determine or influence female status/roles in civil society. According to Povey, this book ignores “specific historical and political factors at play in the formation of each state or regime and their impact on gender politics.” In fact, the book utilizes a historical, comparative context to examine state–society interaction vis-à-vis gender politics.
Povey states that “throughout the book” I argue that concepts such as social justice, equality, freedom, and popular sovereignty are Western constructs, and she cites page 183 as an example of this pattern. This characterization is a simplification of the book's nuanced findings vis-à-vis the study of gender relations and struggles in the Muslim world today.
A perusal of page 183 is necessitated since this is the only page cited. The title at the top of the page “The Impact of the 1906–11 Constitutional Revolution on Women's Social Position” alerts the reader to its content: how the deputies in the majlis (parliament) utilized a translation of the Belgian Constitution to formulate Persia/Iran's first constitution, which included a replication of concepts inherent in the Belgian document and was titled “The Supplementary Fundamental Laws.” This included a “Bill of Rights” that guaranteed citizens equality before the law, protection of life, property, and honor, etc. (Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989], 89). The passage of the 1906 constitution incorporated Western concepts courtesy of the Belgian template. Thus, this process was considered “revolutionary” by scholars because it was unparalleled in Persian history. Next, it discusses Reza Shah's institution of modified versions of French and Italian penal laws into the judicial process, and his advocacy of Kamal Ataturk's “modernization” a la Western dress and banning of the hijab. This historical record underscores Persia/Iran's trajectory towards a modern state that sought to imitate Western mores in a traditional, primarily conservative, society and how precipitous and overambitious measures backfired on those in charge.
Povey's assertion that “[o]ther than repeated descriptions of Muslim majority societies as conservative, backward, and patriarchal, there is no description of the broader impact of issues on gender,” makes no sense whatsoever. The word “backward” appears only five times in the book. Two of these are article headings in the bibliography (pp. 286 and 289); one in an endnote article title (p. 170); one used to describe the Hazaras’ view of a warlord's (ʿAbd al-Rasul Sayyaf) appointment by Karzai (p. 159); and the last a quote from Nikkie Keddie's book Qajar Iran and the Rise of Reza Khan 1796–1925 (Costa Mesa, Calif.: Mazda Publishers, 1999, 15) on how Iranian officials and intellectuals looked to the West for solutions in order to overcome “Iranian backwardness” (p. 179).
Some scholars would rightfully argue that using terms such as “backwards” to describe a specific society's mores and culture borders on the polemical since we tend to view places, people, and events from our own selective prisms which may be far removed from reality. Terms such as brutal, patriarchal, and conservative, however, can be measured or assessed through metrics or specific variables, with the latter term being a bit tricky in terms of utility; however, backward is a subjective term best left out of any scholarly discourse. Thus, with umbrage, I thought it necessary to delve into the weeds and highlight such stark inaccuracies.
Povey argues that my book has “an overwhelming focus on the legislation itself.” Further, she claims that, “there is very little analysis of Muslim women's organizations.” The content refutes both of these points. My focus was never an “overwhelming” one vis-à-vis legislation; legislative measures in these Islamic republics are a focal point so as to assess the degree, and type, of state intervention in matters involving civil society—specifically, how females have fared over the course of time in these countries as secularists and Islamists vied for control of the state.
Povey argues that the book “tends to homogenize women as a group and treat them as passive victims of patriarchal laws and practices.” On the contrary, as enunciated in my conclusive findings, and throughout the book, I argue that, notwithstanding shared linguistic, cultural, and social characteristics across borders, these societies are heterogeneous in that they can be characterized as comprising competing social, economic, and ethnic actors.
The key common thread is that the overwhelming majority of the populace in these countries in 2014 is Muslim (Pakistan 95%; Afghanistan 99%; and Iran 98%). But Muslims are divided along various ideological lines (e.g., the Sufis, Deobandis, Barelvis, and Salafis) of which the sectarian divide (Sunni and Shiʿa) is the most pronounced. There is complexity and a no one-size-fits-all populace, notwithstanding a long shared history and proximity. This is the case for the religious clergy as well (mullahs, mawlanas, pirs, ʿulamaʾ, hojatulislami, and ayatollahs). Povey cites me on the subject of Reza Shah's banning of the hijab and argues that I present the Persian “mullahs” as a homogenous group (p. 27). While one must be careful with lexicon, Povey grasps onto my usage of the word “all” vis-à-vis the clergy's views on the absolute abolishment of any form of veiling. There are, however, some red lines in Islam when it comes to the clerical establishment and one of these happens to involve the subject of female attire. The covering of the head is one such social issue that tends to unite Muslim clerics. I have not come across any example of a cleric who vociferously, and publicly, demanded the banning of the veil or head covering in public. Nor does Povey name the Muslim cleric(s) who publicly advocated this ban. Instead, she shifts the discussion to argue that, “much of the upper-class religious establishment connected to the regime advocated quietism or approved the legislation.” On the subject of “quietism,” I concur (p. 195). Reza Shah made life miserable—not to mention publicly humiliating—for clerics who defied him. Even Ruhollah Khomeini adopted a “quietist” position as he patiently bided his time (p. 188). Khomeini moved out of the shadows only after Reza Shah was forced into exile by the British.
According to Povey, my book reflects an approach “subject to extensive criticism yet…prominent largely outside of academia as part of a political project that seeks to justify intervention in the Middle East on the basis of bringing democracy, women's liberation, and freedom to the region.” A careful reading, however, underscores the importance of homegrown, inclusive solutions with limited external assistance and criticizes foreign intrusion. Furthermore, I have been critical of the efforts to implement controversial and/or precipitous changes based on alien social mores and practices that are, more often than not, concocted by feminists based in the West who only have a superficial understanding of what marginalized females (the base of the social pyramid) in these countries seek as a means to real and lasting empowerment.
Tara Povey's review of my book, The Politics of State Intervention: Gender Politics in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Press, 2013) in IJMES 46:4 misrepresents my comparative work on the gender politics of three Muslim-majority neighboring states whose territory invading Arab armies during the early Islamic period called “Khurasan.” The Safavid Empire encompassed modern-day Iran (known as “Persia” until 1935), Afghanistan, and the southwestern portion of present-day Pakistan. The Afsharid Empire, based out of Isfahan, also included this vast territory; its hegemonic ambitions led to military expeditions to wrest control of the entire Indian subcontinent to the east from the Turkic Mughals, which included the sacking of Delhi by Nadir Shah in 1739. Thus, these contemporary states have historical linkages with shared cultural, ethnic, linguistic, and religious characteristics across what some citizens (Kurds, Baluch, and Pashtuns, for example) perceive as artificial—albeit internationally recognized—borders.
Why begin with this historical framework? Because the first sentence in Povey's review emphasizes that this comparative work examines “three very different neighboring states.” Unfortunately, this incorrect premise sets the standard for the remainder of her review, which does not provide a balanced overview of my foundational theses.
Per the title of the book, this comparative work does focus on the primary mechanism of any contemporary sovereign state to regulate state–society relations: the enactment of a constitution and laws, and implementation measures leveraged to embed state policy, in order to determine or influence female status/roles in civil society. According to Povey, this book ignores “specific historical and political factors at play in the formation of each state or regime and their impact on gender politics.” In fact, the book utilizes a historical, comparative context to examine state–society interaction vis-à-vis gender politics.
Povey states that “throughout the book” I argue that concepts such as social justice, equality, freedom, and popular sovereignty are Western constructs, and she cites page 183 as an example of this pattern. This characterization is a simplification of the book's nuanced findings vis-à-vis the study of gender relations and struggles in the Muslim world today.
A perusal of page 183 is necessitated since this is the only page cited. The title at the top of the page “The Impact of the 1906–11 Constitutional Revolution on Women's Social Position” alerts the reader to its content: how the deputies in the majlis (parliament) utilized a translation of the Belgian Constitution to formulate Persia/Iran's first constitution, which included a replication of concepts inherent in the Belgian document and was titled “The Supplementary Fundamental Laws.” This included a “Bill of Rights” that guaranteed citizens equality before the law, protection of life, property, and honor, etc. (Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989], 89). The passage of the 1906 constitution incorporated Western concepts courtesy of the Belgian template. Thus, this process was considered “revolutionary” by scholars because it was unparalleled in Persian history. Next, it discusses Reza Shah's institution of modified versions of French and Italian penal laws into the judicial process, and his advocacy of Kamal Ataturk's “modernization” a la Western dress and banning of the hijab. This historical record underscores Persia/Iran's trajectory towards a modern state that sought to imitate Western mores in a traditional, primarily conservative, society and how precipitous and overambitious measures backfired on those in charge.
Povey's assertion that “[o]ther than repeated descriptions of Muslim majority societies as conservative, backward, and patriarchal, there is no description of the broader impact of issues on gender,” makes no sense whatsoever. The word “backward” appears only five times in the book. Two of these are article headings in the bibliography (pp. 286 and 289); one in an endnote article title (p. 170); one used to describe the Hazaras’ view of a warlord's (ʿAbd al-Rasul Sayyaf) appointment by Karzai (p. 159); and the last a quote from Nikkie Keddie's book Qajar Iran and the Rise of Reza Khan 1796–1925 (Costa Mesa, Calif.: Mazda Publishers, 1999, 15) on how Iranian officials and intellectuals looked to the West for solutions in order to overcome “Iranian backwardness” (p. 179).
Some scholars would rightfully argue that using terms such as “backwards” to describe a specific society's mores and culture borders on the polemical since we tend to view places, people, and events from our own selective prisms which may be far removed from reality. Terms such as brutal, patriarchal, and conservative, however, can be measured or assessed through metrics or specific variables, with the latter term being a bit tricky in terms of utility; however, backward is a subjective term best left out of any scholarly discourse. Thus, with umbrage, I thought it necessary to delve into the weeds and highlight such stark inaccuracies.
Povey argues that my book has “an overwhelming focus on the legislation itself.” Further, she claims that, “there is very little analysis of Muslim women's organizations.” The content refutes both of these points. My focus was never an “overwhelming” one vis-à-vis legislation; legislative measures in these Islamic republics are a focal point so as to assess the degree, and type, of state intervention in matters involving civil society—specifically, how females have fared over the course of time in these countries as secularists and Islamists vied for control of the state.
Povey argues that the book “tends to homogenize women as a group and treat them as passive victims of patriarchal laws and practices.” On the contrary, as enunciated in my conclusive findings, and throughout the book, I argue that, notwithstanding shared linguistic, cultural, and social characteristics across borders, these societies are heterogeneous in that they can be characterized as comprising competing social, economic, and ethnic actors.
The key common thread is that the overwhelming majority of the populace in these countries in 2014 is Muslim (Pakistan 95%; Afghanistan 99%; and Iran 98%). But Muslims are divided along various ideological lines (e.g., the Sufis, Deobandis, Barelvis, and Salafis) of which the sectarian divide (Sunni and Shiʿa) is the most pronounced. There is complexity and a no one-size-fits-all populace, notwithstanding a long shared history and proximity. This is the case for the religious clergy as well (mullahs, mawlanas, pirs, ʿulamaʾ, hojatulislami, and ayatollahs). Povey cites me on the subject of Reza Shah's banning of the hijab and argues that I present the Persian “mullahs” as a homogenous group (p. 27). While one must be careful with lexicon, Povey grasps onto my usage of the word “all” vis-à-vis the clergy's views on the absolute abolishment of any form of veiling. There are, however, some red lines in Islam when it comes to the clerical establishment and one of these happens to involve the subject of female attire. The covering of the head is one such social issue that tends to unite Muslim clerics. I have not come across any example of a cleric who vociferously, and publicly, demanded the banning of the veil or head covering in public. Nor does Povey name the Muslim cleric(s) who publicly advocated this ban. Instead, she shifts the discussion to argue that, “much of the upper-class religious establishment connected to the regime advocated quietism or approved the legislation.” On the subject of “quietism,” I concur (p. 195). Reza Shah made life miserable—not to mention publicly humiliating—for clerics who defied him. Even Ruhollah Khomeini adopted a “quietist” position as he patiently bided his time (p. 188). Khomeini moved out of the shadows only after Reza Shah was forced into exile by the British.
According to Povey, my book reflects an approach “subject to extensive criticism yet…prominent largely outside of academia as part of a political project that seeks to justify intervention in the Middle East on the basis of bringing democracy, women's liberation, and freedom to the region.” A careful reading, however, underscores the importance of homegrown, inclusive solutions with limited external assistance and criticizes foreign intrusion. Furthermore, I have been critical of the efforts to implement controversial and/or precipitous changes based on alien social mores and practices that are, more often than not, concocted by feminists based in the West who only have a superficial understanding of what marginalized females (the base of the social pyramid) in these countries seek as a means to real and lasting empowerment.